LIFE  AND  WORKS  OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 

COMMEMORATIVE  EDITION 

EDITED  BY  MARION  MILLS  MILLER,  LITT.  D. 
(PRINCETON) 

IN  TEN  VOLUMES:     VOLUME  II 


PAINTED  AND  ENGRAVED  Br    WM.    E.    MARSHALL 

LINCOLN  AS   PRESIDENT 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

(MARCH  4,  1861  TO  MAY  3,  1865) 


BY 

HENRY   C.   WHITNEY 

Author  of  "LIFE  ON  THE  CIRCUIT  WITH  LINCOLN" 


THE  CURRENT  LITERATURE  PUBLISHING  Co. 

NEW  YORK 

1969 


Copyright,  1892,  by  Henry  C.  Whitney 
Copyright,  1907,  by  William  H.  Lambert 


Annex 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    THE  CABINET    -.1       •••       .-,       ,.:       -.1       -..  i 

II.      FORT    SUMTER   AND  THE   VIRGINIA    CONVEN- 

TION           .           .           .                                   ...  29 

III.  FOREIGN   AFFAIRS        .        .        .  49 

IV.  THE  CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES        .  65 
V.    THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  .....  86 

VI.    BULL  RUN  AND  MILITARY  EMANCIPATION  102 

VII.    THE  PRESIDENT  AND  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  122 

VIII.    BURNSIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE         .        .  165 

IX.    THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST        .        .        .192 

X.    GENERAL    GRANT       .....  233 

XI.    EMANCIPATION    ......  241 

XII.    OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR  .        .        .  260 

XIII.  NORTHERN   RESISTANCE  TO  MILITARY   AU- 

THORITY          ......  277 

XIV.  THE  SECOND  ELECTION  AND  INAUGURATION 

—RECONSTRUCTION           ....  296 

XV.    THE  END  .                                 ...  319 


INDEX  OF  VOLUMES  ONE  AND  Two    .        .    343 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   CABINET 

NEXT  morning  (March  5,  1861)  the  President 
began  his  official  career.  The  heads  of  the  de- 
partments, and  Senators  and  Congressmen,  and 
zealous  and  interested  friends  came  in  great 
numbers,  and  were  received,  so  far  as  time  would 
allow.  At  11:30  A.M.  Mr.  John  G.  Nicolay 
started  <x)  the  Capitol  with  the  first  official  com- 
munication to  the  Senate :  it  contained  the  Presi- 
dential nominees  for  the  Cabinet.  These  were: 
William  H.  Seward,  of  New  York,  Secretary  of 
State;  Salmon  P.  Chase,  of  Ohio,  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury;  Simon  Cameron,  of  Pennsylvania, 
Secretary  of  War;  Gideon  Welles,  of  Connecti- 
cut, Secretary  of  the  Navy ;  Caleb  B.  Smith,  of 
Indiana,  Secretary  of  the  Interior ;  Montgomery 
Blair,  of  Maryland,  Postmaster-General ;  and 
Edward  Bates,  of  Missouri,  Attorney-General. 
These  nominations  were  promptly  confirmed  by 
the  Senate,  and  the  appointees  entered  at  once 
upon  their  duties. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  not  only  the  most  consummate 
statesman  of  his  time,  but  he  was  also  and  equally 
the  most  astute  and  sagacious  politician ;  he  well 
knew  and  realized  that  legitimate  politics  was 
based  on  system  and  constancy — that  utility  was 


3  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

its  motor,  and  good  faith  its  balance  wheel ;  that 
political  tergiversation  and  ingratitude  would 
handicap  its  success,  in  exact  relation  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  turpitude  and  flagitious  cause  at 
issue. 

Now  Lincoln  had  been  elected  by  a  composite 
vote,  and  he  realized  that  political  expediency, 
good  faith,  propriety  and  justice  all  demanded 
that  he  should  make  an  equitable  division  of  the 
offices  between  the  two  political  factors,  which, 
united,  had  secured  his  election.  As  soon  as  his 
election  had  been  assured,  he  resolved  upon  the 
various  members  of  his  Cabinet,  so  far  as  his  per- 
sonal wish  was  concerned,  the  Administration 
representing  the  old  parties  equally,  thus: 

Whigs  Democrats 

Illinois  Lincoln  Ohio  Chase 

New  York  Seward  Connecticut  Welles 

Missouri  Bates  Maryland  Blair 

New  Jersey  Dayton  Illinois  Judd 

And  in  point  of  fact,  he  desired  Judd  person- 
ally, more  than  any  of  the  others ;  I  confess  I  see 
no  reason  why.  But  there  were  circumstances 
which  militated  against  the  carrying  out  of  this 
policy.  Judd  came  from  the  same  State  as  the 
President ;  his  appointment  would  have  been  ex- 
tremely obnoxious  to  all  of  Lincoln's  old  Whig 
friends,  as  Davis,  Swett,  Logan,  Dickey,  Brown- 
ing, Williams,  Washburne,  Yates,  and  Norton. 

Lincoln's  friends,  including  Judd,  had  without 
authority  promised  the  friends  of  Cameron  and 
of  Smith  places  for  these  in  the  Cabinet.  Judd 
therefore  could  not  displace  either  of  them.  Lin- 
coln must  have  Chase,  Seward,  a  man  from  New 


THE  CABINET  3 

England,  and  two  Southern  men,  and  Judd  and 
Dayton  were  necessarily  thus  ruled  out.  His 
chief  competitors  for  the  nomination  had  been 
Seward,  Chase,  Bates,  and  Cameron.  He  rea- 
soned that  these  men  were  representative  with 
himself  of  the  strength  of  the  Republican  party. 
Cameron  he  omitted  in  his  personal  desire,  by 
reason  of  his  malodorous  political  record;  the 
others  he  was  resolved  upon,  and  must  have  at 
all  hazards. 

From  the  time  the  convention  of  1860  ad- 
journed, it  was  palpable  that,  if  Lincoln  was 
elected,  Seward  must  be  Secretary  of  State;  to 
have  omitted  this,  would  have  been  worse  than  a 
crime,  for  it  would  have  been  a  gross  political 
blunder.  Seward,  more  than  any  other  man,  had 
built  up  the  Republican  party ;  of  the  non-mer- 
chantable part  of  the  convention,  he  was  the 
choice.  Lincoln  became  the  nominee  only  by  vir- 
tue of  political  dickers,  unauthorized,  it  is  true, 
but  nevertheless  made  in  his  behalf.  That  Seward 
would  be  part  of  the  Administration  was  every- 
where conceded ;  and  he  and  his  coterie  expected 
that  he  would  be  the  Administration  itself. 
Seward  took  the  stump  accordingly,  and  made 
a  series  of  speeches  which  for  classical  style, 
comprehensiveness  of  detail,  and  political  erudi- 
tion have  never  been  excelled.  Therein  lay  his 
forte;  he  was  the  Burke  and  Fox  combined  of 
American  politics, — but  not  the  Pitt,  for  he  was 
the  most  unsafe  of  statesmen. 

Seward  took  no  pains  to  refute  the  assumption, 
which  was  general,  that  he  was  to  be  the  vis 
inertia  of  the  coming  Administration.  After  a 
short  time  for  reflection,  for  looks'  sake,  on  the 
28th  of  December  he  accepted  the  high  honor 


4  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

offered  him,  and  cast  a  wary  and  critical  eye  on 
the  political  field  to  ascertain  the  true  policy  for 
the  political  future  of  William  Henry  Seward. 
For  he  was  nothing  if  not  a  politician,  and  an 
optimistic  one  at  that,  and  his  hopeful  fancy 
penetrated  through  the  angry  and  threatening 
clouds  of  secession  and  civil  war,  and  reveled  in 
the  tranquil  and  serene  azure  of  reconciliation 
and  peace.  Inasmuch  as  he  had  been  an  actor  in 
the  stirring  era  of  1850  when  secession  was 
threatened,  but  was  averted,  he  hoped  for  a  simi? 
lar  result  now. 

Seward's  geniality,  talents,  and  high  political 
position  made  him  hosts  of  personal  friends  even 
among  his  political  enemies,  and  he  was  looked 
to  as  the  political  oracle  of  the  times,  the  more 
especially  as  the  conventional  head  of  the  Admin- 
istration, with  wisdom  and  propriety,  was  mute. 
That  a  statesman  of  Seward's  great  ability  should 
make  so  gross  a  mistake  as  to  assume  that  he 
was  to  run  the  Administration  of  a  President 
about  whose  characteristics  he  knew  nothing, 
and,  on  this  assumption,  to  act  in  advance,  is 
strange,  but  it  is  nevertheless  true.  From  the 
time  that  Lincoln  solicited  his  acceptance  of  a 
Cabinet  office,  Seward  assumed  that  he  was  to 
be  the  "  power  behind  the  throne." 

On  Saturday,  March  2,  Mr.  Seward  had  writ- 
ten to  the  President-elect  asking  leave  to  with- 
draw his  consent  to  accept  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  State.  Mr.  Lincoln  thought  over  the  situation 
until  Monday,  when  he  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  Mr.  Seward  wished  to  dominate  it  by  having 
his  resignation  accepted  and  then  either  resum- 
ing his  place  in  the  Senate  of  which  he  would  be 
the  leader,  or  gracefully  yielding  to  the  public 


THE  CABINET  5 

outcry,  which  he  felt  sure  would  follow,  thus  re- 
entering  the  council  of  the  President  as  the  mas- 
ter-spirit of  the  Administration.  This  position 
the  President  determined  to  maintain  for  him- 
self. Remarking  "  I  can't  afford  to  let  Seward 
take  the  first  trick,"  he  handed  the  following 
letter  to  Mr.  Nicolay,  his  private  secretary,  for 
him  to  copy  and  transmit  to  Mr.  Seward : 

.  Your  note  ...  is  the  subject  of  the  most  painful 
solicitude  with  me ;  and  I  feel  constrained  to  beg  that 
you  will  countermand  the  withdrawal.  The  public  in- 
terest, I  think,  demands  that  you  should ;  and  my 
personal  feelings  are  deeply  enlisted  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. Please  consider  and  answer  by  9  o'clock  A.M. 
to-morrow. 

On  March  5  Mr.  Seward  withdrew  his  letter 
in  season  for  the  original  "  slate "  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Senate.  However,  not  at  once  did 
he  give  up  the  game.  Indeed,  he  spread  his  entire 
hand  on  the  table,  assured  that  Lincoln  would 
recognize  its  strength  and  throw  up  his  own. 
Instead,  Lincoln  held  him  to  the  rules  of  the 
game,  which  required  the  Secretary  to  follow  the 
President's  lead,  and  he  bade  him  take  up  his 
hand  again.  To  Seward's  credit  it  must  be  re- 
corded that  he  did  so. 

On  April  i  Secretary  Seward  submitted  to  Mr. 
Lincoln  a  paper  entitled1:  "  Some  Thoughts  for 
the  President's  Consideration."  In  this  he  out- 
lined the  course  needful  to  be  pursued,  first  im- 
pudently premising  that  no  policy  had  as  yet 
been  adopted.  This  document  sounds  very  much 
like  pleasantry  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary,  but 
it  was  on  too  serious  a  matter,  and  at  too  serious 
a  time  for  this,  and  was  delivered  in  expectation 


6  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

that  the  President  would  abdicate  his  high  pow- 
ers and  confer  them  on  his  ambitious  and  meddle- 
some subordinate.  The  programme  suggested 
was  thus:  Change  the  question  before  the  public 
from  one  about  slavery  for  a  question  about 
union  or  disunion.  Demand  categorically  and  at 
once  explanations  from  Spain  and  France.  Seek 
explanations  from  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  and 
send  agents  into  Canada,  Mexico,  and  Central 
America  to  rouse  a  vigorous  spirit  of  independ- 
ence on  this  continent  against  European  inter- 
vention. And  if  satisfactory  explanations  are 
not  received  from  Spain  and  France,  convene 
Congress  and  declare  war  against  them.  But 
whatsoever  be  the  policy  adopted,  there  must  be 
an  energetic  prosecution  of  it.  For  this  purpose 
it  must  be  somebody's  business  to  pursue  and 
direct  it  incessantly.  Either  the  President  must 
do  it  himself  and  be  all  the  while  active  in  it,  or 
he  should  let  it  devolve  on  some  member  of  his 
Cabinet.  Once  adopted,  debate  on  it  must  end, 
and  all  agree  and  abide.  "  It  is  not  my  especial 
province,  but  I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor  assume 
responsibility."  And  yet  the  author  of  this 
idiotic  performance  came  very  near  to  being  in 
the  position  of  dread  responsibility  held  by  the 
sage  Lincoln.  The  President  did  not  need  any 
time  for  consideration  of  so  senseless  yet  mis- 
chievous a  document.  Indeed,  had  its  existence 
been  made  public,  it  would  have  made  the  Ad- 
ministration as  ridiculous  as  its  hosts  of 
enemies  could  desire. 

Before  William  Henry  Seward  closed  his  eyes 
in  sleep  that  night  he  was  "  a  sadder  and  wiser 
man,"  for  he  had  read  a  note  from  his  master 
both  in  position  and  in  intellect  which  was 


THE  CABINET  7 

entirely  free  from  ambiguity,  and  which,  dis- 
daining to  reply  to  the  bellicose  matter  broached, 
gave  the  premier  to  understand  that  the  trust 
which  the  people  had  invested  the  President  with 
should  be  sacredly  enforced  by  him  without  the 
interference  of  any  subordinate.  It  was  respect- 
ful and  dignified  in  tone  and  diction,  but  it  was 
as  sharp  and  trenchant  as  a  Dasmascus  blade. 
It  ended  thus: 

Upon  your  closing  proposition  [the  adoption  of  a 
fixed  policy  and  its  energetic  prosecution  either  by  the 
President  or  one  specially  chosen  member  of  the  Cabi- 
net] I  remark  that  if  this  must  be  done,  I  must  do  it. 
When  a  general  line  of  policy  is  adopted,  I  apprehend 
there  is  no  danger  of  its  being  changed  without  good 
reason,  or  continuing  to  be  a  subject  of  unnecessary 
debate;  still,  upon  points  arising  in  its  progress,  I 
wish,  and  suppose  I  am  entitled  to  have,  the  advice  of 
all  the  Cabinet. 

Throughout  the  dark  winter  of  186061,  Seward 
had  clearly  seen  the  masked  designs  of  the  South- 
ern leaders,  and  kept  the  President  fully  advised 
of  the  true  trend  of  affairs.  He  wrote  that  it 
was  the  fell  design  of  the  Southern  leaders  to 
break  up  the  Union,  by  reason  of  their  loss  of 
political  power,  and  he  added  that  the  President 
(Buchanan)  didn't  know  which  way  to  turn,  or 
what  to  do — that  Union  men  were  alarmed,  and 
the  situation  was  chaotic.  Being  thus  convinced 
of  the  animus  of  the  Southern  leaders,  and  of 
the  imbecility  of  the  Administration,  he  deemed 
it  of  supreme  importance  that  the  principle  of 
inertia  should  rule  until  after  March  4,  fearing 
that  a  coup  d'etat  of  some  sort  might  be  at- 
tempted to  prevent  Mr.  Lincoln  from  gaining 
possession  of  the  Government.  He  accordingly 


8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

affected  a  nonchalance  he  did  not  feel,  stated  his 
opinions  insincerely  in  optimistic  language  for 
the  ears  of  the  Southern  leaders,  and  predicted 
that  in  "  ninety  days  "  (which  would  reach  into 
Lincoln's  term)  there  would  be  political  har- 
mony. 

That  Seward  compromised  himself  by  these 
utterances,  which  were  not  the  substance  of 
things  hoped  for  by  him,  is  clear;  the  Southern 
leaders  interpreted  it  to  mean  that  there  would 
be  no  coercion,  but  that  they  would  be  allowed 
to  secede  in  peace.  Seward  afterward  claimed 
that  he  promulgated  these  views  in  order  to  keep 
the  status  quo  intact  till  Lincoln  could  take  hold. 
This  insincerity,  if  it  were  so,  was  not  difficult 
for  Seward,  for  his  political  practices  were 
Machiavellian,  and,  like  Talleyrand,  he  could  use 
language  to  conceal  his  thoughts.  But  whether 
sincere  or  insincere,  he  did  the  one  thing  needful 
at  the  time,  and  bound  himself  to  a  line  of  policy 
which,  if  submitted  to  the  people,  in  my  judg- 
ment and  in  that  of  men  much  more  astute  than 
I,  would  never  have  been  indorsed  by  them. 

Seward's  early  policy  was  to  yield  to  the 
secession  menace,  back  squarely  down,  and  play 
the  coward,  and  then  retrieve  the  resulting  dis- 
aster in  some  chance,  haphazard  way.  Whether 
he  adopted  this  belief  from  timidity  or  ex- 
pediency is  not  clear;  it  was  probably  the  latter, 
but  the  weak  men  in  the  Cabinet  and  General 
Scott  shared  his  views,  thus  giving  to  the  Ad- 
ministration an  appearance  of  irresolution  which 
was  finally  terminated  by  the  President  following 
Blair's  advice,  and  determining  to  attempt  to  re- 
lieve Fort  Sumter.  Meanwhile  Seward's  course 
was  very  perplexing  to  the  Administration  and 


THE  CABINET  9 

to  the  conspirators  at  Charleston  and  Montgom- 
ery as  well.  Taking  counsel  of  his  hopes,  the 
Secretary  had  no  hesitation  in  giving  definite  as- 
surances to  the  friends  and  emissaries  of  the 
secession  cause  that  Sumter  would  be  evacuated. 
Martin  J.  Crawford,  a  Rebel  commissioner,  noti- 
fied his  government  on  March  6  that  Seward 
and  Cameron  were  resolved  on  a  peace  policy, 
which  they  could  enforce  on  the  President.  And 
Seward  definitely  assured  Mr.  Justice  Campbell 
that  Sumter  would  be  evacuated  at  once. 
Finally,  when  it  was  apparent  that  Sumter  was 
to  be  relieved,  the  entire  administration  was  ac- 
cused of  duplicity,  and  Campbell  was  discredited 
by  his  own  people.  This  arose  from  the  lack 
of  harmony  between  Seward's  optimistic  hopes 
and  Lincoln's  constancy  and  heroism. 

One  James  E.  Harvey  became  an  attache  of  the 
State  department.  On  April  6,  1861,  this  Harvey 
telegraphed  to  Judge  McGrath  at  Charleston: 
"  Positively  determined  not  to  withdraw  Ander- 
son. Supplies  go  immediately,  supported  by 
naval  force  under  Stringham,  if  their  landing  be 
resisted.  A  Friend."  The  Rebel  commissioner 
Caldwell  indorsed  it,  "  The  above  is  by  a  reliable 
man."  But  the  telegraph  office  insisted  upon 
knowing  the  name  of  the  sender,  and  it  was  then 
given.  Two  days  later  Harvey  sent  this  dis- 
patch :  "  Orders  issued  for  withdrawal  of  An- 
derson's command.  Scott  declares  it  military 
necessity.  This  is  private."  This  dispatch  was 
immediately  followed  by  another  to  the  effect 
that  efforts  were  making  to  consider  the  with- 
drawal, but  it  would  be  in  vain,  and  still  another 
from  the  same  source,  stating  that  the  final  order 
had  not  yet  been  made,  and  that  in  the  Cabinet 


io  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

six  were  for  withdrawal  and  one  against  it.  It 
will  be  seen  that  his  information  was  as  accurate 
as  he  could  have  got  had  he  been  present  in 
the  Executive  Chamber  throughout  all  the 
Cabinet  proceedings.  And  Seward  afterward 
appointed  this  spy  and  informer  Minister  to 
Portugal. 

Secretary  Seward  was  a  very  sagacious  and 
subtle  politician,  and  his  ambition  was  not  limited 
by  time  or  propriety,  but  reached  out  into  the 
illimitable  regions  of  the  hereafter  and  unknown, 
the  goal  of  his  aspirations  being  immortality. 
While  out  riding  one  day  with  a  friend,  toward 
the  close  of  his  life,  they  passed  through  Union 
Square  in  New  York,  and  as  they  came  opposite 
the  Lincoln  statue  in  that  park,  Seward  said  bit- 
terly, "  Death  has  cheated  me  of  immortality," 
his  idea  being  that  history  would  have  garnered 
into  his  fame  the  honors  of  Lincoln's  administra- 
tion, had  not  premature  death  placed  the  great 
President  in  an  elevation  too  lofty  to  be  shared 
with  another. 

Indeed  Seward's  friends  claimed  that  he  really 
administered  the  government  in  Lincoln's  name ; 
and  so  astute  and  generally  accurate  a  critic  as 
Charles  Francis  Adams  made  this  bold  claim 
after  the  eminent  subjects  were  both  dead.  That 
this  claim  has  no  basis  at  all  is  attested  by  events 
considered  both  as  a  whole  and  in  every  detail. 
Seward  perhaps  at  first  exercised  more  authority 
than  any  other  Cabinet  minister,  but  when  the 
administration  got  worn  to  its  bearings,  he  was 
no  more  potent  than  Chase  or  Stanton.  Seward's 
famous  dispatch  to  Minister  Adams  was  radically 
changed  by  the  President,  and  that  document 
was  the  chef  d'oeuvre  of  the  Seward  diplomacy. 


THE  CABINET  II 

Mr.  Lincoln  attempted  to  provision  Sumter,  re- 
leased Mason  and  Slidell,  and  retained  McClel- 
lan,  all  against  Seward's  policy.  In  point  of 
fact,  everything  shows  that  Lincoln  paid  no  more 
attention  to  Seward  than  he  did  to  even  Welles, 
and  the  only  basis  for  the  claim  of  Seward's 
predominance  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Secretary 
of  State  arrogated  more  to  himself,  and  took 
more  liberties  than  the  others  did.  Seward  is  an 
interesting  character;  one  can  but  admire  the 
cleverness  of  his  methods  while  condemning 
them.  His  political  aims  were  preservative  and 
heroic,  but  his  course  was  replete  with  "  ways 
that  were  dark  and  tricks  that  were  vain." 

As  an  illustration  of  his  devious  and  mys- 
terious methods  the  following  facts  may  be 
cited:  Although  he  was  a  Protestant  (an  Epis- 
copalian), yet  during  his  whole  political  life  he 
was  in  close  touch  with  Bishop  Hughes,  who  was 
then  the  most  influential  Catholic  in  America. 
The  most  prominent  of  the  founders  of  the  Re- 
publican party,  he  was  on  terms  of  extreme  in- 
timacy with  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  even  during 
this  Senator's  flagitious  fight  to  repeal  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise.  Seward's  intimacy  with 
Weed,  the  Mephistopheles  and  Fouche  combined 
of  politics,  was  openly  proclaimed  by  himself. 
Seward  said  one  day,  after  the  name  of  Weed 
had  come  up  just  before,  in  a  Cabinet  meeting, 
"  Weed  and  Seward  are  one ;  what  I  say,  he  con- 
curs in;  what  he  does,  I  approve;  we  are  one." 
"  I  am  very  sorry  to  hear  that  remark,"  said 
Secretary  Chase ;  "  I  would  strain  a  point  to 
oblige  Governor  Seward,  but  I  would  not  do  any- 
thing for  the  especial  benefit  of  Mr.  Weed ;  they 
never  can  be  one  to  me."  But  Weed  remained 


12  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  right  bower  of  the  administration  of  the 
State  department,  as  he  had  been  the  right  bower 
of  the  Secretary  for  years  before.  At  the  close 
of  Lincoln's  term  Weed  retired  from  the  political 
world  a  man  of  great  wealth. 

Seward's  dignity  of  character  was  rather  the 
result  of  intellectual  force  than  of  moral  convic- 
tions. The  political  morality  of  Albany  was 
alike  in  all  its  graduates.  "  To  the  victors  belong 
the  spoils,"  said  Marcy  from  the  Democratic 
ring;  "Weed  and  I  are  one,"  echoed  Seward 
from  the  Whig  contingent. 

Chase  was  different:  he  was  not  even  a  poli- 
tician; he  had  no  claque,  no  mentor,  no  devious 
ways.  He  relied  for  success  solely  upon  man- 
hood, individuality,  statesmanship.  Not  only 
would  rivalry  keep  Chase  and  Seward  apart,  but 
their  characteristics  alone  would  do  so,  unaided. 
They  were  civil  and  mechanically  polite  to  each 
other  when  they  first  met  in  Lincoln's  Cabinet; 
they  were  no  more  nor  less  so,  the  last  time. 

A  serious  difficulty  lay  in  harmonizing  the 
"  Seward  "  and  "  Chase  "  factions.  Seward  ex- 
pected and  designed  to  "  run  "  the  administra- 
tion, that  is,  to  administer  the  government  in  Lin- 
coln's name ;  and  he  did  not  intend  to  "  brook  a 
rival  near  the  throne."  Chase  feared  this  domi- 
nating influence  of  Seward,  and  felt  no  assurance 
of  amity  or  concord  in  such  companionship,  and 
their  several  friends  were  even  more  bitter  in 
their  opposition  than  the  principals  themselves. 

The  radical  majority  of  Congress  in  1862  was 
more  in  sympathy  with  the  principles  represented 
by  Secretary  Chase  in  the  national  council  than 
with  those  of  the  President.  This  was  clearly 
indicated  by  the  favor  with  which  the  financial 


THE  CABINET  13 

propositions  of  the  message  of  that  year  were  re- 
ceived, and  by  the  lack  of  consideration  paid  to 
the  President's  pet  measure  of  compensated 
emancipation.  As  early  as  September  12,  1862, 
Secretary  Chase  recorded  in  his  diary  an  im- 
pression of  the  President  that  prevailed  among 
the  radicals: 

I  think  that  the  President,  with  the  most  honest  in- 
tentions in  the  world,  and  a  naturally  clear  judgment 
and  a  true,  unselfish  patriotism,  has  yielded  so  much  to 
border-State  and  negrophobic  counsels  that  he  now 
finds  it  difficult  to  arrest  his  own  descent  towards  the 
most  fatal  concessions.  He  has  already  separated  him- 
self from  the  great  body  of  the  party  which  elected 
him;  distrusts  most  those  who  represent  its  spirit,  and 
waits — for  what? 

The  radicals  in  Congress  considered  the  Presi- 
dent a  weak  man,  too  greatly  swayed  by  certain 
of  his  counselors,  chiefly  Secretary  Seward,  who 
had  incurred  the  enmity  of  the  anti-slavery  men 
by  the  statement  in  a  letter  to  Minister  Adams 
on  July  5,  1862,  that  by  demanding  an  edict  of 
universal  emancipation  they  were  acting  in  con- 
cert with  the  secessionists  to  precipitate  a  servile 
war.  The  Republican  Senators  went  so  far  as 
to  hold  a  caucus  which  adopted  a  resolution  re- 
questing the  President  to  reconstruct  his  Cabinet. 
Hearing  of  this  action,  Secretary  Seward  offered 
his  resignation  to  the  President. 

The  committee  appointed  to  present  the  reso- 
lution of  the  caucus  waited  on  the  President  on 
December  19.  As  the  President  afterwards  re- 
ported to  the  Cabinet,  in  language  wherein  humor- 
ous candor  triumphed  over  personal  humilia- 
tion :  "  While  they  seemed  to  believe  in  my  hon- 
esty, they  also  appeared  to  think  that,  when  I 


14  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

had  in  me  any  good  purpose  or  intention, 
Seward  contrived  to  suck  it  out  of  me  unper- 
ceived." 

Lincoln  asked  the  committee  to  call  again  that 
evening,  at  which  time  he  also  convened  the 
Cabinet,  with  the  exception  of  Seward.  He  in- 
formed neither  the  Senators  nor  the  Ministers 
that  the  other  party  would  be  present.  The  com- 
mittee presented  its  charges  against  the  Cabinet 
in  general  and  the  Secretary  of  State  in  par- 
ticular, and  the  President  and  the  Cabinet,  even 
Secretary  Chase,  who  had  in  private  endorsed 
the  opinions  of  the  Senators,  defended  them- 
selves, and  either  implicitly  or  explicitly  their  ab- 
sent colleague.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
however,  protested  that  the  President  had  placed 
him  in  a  false  position  by  not  notifying  the 
Cabinet  that  the  committee  would  be  present  at 
the  meeting,  in  which  case  he  would  not  have 
come.  As  the  committee  were  departing,  de- 
feated by  the  unanimity  of  the  Cabinet,  which 
Chase  had  told  them  was  in  discord,  Senator 
Trumbull,  of  Illinois,  informed  the  President 
with  some  heat  of  the  two-faced  attitude  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  that  had  led  the  Sen- 
ators into  such  a  humiliating  situation. 

At  the  Cabinet  meeting  next  day  Secretary 
Chase  tendered  his  written  resignation.  This 
was  what  the  President,  ever  since  the  resigna- 
tion of  Secretary  Seward,  had  been  playing  for. 
He  promptly  received  the  paper,  and  closed  dis- 
cussion by  dismissing  the  meeting.  Then  he  sent 
the  following  note  to  both  Seward  and  Chase : 

You  have  respectively  tendered  me  your  resignations 
as  Secretary  of  State  and  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States.  I  am  apprised  of  the  circumstances 


THE  CABINET  15 

which  may  render  this  course  personally  desirable  to 
each  of  you ;  but  after  most  anxious  consideration  my 
deliberate  judgment  is  that  the  public  interest  does  not 
admit  of  it.  I  therefore  have  to  request  that  you  will 
resume  the  duties  of  your  Departments  respectively. 

As  neither  Secretary  by  insisting  on  resigning 
would  permit  his  rival  to  obtain  the  victory,  each 
decided  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet.  Seward, 
from  the  day  that  Lincoln  rejected  his  "  Some 
Thoughts  for  the  President's  Consideration,"  had 
recognized  him  as  master.  Chase  now  had 
learned  the  same  lesson.  Thereafter  Lincoln  had 
a  harmonious  Cabinet  of  balanced  opinion,  ad- 
visory but  subordinate  to  his  own.  As  he  quaintly 
remarked  to  a  friendly  Senator  (Ira  Harris,  of 
New  York)  :  "  Now  I  can  ride;  I've  got  a  pump- 
kin in  each  end  of  my  bag." 

In  the  formation  of  the  Cabinet  David  Davis 
made  it  very  disagreeable  for  the  President- 
elect, by  constantly  causing  it  to  be  represented 
that  his  cousin,  H.  Winter  Davis,  ought  to  receive 
a  Cabinet  appointment.  Of  course  this  was  im- 
possible, and  David  Davis  probably  knew  it,  as 
any  such  appointment  as  that  would  alienate  the 
whole  Blair  family:  Francis  P.  Blair,  Sr., 
Francis  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  Montgomery  Blair,  B. 
Gratz  Brown,  and  the  rest.  This  would  amount 
to  surrendering  the  political  allegiance  of  Mary- 
land and  Missouri,  and  possibly  Kentucky.  Nof 
that  never  would  do.  I  suppose  the  Judge 
shrewdly  thought  that  the  President-elect  might 
placate  him  by  appointing  him  instead  of  Winter 
Davis. 

However,  it  was  more  than  an  annoyance. 
Lincoln  found  considerable  difficulty  in  ignoring 
Winter  Davis  and  his  pretensions,  and  Winter 


16  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Davis  kept  up  a  "  fire  in  the  rear  "  on  the  Admin- 
istration ever  afterward,  though  nothing  serious 
came  of  it. 

Really,  the  most  difficult  matter  was  the  cases 
of  Smith  and  Cameron.  Without  the  aid  of  In- 
diana and  Cameron's  Pennsylvania  contingent  in 
the  convention,  the  nomination  would  have  gone 
to  Seward,  and  those  factors  would  have  been 
traded  off  to  Seward  had  not  the  "  Lincoln " 
coterie  acquired  them  beforehand.  Smith  and 
Cameron  were  after  the  "  spoils,"  and  these  were 
promised  them  as  emphatically  as  David  Davis, 
Swett,  Logan,  and  Judd  could  do  it.  Lincoln  was 
bound  in  fealty  to  his  friends  and  supporters,  and 
it  would  savor  strongly  of  ingratitude,  if  not  of 
dishonor,  to  repudiate  their  bargains.  In  case  of 
Smith  there  was  no  serious  difficulty.  He  had 
never  been  in  a  position  to  show  his  quality.  The 
murky  condition  of  the  "  Smith  "  horizon  was 
caused  by  his  followers,  their  demands,  and  their 
too  plainly  apparent  greed.  All  danger  from  that 
source  might  be  forestalled,  and  perhaps  coun- 
teracted— at  all  events,  that  appointment  would 
not  evoke  violent  criticism.  The  great  strain 
came  to  Lincoln  in  being  obliged  to  discard  Judd 
in  order  to  pay  Indiana  for  its  vote  in  the  con- 
vention. Yet  Judd  could  not  complain,  since  he 
had  made  the  bargain.  The  case  of  Cameron 
was  different;  he  had  a  national  reputation  for 
tergiversation,  and,  while  Swett,  Davis,  and  Logan 
were  compelled  to  demand  his  appointment,  party 
leaders  from  all  quarters  violently  protested 
against  it.  The  very  best  Republican  leaders  in 
Pennsylvania,  such  as  Governor  Andrew  G.  Cur- 
tin,  were  also  opposed  to  it,  and  Lincoln  came  to 
a  pretty  firm  resolve  not  to  make  the  appoint- 


THE  CABINET  17 

ment.  He  said  to  Swett  one  day :  "  You  know 
I  am  called  '  Honest  old  Abe ;'  how  will  it  appear 
to  the  world  for  me  to  appoint  Cameron  as  one 
of  my  political  family,  and  thus  indorse  him  and 
his  record — especially  as  leading  men  all  over 
the  nation,  and  particularly  in  Pennsylvania, 
vehemently  oppose  it?  I  can't  do  it."  And  he 
informed  Cameron  that  he  could  not.  But  the 
political  sagacity  of  Cameron  was  superior  to 
Lincoln's  determination.  He  insisted  on  the  con- 
sideration for  his  votes  in  the  convention;  the 
Pennsylvania  opponents  would  not  prefer  writ- 
ten charges,  and  Lincoln,  with  extreme  re- 
luctance, gave  Cameron  the  War  Department, 
which  he,  of  course,  at  once  proceeded  to  run  in 
the  "  Cameronian  "  way,  and  very  soon  "  ran 
it  into  the  ground." 

Secretary  Cameron  was  a  man  of  shrewd 
political  ability,  but  with  no  talent  for  executive 
administration.  Thoroughly  loyal  to  his  chief, 
he  nevertheless  placed  him  in  a  most  delicate 
position  by  inserting  in  the  annual  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  which  was  printed  on  Decem- 
ber i,  1861,  an  unauthorized  dictum  in  regard  to 
the  arming  of  slaves  by  the  Federal  Government, 
saying : 

It  is  as  clearly  a  right  of  the  Government  to  arm 
slaves,  when  it  may  become  necessary,  as  it  is  to  use 
gunpowder  taken  from  the  enemy.  Whether  it  is  ex- 
pedient to  do  so  is  purely  a  military  question.  .  .  . 
If  it  shall  be  found  that  the  men  who  have  been  held 
by  the  Rebels  as  slaves  are  capable  of  bearing  arms 
and  performing  efficient  military  service,  it  is  the  right, 
and  may  become  the  duty,  of  the  Government  to  arm 
and  equip  them,  and  employ  their  services  against  the 
Rebels,  under  proper  military  regulation,  discipline,  and 
command. 


18  "LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

While  this  was  also  the  President's  secret  be- 
lief and  intention,  he  was  not  ready  to  announce 
it,  and  had  indeed  censured  General  Fremont  for 
his  unauthorized  proclamation  of  military  eman- 
cipation of  slaves  coming  within  his  lines.  Ac- 
cordingly he  suppressed  the  first  edition  of  the 
Secretary's  report  containing  this  pronounce- 
ment. This  suppression  was  the  only  rebuke  that 
the  President  administered,  yet  the  offending 
Secretary  realized  that  his  tenure  of  office  was  a 
slight  one.  His  position  became  irksome,  and  he 
was  greatly  relieved  accordingly  by  his  transfer 
on  January  n,  1862,  to  the  congenial  post  of  a 
foreign  minister,  going  to  represent  our  country 
at  the  friendly  court  of  St.  Petersburg. 

On  April  30,  1862,  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives passed  a  resolution  censuring  Mr.  Cameron 
for  entrusting,  while  Secretary  of  War,  large 
sums  of  money  to  an  irresponsible  and  unbonded 
agent  for  the  purchase  of  military  supplies,  and 
for  dealing  with  illegitimate  contractors  of  such 
supplies.  On  the  2/th  of  May,  1862,  the  Presi- 
dent sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  on  the 
subject,  showing  in  detail  that  he  and  the  heads 
of  the  Government  department  had  authorized 
the  acts  complained  of,  and  justifying  them  as 
necessary  to  save  the  Government  in  the  crisis 
that  then  existed.  "  Congress,"  he  said,  "  will 
see  that  I  should  be  wanting  in  candor  or  in  jus- 
tice if  I  should  leave  the  censure  ...  to 
rest  exclusively  or  chiefly  upon  Mr.  Cameron." 

Lincoln's  worst  fears  were  realized  in  the  ap- 
pointments of  Smith  and  Cameron.  And  he  got 
rid  of  both  as  soon  as  he  could.  He  didn't  im- 
prove matters  much  in  case  of  Smith,  for  he 
replaced  him  with  a  man  (John  T.  Usher)  of 


THE  CABINET  19 

the  same  political  school  and  tendencies.  But  in 
Stanton,  who  replaced  Cameron,  he  secured  the 
right  man  in  the  right  place — the  bete  noire  of 
skulkers,  plunderers,  and  incompetents;  a  man 
who  never  tired,  and  who  followed  his  duties 
and  the  courage  of  his  convictions  to  a  premature 
grave. 

The  appointment  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton  to  the 
most  important  position  in  the  Cabinet  was 
thoroughly  characteristic  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  Of  all 
the  lawyers  with  whom  Lincoln  had  come  in  con- 
tact in  his  professional  career,  Stanton  was  the 
only  one  who  had  inflicted  a  slight  upon  him 
which  continued  to  rankle  in  his  sensitive  nature. 
In  a  celebrated  patent  suit,  the  McCormick-Man- 
ney  reaping-machine  case,  tried  at  Cincinnati 
in  1859,  Lincoln  and  Stanton  were  associated 
with  George  Harding,  a  patent  lawyer,  as  as- 
sociate counsel.  Only -one  lawyer  besides  Hard- 
ing was  permitted  to  speak,  and  the  choice  fell 
on  Stanton.  Stanton  completely  ignored  Lincoln, 
who  was  present  and  ready  to  offer  suggestions. 
Lincoln  was  cut  to  the  heart'  by  his  treatment, 
and  thought  of  returning  home.  His  sense  of 
duty  toward  his  client,  however,  kept  him  as  an 
auditor  in  the  courtroom.  As  he  listened  to 
Stanton's  masterly  conduct  of  the  case,  his  sense 
of  personal  injury  was  lost  for  the  moment  in 
professional  admiration  of  the  "  college-bred " 
attorney  from  Washington,  and  he  returned  to 
Illinois  with  the  resolution,  as  a  "  corn-field  law- 
yer," to  prepare  himself  to  cope  with  the  edu- 
cated class  of  his  professional  rivals  that  was 
"  working  out  toward  the  West." 

Again,  in  the  trying  months  succeeding  his  in- 
auguration, President  Lincoln  was  cognizant  of 


80  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Stanton's  contemptuous  criticism  of  his  character 
and  acts,  privately  expressed,  it  is  true,  to  public 
men  whose  opposition  to  the  President  could  and 
did  work  him  much  injury.  Indeed,  for  a  time 
General  McClellan  and  Stanton  collogued  to- 
gether, being  drawn  to  one  another  by  a  common 
contempt  for  the  "  imbecile  "  at  the  head  of  the 
nation.  Nevertheless,  the  President  recalled 
that,  as  Attorney-General  in  Buchanan's  Cabinet, 
Stanton  had,  under  the  most  trying  and  critical 
circumstances,  acted  the  part  of  a  patriot,  and 
with  supreme  genius  secretly  forestalled  the 
machinations  of  the  secessionist  conspirators 
among  his  fellow  Presidential  advisers. 

Laying  personal  feeling  aside,  and  considering 
only  the  interest  of  the  nation,  President  Lincoln 
chose  as  his  War  Minister  the  man  whom  he  be- 
lieved to  be  best  qualified  for  the  position — Ed- 
win M.  Stanton.  From  a  moral  point  of  view, 
this,  and  not  the  Emancipation  Proclamation, 
was  "  the  greatest  act  of  the  Administration." 

And  so  the  Cabinet  was  made  up  of  somewhat 
combustible  material,  but,  with  four  former 
Democrats  and  three  former  Whigs,  the  Presi- 
dent made  a  perfect  equipoise  by  counting  him- 
self as  a  Whig.  Later  in  his  administration, 
however,  there  were  times  when  he  outweighed 
the  entire  Cabinet.  Immediately  after  the  second 
disaster  at  Bull  Run,  and  while  the  demoralized 
troops  were  crowding  into  the  defenses  of  Wash- 
ington, a  Cabinet  meeting  was  called,  and,  before 
the  President  came  in,  a  rumor  was  rife  that  Mc- 
Clellan had  been  reinstated  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  rumor  Lincoln  con- 
firmed when  he  entered.  Stanton  showed  fight 
at  once.  "  No  such  order  has  come  through  the 


THE  CABINET  at 

War  Department,"  he  said.  "  No,"  said  the 
President,  "  I  did  it  of  my  own  independent 
motion,  under  my  sense  of  responsibility  to  the 
country;"  and  he  proceeded  to  explain  his  rea- 
sons kindly  but  firmly  to  the  angry  Cabinet,  and 
to  show  them  that  it  was  as  bitter  a  dose  for  him 
personally  as  it  possibly  could  be  to  them.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  President's  soothing  manner, 
Stanton,  Chase,  and  Blair  would  probably  have 
resigned. 

Lincoln's  action  regarding  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  was  similar  to  this.  He  said  to  his 
Cabinet:  "About  the  main  object,  that  of  issu- 
ing a  proclamation,  I  have  fully  made  up  my 
mind,  but  upon  minor  and  formal  matters,  I  will 
receive  advice  in  connection  with  it." 

And  Chase  was  the  only  member  of  his  Cabinet 
who  ever  left  on  account  of  dissatisfaction  with 
the  President,  and  his  dissatisfaction  arose  from 
the  fact  that  he  had  a  very  big  head  in  a  double 
sense,  and  thought  he  ought  to  sit  at  the  head  of 
the  council  board,  instead  of  at  one  side  thereof. 
Two  or  three  Congressmen  had  a  measure  ap- 
purtenant to  the  War  Department,  in  behalf  of 
which  they  sought  the  aid  of  the  President ;  and 
he  made  the  order  on  the  department.  This, 
however,  Stanton  utterly  ignored.  "  I  shan't 
obey  it,"  said  he,  "  and  the  President  is  a  d — d 
fool  to  make  such  an  order."  "  What  remark 
w'as  that  ?  "  said  the  Congressman.  "  I  said  the 
President  was  a  d — d  fool  to  make  such  an 
order,"  repeated  Stanton.  Back  to  the  President 
the  Congressman  went  in  high  dudgeon,  and 
reported  what  Stanton  said.  "  Did  he  say 
that  ?"  queried  Lincoln  carelessly.  "  Yes,  he 
did,"  said  the  indignant  Congressman.  "  Well, 


33  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

then,  I  reckon  it  must  be  so  if  Stanton  said  it,  for 
he  is  generally  right,"  was  the  reply.  However, 
the  President  saw  Stanton  soon  after,  and  the 
order  was  enforced. 

Assistant- Adjutant-General  Long  narrates  a 
similar  incident.  Some  outsiders  had  persuaded 
Lincoln  to  adopt  a  certain  line  of  policy  which 
apparently  was  impolitic,  and  Stanton  refused  to 
carry  out  the  order.  The  President  called  on  the 
great  War  Secretary,  who  substantially  demon- 
strated to  him  that  he  was  wrong,  and  repeated 
that  he  shouldn't  carry  out  the  order.  Lincoln 
sat  carelessly  on  a  lounge  nursing  his  left  leg,  and 
said :  "  I  reckon  it'll  have  to  be  done,  Mr.  Sec- 
retary." "  Well,  I  shan't  do  it,"  said  Stanton.  It 
was  getting  unpleasant  for  the  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral, and  he  started  to  go.  As  he  passed  through 
the  door,  he  heard  the  President  say  good-humor- 
edly,  "  I  reckon  you'll  have  to  do  it.  Mr.  Sec- 
retary." In  a  half-hour  the  order  came  over, 
signed  by  Stanton. 

At  the  Presidential  election  of  1864,  as  the 
War  Department  had  the  best  facilities  for  get- 
ting dispatches,  the  President  would  go  there  after 
dinner  to  get  the  news.  Once,  stretching  him- 
self out  on  a  lounge,  he  took  a  book  of  jokes  he 
had  with  him  out  of  his  pocket  and  commenced 
to  read  aloud,  chuckling  with  laughter,  in  which 
the  three  or  four  public  men  who  were  present 
likewise  joined.  Returns  soon  began  to  come 
in,  and  he  read  the  dispatches  languidly  and  re- 
sumed his  reading  and  laughter  where  he  left  off. 
After  this  had  gone  on  for  a  while,  Stanton  got 
very  angry,  and,  beckoning  one  of  those  present 
into  an  adjoining  room,  he  almost  exploded  with 
suppressed  rage.  "  See  that  d — d  fool  there,  act- 


THE  CABINET  23 

ing  like  a  monkey  while  the  country  is  on  the 
brink  of  hell !  "  he  muttered.  But  Lincoln  paid 
no  attention  to  Stanton,  and  stuck  to  his  stories 
till  the  news  indicated  no  doubt  of  the  result. 
Then  he  put  his  .book  in  his  pocket,  got  up, 
stretched  his  arms  and  legs,  yawned,  and  went 
home. 

When  Chase  resigned  the  President  said, 
"  Chase  is  all  right,  but  he's  got  the  Presidential 
itch  and  that'll  spoil  anyone.  He's  the  very  kind 
of  timber  for  a  good  Chief  Justice." 

Governor  Tod,  of  Ohio,  whom  Lincoln  had  ap- 
pointed as  Chase's  successor,  declined  the  office, 
and  Lincoln  went  to  bed  greatly  worried,  for  the 
appointment  was  a  most  critical  one.  Next  morn- 
ing he  selected  William  Pitt  Fessenden  for  the 
place.  He  had  dreamed  that  name,  or,  more 
properly,  had  balanced  all  suitable  candidates 
during  the  silent  watches  of  the  night,  and  Fes- 
senden's  was  the  name  that  tipped  the  scale.  Lin- 
coln then  wrote"  a  note  to  Fessenden  telling  him 
what  he  had  done,  and  sent  for  the  Register  of  the 
Treasury ;  then  forwarded  the  appointment  to 
the  Senate.  Soon  Fessenden  came  in  pale  with 
excitement,  exclaiming :  "  I  can't  take  it ;  my 
health  won't  stand  it;  you  must  not  insist  on  it!  " 
The  President  came  forward,  and,  putting  his 
arms  affectionately  about  his  neck,  said,  "  Fessen- 
den, we've  got  to  put  down  this  war,  and  you're 
one  of  the  instruments  to  do  it,  and  you've  no 
right  to  decline.  I  would  like  to  be  set  free  my- 
self, but  I  can't,  neither  can  you;  your  name  is 
now  at  the  Senate ;  it  will  be  confirmed  forthwith, 
and  you  must  be  at  the  Treasury,  signing  war- 
rants, by  two  o'clock."  And  Fessenden  was. 

When  the  President  desired  to  enforce  any- 


84  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

thing1  he  did  it,  but  he  greatly  disliked  to  come 
in  collision  with  his  Secretaries.  The  old  story 
is  worn  threadbare,  that  he  sent  someone  to 
Stanton  for  some  action  and  the  party  returned 
saying  that  the  Secretary  wouldn't  do  it.  "  Then 
I  can't  help  you,"  said  Lincoln,  "  for  I  have  very 
little  influence  with  this  Administration."  And 
another  story  is  also  told  of  the  President  wait- 
ing to  complete  some  action  till  Stanton  had  tem- 
porarily left  the  capital,  and  then  putting  it 
through  under  the  imprimatur  of  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War. 

In  the  routine  work  of  the  departments  the 
great  President  disliked  to  interfere  and  rarely 
did  so;  anything  he  did  do  was  not  in  the  shape 
of  an  order  but  of  a  request  or  suggestion.  I 
once  was  with  him  when  an  applicant  for  some 
place  in  the  Baltimore  Customhouse  was  present. 
The  President  wrote  on  a  card  on  his  knee,  being 
seated  at  the  south  window :  "  Mr.  Chase :  The 
bearer,  Mr. ,  wants  to  be in  the  Custom- 
house at  Baltimore;  if  his  recommendations  are 
satisfactory,  and  I  recollect  them  to  have  been 
so,  the  fact  that  he  is  a  Methodist  should  not  be 
against  him,  as  they  complain  of  us  some."  And 
Dennis  Hanks  relates  that  Lincoln  once  wrote 
a  note  to  Stanton  in  behalf  of  a  very  pretty 
woman,  who  wanted  some  favor :  "  This  woman, 
dear  Stanton,  is  smarter  than  she  seems."  And, 
as  a  rule,  Chase  and  Stanton  did  just  as  they 
pleased  with  his  recommendations. 

It  was  currently  understood  during  Lincoln's 
administration  that  there  was  no  regularity  nor 
system  about  Cabinet  meetings,  and  that  unless 
there  was  a  summons  they  did  not  pretend  to 
meet  regularly.  The  President  preferred  to  have 


THE  CABINET  25 

one  of  them  drop  in  as  Seward  did  in  my  pres- 
ence, if  he  wanted  anything  badly  enough  to 
come  for  it.  Sitting  at  the  window  with  a  spy- 
glass in  his  hand,  he  would  talk  in  a  free-and-easy 
manner,  with  whomsoever  came — write  a  note 
on  a  card  on  his  knee  with  a  lead  pencil,  look 
through  the  spy-glass  at  the  distant  Virginia 
hills  and  down  the  vista  of  the  Potomac.  I  recol- 
lect once  seeing  a  vessel  as  far  down  as  we 
could  see  near  to  Alexandria,  with  its  masts  lean- 
ing toward  the  Virginia  shore.  Lincoln  was 
puzzled  about  it;  he  looked  long  and  earnestly 
at  it.  "  I  wonder  what  that  can  mean,"  he  said 
half  a  dozen  times.  He  liked  to  go  from  one 
thing  to  another  in  his  office ;  he  would  sit  and 
sign  commissions  for  a  while — then  take  a  docu- 
ment out  of  his  drawer  or  off  the  table  and  read 
it — possibly  sign  it — reflect  on  it  a  while,  and 
then  put  it  back  for  further  consideration.  Then 
he  would  gaze  out  of  the  window — then  a 
thought  would  strike  him,  and  he  would  go  to  his 
table  or  desk,  and  write  vigorously  for  a  while, 
then  lapse  into  thought.  Sometimes  he  would  sit 
and  write  for  an  hour  at  a  time,  and  of  course 
when  people  came  in  he  would  attend  to  them  in 
a  purely  informal  way. 

The  painting  of  the  "  Reading  of  the  Emanci- 
pation Proclamation,"  by  F.  B.  Carpenter,  is 
merely  a  fancy  sketch.  Everything  is  idealized, 
since  the  artist  was  posing  his  subjects  for  pos- 
terity. In  fact,  the  idea  of  the  painting  was  ex 
post  facto.  Lincoln  and  his  Cabinet  never  pre- 
sented a  classical  tableau  except  on  canvas.  Ex- 
actly how  the  group  appeared  at  the  supreme 
moment  the  Proclamation  was  read,  we  are  not 
advised,  but  just  before  it  the  spectacle  might 


36  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

have  been  witnessed  of  the  President  reading  a 
joke  of  Artemus  Ward  or  Petroleum  Nasby,  with 
laughter  sandwiched  in,  in  which  all  joined  per- 
functorily except  Chase  and  Stanton,  the  former 
of  whom  was  dignified  and  shocked — the  latter 
of  whom  was  black  and  mad.  Were  this  pro- 
pensity to  be  jocular  a  mere  device  to  aggran- 
dize himself  or  to  amuse  others,  I  should  call  it  a 
blemish ;  as  it  was,  however,  a  device  to  banish 
dull  care  and  to  enable  him  to  "  plow  around  " 
people  (as  he  termed  it),  it  was,  in  his  case,  like 
other  utilities,  a  meritorious  quality. 

Other  matters  which  confronted  Mr.  Lincoln 
at  the  outset  of  his  administration,  and  which 
caused  him  extreme  annoyance,  were  the  pres- 
ence of  so  many  disloyal  persons  in  all  official 
positions  and  the  importunity  of  office-seekers. 

That  new  and  loyal  officers  should  replace  the 
disloyal  incumbents  was  sufficiently  obvious,  but 
the  mad  rush  and  unexampled  persistency  with 
which  the  Administration  was  assailed,  usurping 
the  necessary  time  demanded  for  the  considera- 
tion of  even  grave  matters,  was  where  and  how 
the  moral  outrage  was  exhibited.  Office-seeking 
lust  and  venality  were  never  so  ungraciously  ex- 
hibited as  then ;  men  formerly  of  high  character 
and  influence,  even  some  who  were  surpliced  ser- 
vants of  the  Most  High,  prostituted  their  charac- 
ters by  office-broking  and  huckstering.  Politi- 
cal influence  was  an  acknowledged  subject  of 
purchase  in  many  quarters.  One  case  was  re- 
ported to  me  on  conclusive  authority  of  a  man  of 
influence,  afterwards  a  Cabinet  minister,  who  of- 
fered his  influence  to  procure  an  office  for  one 
hundred  dollars.  Of  these  importunate  and  per- 
sistent devices,  Mr.  Lincoln  complained  most  bit- 


THE  CABINET  27 

terly,  frequently  using  as  an  illustration  this, 
figure :  "  I  am  like  a  man  who  has  a  large  tene- 
ment house  to  let,  but  one  end  is  on  fire;  and,, 
while  it  needs  all  his  efforts  to  extinguish  that, 
tenants  are  importuning  him  to  rent  them  apart- 
ments at  the  other  end."  He  complained  to  me 
most  bitterly  of  Judge  Davis's  importunities  for 
his  friends,  evidently  with  the  view  that  I  should 
repeat  the  complaint  to  Davis  (which  I  did  not), 
and  he  also  informed  me  that  the  most  annoying 
matters  he  had  encountered,  of  a  minor  and  petty 
nature,  were  two  quarrels  about  post-offices  in 
places  of  less  than  10,000  inhabitants,  one  of 
them  being  Davis's  own  town  of  Bloomington, 
111. 

To  this  generation  it  would  appear  that  Mr. 
Lincoln's  entire  administration  was  invested  with 
the  glamour  of  lustrous  deeds  and  great  renown. 
Such  was  not  the  fact  by  any  means ;  on  the  con- 
trary, in  the  beginning  of  his  term  of  office,  he 
was  considered  as  a  President  of  "  shreds  and 
patches,"  with  a  warring  and  uncomfortable 
Cabinet,  and  no  adequate  political  or  moral  sup- 
port; it  was  thought  that  he  had  no  proper 
ability  for  his  high  position,  and  no  substantial 
policy  or  adequate  comprehension  of  its  duties. 
He  was  a  minority  President  and  entirely  untried 
in  the  problems  of  statesmanship.  Seward  ac- 
cepted the  premiership  only  on  the  assumption 
that  he  would  be  the  controlling  and  dominant 
spirit  of  the  Administration.  Had  he  supposed 
that  he  would  be  compelled  merely  to  play  second 
fiddle  to  the  "  rail-splitter,"  he  never  would  have 
accepted  the  place,  but  would  have  preferred  his 
old  leadership  in  the  Senate.  As  it  was,  even 
after  he  had  accepted  the  position,  he  again  de- 


38  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

clined  it,  and  only  re-accepted  on  the  urgent  im- 
portunity of  Mr.  Lincoln.  Chase  went  into  the 
Cabinet  with  great  reluctance,  and  only  from  an 
abiding  sense  of  duty.  The  truth  was,  that  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration  in  its  incipiency  was 
decidedly  "  below  par,"  even  had  it  not  been  con- 
fronted by  a  rebellion ;  and  it  was  an  object  of  al- 
most undisguised  contempt  in  the  view  of  the  cul- 
tured political  classes  of  the  nation. 

The  reason  of  this  was  to  be  found  in  the 
previous  obscurity  of  its  head;  in  the  marked 
prejudice  against  the  negro,  whose  ally  this  Ad- 
ministration was  supposed  to  be;  in  the  extreme 
modesty  of  the  President's  pretensions,  the  ag- 
gressiveness of  the  secessionists'  government  at 
Montgomery,  and  in  the  intrenched  position  in 
society  of  those  in'  sympathy  with  it. 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  to  hew  his  way  to  eternal 
fame  from  the  primeval  forest  of  obscurity, 
through  the  deep-tangled  wildwood  of  unmerited 
popularity,  obloquy,  and  disdain.  He  patiently 
endured  rebuffs,  insults,  and  insolence  which  he 
would  have  resented  in  unequivocal  terms  had  he 
occupied  a  private  station.  He  yielded  ease, 
comfort,  happiness;  he  abnegated  self  entirely 
for  the  public  need;  the  ends  he  aimed  at  were 
"his  "  country's,  God's,  and  truth's." 

It  was  the  solemn  sense  of  his  responsibility 
that  caused  him  to  fight  for  the  supreme  place  in 
the  government.  It  was  not  until  later,  when  his 
predominance  was  assured  in  all  important 
policies,  that  he  could  afford  to  joke  about  "  hav- 
ing very  little  influence  with  the  administration." 


CHAPTER  II 

FORT   SUMTER   AND   THE  VIRGINIA   CONVENTION 

AT  this  time  there  was,  in  form,  another  gov- 
ernment at  Montgomery,  Ala.,  which  pro- 
fessed to  hold  sway  over  the  seven  so-called  Cot- 
ton States  of  the  Union ;  and  which  also  affected 
to  believe  that  the  establishment  of  their  so- 
called  government  would  be  acquiesced  in; 
proper  accounts  taken;  division  of  public  prop- 
erty made,  and  a  treaty  of  peace  entered  into  be- 
tween the  two  governments. 

South  Carolina  had  seceded  December  20, 
1860;  Mississippi,  January  9,  1861 ;  Florida, 
January  10;  Alabama,  January  n;  Georgia, 
January  19;  Louisiana,  January  26;  Texas,  Feb- 
ruary i.  The  secession  conventions  of  these 
States  had  appointed  delegates  equal  in  number 
to  their  former  representation  in  the  Federal 
Congress,  to  meet  in  convention  to  form  a  South- 
ern Confederacy.  These  assembled  on  February 
4  at  Montgomery,  Ala.  On  February  8  the 
seven  States  represented  were  organized  into 
"  The  Confederate  States  of  America,"  and  Jeff- 
erson Davis,  of  Mississippi,  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  of  Georgia,  were  elected  President  and 
Vice-President  respectively  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  secessionists  had  their  agents  and  emis- 
saries everywhere.  Washington  and  the  depart- 
ments were  full  of  their  spies,  and  men  in  high 

29 


3©  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

official  station  were  constantly  giving  aid  and 
comfort  to  the  Confederate  government  at  Mont- 
gomery. 

Just  after  Mr.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated,  John 
W.  Drinkard,  chief  clerk  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  Samuel  Cooper,  Adjutant-General  of 
the  Army,  resigned  their  positions  and  at  once 
accepted  similar  positions  in  the  Confederate 
government,  which  they  held  through  the  war. 
Louis  T.  Wigfall,  lately  Senator  from  Texas  and 
a  native  of  Charleston,  S.  C,  set  up  a  Con- 
federate recruiting  office  in  Baltimore,  opening 
a  bank  account  for  its  financial  support  with 
Walters  &  Co.,  68  Exchange  Place.  On  March 
23,  sixty-four  volunteers  reached  Castle  Pinck- 
ney  from  that  station,  passing  right  by  the  Cap- 
itol at  Washington  en  route. 

Prior  to  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  the 
Montgomery  government  had  selected  three 
citizens  of  facile  and  suave  manners  to  act  as 
commissioners  in  adjusting  the  "differences" 
which  existed  between  the  two  governments. 
They  were  Martin  J.  Crawford,  a  former  Demo- 
cratic Member  of  Congress  from  Georgia ;  John 
Forsyth,  editor  of  a  Democratic  paper  at  Mobile, 
Ala.,  and  Andrew  B.  Roman,  a  former  Gov- 
ernor of  Louisiana,  and  a  Whig  who  had  used  all 
his  influence  to  prevent  disunion. 

The  first  named  reached  Washington  on  March 
3,  when  all  was  bustle  and  confusion  at  the  White 
House,  owing  to  the  removal  of  the  retiring 
President's  baggage  to  a  private  house  whither 
Mr.  Buchanan  was  going  to  be  domiciled  that 
and  the  succeeding  day  and  night.  Crawford 
went  to  work  promptly;  guessed  his  way  to  a 
conclusion,  and  wrote  to  his  government  that  he 


FORT  SUMTER  31 

was  "  fully  satisfied  that  it  would  not  be  wise  to 
approach  Mr.  Buchanan  with  any  hope  of  his  do- 
ing anything  which  would  result  advantageously 
to  our  government.  Buchanan's  fears  for  his 
personal  safety,  his  apprehensions  for  security 
to  his  property,  together  with  the  cares  of  state 
and  his  advanced  age,  render  him  wholly  dis- 
qualified for  his  present  position.  He  is  as  in- 
capable now  as  a  child."  Crawford  further  wrote 
that  Buchanan  had  played  fast  and  loose  with 
the  Confederacy,  agreeing  to  treat  with  it  to-day, 
and  recanting  to-morrow ;  and  that  whatever  he 
might  agree  to  his  Cabinet  would  countermand 
so  soon  as  it  came  to  their  notice.  His  views 
were  substantially  correct. 

Crawford  also  reported  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
under  the  control  of  a  mob  which  rendered  his 
opinion  vacillating  and  unreliable ;  that  Chase 
and  Blair  of  the  incoming  Administration  would 
be  for  war,  and  Seward  and  the  rest  for  peace ; 
that  John  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  had  the  ear  of  the 
President-elect,  and  was  sedulous  in  his  moni- 
tions that  he  let  the  Gulf  States  alone;  that  Bell 
had  assured  Mr.  Lincoln  that,  while  a  majority 
of  the  Southerners  were  for  the  Union,  they  were 
so  sensitive  on  the  subject  of  force  that  every 
slave  State  would  secede  on  its  first  application ; 
that  Bell  advised  Mr.  Lincoln  to  let  the  seceded 
States  do  as  they  chose,  and  to  pay  no  attention 
to  them,  saying  that  they  would  grow  restless 
without  the  affiliation  of  the  border  States,  and  by 
reason  of  increased  taxation  of  the  new  govern- 
ment, and  so  would  soon  make  overtures  for  a 
reconciliation  with  the  Federal  Government.  On 
the  6th  of  March,  the  commissioner  reported  to 
"  J.  Davis  "  at  Montgomery,  that  Seward  and 


32  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Cameron  were  determined  to  maintain  a  pacific 
course  at  all  hazards,  and  that  they  probably 
could  enforce  it ;  and  he  recommended  an  ad- 
hesion to  that  policy  by  the  Confederate  Govern- 
ment for  the  present. 

Mr.  Forsyth  joined  Mr.  Crawford  on  March 
8,  and  concurred  upon  investigation  with  his  col- 
league that  Seward  was  in  favor  of  a  policy  of 
peace.  The  two  visited  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  Sen- 
ator for  Virginia,  and  urged  his  mediation.  The 
latter  accepted  the  office  and  put  himself  in  com- 
munication with  the  new  Secretary  of  State, 
who,  full  of  the  opinion  that  he  was  expressing 
the  vital  tone  of  the  Administration,  as  well  as  of 
the  party  behind  it,  thus  defined  his  position  to 
Senator  Hunter : 

I  have  built  up  the  Republican  party ;  I  have  brought 
it  to  triumph,  but  its  advent  to  power  is  accompanied 
by  great  difficulties  and  perils.  I  must  save  the  party, 
and  save  the  Government  in  its  hands.  To  do  this, 
war  must  be  averted,  the  negro  question  must  be 
dropped,  the  irrepressible  conflict  ignored,  and  an 
Union  party  to  embrace  the  border  slave  States  in- 
augurated. I  have  already  whipped  Mason  and  Hunter 
in  their  own  State.  I  must  crush  out  Davis,  Toombs, 
and  their  colleagues  in  sedition  in  their  respective 
States.  Saving  the  border  States  to  the  Union  by  mod- 
eration and  justice,  the  people  of  the  cotton  States,  un- 
willingly led  into  secession,  will  rebel  against  their 
leaders,  and  reconstruction  will  follow. — Crawford's 
Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  232. 

The  Confederate  Government  had  instructed 
its  commissioners  to  play  with  Seward  for  delay 
until  they  could  get  ready  for  war,  and  they  pur- 
sued that  policy;  but  what  they  desired  was  an 
unequivocal  pledge  that  the  military  status 
would  be  preserved  for  twenty  days,  during 


FORT  SUMTER  33 

which  they  would  not  press  the  object  of  their 
mission,  which  Seward  averred  he  was  not  em- 
powered to  consider,  and  so  urged  that  matters 
be  allowed  to  drift  along  as  they  were.  This  the 
Confederate  commissioners  declined  to  do,  and 
on  the  1 3th  of  March  they  sent  a  diplomatic  dis- 
patch to  the  Federal  State  Department  inform- 
ing the  Federal  Government  that  they  had  been 
appointed  by  the  Confederate  authorities  as  com- 
missioners empowered  to  open  negotiations  for 
the  settlement  of  all  controverted  questions  be- 
tween the  two  governments,  and  to  conclude 
treaties  of  peace  between  "  the  two  nations." 

To  this  note  no  reply  was  returned,  but  Secre- 
tary Seward  made  out  a  memorandum  and  filed 
it  with  the  document,  simply  stating  that  the 
Government  could  not  recognize  the  authority 
under  which  the  alleged  commissioners  acted, 
nor  reply  to  them.  The  memorandum  stated  that 
"  it  could  not  be  admitted  that  the  States  referred 
to  had,  in  law  or  fact,  withdrawn  from  the  Fed- 
eral Union,  or  that  they  could  do  so  in  any  other 
manner  than  with  their  consent,  and  the  consent 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  to  be  given 
through  a  national  convention  to  be  assembled  in 
conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States." 

This  memorandum  was  withheld  until  April 
8,  when  it  was  at  once  telegraphed  both  to  Mont- 
gomery and  Charleston,  where  it  created  great 
excitement. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Chief  Justice  Taney  and  As- 
sociate Justices  Campbell  and  Nelson  had  of  their 
own  volition,  as  good  citizens,  examined  the  legal 
question  of  the  right  of  the  President  to  coerce 
a  State,  and  had  concluded  that  there  was  no  con- 


34  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

stitutional  right  so  to  do;  and  they  gratuitously 
advised  the  several  members  of  the  Cabinet  of  the 
conclusions  to  which  they  had  come,  and  recom- 
mended that  terms  of  conciliation  be  proposed  to 
the  Confederate  Government  through  the  com- 
missioners. At  this  time  Judge  Nelson,  of  New 
York,  was  the  ablest  jurist  on  the  bench.  He  had 
been  appointed  by  President  Tyler,  and  had  con- 
curred in  the  Dred  Scott  decision.  Justice 
Campbell  was  from  Mobile,  Ala.  He  had 
manumitted  his  slaves  when  he  was  a  young 
man,  and,  though  a  Southern  man,  was  strictly 
upright,  and  earnestly  desired  to  avert  war  and 
restore  the  Union,  if  possible;  if  not,  to  let  the 
South  peaceably  secede.  The  animus  of  both  of 
these  eminent  jurists  was  as  disinterested  as  could 
be  expected,  consonant  with  their  political  opin- 
ions; and  their  pacificatory  efforts  were  highly 
commendable.  Secretary  Seward  was  in  favor  of 
evacuating  Fort  Sumter  and  was  anxious  it 
should  be  done,  and  he  informed  Judge  Camp- 
bell, who  was  acting  as  mediator,  that  it  would 
be  evacuated;  and  Campbell  so  informed  the 
Confederate  commissioners,  who  in  turn  in- 
formed their  government.  But  the  fort  was  not 
evacuated,  and  Judge  Nelson  retired  from  any 
further  action  in  the  premises  and  went  home. 
Campbell  remained,  however,  hoping  that  Sum- 
ter would  be  evacuated,  and  receiving  constant 
assurances  from  Seward  that  it  would  be  done. 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  taking  ample  time  to  deliberate 
what  to  do,  being  uncertain  as  to  the  best  policy. 
He  was  hopeful  that  Virginia  would  not  secede, 
and  that  the  Virginia  convention,  which  was  de- 
liberating upon  the  question,  wrould  adjourn  and 
so  cease  to  be  a  menace  to  him.  He  dared  not 


FORT  SUMTER  35 

attempt  to  supply  Sumter,  and  thus  invite  an  at- 
tack, fearing1  its  effects  upon  the  Virginia  con- 
vention. He  dared  not  remove  the  garrison 
from  Sumter,  fearing  the  effect  upon  public 
opinion  at  the  North,  and  in  point  of  fact,  had  he 
done  so,  he  would  have  been  much  more  unmerci- 
fully attacked  than  ever  Buchanan  was. 

On  the  Qth  of  April  the  Confederate  commis- 
sioners sent  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
which  they  proffered  as  their  ultimatum  of 
negotiation  the  evacuation  of  Sumter.  With  this 
letter  the  State  Department  filed  a  memorandum 
as  follows: 

Messrs.  Forsythe,  Crawford  and  Roman  having  been 
apprised  by  a  memorandum  which  has  been  delivered 
to  them,  that  the  Secretary  of  State  is  not  at  liberty  to 
hold  official  intercourse  with  them,  will,  it  is  pre- 
sumed, expect  no  notice  from  him  of  the  new  com- 
munication which  they  have  addressed  to  him  under 
the  date  of  the  gth  inst.,  beyond  the  simple  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  receipt  thereof,  which  he  hereby  very 
cheerfully  gives. 

Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  10,  1861. 
— Crawford's  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  343. 

Of  this  action  the  Confederate  authorities  were 
duly  apprised,  and  the  commissioners  left  Wash- 
ington on  April  n,  and  returned  to  Montgomery. 

The  two  critical  questions  which  animated 
political  councils  both  in  Washington  and  Mont- 
gomery, as  well  as  at  Charleston,  were,  "  Will 
Fort  Sumter  be  abandoned  ?  "  "  Will  Virginia 
secede  ?  "  and  these  questions  assumed  the  logical 
relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  or  cause 
and  effect.  While  the  secessionists  desired  the 
evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter,  they  yet  believed  that 
its  reduction  by  force  would  result  in  the  seces- 


36  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

sion  of  Virginia ;  the  latter  was  a  consummation 
they  devoutly  wished,  but  they  desired  "  peace- 
able secession."  If  Sumter  was  evacuated,  they 
reasoned  that  that  was  the  sign  and  promise  that 
no  further  attempt  at  coercion  would  be  made, 
but  that  secession  would  be  thus  accomplished 
ipso  facto,  and  all  that  would  be  further  needed 
was  a  division  of  property  and  a  treaty.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  reasoned  that  if  Sumter  was  as- 
saulted and  carried,  it  would  force  Virginia  into 
seceding  and  entering  the  Confederacy ;  Ken- 
tucky and  Maryland  would  follow  Virginia's  ex- 
ample; and  Maryland's  secession  would  involve 
the  possession  of  Washington,  the  Federal 
capital,*  and  with  the  material  and  moral 
strength  thus  acquired,  a  recognition  by  Eng- 
land and  France  would  be  inevitable.  These  fond 
hopes  were  enhanced  by  the  concurrence  of  a 
popular  sentiment  at  the  North  as  well  as  at  the 
South,  more  extensive  than  was  known  at  the 
time  or  will  be  credited  by  posterity.  According 
to  this  sentiment  Mr.  Lincoln  was  a  parvenu; 
what  little  personal  following  he  had  was  of  ob- 
scure persons  and  with  no  cohesion;  his  party 
was  raw  and  undisciplined ;  its  nucleus  was  the 
Abolition  coterie,  which  was  a  pariah  among  par- 
ties; so  far  as  the  Republican  party  had  aggres- 
sive strength  beyond  the  Abolitionists,  it  marched 
under  the  personal  banners  of  Seward,  Chase, 

*Senator  Iverson,  of  Georgia,  said :  "  I  see  no  rea- 
son why  Washington  City  should  not  be  continued  the 
capital  of  the  Southern  Confederacy."  The  Richmond 
Examiner  said :  "  Our  people  can  take  Washington,  and 
they  will.  Scott,  the  arch-traitor  [General  Scott  was 
a  native  of  Virginia]  and  Lincoln,  the  beast,  combined 
cannot  prevent  it.  The  Illinois  Ape  must  retrace  his 
journey  back  home  quicker  than  he  came." 


FORT  SUMTER  37 

Cameron,  Jim  Lane,  of  Kansas,  and  Henry  Win- 
ter Davis,  of  Maryland,  and  not  under  a  cohesive 
party  flag.  Abraham  Lincoln  is  now  a  name  to 
conjure  with,  but  in  those  dark  days  he  was  re- 
garded by  the  nation  either  as  a  disagreeable  ac- 
cident or  as  a  moral  usurper. 

When  Mr.  Lincoln  returned  to  his  office  in  the 
afternoon  of  March  4,  he  found  a  communica- 
tion from  Secretary  Holt  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, conveying  Major  Anderson's  estimate  that 
the  force  required  to  reenforce  Fort  Sumter 
would  be  at  least  20,000  disciplined  men. 

On  reading  Anderson's  statement  and  Secre- 
tary Holt's  comment  that  it  "  takes  the  depart- 
ment by  surprise,  as  his  previous  correspondence 
contained  no  such  intimation,"  the  President  at 
once  sent  for  the  Secretary  of  War  and  taking 
him  aside  and  looking  at  him  earnestly,  said, 
"  Mr.  Holt,  I  have  been  looking  at  Major  An- 
derson's statement,  which  surprises  me  some- 
what, and  I  want  to  know  if  there  is  ally  doubt 
at  all  about  his  loyalty  to  the  Government  ?  "  The 
Secretary  replied  promptly  that  he  had  never 
had  any  reason  at  all  to  doubt  Major  Anderson's 
perfect  loyalty.  The  President  replied  that  he 
himself  had  seen  no  reason  to  doubt  it ;  but,  as  he 
was  new  in  his  office,  he  asked  out  of  a  super- 
abundant caution,  as  much  might  depend  upon 
Major  Anderson's  loyalty  in  the  days  to  come. 

The  public  interest  was  centered  on  Fort  Sum- 
ter and  Charleston.  The  secessionists  closely  be- 
leaguered the  little  garrison,  preventing  it  from 
securing  any  supplies  of  any  sort,  and  they 
opened  and  read  the  private  correspondence  of 
its  members  after  it  had  been  committed  to  the 
mail.  The  public  mind  at  the  North  was  in  a 


38  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

state  of  exasperation  over  the  bold  actions  of  the 
secessionists  in  erecting  powerful  batteries  upon 
every  spot  which  would  command  Fort  Sumter, 
and  mounting  upon  them  cannon  which  belonged 
to  the  United  States,  as  well  as  in  denying  the  gar- 
rison the  common  necessaries  of  life,  and  inter- 
course by  means  of  the  mail  with  their  friends 
and  families.  A  demand  was  made  by  the  North- 
ern press  that,  before  our  forces  should  leave 
Fort  Sumter,  it  should  be  ruined  so  as  to  insure 
its  destruction.  The  Commercial  Advertiser,  of 
New  York,  published  the  following  editorial : 

Shall  Fort  Sumter  be  Destroyed?  If,  therefore, 
Major  Anderson  must  abandon  it,  let  him  employ  the 
few  remaining  days  his  provisions  still  hold  out  in 
undermining  inside  the  entire  foundations,  then  let  him 
make  his  preparations  to  leave,  apply  the  fuse,  and,  at 
a  safe  distance,  watch  its  being  leveled  to  the  ground. 
This  would  be  a  gloomy,  but  nevertheless  a  more 
worthy  ending  of  the  sad  history,  than  to  leave  it  a 
stronghold  in  the  possession  of  a  foreign  foe.  If  Sum- 
ter must  be  abandoned  to  the  enemy,  let  it  be  a  shape- 
less mass  of  ruins. 

At  this  time  Lieutenant-General  Winfield 
Scott,  hero  of  the  two  preceding  wars  of  the 
nation,  was  general-in-chief  of  the  army. 

Winfield  Scott  was  born  at  Petersburg,  Va., 
in  1786,  and  in  1841  he  became  general-in- 
chief  of  our  armies.  To  this  illustrious  and 
patriotic  soldier  the  nation  owes  a  debt  of  grati- 
tude of  great  magnitude  for  his  share  in  the 
preservation  of  its  autonomy  and  establishment 
in  the  dark  days  of  1860-61.  His  wisdom  in  the 
crisis  may  be  challenged — his  firmness  and  patri- 
otism, not  at  all. 

Scott's  headquarters  were  at  New  York;  but 


FORT  SUMTER  39 

on  December  12,  1860,  he  came  on  to  Washing- 
ton, took  lodgings  in  an  old-fashioned  house, 
where  Owen  Love  joy  also  lodged,  at  the  north- 
west corner  of  6th  and  D  Streets,  and  put  him- 
self in  communication  with  the  Administration. 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  supported  Scott  for  the  Presi- 
dency in  1852,  and  had  a  high  opinion  both  of 
his  patriotism  and  his  moral  and  physical  cour- 
age, and  relied  very  much  on  him  to  keep  the  ship 
of  state  afloat  till  the  time  should  come  when  he 
should  secure  the  helm.  In  January,  1861, 
Thomas  S.  Mather,  of  Springfield,  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral of  Illinois,  was  going  to  Washington,  and 
Lincoln  wrote  a  letter  introducing  him  to  General 
Scott,  and  stating  that  he  (Lincoln)  was  in  re- 
ceipt of  sundry  letters  which  indicated  that  an  at- 
tempt might  be  made  upon  his  life  prior  to,  or 
during  the  inauguration,  and  asking  his  opinion 
on  the  subject  and  as  to  his  proper  course  of 
action.  The  old  hero  was  confined  to  his  bed  at 
his  lodgings  by  gout,  but  Mather  sent  up  the  let- 
ter, and  in  a  few  minutes  was  himself  invited  up. 
He  found  the  old  veteran  quite  enfeebled  in  body, 
but  vigorous  in  mind  and  courage.  As  soon  as 
Mather  was  shown  into  the  room  the  old  war- 
rior, sitting  uneasily,  drew  himself  up  with  evi- 
dent pain,  and  exclaimed  nervously :  "  General, 
give  my  compliments  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  tell  him 
to  come  to  Washington  whenever  he  pleases. 
These  Maryland  and  Virginia  rangers  I'll  look 
after  myself.  I'll  put  cannon  at  both  ends  of 
Pennsylvania  Avenue,  and  if  they  make  the  first 
signs  of  mischief  I'll  blow  them  to  hell !  "  The 
martial  spirit  and  lofty  patriotism  of  Winfield 
Scott  were  the  bulwark  of  defense  for  the  cause 
of  the  Union,  and  of  established  government, 


40  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

throughout  the  dreary  and  portentous  fall  and 
winter  of  1 860-61,  and  the  docility  of  the  seces- 
sionists who  abounded  in  Washington  on  in- 
auguration day  was  assured  by  the  appearance  of 
that  stately  and  impressive  heroic  figure  on  horse- 
back, who  had  ridden  in  triumph  through  the 
capital  of  the  Montezumas,  and  for  a  half  cen- 
tury had  carried  two  English  bullets  in  his  body 
from  the  little  graveyard  at  Lundy's  Lane. 

The  only  available  military  forces  of  the  gov- 
ernment, in  addition  to  the  feeble  garrisons  in 
part  of  the  Southern  forts,  were  five  companies 
respectively  at  Fort  Warren,  Boston ;  Fort  Ham- 
ilton, New  York;  Pittsburg,  Pa.;  Augusta,  Ga., 
and  Baton  Rouge,  La. 

The  maximum  of  the  army  was  18,000  men, 
and  these  were  all  required  for  the  protection  of 
the  frontier.  As  early  as  1857,  General  Scott 
had  tried  to  secure  an  addition  of  five  regiments 
to  the  regular  army,  but  his  request  had  never 
been  acted  on. 

To  General  Scott  Mr.  Lincoln  at  once  sub- 
mitted Major  Anderson's  report.  That  same 
evening  (March  5)  Scott  returned  it  with  the 
discouraging  reply :  "  Evacuation  seems  almost 
inevitable  and  in  this  view  our  chief  engineer 
(Brigadier  Totten)  concurs — if  indeed  the  worn- 
out  garrison  be  not  assaulted  and  carried  in  the 
present  week." 

On  March  9.  the  President  wrote  to  General 
Scott,  making  the  following  interrogatories : 


(1)  To   what   point   of  time   can    Major   Anderson 
maintain   his   position   at   Fort    Sumter,   without   fresh 
supplies  or  reinforcements? 

(2)  Can  you,  with  all  the  means  now  in  your  con- 


FORT  SUMTER  41 

trol,    supply    or    reinforce    Fort    Sumter    within    that 
time? 

(3)  If  not,  what  amount  of  means,  and  of  what 
description,  in  addition  to  that  already  at  your  control, 
would  enable  you  to  supply  and  reinforce  that  fortress 
within  the  time? 

That  night  the  first  Cabinet  meeting  was  held. 
The  Attorney-General,  Edward  Bates,  has  left  in 
his  diary  a  report  of  the  deliberations,  which 
were  wholly  concerned  with  the  question  of  Fort 
Sumter.  He  wrote. 

The  army  officers  and  navy  officers  differ  widely 
about  the  degree  of  danger  to  rapid-moving  vessels 
passing  under  the  fire  of  land  batteries.  The  army 
officers  think  destruction  almost  inevitable,  where  the 
navy  officers  think  the  danger  but  slight.  The  one  be- 
lieve that  Sumter  cannot  be  relieved — not  even  pro- 
visioned— without  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men 
and  a  bloody  battle.  The  other  (the  naval)  believe  that 
with  light,  rapid,  vessels  they  can  cross  the  bar  at  high 
tide  of  a  dark  night,  run  the  enemy's  forts  (Moultrie 
and  Cummings  Point),  and  reach  Sumter  with  little 
risk.  They  say  that  the  greatest  danger  will  be  in  land- 
ing at  Sumter,  upon  which  point  there  may  be  a  con- 
centrated fire.  They  do  not  doubt  that  the  place  can  be 
and  ought  to  be  relieved.  Mr.  Fox  is  anxious  to  risk 
his  life  in  leading  the  relief,  and  Commodore  String- 
ham  seems  equally  confident  of  success. 

On  March  n  and  12,  General  Scott  replied  to 
the  President's  questions  of  the  Qth  inst.,  saying 
that,  while  the  garrison  could  hold  out  for  about 
forty  days  longer  with  its  present  provisions, 
the  enemy  could  wear  it  out  by  a  succession  of 
pretended  night  attacks,  so  that  it  could  be  easily 
taken  by  a  culminating  real  assault.  To  supply 
and  reenforee  the  fort  would  require  a  fleet  and 
transports  which  would  be  at  least  four  months 
in  collecting,  and  5,000  regulars  and  20,000  vol- 


42  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

tinteers,  the  use  and  enlistment  of  which  could 
be  authorized  only  by  new  acts  of  Congress, 
after  which  it  would  take  from  six  to  eight 
months  to  prepare  the  troops  for  action.  Scott 
therefore  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  "  that  Major  An- 
•derson  be  instructed  to  evacuate  the  fort  so  long 
gallantly  held  by  him  and  his  companions,  im- 
mediately on  procuring  suitable  water  transpor- 
tation, and  that  he  embark  with  his  command 
ior  New  York." 

As  Lincoln  observed  in  his  message  to  Con- 
gress of  July  4.  1861 :  "  In  a  purely  military 
point  of  view  this  reduced  the  duty  of  the  Ad- 
ministration in  the  case  to  the  mere  matter  of 
getting  the  garrison  safely  out  of  the  fort.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  March  15,  the  President  sent  to 
each  member  of  his  Cabinet  the  inquiry :  "  As- 
suming it  to  be  possible  to  now  provision  Fort 
Sumter,  under  all  the  circumstances  is  it  wise  to 
attempt  it  ?  " 

All  answered  in  the  negative  except  Secretaries 
Chase  and  Blair.  Mr.  Francis  P.  Blair,  Sr.,  at 
this  juncture,  earnestly  urged  the  President  not 
to  abandon  Sumter,  and  even  assured  him  that 
he  thought  he  would  be  impeached  if  he  did  so. 

The  President  next  sent  Captain  Fox  to  Sum- 
ter to  obtain  actual  information  as  to  the  state  of 
the  fort.  Upon  his  return  and  report,  which  ex- 
pressed the  feasibility  of  the  plan,  Mr.  Lincoln 
determined  to  supply  it  with  provisions.  On 
March  29,  after  consultation  with  his  Cabinet, 
he  ordered  Secretary  Cameron  of  the  War  De- 
partment to  cooperate  with  Secretary  Welles  of 
the  Navy  Department  in  preparing  an  expedition 
to  sail  with  provisions  for  Fort  Sumter  as  early 
.as  April  6. 


FORT  SUMTER  43 

Owing  to  a  gale  only  the  Baltic  of  the  fleet  ar- 
rived in  time  to  be  of  service  to  Major  Ander- 
son, and  that  only  to  bear  away  the  surrendered 
garrison.  The  Confederate  Government  heard  of 
the  coming  of  the  provisioning  expedition,  and, 
considering  the  capture  of  the  fort  necessary  to 
the  life  of  the  rebellion,  ordered  General  P.  G.  T. 
Beauregard,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  invest- 
ment, to  procure  its  surrender,  or,  failing  in  this, 
to  bombard  it.  On  the  nth  Beauregard  sent  to 
Major  Anderson  a  summons  to  surrender,  offer- 
ing to  him,  in  case  of  compliance,  facilities  to  re- 
move the  troops,  and  to  the  garrison  the  privilege 
of  saluting  their  flag.  To  this  Anderson  replied 
that  he  would  surrender  the  fort  on  the  I5th  if 
supplies  did  not  reach  him  by  that  time,  or  if  he 
did  not  before  then  receive  orders  to  the  con- 
trary from  his  government. 

These  conditions  did  not  suit  the  Confederates, 
and  on  Friday,  April  12,  at  3  A.  M.,  they  gave 
Anderson  notice  that  their  batteries  would  open 
on  the  fort  in  an  hour.  At  4.30  the  bombard- 
ment began,  and  continued  throughout  that  day 
and  into  the  next.  At  nine  o'clock  on  Saturday 
morning  the  fort  took  fire,  and  Major  Anderson 
felt  compelled  to  throw  all  but  five  barrels  of 
powder  into  the  sea  to  prevent  an  explosion. 
The  flag-staff  was  shot  through  at  i  p.  M.,  and 
the  Confederates,  observing  the  fall  of  the  flag, 
sent  messengers  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the 
fort.  The  first  of  these  to  arrive  was  Senator 
Wigfall,  who  was  a  colonel  on  Beauregard's 
staff. 

Anderson  accepted  the  conditions  of  surrender 
offered  upon  the  nth,  and  Wigfall  agreed  to  the 
capitulation.  Although  Wigfall  had  not  been  au- 


44  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

thorized  to  take  this  action,  Beauregard  ratified 
the  arrangement.  By  8  p.  M.  the  capitulation  was 
arranged,  and  on  the  following  day,  Sunday, 
April  14,  the  garrison  sailed  northward  in  the 
Baltic. 

The  extreme  caution  displayed  by  Mr.  Lincoln 
in  this  affair  of  Fort  Sumter,  the  most  important 
matter  which  confronted  his  Administration,  can- 
not be  too  highly  commended.  That  this  provi- 
sioning of  the  fort  would  inaugurate  a  war  was 
certain;  it  was  in  the  highest  degree  salutary  to 
avoid  the  initiative  altogether  if  possible,  or,  if 
it  must  needs  come,  to  have  it  charged  up  to  the 
enemy.  In  a  war  such  as  was  inevitable  the 
moral  aspect  was  of  primary  importance ;  and  the 
President  displayed  great  talent  and  adroitness  in 
doing  no  act  which  could  properly  be  considered 
a  casus  belli. 

Nor  can  this  war  be  charged  to  haste  or  want 
of  proper  deliberation,  or  considered  as  inau- 
gurated in  passion  or  by  an  accident  of  any  sort. 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  a  cold-blooded  affair,  be- 
gun after  the  most  profound  and  painstaking  de- 
liberation and  warning.  The  good  offices  of  Jus- 
tice Campbell,  of  the  Russian  Minister,  of  James 
L.  Pettigru,  of  Charleston,  of  ex-Governor  Wil- 
liam Aiken,  and  others  were  exerted  to  the  ut- 
most in  favor  of  pacification,  but  no  marplots  or 
conspirators  were  any  more  fatally  bent  on  mis~ 
chief  and  ruin  than  were  the  Montgomery  and 
Charleston  secessionists.  The  people  of  South 
Carolina  were  nearly  unanimous  in  their  wishes ; 
but  the  representatives  at  Montgomery  were  be- 
traying their  constituents,  who  had  acquiesced  re- 
luctantly in  secession  on  the  assurance  from  all 
the  politicians  that  it  would  be  peaceably  ac- 


THE  VIRGINIA  CONVENTIO  45 

complished.  Had  they  suspected  that  they  were 
to  achieve  their  independence  through  the  arbit- 
rament of  war,  and  that  blood  would  bedew  the 
"  sacred  soil  "  of  every  Southern  State,  not  a 
single  State  except  South  Carolina  would  have 
seceded. 

Poor  old  Virginia,  the  mother  of  States  and 
statesmen,  was  slaughtered  at  last  in  the  house  of 
her  friends.  Since  February  13  the  State  had 
been  holding  a  convention  to  consider  its  policy  in 
the  crisis.  The  Union  delegates  were  in  a  ma- 
jority. An  ordinance  of  secession  was  voted 
down  on  March  17  by  a  majority  of  ninety  to 
forty-five ;  and  a  similar  proposition  was  de- 
feated on  April  4,  but  still  the  convention  declined 
to  adjourn.  Mr.  Lincoln  therefore  caused  a  let- 
ter to  be  sent  to  George  W.  Summers,  of  Charles- 
ton, Va.,  the  most  talented  of  the  Union  men  in 
his  State,  requesting  that  he  come  to  Washing- 
ton for  conference.  Summers,  who  died  during 
the  war  of  softening  of  the  brain,  induced  by  the 
mental  anxiety  which  the  war  aroused,  was  kept 
by  timidity  from  accepting  the  President's  in- 
vitation: but  he  sent  John  B.  Baldwin  in  his 
place. 

The  interview  was  held  on  the  morning  of 
April  4.  Baldwin  returned  to  the  convention  re- 
porting that  his  conference  with  the  President 
was  inconclusive;  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  charac- 
terized the  convention  as  a  "  standing  menace 
which  embarrassed  him  very  much,"  and  there- 
fore he  desired  that  it  adjourn  sine  die,  but  that 
he  had  given  no  promise  of  what  return  he  would 
make  to  it  for  compliance  with  his  wishes.  John 
Minor  Botts,  another  member  of  the  convention, 
called  on  the  President  two  days  afterwards,  and 


46  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

held  a  conversation  in  which  Mr.  Lincoln  gave 
an  account  of  the  interview  with  Baldwin  which, 
as  remembered  by  Mr.  Botts,  differed  materially 
from  Baldwin's  report.  The  President,  said 
Botts,  spoke  of  the  fleet  in  New  York  harbor  pre- 
paring to  sail  that  afternoon  to  provision  Fort 
Sumter.  "  Now,"  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  "  your  con- 
vention in  Richmond  has  been  sitting  for  nearly 
two  months,  and  all  it  has  done  has  been  to  shake 
the  rod  over  my  head  [threatening  to  secede  if 
coercion  should  be  used  to  bring  back  South 
Carolina  into  the  Union].  If  the  Union  majority 
in  the  Virginia  convention  will  adjourn  it  with- 
out its  passing  an  ordinance  of  secession,  this 
fleet  shall  be  kept  from  sailing,  and  instead,  Fort 
Sumter  shall  be  evacuated.  I  think  it  is  a  good 
swap  to  give  a  fort  for  a  State  any  time." 

As  a  result  of  Baldwin's  report,  the  Virginia 
convention  remained  in  session,  and  on  April  8 
appointed  another  delegation,  consisting  of  Wil- 
liam Ballard  Preston,  Alexander  H.  H.  Stuart, 
and  George  W.  Randolph,  to  wait  on  President 
Lincoln,  and  ask  him  to  communicate  to  the  con- 
vention "  the  policy  which  the  Federal  executive 
intends  to  pursue  in  regard  to  the  Federal 
States." 

The  committee  had  an  audience  with  the  Presi- 
dent at  Washington  on  April  13,  the  day  after 
Fort  Sumter  had  been  fired  upon  by  the  South 
Carolinian  secessionists.  He  referred  the  con- 
vention to  the  policy  expressed  in  his  inaugural 
address : 

As  I  then  and  therein  said,  I  now  repeat :  "  The 
power  confided  to  me  will  be  used  to  hold,  occupy,  and 
possess  the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  to  collect  the  duties  and  imposts;  but 


THE  VIRGINIA  CONVENTION  47 

beyond  what  is  necessary  for  these  objects,  there  will 
be  no  invasion,  no  using  of  force  against  or  among 
the  people  anywhere."  ...  In  case  it  proves  true 
that  Fort  Sumter  has  been  assaulted,  as  is  reported,  I 
shall  perhaps  cause  the  United  States  mails  to  be  with- 
drawn from  all  the  States  which  claim  to  have  seceded, 
believing  that  the  commencement  of  actual  war  against 
the  Government  justifies  and  possibly  demands  this.  .  .  . 
Whatever  else  I  may  do  for  the  purpose,  I  shall  not 
attempt  to  collect  the  duties  and  imposts  by  any  armed 
invasion  of  any  part  of  the  country ;  not  meaning  by 
this,  however,  that  I  may  not  land  a  force  deemed 
necessary  to  relieve  a  fort  upon  a  border  of  the  country. 

Baldwin  was  nominally  a  Union  man,  and  had 
voted  against  secession,  but  for  some  reason  he 
had  fallen  into  the  toils  of  the  secessionists;  ac- 
cordingly he  reported  that  his  mission  was  a  fail- 
ure, and  that  the  President  would  make  no  prom- 
ise whatever  about  Sumter.  The  reason  for  this 
reprehensible  conduct,  which  led  to  the  disman- 
tlement, invasion,  and  ruin  of  Virginia,  was  prob- 
ably that  Baldwin  was  in  favor  of  secession,  but 
feared  to  vote  openly  for  it  by  reason  of  the  cer- 
tain wrath  of  his  constituents,  and  therefore  en- 
deavored to  accomplish  secession  in  an  indirect 
and  covert  way. 

The  report  of  this  committee,  followed  as  it 
was  by  the  President's  call  of  April  15  for 
75,000  militia  to  suppress  the  rebellion  and 
to  be  raised  by  the  several  States  of  the 
Union,  which  included  Virginia,  caused  the  con- 
vention, on  April  17,  to  pass  an  ordinance  of 
secession.  This  was  followed  by  a  similar  ordi- 
nance in  Arkansas  on  May  6,  a  military  league 
with  the  Confederacy  in  Tennessee  on  May  7,  and 
an  ordinance  of  secession  in  North  Carolina  on 
May  20. 


48  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

No  doubt  can  exist  that  if  the  first  delegate, 
Baldwin,  had  correctly  reported  the  President, 
the  convention  would  promptly  have  adjourned; 
Sumter  would  have  been  evacuated ;  the  cotton 
States'  cabal  would  have  had  no  support  of  any 
kind  from  the  border  States ;  North  Carolina,  Ar- 
kansas, and  Tennessee  would  have  refused  to  go 
with  them ;  the  people  of  the  Gulf  States  would 
have  grown  restless  at  their  anomalous  position, 
and  under  the  lead  of  Stephens,  Hill,  Sam  Hous- 
ton, Bouligny,  Hamilton,  and  other  Union  men 
would  have  effected  a  counter-revolution  which 
would  have  disintegrated  the  Confederacy. 

The  Confederate  Government  established  its 
capital  at  Richmond  on  the  21  st  of  May;  and 
North  Carolina,  being  surrounded  by  secession 
territory,  seceded  the  same  day.  So  the  most 
conspicuous  battlefield  was  transferred  of  neces- 
sity to  the  territory  about  and  between  the  capi- 
tals; and  to  the  most  ordinary  apprehension  it 
was  palpable  that  nothing  but  ruin,  temporarily 
at  least,  was  in  store  for  that  proud  State  which 
had  furnished  the  Union  seven  sovereign  States 
and  seven  Presidents. 


CHAPTER  III 

FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 

THERE  is  an  ancient  story,  which  was  a  favor- 
ite with  Lincoln,  of  a  hunter  who  at  a  critical 
juncture  in  a  fight  with  a  bear  prayed:  "O 
Lord,  be  on  my  side  if  you  will,  but  if  you  won't, 
don't  help  the  bear !  " 

At  the  same  time  that  the  President  was  en- 
deavoring to  win  Maryland,  Kentucky,  and  Mis- 
souri to  the  Union  cause,  and,  failing  in  this,  to 
prevent  their  joining  the  Confederacy,  he  was 
exerting  every  available  influence  of  his  Admin- 
istration to  maintain  cordial  relations  with 
European  governments  and  to  block  the  strenu- 
ous efforts  which  the  Confederacy  was  making 
toN  secure  from  them  recognition  as  a  nation. 

He  chose  most  admirable  men  for  his  foreign 
ministers.  For  the  two  most  important  countries, 
Great  Britain  and  France,  his  choice  was  par- 
ticularly happy.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  of 
Massachusetts,  who  was  accredited  to  the  Court 
of  St.  James,  was  the  grandson  of  one  Presi- 
dent, and  the  son  of  another,  both  brave  and 
brilliant  men,  and  he  had  inherited  their  qualities. 
William  L.  Dayton,  of  New  Jersey,  who  went 
to  the  French  court,  was  a  man  whom  Lincoln 
revered  for  his  high  character,  and  whom  he 
had  been  anxious  to  honor  from  the  day  when  his 

49 


50  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

own  elevation  to  dignity  and  power  was 
assured. 

That  the  illegitimate,  but  then  powerful  gov- 
ernment of  Louis  Napoleon,  and  likewise  the 
aristocracy  or  ruling  power  of  Great  Britain, 
would  deeply  sympathize  with,  and  aid  any 
movement  to  enfeeble,  humiliate,  or  destroy  our 
Government  was  nowise  in  doubt.  And  it  also 
was  assumed  that  England  must,  at  all  hazards, 
secure  the  cotton  crops  of  the  South,  and  to  this 
end  would  accede  to  any  reasonable  commercial 
treaty  which  would  enforce  the  autonomy  of  a 
government  composed  chiefly  of  the  Cotton 
States.  In  fact,  had  it  not  been  for  this  belief,  the 
South  would  never  have  rebelled. 

The  corollary  was  inevitable  that,  in  the  event 
of  recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  by 
England  and  France,  the  United  States  would 
declare  war  against  these  nations,  the  certain  out- 
come of  which  would  be  the  defeat  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  establishment  of  the  Confederate 
States  as  a  nation. 

In  view  of  the  anomalous  character  of  our 
national  affairs,  it  was  deemed  politic  and  neces- 
sary by  the  Administration  to  issue  a  more  elab- 
orate letter  of  instructions,  primarily  and  os- 
tensibly for  the  guidance  of  all  our  ambassadors 
in  Europe,  but  even  more  emphatically  designed 
as  an  official  declaration  by  the  Government  itself 
of  its  purposes  with  reference  to  the  domestic  in- 
surrection within  its  borders,  and  of  its  expecta- 
tions and  its  desires  in  reference  to  the  attitude 
and  the  conduct  of  the  powers  of  the  world  in 
that  crisis. 

This  important  document  was  drawn  with 
great  skill  and  care  by  the  Secretary,  and  then 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  51 

Gubmitted  to  the  President  for  his  approval.  The 
President  was  equal  to  the  dignity  and  impor- 
tance of  the  occasion,  and  this  was  his  first  ex- 
perience in  the  important  role  of  diplomacy.  He 
took  the  document  and  amended  it  in  many  par- 
ticulars, which  relieved  it  of  an  objectionable 
style,  while  preserving  its  firmness  of  attitude 
and  dignity  of  character.  It  was  a  wonderful 
performance,  and  when  known,  as  it  was  not  till 
after  the  death  of  the  performer,  gained  him  the 
plaudits  of  publicists  everywhere.  No  jeweler's 
scale  ever  weighed  diamond  dust  with  more 
equal  poise  than  Fate  weighed  the  contingency 
of  war  with  England  in  1861.  The  British 
nation  had  an  earnest  desire  to  take  the  first  step 
thereto,  by  recognizing  the  insurgents  as  a  nation 
de  facto;  and  simply  waited  a  chance  to  do  so. 
An  ill-mannered  phrase — a  hint  of  defiance — a 
gleam  of  superciliousness  would  be  sufficient,  and 
so  matters  stood  when  the  President  signed  the 
letter. 

By  this  letter  Adams  was  instructed  to  ac- 
knowledge on  behalf  of  the  .President  the  ex- 
pression of  the  British  Government's  good-will 
to  the  United  States,  but  was  advised  not  to  rely 
on  any  mere  national  courtesies,  nor  to  let  fall  any 
"  admissions  of  weakness  in  our  constitution,  or 
of  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  Government," 
but  on  the  contrary,  to  claim  by  comparison  with 
other  countries  that  our  "  constitution  and  gov- 
ernment are  really  the  strongest  and  surest  which 
have  ever  been  erected  for  the  safety  of  any 
people."  Any  suggestion  of  foreign  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  seceding  States,  with  a  view  to 
compromise,  was  to  be  sternly  discountenanced, 
and  war  was  to  be  threatened  in  case  of  recogni- 


5 a  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

tion  of  the  Confederate  Government.    The  min- 
ister was  further  advised  to  be  discreet. 

You  will  not  consent  to  draw  into  debate  before  the 
British  Government  any  opposing  moral  principles 
which  may  be  supposed  to  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the 
controversy  between  those  States  and  the  Federal 
Union.  You  will  indulge  in  no  expressions  of  harsh- 
ness or  disrespect,  or  even  impatience  concerning  the 
seceding  States,  their  agents,  or  their  people.  But  you 
will,  on  the  contrary,  all  the  while  remember  that  those 
States  are  now,  as  they  always  heretofore  have  been, 
and,  notwithstanding  their  temporary  self-delusion,  they 
must  always  continue  to  be,  equal  and  honored  members 
of  this  Federal  Union,  and  that  their  citizens,  through- 
out all  political  misunderstandings  and  alienations,  still 
are  and  always  must  be  our  kindred  and  countrymen. 
In  short,  all  your  arguments  must  belong  to  one  of 
three  classes,  namely :  First.  Arguments  drawn  from 
the  principles  of  public  law  and  natural  justice,  which 
regulate  the  intercourse  of  equal  States.  Secondly. 
Arguments  which  concern  equally  the  honor,  welfare, 
and  happiness  of  the  discontented  States,  and  the  honor, 
welfare,  and  happiness  of  the  whole  Union.  Thirdly. 
Arguments  which  are  equally  conservative  of  the  rights 
and  interests,  and  even  sentiments  of  the  United  States, 
and  just  in  their  bearing  upon  the  rights,  interests,  and 
sentiments  of  Great  Britain  and  all  other  nations. 

Before  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Adams  in  London 
with  the  letter,  however,  the  British  and  French 
governments,  acting  with  indecent  haste,  had  con- 
cluded to  intervene  in  our  affairs  to  the  extent  of 
recognizing  the  bastard  government  at  Mont- 
gomery as  a  belligerent,  which  was  a  step  in  the 
direction  of  recognizing  it  as  a  nation  on  an 
equality  with  the  United  States.  Against  this 
unjust  and  impertinent  interference  in  our  affairs 
our  Government  protested  with  emphasis,  and 
when  on  June  15  succeeding,  the  English  and 
French  ministers,  acting  in  concert,  desired  dip- 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  53 

lomatically  to  present  sundry  instructions  which 
had  been  received  from  their  respective  govern- 
ments, the  President,  who  had  been  unofficially 
advised  of  its  contents,  declined  to  receive  the 
document,  though  our  Government  did  take  suffi- 
cient note  of  the  memorandum  to  notify  Ministers 
Adams  and  Dayton  of  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  toward  it.  This  paper  (wrote  Secretary 
Seward  to  Minister  Adams)  purports  to  contain 
a  decision  of  the  British  Government  that  this 
country  is  divided  into  two  belligerent  parties 
toward  which  Great  Britain  assumes  the  attitude 
of  a  neutral.  Against  this  view  the  Secretary  pro- 
tested. The  United  States,  he  said,  are  the  sole 
sovereign  power  in  the  country,  fulfilling  all 
national  obligations  to  other  countries,  and  until 
this  sovereignty  was  impaired  to  the  detriment 
of  foreign  nations,  none  of  them  had  a  right  to 
intervene,  or  to  cast  off  its  obligations  to  the 
United  States.  "  Any  other  principle,"  he  ob- 
served, "  would  be  to  resolve  government  every- 
where into  a  thing  of  accident  and  caprice,  and  ul- 
timately all  human  society  into  an  estate  of  war." 

Upon  receiving  this  dispatch  Minister  Adams 
called  upon  Lord  John  Russell,  the  British  For- 
eign Secretary,  and  told  him  that  a  continuation 
of  the  apparent  relation  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment with  the  Rebel  commissioners,  then  in  Lon- 
don, "  could  scarcely  fail  to  be  viewed  by  us  as 
hostile  in  spirit,  and  to  require  some  correspond- 
ing action  accordingly."  Lord  John  Russell  re- 
plied that  he  "  had  no  expectation  "  of  seeing  the 
Rebel  commissioners  again. 

Nevertheless  our  complaints  and  protests  pro- 
duced no  change  in  the  unofficial  attitude  of  those 
powerful  governments  toward  the  rebellion ;  these 


54  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

still  remained  as  earnest  sympathizers  and  en- 
couragers  of  a  faction  whose  aim  and  intent  was 
to  establish  a  government  upon  the  corner  stone 
of  an  institution  which  England  and  France  had 
been  zealous  and  enthusiastic  in  declaring  as 
piracy.  Their  antipathy  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  was  equally  pronounced;  the 
leading  statesmen  and  newspapers  treated  our 
Government  with  disparagement  and  contempt; 
their  chief  comic  paper  used  our  honored  and  de- 
voted President  as  its  chief  butt  of  ridicule. 
While  Mr.  Lincoln  was  winning  the  esteem  of 
publicists  and  disinterested  statesmen  in  Ger- 
many, Russia,  Switzerland,  and  Italy,  for  his 
masterly  and  philanthropic  conduct  of  affairs  in 
an  era  of  the  sternest  difficulty,  the  leading 
political  exponents  of  England  lost  no  oppor- 
tunity to  belittle  and  disparage  our  efforts,  in- 
tentions, and  deeds.  In  every  way  that  sympathy 
could  be  accorded,  or  material  help  afforded  to 
the  Rebels  without  cause  for  an  open  rupture,  it 
was  done  in  England.  Union  adherents  in  Eng- 
land were  vilified  and  insulted,  and  Rebels  cor- 
respondingly honored ;  the  Rebel  navy  and  block- 
ade-runners were  products  of  British  shipyards, 
and,  but  for  them,  there  would  not  have  been  a 
decent  vessel  afloat  adorned  with  the  Confeder- 
ate flag.  It  is  reasonably  safe  to  say  that  had 
England  maintained  its  obligations  of  truth, 
humanity,  and  national  honor,  the  war  would  have 
been  crushed  out  two  years  earlier  than  it  was, 
and  had  it  not  been  for  preliminary  assurances  of 
support  from  England,  France,  and  the  "  Copper- 
heads "  of  the  Northern  States  it  never  would 
have  been  initiated. 

The  firm,  just,  and  unyielding  attitude  of  the 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  55 

iAdministration  compelled  the  governments  of 
England  and  France  to  delay  their  recognition 
of  the  Confederacy  as  a  nation,  but  an  event 
occurred  in  the  fall  which  caused  the  secession- 
ists the  greatest  delight  and  induced  a  belief  that 
the  long-wished-for  time  had  at  length  arrived, 
and  that  not  only  would  the  South  be  recognized 
as  a  nation,  but  that  war  would  also  be  declared 
by  England  against  the  United  States. 

The  Rebel  Government  decided  to  dispatch 
agents  or  ambassadors  to  England  and  France, 
in  order  to  bring  about  a  consummation  of  their 
hopes,  and  James  M.  Mason,  of  Virginia,  and 
John  Slidell,  of  Louisiana,  were  selected.  On 
October  12,  1861,  accompanied  with  their  fam- 
ilies, they  sailed  from  Charleston  for  Cuba  in  the 
blockade-runner  Tlieodora,  and  left  Havana  for 
St.  Thomas  en  route  to  Europe  in  the  British 
mail  steamer  Trent,  on  which  vessel  on  Novem- 
ber 8  they  were  captured  by  Captain  Wilkes  of 
our  navy,  and  taken  on  board  his  frigate  San 
Jacinto,  and  carried  to  Fort  Warren  in  Boston 
Harbor,  where  they  were  held  as  prisoners  of 
war.  This  action  was  approved  by  Congress,  by 
the  Cabinet,  and  by  the  public.  The  report  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  December  2  said : 

The  prompt  and  decisive  action  of  Captain  Wilkes 
on  this  occasion  merited  and  received  the  emphatic  ap- 
proval of  the  department ;  and  if  a  too  generous  for- 
bearance was  exhibited  by  him  in  not  capturing  the  ves- 
sel which  had  these  Rebel  enemies  on  board,  it  may,  in 
view  of  the  special  circumstances,  and  of  its  patriotic 
motives,  be  excused ;  but  it  must,  by  no  means,  be  per- 
mitted to  constitute  a  precedent  hereafter,  for  the  treat- 
ment of  any  case  of  similar  infraction  of  neutral  obliga- 
tions by  foreign  vessels  engaged  in  commerce  or  the 
carr>-ing  trade. 


56  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

However,  Lincoln's  logical  instincts  engen- 
dered in  his  mind  the  opinions  that  Wilkes'  action 
was  technically  unauthorized,  and  would  be 
seized  upon  by  England  as  a  pretext  to  involve 
the  nation  in  a  war.  He  therefore  conferred 
with  Hon.  Thomas  Ewing,  a  retired  statesman 
of  the  preceding  generation,  who  assured  him 
that  Captain  Wilkes  had  been  wrong  by  the  law 
of  nations.  Accordingly,  on  November  30  a 
dispatch  was  sent  to  our  minister  recounting  the 
facts,  disavowing  any  complicity  in  Captain 
Wilkes'  act,  and  expressing  a  desire  to  treat  with 
England  on  the  subject.  On  the  same  day  the 
British  minister  for  foreign  affairs  sent  a  note 
to  Lord  Lyons,  the  British  minister  at  Washing- 
ton, expressing  the  desire  of  the  British  Cabinet 
that  our  nation  would  disavow  any  authority  in 
the  affair,  would  yield  up  the  prisoners,  and  make 
an  apology;  all  of  which  were  impressed  with 
the  force  and  authority  of  an  ultimatum.  On 
December  26  Secretary  Seward  handed  Lord 
Lyons  a  dispatch  in  which  he  claimed  a  right 
and  duty  on  the  part  of  Captain  Wilkes  to  do 
precisely  as  he  did,  but  admitted  that  Wilkes 
erred  in  not  bringing  the  prisoners  into  a  prize 
court  for  adjudication,  hence  that  the  nation 
could  not  technically  hold  them,  and  therefore 
he  ordered  their  discharge.  This  dispatch 
contained  a  very  ingenious  device  for  getting 
out  of  a  serious  dilemma.  If  we  were  right, 
we  must  maintain  our  position  even  at  the 
expense  and  hazard  of  a  war  with  England. 
We  could  not  display  cowardice;  it  would 
ruin  our  nation  abroad  and  destroy  its  pres- 
tige at  home ;  our  soldiers  would  have  re- 
tired from  the  war,  and  our  resistance  to 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  57 

the  rebellion  would  have  ended.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  we  were  wrong,  we  were  equally  bound 
to  make  reparation,  but  no  sophistical  case  of 
being  wrong  would  answer ;  the  whole  array  of 
nations  stood  as  an  impenetrable  phalanx  of 
critics — the  secessionists  in  the  South,  and  their 
aiders  and  abetters  in  Congress  and  elsewhere, 
were  ready  to  seize  any  pretext  to  humiliate  and 
contemn  the  Administration.  Captain  Wilkes 
stood  high  in  a  conventional  and  moral  sense, 
and  his  act,  done  in  good  faith  and  for  the  honor 
of  the  nation,  had  been  applauded  by  the  Navy 
Department,  by  Congress,  and  By  universal  acclaim 
of  the  people ;  hence  now  to  sacrifice  him  would 
be  deemed  an  act  of  cowardice  and  certainly  un- 
just. The  dilemma  was  to  appease  England 
without  losing  caste  with  our  people  and  with 
the  world.  Our  enemies  did  not  see  the  pos- 
sibility of  escape  from  this  dilemma,  and  a  war 
with  England  was  deemed  certain  and  inevitable. 
The  "  Copperhead  "  contingent  in  Congress  did 
their  "  level  best "  to  foment  it,  while  it  was 
declared  in  the  London  newspapers  that  "  the 
war  will  be  terrible;  it  will  commence  with  a 
recognition  of  Southern  independence,  their  al- 
liance and  sure  independence." 

Mr.  Seward's  dispatch  dispelled  these  florid 
and  flagitious  hopes.  The  Vallandighams  and 
Pendletons  raged  in  Congress  over  their  dis- 
comfiture, and  in  Dixie  feelings  of  chagrin  were 
almost  too  full  for  utterance,  although  one  of  the 
Southern  paragraphers  did  venture  to  advise  us 
that  "  the  surrender  was  an  exhibition  of  mean- 
ness and  cowardice  unparalleled  in  the  political 
history  of  the  civilized  world." 

These  Confederate  commissioners  were  given 


j8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

•over  to  the  custody  of  a  British  vessel  by  which 
they  were  transported  to  London ;  upon  which 
they  dropped  completely  out  of  sight.  They 
made  no  political  impression,  and  remained 
abroad  until  they  died,  expatriated. 

It  may  be  stated  that  the  hopes  of  foreign  in- 
tervention attained  their  acme  on  the  day  that 
news  of  the  Trent  affair  reached  London,  but 
that  they  lapsed  into  nothingness  immediately 
after  the  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell. 

That  the  English  Government  desired  a  war, 
with  an  excusing  cause  behind  it,  is  clear;  and 
that  our  Administration  was  as  zealous  (or  at 
least  that  its  head  was)  to  avoid  it  is  equally  so. 
To  any  suggestions,  of  which  there  were  many, 
made  to  the  Executive,  tending  to  stimulate  and 
enliven  his  warlike  spirit,  his  terse  answer,  em- 
bodying his  policy,  was, "  one  war  at  a  time."  The 
Trent  affair  was  really  beneficial  to  our  relations 
with  England,  for  it  assured  England  that  our 
Cabinet  was  ruled  and  animated  by  knowledge, 
justice,  firmness,  and  moderation,  rather  than  by 
enthusiasm  and  popular  clamor;  and  a  spirit  of 
respect  for  it  was  observed  ever  afterwards,  in 
Great  Britain  and  France.  On  February  18, 
1862,  our  minister  complained  to  the  British  Ad- 
miralty that  a  gunboat  was  being  built  at  Liver- 
pool for  the  Rebel  service.  The  Foreign  Secre- 
tary evaded  the  protest  on  a  flimsy  pretext,  which 
proved  fallacious,  and  she  turned  up  at  Nassau 
as  a  Rebel  privateer  immediately  thereafter.  In 
June  succeeding  the  attention  of  the  British  Cab- 
inet was  drawn  to  the  fact  that  another  war 
steamer  was  being  built  for  the  Rebels.  The 
Cabinet  temporized  till  the  vessel  got  away,  sailed 
..to  the  Azores,  and  took  on  an  armament.  First 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  59 

as  "  290,"  and  afterward  as  the  Alabama  she 
preyed  upon  our  shipping  till  June  19,  1864, 
when  she  was  sunk  off  the  French  port  of  Cher- 
bourg by  the  Kearsarge. 

Louis  Napoleon,  himself  an  usurper,  conceived 
likewise  an  ardent  affection  for  this  bastard  gov- 
ernment, and,  after  trying  to  secure  the  coopera- 
tion of  England  and  Russia  in  a  mediation  in  our 
affairs,  resolved  to  make  the  attempt  single- 
handed.  Accordingly,  on  January  9,  1863,  the 
French  Government  sent  to  its  minister  a  pro- 
posal for  mediation,  in  which  it  suggested  a 
meeting  of  the  Government  with  the  Rebels.  To 
this  the  President  instructed  his  Secretary  to 
make  a  reply  whose  vigor  and  stern  independence 
will  doubtless  be  appreciated  by  all  patriotic 
hearts.  It  said  in  part : 


This  Government  has  not  the  least  thought  of  relin- 
quishing the  trust  which  has  been  confided  to  it  by  the 
nation  under  the  most  solemn  of  all  political  sanctions ; 
and  if  it  had  any  such  thought,  it  would  still  have  abun- 
dant reason  to  know  that  peace  proposed  at  the  cost 
of  dissolution  would  be  immediately,  unreservedly,  and 
indignantly  rejected  by  the  American  people.  It  is  a 
great  mistake  that  European  statesmen  make,  if  they 
suppose  this  people  are  demoralized.  Whatever,  in  the 
case  of  an  insurrection,  the  people  of  France,  or  of 
Great  Britain,  or  of  Switzerland,  or  of  the  Netherlands 
would  do  to  save  their  national  existence,  no  matter 
how  the  strife  might  be  regarded  by  or  might  affect 
foreign  nations,  just  so  much,  and  certainly  no  less,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  will  do,  if  necessary  to  save 
for  the  common  benefit  the  region  which  is  bounded  by 
the  Pacific  and  the  Atlantic  coasts,  and  by  the  shores 
of  the  Gulfs  of  St.  Lawrence  and  Mexico,  together  with 
the  free  and  common  navigation  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
Missouri,  Arkansas,  Mississippi,  Ohio,  St.  Lawrence, 
Hudson,  Delaware,  Potomac,  and  other  natural  high- 


60  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

ways  by  which  this  land,  which  to  them  is  at  once  a 
land  of  inheritance  and  a  land  of  promise,  is  opened  and 
watered.  Even  if  the  agents  of  the  American  people 
now  exercising  their  power  should,  through  fear  or  fac- 
tion, fall  below  this  height  of  the  national  virtue,  they 
would  be  speedily,  yet  constitutionally,  replaced  by 
others  of  sterner  character  and  patriotism. 

The  question  of  foreign  intervention  was  for- 
ever put  to  rest  by  this  dispatch.  Foreign  nations 
admired  the  dignity  and  spirit  with  which  the  Ad- 
ministration bore  itself  in  its  era  of  misfortune, 
and  respected  it  accordingly.  In  the  vigor  of  its 
management  of  foreign  relations  it  compared 
favorably  with  any  preceding  Administration. 
The  unostentatious  dignity,  unyielding  firmness, 
and  delicate  tact  displayed  secured  the  approval 
of  nations,  and  commanded  the  respect  of  the 
civilized  world. 

In  1863  Rebel  rams  destined  for  the  Rebel 
navy  (so-called)  were  being  built  in  England, 
and  our  minister,  unwearied  and  assiduous  amidst 
discouragements,  made  energetic  protests  which 
finally,  after  much  diplomacy,  took  effect,  and 
at  last,  on  September  8,  he  had  the  satisfaction  of 
receiving  assurances  from  the  Cabinet  that  the 
rams  would  not  be  suffered  to  depart. 

But  the  British  Cabinet  and  the  British  ad- 
miralty alike  strained  every  point  in  favor  of  the 
Rebels,  and  in  a  case  which  found  its  way  into 
the  Admiralty  Court  the  doctrine  was  adjudged 
that  gave  license,  or  at  least  excuse,  for  the 
Rebels  to  fit  out  their  war  vessels  in  British 
ports.  Our  Government  informed  the  British 
Cabinet  in  diplomatic  language  that,  if  that  policy 
was  persisted  in,  those  vessels  would  be  deemed 
pirates,  and  they  would  be  pursued  into  any  port. 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  61 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  occurrences,  diplo- 
matic and  other,  occurred  in  connection  with 
the  building  of  two  Rebel  rams  by  the  Messrs. 
Laird  of  Birkenhead.  Minister  Adams  had  a 
detective  watching  progress  and  securing  in- 
formation, and  as  the  vessels  approached  com- 
pletion he  notified  the  British  ministry,  which  at- 
tempted to  evade  the  scrutiny  and  investigation, 
and  succeeded  well  for  a  time  until  the  proofs 
were  forced  so  clearly  on  the  Government  that  it 
expressed  its  willingness  to  detain  the  vessels, 
but  required  a  deposit  of  one  million  pounds  in 
gold  coin  as  security  for  any  damage  that  might 
accrue  should  the  detention  prove  wrongful. 

There  was  very  little  time  to  obtain  and  make 
the  deposit,  even  if  our  Government  had  the  gold, 
which  it  did  not  at  that  time.  At  this  juncture 
an  unknown  American  visited  Mr.  Adams  and 
offered  to  furnish  the  gold  required,  but  sug- 
gested that  the  Government  had  better  approve 
the  act  and  secure  the  amount  to  him.  Mr. 
Adams  suggested  that  he  would  ask  the  Govern- 
ment to  deposit  $10,000,000  of  5-20  bonds  as 
collateral  in  refunding  the  $5,000,000  so  to  be 
advanced. 

The  news  reached  the  Department  on  a  Friday 
morning,  and  the  bonds  must  be  on  shipboard  by 
noon  of  next  Monday.  Of  blank  bonds  there 
were  on  hand  $7,500,000  in  denomination  of 
$1,000  only;  the  remaining  $2,500,000  must  be 
made  up  from  those  of  the  denomination  of  $500. 
And  all  of  these  bonds  to  be  valid  must  be  signed 
by  the  Register  of  the  Treasury  in  person. 
Twelve  thousand  five  hundred  signatures  to  be 
made  in  sixty-four  hours,  including  the  time  in- 
dispensable to  eat  and  sleep !  It  was  not  thought 


6a  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

possible  for  one  man  to  accomplish  it,  so  the  plan 
proposed  was  for  Mr.  Chittenden,  the  Register, 
to  sign  as  long  as  he  could  endure  it,  and  then  to 
resign  his  office  and  have  a  new  Register  ap- 
pointed who  should  sign  the  rest.  Mr.  Chitten- 
den summoned  his  physician,  had  his  diet  pre- 
scribed and  brought  to  the  office,  and  his  lodging 
provided,  and  at  noon  of  Friday  set  about  his 
long  task.  The  physician  watched  his  pulse,  ad- 
ministered stimulants  and  nervines  as  required, 
and  indicated  small  intervals  of  repose:  but  no 
extended  delay  could  be  allowed,  as  his  arm  and 
fingers  would  become  unserviceable  by  rest  for 
any  length  of  time.  Mr.  Chittenden  was  a  sin- 
cere patriot  and  a  great  man,  and  was  very  am- 
bitious to  complete  the  task  himself,  as  it  would 
not  appear  legitimate  to  have  two  different  Regis- 
ters' names  on  the  bonds,  and  there  were  other 
reasons.  So  he  kept  at  work.  His  fingers  con- 
tracted and  swelled,  became  very  painful  so  he 
•could  hardly  hold  the  pen;  his  arm  and  whole 
right  side  sympathized ;  his  brain  and  spinal  cord 
partook  of  the  nervous  derangement;  but  he 
accomplished  his  task  alone — then  took  to  his 
bed.  He  suffered  more  or  less  all  his  later  life 
from  the  reflex  consequences  of  this  terribly 
severe  task. 

The  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  re- 
gard to  Mexico  was  thus  stated  in  our  instruc- 
tions to  the  American  minister  at  Paris : 

The  United  States  have  neither  the  right  nor  the  dis- 
position to  intervene  by  force  on  either  side  in  the 
lamentable  war  which  is  going  on  between  France  and 
Mexico.  On  the  contrary,  they  practice  in  regard  to 
Mexico,  in  every  phase  of  that  war,  the  non-interven- 
tion which  they  require  all  foreign  powers  to  observe 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  63 

In  regard  to  the  United  States.  But  notwithstanding 
this  self-restraint  this  Government  knows  full  well  that 
the  inherent  normal  opinion  of  Mexico  favors  a  govern- 
ment there  republican  in  form  and  domestic  in  its  or- 
ganization, in  preference  to  any  monarchical  institu- 
tions to  be  imposed  from  abroad.  This  Government 
knows  also  that  this  normal  opinion  of  the  people  of 
Mexico  resulted  largely  from  the  influence  of  popular 
opinion  in  this  country,  and  is  continually  invigorated 
by  it.  The  President  believes,  moreover,  that  this 
popular  opinion  of  the  United  States  is  just  in  itself 
and  eminently  essential  to  the  progress  of  civilization  on 
the  American  continent,  which  civilization,  it  believes, 
can  and  will,  if  left  free  from  European  resistance, 
work  harmoniously  together  with  advancing  refinement 
on  the  other  continents.  This  Government  believes  that 
foreign  resistance,  or  attempts  to  control  American  civ- 
ilization, must  and  will  fail  before  the  ceaseless  and 
ever-increasing  activity  of  material,  moral,  and  political 
forces,  which  peculiarly  belong  to  the  American  conti- 
nent. Nor  do  the  United  States  deny  that,  in  their 
opinion,  their  own  safety  and  the  cheerful  destiny  to 
which  they  aspire  are  intimately  dependent  on  the  con- 
tinuance of  free  republican  institutions  throughout 
America.  .  .  .  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  prac- 
tice reserve  upon  the  point  that  if  France  should, 
upon  due  consideration,  determine  to  adopt  a  policy  in 
Mexico  adverse  to  the  American  opinion  and  senti- 
ments which  I  have  described,  that  policy  would  prob- 
ably scatter  seeds  which  would  be  fruitful  of  jealousies 
which  might  ultimately  ripen  into  collision  between 
France  and  the  United  States  and  other  American  re- 
publics. 

Although  the  House  of  Representatives  passed 
a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  this  nation  ought 
not  to  view  with  complacency  the  attempt  to  set 
up  a  monarchy  in  Mexico,  yet  the  Senate  did  not 
concur  in  it.  But  the  triumph  of  Benito  Juarez 
and  the  execution  of  Maximilian  solved  the  prob- 
lem in  our  favor. 

In  1863  one  Arguelles,  a  colonel  in  the  Spanish 
army  and  Lieutenant-Governor  in  Colon,  Cuba,. 


64  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

had  captured  a  large  number  of  slaves  that  had 
been  imported  from  Africa  within  his  district, 
and  turned  them  over  to  the  Government,  receiv- 
ing $15,000  as  prize  money  therefor.  He  then 
came  to  New  York  City  and  embarked  in  the 
publishing  business.  The  Spanish  Government 
thereafter  ascertained  that  he'  had  .sold 
140  of  the  negroes  into  slavery,  represent- 
ing officially  that  they  had  died,  and  so  it 
stated  to  our  Government  that  his  presence  was 
needed  in  Cuba  to  secure  the  liberty  of  the  slaves. 
The  matter  was  secretly  arranged;  the  Govern- 
ment decided  that  to  furnish  an  asylum  for  a 
wretch  charged  by  his  own  government  with  the 
awful  crime  of  enslaving  140  human  beings  was 
not  in  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  our  institutions, 
and  that  he  should  be  surrendered  to  his  own 
country,  and  it  was  done.  The  whole  Copper- 
head and  Rebel  press  were  venomous  in  their  de- 
nunciations of  the  Administration  for  its  action. 
Secretary  Seward,  on  the  whole,  was  an  ad- 
mirable and  adroit  minister.  His  personal  pop- 
ularity and  magnetism  were  very  great.  His 
cheerfulness  and  magnetism  were  needed  ad- 
juncts ;  and  his  dexterity  and  insouciance  were 
valuable  agents  in  aid  of  a  correct  performance  of 
his  difficult  role.  Secretary  Seward  was  a  re- 
markable man.  His  varied  talents  were  always 
at  the  front;  he  was  a  statesman  of  infinite  re- 
sources ;  he  had  a  facile  adaptation  of  political 
morality  of  great  use  to  a  diplomatist.  His  con- 
science did  not  prevent  him  from  using  language 
to  dissemble  and  also  to  conceal  his  thoughts.  A 
constitutionally  candid  man  would  make  a  poor 
diplomatist.  Seward  was  not  troubled  on  that 
account. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES 

WHEN  the  somber  shadow  of  sectional  strife 
darkened  our  political  horizon  Mr.  Lincoln 
recognized  that  the  thunderbolt  of  war  then  be- 
ing forged  could  mean  no  other  than  a  popular 
war,  both  in  essence  and  in  name.  In  his  first 
official  utterance,  his  Inaugural  Address,  Lincoln 
avowed  his  intention  to  execute  the  laws  in  all 
the  States,  unless  his  "  rightful  masters,  the 
American  people,  should  withhold  the  requisite 
means  or  in  some  authoritative  manner  direct  the 
contrary." 

Now  an  autocratic  war  has  elements  of 
strength,  and  also  those  of  weakness;  it  has 
unity,  secrecy,  and  constancy  of  aim;  it  may  lack 
spirit,  enthusiasm,  and  esprit  du  corps.  A  pop- 
ular war  has  the  strength  and  spirit  of  enthusi- 
asm ;  but  lacks  constancy,  secrecy,  and  discipline. 
Politics  become,  necessarily,  in  practice,  inter- 
woven with  arms.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  obliged  to 
make  generals  of  several  blatant  politicians  to 
keep  them  from  fighting  against  the  war  with 
their  mouths  in  Congress.  These  spent  their  time 
in  witnessing  battles  and  in  glorifying  their  own 
prowess  to  their  Northern  constituencies  at  the 
end  of  each  campaign  or  oftener. 

The  Administration  was  obliged  to  storm  the 
citadels  of  popular  opinion  wherein  it  was  in- 

65 


66  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

trenched;  it  was  as  needful  to  capture  the  New 
York  Herald  as  it  was  New  Orleans;  it  was  as 
imperative  to  keep  Horace  Greeley  quiet  as  to 
prevent  the  invasion  of  Ohio;  it  was  no  less  an 
object  to  put  Democratic  Congressmen  in  good 
humor  than  to  take  Richmond. 

Men  possessing  social  or  political  or  financial 
power  were  sedulously  and  systematically  culti- 
vated, and  their  adhesion  ostentatiously  pro- 
claimed. The  Administration  was  to  make  the 
war  technically  and  actually  popular. 

To  James  Gordon  Bennett  was  tendered  the 
mission  of  France  because  of  the  power  of  his 
great  paper.  No  other  war  was  ever  so 
thoroughly  superimposed  upon  popular  opinion. 
Not  only  was  popular  opinion  at  home  catered  to 
and  cajoled,  but  likewise  that  of  foreign  nations. 
Archbishop  Hughes  and  Henry  Ward  Beecher 
were  sent  by  the  Government  to  England  on  a 
mission  .of  diplomatic  politics,  and  Mr.  Lincoln 
took  especial  pains  to  cultivate  the  English  labor- 
ing classes  in  his  addresses  to  the  workingmen  of 
Manchester  and  London. 

The  War  of  the  Rebellion  on  the  side  of  the 
South  was  unpopular  in  its  incipiency,  but  be- 
came popular  upon  the  North's  invasion  of 
Southern  soil.  The  war  was  waged  on  one  side 
to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Government ; 
and  on  the  other,  as  was  confidently  believed  by 
the  combatants,  to  maintain  the  inviolability  of 
their  homes.  It  was  therefore,  in  the  main,  a 
popular  war  on  both  sides,  although  a  strong 
party  in  Georgia  and  North  Carolina  resented 
the  use  of  their  citizens  in  arms  beyond  the  State 
lines.  Towards  the  last  the  mainstay  and.  vital 
principle  was  the  imperious  will  of  Davis;  and, 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  67 

although  the  Federal  Administration  had  to  cater 
and  truckle  to  the  popular  will  in  many  ways  to 
keep  the  armies  intact,  its  trump  card  at  last 
proved  to  be  that  most  radical  of  measures,  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
hindered  rather  than  helped  by  the  fact  that  in 
each  and  every  State  there  were  citizens  zealous 
in  the  behalf  of  the  Union,  and  demanding  the 
rights  of  American  citizenship.  In  Texas  there 
were  Sam  Houston  and  Andrew  J.  Hamilton;  in 
Louisiana  there  was  John  E.  Bouligny ;  in  North 
Carolina  there  were  John  A.  Gilmer  and  his  ad- 
herents ;  in  South  Carolina  there  was  James  L. 
Pettigru,  probably  the  best  lawyer  in  the  State. 
In  Tennessee,  a  third  part  of  the  State  (East 
Tennessee),  and  a  majority  of  the  people  in  the 
States  of  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  Ken- 
tucky, and  Missouri,  were  in  favor  of  the  Union. 

If  it  was  lawful  and  competent  for  General 
Scott,  in  a  moment  of  panic,  to  advise  that  the 
"  wayward  sisters  "  might  "  go  in  peace,"  and  for 
Horace  Greeley  to  echo  that  sentiment,  a  mo- 
ment's reflection  will  disclose  that  the  door  to  the 
utterance  of  such  sentiments  was  barred  and 
bolted  to  the  President.  Scott,  Greeley,  et  id 
genus  omne  could  indulge  in  their  political 
fancies ;  the  President  was  bound  by  an  oath  to 
maintain  the  Union  inviolate. 

Thus  understanding  that  a  conflict  was  inevi- 
table, the  President  in  his  inaugural  made  plain  to 
all  unprejudiced  men  the  political  situation,  his 
duty  in  the  then  approaching  crisis,  and  the  re- 
sponsibility which  rested  on  the  people.  Much 
discretion  rested  in  him ;  he  could  have  instructed 
the  District-Attorney  of  Alabama  to  swear  out  a 


68  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

complaint  against  the  Confederate  conspirators 
at  the  first  overt  act  of  treason,  and  in  like  man- 
ner he  could  have  instructed  the  District-Attor- 
ney of  South  Carolina  to  cause  the  arrest  of 
Beauregard  and  his  army  after  the  assault  on 
Sumter.  Either  would  have  been  a  brutem  ful- 
men  under  the  circumstances,  but  would  have 
been  within  the  strict  line  of  Presidential  duty. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  however,  was  as  practical  a  states- 
man as  he  had  been  a  lawyer,  and  he  attempted 
nothing  for  show.  As  the  South  was  raising 
armies,  he  deemed  it  to  be  his  indispensable  duty 
also  to  raise  an  army  of  resistance  to  act  in  any 
needed  emergency ;  this  he  did,  and  then  referred 
the  entire  political  anomaly  to  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives. 

On  April  15,  the  day  after  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Sumter  to  the  armed  force  of  the  Confed- 
eracy, the  President  issued  a  proclamation  call- 
ing forth  the  militia  of  the  several  States  of  the 
Union  to  the  aggregate  number  of  75,000  to  sur- 
press  combinations  which  existed  in  the  seceding 
States  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  and  obstruct- 
ing the  enforcement  of  Federal  laws,  and  which 
were  "  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  or- 
dinary course  of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  the 
powers  vested  in  the  marshals  by  law."  The 
concluding  paragraph  of  the  proclamation  con- 
vened Congress  to  meet  on  July  4  "  to  consider 
and  determine  such  measures  as,  in  their  wis- 
dom, the  public  safety  and  interest  might  seem 
to  demand." 

The  fall  of  Fort  Sumter  is  the  most  momen- 
tous event  in  political  history.  It  changed  at 
once  in  a  great  nation  the  question  of  union  or 
secession  from  an  intellectual  proposition  to  an 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  69 

emotional  issue.  No  matter  how  differently  the 
people  in  each  section  had  thought  before,  they 
now  felt  as  one.  It  is  true  that  there  still  re- 
mained many  Unionists  in  the  South,  and  still 
more  persons  in  the  North  who  were  in  sympathy 
with  the  Southern  cause,  but  these  were  com- 
prised respectively  in  the  terms  "  North  "  and 
"  South,"  which  became  thereafter  psychological 
rather  than  geographical  divisions  of  the  country. 
The  passion  of  nationality  unified  both  the 
Union  and  the  Confederacy,  and,  though  in  each 
section  the  beloved  object  was  different,  the 
emotions  were  identical  in  kind.  Political  and 
moral  philosophy  had  and  continued  to  have  op- 
posing basic  principles  in  the  divisions.  Govern- 
ment was  a  matter  of  equal  and  constituted 
rights  of  States  to  the  chief  party  in  the  South, 
and  of  equal  national  rights  of  men  to  the  chief 
party  in  the  North.  Southern  ethics  demanded 
the  recognition  of  rights  to  property  vested  in 
its  possessors,  and  Northern  ethics  the  establish- 
ment of  rights  to  property  inherent  in  its  pro- 
ducers. But  patriotism  superseded  all  intel- 
lectual and  moral  considerations  and  impulses, 
and  used  these  for  its  own  ends,  overriding  or 
exaggerating  them  as  necessity  required.  This 
led  to  striking  contradictions  and  paradoxes  in 
action.  Jefferson  Davis  became  even  more  of  an 
autocrat  than  the  "  tyrant "  Lincoln — as  the 
secessionists  were  wont  to  style  the  constitu- 
tionally elected  commander-in-chief  of  the  armies 
and  navies  of  the  republic.  Robert  E.  Lee  would 
have  used  national  power  to  deprive  citizens  of 
their  property  by  freeing  the  slaves  in  order  to 
save  the  Confederacy.  Abraham  Lincoln  was 
ready  to  abandon  Federal  property,  and  leave  to 


70  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  indefinite  future  the  establishment  of  human 
rights,  in  order  to  preserve  the  political  integrity 
of  the  Union.  And  Stephen  A.  Douglas  who  had 
made  a  fetich  of  "  popular  sovereignty,"  and 
stripped  himself  of  the  bright  endowments  of  in- 
tellectual consistency  and  moral  independence  to 
cast  them  before  its  shrine,  came  forward  the 
very  first  of  all  citizens  of  the  republic  to  offer 
to  his  old  and  triumphant  antagonist  his  services 
for  the  preservation  of  the  country. 

The  call  for  troops  was  really  signed  on  Sun- 
day, April  14,  though  dated  April  15.  On  the 
evening  of  the  I4th  Senator  Douglas  called  upon 
President  Lincoln  and  was  closeted  with  him  for 
two  hours.  He  went  forth  from  the  conference 
to  publish  by  telegraph  to  the  country  the  declara- 
tion that  he  was  "  prepared  to  sustain  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  exercise  of  all  his  constitutional  func- 
tions to  preserve  the  Union,  and  maintain  the 
Government,  and  defend  the  Federal  capital."  On 
April  25,  before  the  Illinois  Legislature,  he  made, 
in  behalf  of  the  Union,  the  most  eloquent 
speech  of  his  life.  Unfortunately  for  the  cause 
which  had  become  the  paramount  passion  of  his 
soul,  he  died  a  little  more  than  a  month  there- 
after, on  June  3,  at  his  home  in  Chicago.  Even 
measured  by  his  few  weeks  of  service,  his  place 
is  secure  in  American  history  as  the  first  and 
greatest  of  "  War  Democrats." 

There  was  a  rending  pull  of  patriotism  in  op- 
posing directions  in  the  case  of  a  number  of  men 
who  were  citizens  of  a  seceding  State  and  also 
owed  allegiance  to  the  national  Government.  Of 
these  Robert  E.  Lee  may  be  taken  as  the  chief 
example.  Lee  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
whose  ability  had  been  recognized  and  rewarded 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  71 

by  the  Government.  On  March  16  he  had  been 
made  colonel  of  the  First  Cavalry  by  the  new 
Administration.  He  was  the  favorite  of  General 
Scott,  who  intended,  in  case  of  armed  conflict  with 
the  Confederacy,  to  make  him  the  chief  of  his  gen- 
erals in  the  field.  On  the  i8th  of  April,  Francis 
P.  Blair,  Sr.,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  held 
an  interview  with  Lee  in  which  he  unofficially 
offered  him  the  command  of  the  Union  army. 

There  is  a  conflict  of  testimony  as  to  Lee's 
answer.  Lee  in  1868  wrote  to  Reverdy  Johnson: 
"  I  declined  the  offer  .  .  .  stating  as  candidly 
and  courteously  as  I  could  that,  although  op- 
posed to  secession  and  deprecating  war,  I  could 
take  no  part  in  the  invasion  of  the  Southern 
States."  Montgomery  Blair,  the  son  of  Francis 
P.  Blair,  Sr.,  and  Postmaster-General  at  the  time, 
deriving  his  information  from  his  father,  said  in 
1866  that  Lee  was  undecided  as  to  what  he  would 
do,  answering  that  "  he  would  consult  with  his 
friend,  General  Scott,"  and  that  Lee  "  went  on 
the  same  day  to  Richmond,  probably  to  arbitrate 
difficulties ;  and  we  see  the  result." 

On  April  20,  after  Lee  had  talked  with  friends 
in  Richmond,  he  wrote  to  Scott,  saying: 

GENERAL  :  Since  my  interview  with  you  on  the  i8th 
instant,  I  have  felt  that  I  ought  not  longer  to  retain  my 
commission  in  the  army.  I  therefore  tender  my  resig- 
nation, which  I  request  you  will  recommend  for  accept- 
ance. It  would  have  been  presented  at  once,  but  for  the 
struggle  it  has  cost  me  to  separate  myself  from  a 
service  to  which  I  have  devoted  all  the  best  years  of 
my  life  and  all  the  ability  I  possessed.  .  .  .  Save  in 
defense  of  my  native  State,  I  never  desire  again  to 
draw  my  sword. 

On  April  22  Lee  accepted  from  the  Governor 


72  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and  Convention  of  Virginia  the  chief  command 
of  the  Virginia  State  troops. 

Throughout  the  North  disinterested  patriots 
and  scheming  politicians  alike  joined  in  the  de- 
mands of  duty,  and  urged  that  the  insult  to  our 
glorious  flag  be  avenged.  Meetings  were  every- 
where held,  and  fervid  orators  in  impassioned 
strains  fanned  the  people  into  a  fierce  flame  of 
enthusiasm  in  behalf  of  our  menaced  Govern- 
ment. Politicians  who,  but  ten  months  before,  at 
Charleston,  had  clasped  the  hands  of  these  trai- 
tors in  fraternal  concord,  were  now  eager  to  raze 
that  city  of  unsavory  political  memories  to  the 
ground.  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  an  uneasy  New 
England  politician,  who  at  Charleston  had  voted 
fifty-seven  times  for  Jefferson  Davis  as  his  choice 
for  President  of  the  United  States,  was  one  of 
the  earliest  in  the  field.  Obtaining  a  militia  gen- 
eral's commission,  he  started  promptly  at  the 
head  of  the  hastily  improvised  Massachusetts 
regiment  for  the  front. 

Some  of  the  lesser  politicians  who  had  opposed 
Mr.  Lincoln's  election  at  the  North  promptly 
joined  in  the  general  acclaim  of  patriotism ; 
others,  less  enthusiastic  and  patriotic,  were 
seized  by  the  oncoming  tide  and  borne  on  to 
their  patriotic  duty,  while  still  others,  more  ob- 
durate, headed  the  reactionary  forces,  and  were 
Jacobins,  and  sometimes  worse,  to  the  bitter  end. 
I  almost  distrust  my  own  memory  when  I  reflect 
on  some  utterances  which  in  the  opaque  moral 
and  political  days  which  tried  men's  souls  I  heard 
from  those  in  behalf  of  whom  the  voice  of  pa- 
triotic eulogy  now  emblazons  the  sober  historic 
page. 

The  Governors  of  all  the  free  States  responded 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  73 

nobly  and  with  enthusiasm.  They  promptly 
offered  more  men  than  were  required  or  could  be 
armed.  Places  where  "  men  most  do  congre- 
gate "  were  converted  into  recruiting  stations ; 
and  the  sound  of  the  "  ear-piercing  fife  "  and  the 
"  spirit-stirring  drum  "  resounded  all  over  the 
land.  The  Governors  of  the  border  States,  how- 
ever, chose  to  bite  against  a  file.  Governor  Jack- 
son, of  Missouri,  said,  "  not  one  man  will  Mis- 
souri furnish  to  carry  on  such  an  unholy  cru- 
sade ;  "  Governor  Magoffin,  of  Kentucky,  said : 
"  I  say  emphatically,  Kentucky  will  furnish  no 
troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of  subduing  her 
sister  Southern  States ;  "  and  Governor  Harris, 
of  Tennessee,  said :  "  Tennessee  will  not  furnish 
a  man  for  coercion,  but  50,000  for  the  defense  of 
our  Southern  brothers."  And  in  each  of  these 
statements  the  author  was  guilty  of  unpremedi- 
tated error,  for  each  of  those  States  did  furnish 
thousands  of  valiant  Union  troops  to  aid  in  put- 
ting down  the  rebellion. 

As  an  answer  to  Lincoln's  call  for  troops,  Jef- 
ferson Davis,  President  of  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy, issued  a  proclamation  on  April  17,  offer- 
ing letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  to  privateers 
desiring  to  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States.  Two  days  later  President  Lincoln 
replied  by  proclaiming  a  blockade  of  all  the  Con- 
federate ports,  and  giving  notice  that  privateer- 
ing would  be  treated  as  piracy. 

Massachusetts  was  the  first  Union  State  in  the 
field.  Governor  John  A.  Andrew  had  the  State 
militia  equipped  ready  for  the  call ;  within  two 
days  thereafter  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  was  en 
route  to  Washington,  and  on  the  morning  of  April 
19  they  reached  Baltimore.  There  was  a  distance 


74  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

of  a  mile  between  the  Philadelphia  station  at 
which  they  arrived  and  the  one  for  Washington. 
A  number  of  the  companies  made  the  transfer 
in  street-cars,  amid  the  hooting  of  a  gathering 
mob.  The  windows  of  the  ninth  car  were  broken 
by  paving  stones  thrown  by  the  rioters,  who  also 
fired  pistols  into  the  car.  Several  soldiers  were 
injured,  and  Major  Watson,  who  was  aboard, 
finally  gave  orders  to  the  soldiers  to  shoot  back, 
which  was  done.  The  mob  laid  obstructions  on 
the  track,  so  that  the  last  four  companies  were 
compelled  to  march  between  the  stations.  They 
had  to  fight  their  way  through  the  mob,  and  sev- 
eral persons  were  killed  on  both  sides. 

A  mass  meeting  of  citizens  was  held  at  4  P.M., 
in  Monument  Square,  at  which  Governor  Thomas 
H.  Hicks  of  the  State,  and  Mayor  George  W. 
Brown  of  the  city,  made  speeches,  the  universal 
sentiment  being  in  opposition  to  Federal  "  co- 
ercion "  of  the  seceding  States.  After  the  meet- 
ing the  city  authorities,  with  the  sanction  of  the 
State  executive,  ordered  the  railroad  bridges 
between  Baltimore  and  Philadelphia  and  Harris- 
burg  to  be  destroyed.  This  was  done,  and  Wash- 
ington was  thereby  entirely  cut  off  from  railroad 
communication  with  the  North. 

In  order  that  Maryland  might  not  be  incited 
to  rebellion  at  this  critical  juncture,  President 
Lincoln  bowed  to  the  aggression. 

After  correspondence  with  Governor  Hicks 
and  Mayor  Brown,  and  two  interviews  with 
Mayor  Brown  in  which  these  executives  opposed 
further  transit  of  Federal  troops  through  Balti- 
more, or  over  an  alternative  route  through  An- 
napolis, the  President  on  April  22  sent  a  diplo- 
matic note  through  Secretarv  Seward  to  the 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  75 

Governor,  of  which  the  tenor  may  be  judged  by; 
the  following  appealing  passage: 

He  [Lincoln]  cannot  but  remember  that  there  has 
been  a  time  in  the  history  of  our  country  when  a  gen- 
eral of  the  American  Union,  with  forces  designed  for 
the  defense  of  its  capital,  was  not  unwelcome  anywhere 
in  the  State  of  Maryland. 

The  Administration  and  our  leading  patriotic 
public  men  regarded  the  on-coming  war  as  an 
awful  but  inevitable  calamity,  which  it  would  tax 
the  highest  energies  of  the  nation  to  sustain.  Nor 
was  our  Administration  at  all  confident  of  suc- 
cess. Senator  Douglas'  opinion,  that  a  necessity 
existed  for  200,000  troops  at  the  first  call,  at- 
tested his  opinion  of  the  gloomy  outlook.  The 
Confederate  cabal  at  Montgomery  was  more 
optimistic.  The  sanguine  expression  of  expecta- 
tion made  by  its  Secretary  of  War  attested  its 
belief.  The  superficial  on  both  sides  regarded  it 
as  a  national  interlude  of  a  few  months'  duration. 

Beau  regard  was  ordered  into  Northern  Vir- 
ginia to  assume  command  of  the  forces  gather- 
ing there  from  the  Gulf  States.  Our  troops  were 
concentrating  around  the  national  capital.  The 
scions  of  a  slave-holding  aristocracy  took  the 
field  with  all  the  paraphernalia  of  gentility :  body- 
servants,  kid  gloves,  "  Byron  "  collars,  perfum- 
ery, and  pomatum.  The  backwoodsmen  flocked 
in  with  ancient  rifles,  buckhorn-handled  knives, 
and  hunting  shirts.  In  camp  they  wrestled, 
fought,  pitched  horseshoes,  and  talked  "  horse." 

Although  the  Virginia  secessionists  had  burned 
the  Federal  armory  at  Harper's  Ferry  on  April 
1 8,  and  seven  ships  and  half  the  buildings  at  the 
Gosport  navy  yard  at  Norfolk,  Mr.  Lincoln  ap- 


76  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

plied  his  policy  of  non-aggression  to  Virginia 
no  less  than  to  Maryland.  On  April  24  he  wrote 
a  letter  to  Reverdy  Johnson,  of  Maryland  (who 
had  taken  a  leading  part  in  attempting  to  adjust 
amicably  the  relations  of  Virginia  to  the  Federal 
government),  which  concluded  with  the  words: 
"  I  have  no  objection  to  declare  a  thousand  times 
that  I  have  no  purpose  to  invade  Virginia  or  any 
other  State,  but  I  do  not  mean  to  let  them  invade 
us  without  striking  back." 

On  April  25  Lincoln  wrote  to  General  Scott 
upon  the  question  which  had  been  submitted  to 
him,  of  arresting  and  dispersing  the  Maryland 
Legislature,  in  view  of  its  threatened  action  to 
arm  the  citizens  of  the  State  against  the  United 
States.  He  thought  such  repression  neither  jus- 
tifiable nor  efficient  for  the  reasons  that  their  ac- 
tion, whether  peaceful  or  hostile,  could  not  be 
known  in  advance ;  and  even  if  the  Legislature 
were  dispersed  it  would  reassemble  elsewhere. 

I  therefore  conclude  that  it  is  only  left  to  the  com- 
manding general  to  watch  and  await  their  action,  which 
if  it  shall  be  to  arm  their  people  against  the  United 
States,  he  is  to  adopt  the  most  prompt  and  efficient 
means  to  counteract,  even,  if  necessary,  to  the  bom- 
bardment of  their  cities,  and,  in  the  extremest  neces- 
sity, the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 

Annapolis,  the  capital  of  Maryland,  being  oc- 
cupied by  Massachusetts  volunteers  under  com- 
mand of  Brigadier-General  Benjamin  F.  Butler, 
Governor  Hicks  thought  it  wise  to  convene  the 
Legislature  at  Frederick.  Here  on  the  27th  of 
April  he  sent  it  a  special  message,  in  which  he 
admitted  the  right  of  transit  through  the  State 
for  Federal  troops  going  to  the  defense  of  Wash- 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  77 

ington,  and  counseled  "  that  we  shall  array  our- 
selves for  Union  and  peace."  He  expressed  the 
conviction  that  "  the  only  safety  of  Maryland 
lies  in  preserving  a  neutral  position  between  our 
brethren  of  the  North  and  of  the  South." 

The  Legislature  was  divided  in  its  sentiments. 
The  Senate  was  secessionist;  as  it  was  about  to 
pass  a  bill  vesting  the  military  control  of  the 
State  in  a  secession  "  Board  of  Public  Safety," 
it  became  alarmed  at  the  evidence  of  a  strong 
Union  feeling  in  the  lower  house,  and  through- 
out the  State,  and  desisted.  Scharf,  in  his  "  His- 
tory of  Maryland,"  says  that  Senator  Mason,  of 
Virginia,  appeared  before  the  Legislature  to  ar- 
range a  military  alliance  of  the  two  States.  The 
only  action  taken,  however,  was  to  send  a  com- 
mittee consisting  of  Otho  Scott,  R.  M.  McLane, 
and  W.  J.  Ross  to  confer  with  President  Lincoln. 
This  they  did  on  May  4;  and  on  May  6  they  re- 
ported to  the  Legislature  that  as  a  result  of  the 
conference  they  felt  "  painfully  confident  that  a 
war  is  to  be  waged  to  reduce  all  the  seceding 
States  to  allegiance  to  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment" 

On  May  14  the  Legislature  adjourned  to  meet 
again  on  June  14,  and  at  once  Governor  Hicks 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  into  Federal  service 
four  regiments  of  State  militia,  in  accordance 
with  the  President's  call  for  troops.  Already 
General  Butler  had  occupied  Baltimore  [on 
May  13]. 

On  April  27  the  War  Department  organized 
the  contemplated  seat  of  war  into  departments  as 
follows,  viz. : 

I.  Washington,  embracing  the  original  Dis- 
trict, Fort  Washington  and  coterminous  country 


78  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and   Maryland   to   and    including    Bladensburg; 
under  command  of  Colonel  J.  K.  F.  Mansfield. 

2.  Annapolis,  embracing  the  country  for  twenty 
miles  on  both  sides  of  the  railway,  between  Wash- 
ington and  Annapolis ;  in  charge  of  the  militia 
general,  Benjamin  F.  Butler. 

3.  Pennsylvania,  embracing  the  rest  of  Mary- 
land,  Pennsylvania  and  Delaware ;  under  com- 
mand of  the  militia  general,  Robert  Patterson. 

On  May  3,  1861,  the  President  issued  a 
proclamation  calling  for  42,034  more  volunteers 
from  the  several  States,  and  an  increase  in  the 
regular  army  of  22,714  men,  and  in  the  navy  of 
18,000. 

On  the  same  day  the  Department  of  the  Ohio, 
consisting  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  was 
created,  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
George  B.  McClellan,  who  had  on  April  23  been 
appointed  by  Ohio  as  major-general  of  its  volun- 
teers. 

At  that  time  McClellan  was  reputed  the  best 
military  engineer  in  the  country.  He  was  gradu- 
ated from  West  Point  on  July  i,  1846,  being  the 
leader  of  his  class  in  mathematics.  He  went 
through  the  Mexican  War  as  a  Iteutenant  of 
engineers,  and  after  it  served  for  a  few  years 
as  an  instructor  of  practical  engineering  at  West 
Point.  This  was  followed  by  engineering  duty 
in  the  West.  In  1855  he  was  sent  to  Europe  with 
two  other  officers  to  report  on  the  conditions  of 
the  Crimean  War.  Captain  McClellan's  report,  re- 
published  in  1861,  under  the  title  of  "  The  Armies 
of  Europe,"  is  admirable  for  its  clearness,  full- 
ness, and  accuracy.  In  1857  he  resigned  his 
commission  to  accept  the  place  of  civil  engineer 
of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad.  He  became  its 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  79 

vice-president  in  1858.  In  1859  he  was  elected 
president  of  the  eastern  division  of  the  Ohio  and 
Mississippi  Railroad,  with  headquarters  at  Cin- 
cinnati. In  1860  he  became  president  of  the  St. 
Louis,  Missouri,  and  Cincinnati  Railroad,  which 
office  he  held  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

The  frontier  of  the  department  being  along  the 
border  State  of  Kentucky,  which  had  not  taken 
decisive  action  on  the  question  of  Union  or 
secession,  General  McClellan  recommended  or- 
ganization for  observation  rather  than  for  action. 

Many  Kentuckians  regarded  with  apprehension 
the  presence  of  Federal  troops  on  their  border. 
A  State  Senator  wrote  to  the  President  protest- 
ing in  particular  against  the  stationing  of  United 
States  troops  at  Cairo.  Lincoln  dryly  replied 
through  his  secretary,  John  Hay : 

The  President  .  .  directs  me  to  say  that  the  views 
so  ably  stated  by  you  shall  have  due  consideration,  and 
to  assure  you  that  he  would  never  have  ordered  the 
movement  of  troops  complained  of  had  he  known  that 
Cairo  was  in  your  senatorial  district. 

The  position  generally  taken  by  Kentucky  in 
regard  to  the  burning  issue  of  the  day  was  that 
known  as  "  armed  neutrality."  It  was  expressed 
in  a  resolution  of  a  public  meeting  in  Louisville, 
April  18,  which  declared  that: 

The  present  duty  of  Kentucky  is  to  maintain  her 
present  independent  position,  taking  sides  not  with  the 
Administration,  nor  with  the  seceding  States,  but  with 
the  Union  against  them  both;  declaring  her  soil  to  be 
sacred  from  the  hostile  tread  of  either ;  and,  if  neces- 
sary, to  make  the  declaration  good  with  her  strong 
right  arm. 

Governor    Magoffin    and    General    Simon    B. 


8o  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Buckner,  commander  of  the  State  militia,  who,  as 
transpired  in  their  later  acts;  were  secessionists 
at  heart,  adopted  this  position.  The  Governor 
replied  to  President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops: 
"  Kentucky  will  furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked 
purpose  of  subduing  their  sister  Southern 
States,"  and  this  declaration  was  approved  by  the 
Kentucky  Legislature. 

The  President,  therefore,  on  May  7  sent  Major 
Anderson,  the  hero  of  the  hour  on  account  of  his 
defense  of  Fort  Sumter,  to  Cincinnati  to  recruit 
volunteers  from  Kentucky  and  western  Virginia. 
Recruiting  camps  were  established  in  Kentucky 
by  other  officers,  and  by  June  10  the  First  and 
Second  Regiments  of  Kentucky  volunteer  infan- 
try were  organized.  An  election  of  Congress- 
men, which  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  Presi- 
dent's call  convening  a  special  session  of  Con- 
gress upon  July  4,  was  held  on  June  20,  and  re- 
sulted in  the  election  of  nine  outspoken  loyalists 
out  of  ten  Kentucky  Representatives. 

Missouri  was  a  Unionist  State  with  a  seces- 
sionist Governor  and  Legislature.  The  Gov- 
ernor, Claiborne  F.  Jackson,  though  elected  upon 
the  Douglas  ticket,  had  become  a  disunionist, 
and  the  Breckinridge  or  pro-slavery  party,  owing 
to  the  division  of  their  opponents  among  the 
Douglas,  Bell,  and  Lincoln  parties,  had  secured 
a  majority  of  the  Legislators.  These  called  a 
State  convention  with  the  intention  that  it  should 
pass  an  ordinance  of  secession.  Instead  a  strong 
majority  of  Union  delegates  was  elected,  and 
when  the  convention  met  on  February  28,  it  con- 
demned secession;  on  March  22  it  adjourned  to 
December. 

Governor  Jackson  thereupon  established  under 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  81 

State  laws  a  camp  near  St.  Louis,  nominally  for 
the  instruction  of  militia,  but  really  to  capture 
the  State  for  the  Confederacy.  It  was  called 
"  Camp  Jackson,"  and  was  placed  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-General  D.  M.  Frost,  a 
West  Point  graduate.  Frost  and  Jackson 
planned  to  capture  the  Federal  arsenal  at  St. 
Louis,  and  another  secessionist,  Jefferson  M. 
Thompson,  began  drilling  another  camp  at  St. 
Joseph  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  arsenal 
at  Leavenworth,  Kan.  To  oppose  these  pur- 
poses the  Union  men  organized  "  Home  Guards  " 
and  a  "  Committee  of  Safety." 

The  Government,  feeling  that  General  William 
S.  Harney,  commander  of  the  department  in 
which  Missouri  was  situated,  had  been  lax  in 
repressing  sedition,  summoned  him  to  Washing- 
ton. On  the  way  he  was  captured  by  Confeder- 
ates at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  taken  to  Richmond, 
but  was  there  released  in  order  not  to  provoke 
wavering  Missouri  against  the  Confederacy,  and 
was  sent  on  to  Washington.  While  he  was  ab- 
sent from  St.  Louis  the  Government  at  Washing- 
ton seized  the  opportunity  to  make  a  strong 
move. 

On  April  20  Secretary  Cameron,  of  the  War 
Department,  wrote  to  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon, 
an  ardent  anti-slavery  man,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  St.  Louis  arsenal,  the  following 
order : 

The  President  of  the  United  States  directs  that  you 
enroll  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States  the 
loyal  citizens  of  St.  Louis  and  vicinity,  not  exceeding, 
with  those  heretofore  enlisted,  ten  thousand  in  number, 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  authority  of  the 
United  States  for  the  protection  of  the  peaceable  in- 


82  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

habitants  of  Missouri;  and  you  will,  if  deemed  neces- 
sary, proclaim  martial  law  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis. 

Upon  this  order  General  Scott  made  the  in- 
dorsement, "  It  is  revolutionary  times,  and  there- 
fore I  do  not  object  to  the  irregularity  of  this." 

This  was  the  first  act  of  President  Lincoln 
which  can  be  criticised  as  arbitrary.  It  was  sig- 
nificant of  his  determination  to  use  the  strongest 
measures  to  save  the  Union  when  nothing  milder 
would  suffice. 

On  May  8  Camp  Jackson  was  supplied  by 
Jefferson  Davis  with  arms  and  ammunition  from 
the  stores  of  the  captured  arsenal  at  Baton 
Rouge,  La. 

The  Safety  Committee  knew  of  this  action,  but 
permitted  the  consignment  to  reach  its  destina- 
tion in  order  to  have  a  legal  excuse  for  capturing 
the  camp.  The  next  day  Captain  Lyon  went  in 
disguise  to  Camp  Jackson  to  plan  the  method  of 
taking  it.  On  the  following  day,  May  10,  he  sud- 
denly surrounded  the  camp  with  Home  Guards 
and  Federal  volunteers,  and  planted  batteries  in 
commanding  positions.  General  Frost  sur- 
rendered, protesting  that  he  meant  no  hostility 
to  the  United  States — an  idle  plea,  since  he  was 
"  caught  with  the  goods." 

Lyon's  troops  marched  with  the  prisoners  back 
to  the  arsenal.  On  the  way  they  were  attacked 
by  a  mob  who  killed  two  or  three  soldiers.  The 
comrades  of  these  fired  into  the  crowd,  killing 
a  number  of  men,  women,  and  children,  most  of 
whom,  if  not  all,  were  innocent  spectators. 

The  next  morning  the  prisoners  were  paroled 
and  disbanded.  On  the  same  clay,  General  Har- 
nev  returned  from  Washington,  having  been  re- 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES     83 

instated  in  command  largely  because  of  the  loy- 
alty he  had  shown  at  Richmond  in  refusing  over- 
tures made  by  the  Confederacy  to  win  his  inter- 
est and  friendship. 

General  Harney  at  once  assumed  the  leader- 
ship of  the  conservative  pro-slavery  faction  of 
the  Missouri  Unionists.  Captain  Lyon  was  at 
the  head  of  the  radicals.  A  clash  of  policy  and 
of  personal  interest  ensued,  which  lasted  almost 
throughout  the  war,  and  caused  the  President 
from  first  to  last  a  great  deal  of  concern  and  an- 
noyance. The  division  entered  even  into  his 
Cabinet,  where  Attorney-General  Bates  espoused 
the  cause  of  the  Harney  faction,  and  Postmaster- 
General  Blair  that  of  the  Lyon  radicals. 

Lincoln  admired  Captain  Lyon  for  the  wisdom 
and  energy  he  had  displayed  in  the  capture  of 
Camp  Jackson.  He  distrusted  Harney,  not  as 
disloyal,  but  as  weak  and  temporizing.  So  he 
made  Lyon  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers, 
and  on  May  18  caused  the  War  Department  to 
send  an  order  to  Frank  Blair,  Jr.,  at  St.  Louis, 
relieving  General  Harney  from  his  command, 
and  appointing  Lyon  in  his  stead.  At  the  same 
time  Lincoln  wrote  Blair  telling  him  to  withhold 
the  execution  of  this  order  until  the  necessity  to 
the  contrary  became  very  urgent.  This  necessity 
arose  within  a  fortnight. 

On  the  night  of  the  capture  of  Camp  Jack- 
son (May  10),  Governor  Jackson  hastily  con- 
vened the  Legislature  at  Jefferson  City  and 
caused  it  to  pass  a  military  bill  appointing  the 
Governor  a  military  dictator,  and  appropriating 
for  his  purposes  three  million  dollars  to  be  raised 
by  diverting  the  school  fund,  issuing  bonds,  and 
anticipating  two  years'  taxes.  As  his  first  step 


84  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

under  this  dictatorship  to  force  the  State  into 
the  Confederacy,  Governor  Jackson  appointed 
ex-Governor  Sterling  Price  as  Major-General 
in  command  of  the  Missouri  State  Guard.  This 
was  a  clever  appointment,  for  Price,  while  an 
ardent  secessionist  at  heart,  had  impartially  pre- 
sided over  the  State  convention  which  voted 
down  secession,  and  since  then  had  been  active  in 
allaying  discord  in  the  State,  thereby  winning  the 
confidence  of  General  Harney.  On  May  21 
Price  made  a  compact  with  Harney  whereby 
the  Federal  officer  agreed  that  he  would  not 
molest  the  State  officer  in  his  effort  "  to  maintain 
order  within  the  State,"  and  that  he  would  re- 
frain from  military  movements  of  his  own  which 
might  "  create  excitements  and  jealousies." 

With  this  assurance  Price  began  the  organiza- 
tion all  over  the  State  of  secessionist  companies 
under  the  guise  of  militia.  The  Federal  Govern- 
ment heard  of  this,  and  on  May  27  the  Adjutant- 
General  wrote  to  Harney  a  warning  to  be  watch- 
ful, saying,  "  The  authority  of  the  United  States 
is  paramount,  and  whenever  it  is  apparent  that  a 
movement,  whether  by  color  of  State  authority 
or  not,  is  hostile,  you  will  not  hesitate  to  put  it 
down." 

On  May  30,  before  General  Harney  had  time 
to  heed  this  warning,  Mr.  Blair  exercised  his  dis- 
cretionary power,  and  delivered  to  Harney  the 
order  relieving  him. 

General  Lyon,  now  in  command,  arranged  a 
conference  with  Jackson  and  Price  on  June  II. 
He  demanded  that  they  disband  the  "  State 
Guards  "  and  give  up  the  military  bill.  Jack- 
son and  Price  refused  to  do  so,  and  hurried  to 
Jefferson  City,  burning  the  bridges  behind  them. 


CONTEST  FOR  THE  BORDER  STATES  85 

Arrived  at  the  State  capital,  the  Governor  pub- 
lished a  proclamation  of  war,  and  called  50,000 
militia  into  service. 

Lyon's  answer  was  to  embark  batteries  and 
troops  on  swift  river  steamboats,  and  on  June 
13  to  steam  to  Jefferson  City.  He  arrived  on 
June  15  before  resistance  could  be  organized,  and 
found  the  secessionists  were  fled.  Lyon  followed 
Price  fifty  miles  up  the  river  to  Boonville,  where 
on  the  1 7th  he  defeated  him  in  a  skirmish  and 
dispersed  his  militia. 

The  State  convention,  which  had  adjourned  to 
December,  met  by  special  call  on  July  22;  it 
abrogated  the  arbitrary  acts  of  the  Jackson  ad- 
ministration and  of  the  Legislature,  and  in- 
augurated a  provisional  government  at  St.  Louis, 
choosing  Hamilton  R.  Gamble,  a  conservative 
Unionist,  as  governor.  Jackson,  fleeing  from 
place  to  place  in  the  State,  kept  up  the  pretense 
of  a  State  government.  This  the  Jefferson  Davis 
Government  recognized,  admitting  the  State  into 
the  Confederacy,  but  the  substance  of  power  lay 
entirely  with  the  Union  Government  throughout 
the  war. 

Governor  Gamble  resorted  to  vigorous  meas- 
ures to  purge  from  the  politics  of  the  State  every- 
thing which  at  all  savored  of  an  adhesion  to  the 
Rebel  Government.  To  this  end  he  ordered  all 
troops  which  had  gone  into  the  Rebel  army  from 
Missouri  to  return  to  their  allegiance,  promising, 
with  the  assent  of  the  Federal  Government,  se- 
curity to  all  who  did  so. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  FIRST   MESSAGE 

WHEN  the  Virginia  convention  voted  the 
State  into  the  Confederacy,  the  western 
mountain  counties,  which  had  always  been 
at  odds  with  the  eastern  seaboard  over 
the  question  of  slavery,  determined  to  re- 
main in  the  Union.  Their  leaders  appealed 
to  Lincoln,  with  the  result  that  on  May  26  Gen- 
eral McClellan  sent  four  regiments  into  the 
State,  under  protection  of  which  a  provisional 
loyal  State  government  was  organized  at  Wheel- 
ing, on  June  19.  With  such  an  encouraging- 
opening  General  McClellan  began  planning  to 
enter  Confederate  Virginia  by  way  of  the  Kan- 
awha  river,  and  to  capture  Richmond.  In  the 
meantime,  General  Lee  had  arranged  the  militia 
of  Virginia  along  the  northern  boundary  of  the 
State  ostensibly  as  an  army  of  defense  against 
the  Federal  troops  gathering  at  Washington,  and 
thereby  he  invited  the  first  attack  upon  the  Con- 
federacy from  that  quarter.  As  President  Lincoln 
was  soon  to  recall  in  his  message  to  Congress  in 
special  session,  the  presence  of  troops  from  other 
Southern  States  in  this  Virginian  army,  as  well 
as  the  seizure  of  the  Federal  Gosport  navy-yard 
and  the  armory  at  Harper's  Ferry,  clearly  showed 
that  Virginia  was  in  open  rebellion,  and  there- 

86 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  87 

fore  invasion  of  the  State  by  Federal  troops  was 
not  an  act  of  aggression  but  of  imperative  neces- 
sity as  a  measure  of  defense. 

On  May  24  the  first  Michigan  regiment  under 
Colonel  Elmer  E.  Ellsworth  occupied  Alexan- 
dria, causing  the  Rebel  garrison  at  that  place  to 
retire.  Colonel  Ellsworth  proceeded  to  the  prin- 
cipal hotel,  over  which  the  Rebel  flag  had  been 
flying  in  plain  sight  of  the  national  capital  for 
several  weeks,  and,  climbing  upon  the  roof  with 
three  companions,  cut  down  the  flaunting  ban- 
ner with  his  own  hand.  As  he  descended  the 
stairs  the  hotel  proprietor  killed  him  with  a  shot- 
gun, and  was  himself  instantly  done  to  death 
with  rifle  and  bayonet  by  Francis  E.  Brownell, 
one  of  Ellsworth's  companions. 

No  more  grievous  blow,  except  the  assassina- 
tion of  one  of  his  family,  could  have  been  struck 
at  the  tender  heart  of  Lincoln  than  this  murder 
of  the  gallant  young  colonel.  Ellsworth  had 
been  a  student  in  Lincoln's  law  office,  and,  com- 
ing with  him  to  Washington,  had  formed  a  part 
of  his  household  there. 

A  relation  like  that  of  knight  and  squire  of  the 
age  of  chivalry  existed  between  the  two.  Lin- 
coln had  grown  too  wise  to  give  of  his  confi- 
dences to  the  young  men  about  him,  but  he  none 
the  less  took  a  deep  interest  in  them,  studying 
their  natures  and  loving  them  for  their  personal 
loyalty  to  him,  and  for  their  enthusiasm  in  his 
cause  which  they  had  made  their  own.  Ells- 
worth had  displayed  no  talent  for  law,  and  was 
something  of  a  nuisance  in  the  office,  owing  to  his 
mislaying  papers  (one  of  Lincoln's  most  impor- 
tant speeches  was  lost  to  the  world  through  Ells- 
worth losing  the  transcription  of  it),  yet  Lincoln 


88  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

patiently  bore  with  him,  because  he  recognized 
in  the  young  man's  one  passion,  which  was  for 
arms,  evidence  of  capacity  for  military  leadership, 
and  he  sincerely  respected  him  for  it.  On  the  day 
following  Ellsworth's  death  Lincoln  wrote  a  letter 
of  condolence  to  the  young  officer's  parents  in 
which  his  reserve  in  not  obtruding  his  own  al- 
most fatherly  affection  upon  those  in  whom  the 
natural  jealousy  of  parenthood  would  be  intensi- 
fied by  grief,  reveals  a  courtesy  even  finer  than 
his  expression  of  that  admiration  for  the  noble 
qualities  of  the  dead  son  which  would  bring  un- 
alloyed consolation  to  the  bereaved  father  and 
mother. 


MY  DEAR  SIR  AND  MADAM:  In  the  untimely  loss  of 
your  noble  son,  our  affliction  here  is  scarcely  less  than 
your  own.  So  much  of  promised  usefulness  to  one's 
country,  and  of  bright  hopes  for  one's  self  and  friends, 
have  rarely  been  so  suddenly  dashed  as  in  his  fall. 
In  size,  in  years,  and  in  youthful  appearance  a  boy  only, 
his  power  to  command  men  was  surpassingly  great. 
This  power,  combined  with  a  fine  intellect,  an  indomi- 
table energy,  and  a  taste  altogether  military,  consti- 
tuted in  him,  as  seemed  to  me,  the  best  natural  talent 
in  that  department  I  ever  knew. 

And  yet  he  was  singularly  modest  and  deferential  in 
social  intercourse.  My  acquaintance  with  him  began 
less  than  two  years  ago ;  yet  through  the  latter  half  of 
the  intervening  period  it  was  as  intimate  as  the  dis- 
parity of  our  ages  and  my  engrossing  engagements 
would  permit.  To  me  he  appeared  to  have  no  indul- 
gences or  pastimes ;  and  I  never  heard  him  utter  a  pro- 
fane or  an  intemperate  word.  What  was  conclusive  of 
his  good  heart,  he  never-  forgot  his  parents.  The  honors 
he  labored  for  so  laudably,  and  for  which  in  the  sad 
end  he  so  gallantly  gave  his  life,  he  meant  for  them 
no  less  than  for  himself. 

In  the  hope  that  it  may  be  no  intrusion  upon  the 
sarredness  of  vour  sorrow,  I  have  ventured  to  address 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  89 

you  this  tribute  to  the  memory  of  my  young  friend  and 
your  brave  and  early  fallen  child. 

May  God  give  you  that  consolation  which  is  beyond 
all  earthly  power. 

Sincerely  your  friend  in  a  common  affliction, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

The  capture  of  Alexandria  inaugurated  open 
conflict  between  the  Confederacy  and  the  Union 
in  Virginia.  General  Beauregard,  who  was 
looked  upon  by  the  South  as  the  hero  of  Fort 
Sumter,  was  sent  on  May  31  to  command  the 
Confederate  forces  centering  about  Manassas. 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  in  command  at 
Winchester,  having  fallen  back  from  Harper's 
Ferry  before  a  superior  Union  force  under  Gen- 
eral Robert  Patterson.  On  June  19  President 
Lincoln  called  his  Cabinet  and  the  leading  gen- 
erals to  a  council  of  war,  at  which  it  was  decided 
that  General  Irvin  McDowell  should  lead  the 
Union  forces  against  Beauregard,  while  Patter- 
son should  remain  confronting  Johnston  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  following  him  in  a  rear  at- 
tack if  he  should  attempt  to  join  Beauregard. 

This  was  the  situation  when  Congress  met  in 
special  session  on  July  4,  and  listened  to  the 
President's  message. 

In  this  important  paper  Mr.  Lincoln  described 
the  state  of  affairs  at  the  time  of  his  inaugura- 
tion; the  suspension  of  all  functions  of  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  save  those  of  the  Post-office, 
in  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Missis- 
sippi, Louisiana,  and  Florida;  the  seizure  by  the 
several  governments  of  these  States  of  forts  and 
other  Federal  property,  and  the  organization  of 
these  States  into  a  Confederation  which  "  was  al- 
ready invoking  recognition,  aid,  and  intervention 


90  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

from  foreign  powers."  The  President  recounted 
his  forbearance  in  pursuing  the  policy  expressed 
in  his  inaugural  address  of  exhausting  all  peace- 
ful measures  before  resorting  to  stronger  ones. 

He  then  lucidly  recited  the  story  of  the  assault 
upon  Fort  Sumter  by  South  Carolina,  demon- 
strating that  it  was  in  no  sense  an  act  of  defense, 
but  on  the  contrary  of  deliberate  aggression,  de- 
signed to  force  the  hand  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment. 


That  this  was  their  object  the  Executive  well  under- 
stood; and  having  said  to  them  in  the  inaugural  ad- 
dress, "  You  can  have  no  conflict  without  being  your- 
selves the  aggressors,"  he  took  pains  not  only  to  keep 
this  declaration  good,  but  also  to  keep  the  case  so  free 
from  the  power  of  ingenious  sophistry  that  the  world 
.should  not  be  able  to  misunderstand  it.  By  the  affair  at 
Fort  Sumter,  with  its  surrounding  circumstances,  that 
point  was  reached.  ...  In  this  act,  discarding  all 
•else,  they  have  forced  upon  the  country  the  distinct  is- 
sue, "  immediate  dissolution  or  blood." 

And  this  issue  embraces  more  than  the  fate  of  the 
United  States.  It  presents  to  the  whole  family  of  man 
the  question  whether  a  constitutional  republic  or 
democracy — a  government  of  the  people  by  the  same 
people — can  or  cannot  maintain  its  territorial  integrity 
against  its  own  domestic  foes.  It  presents  the  question 
whether  discontented  individuals,  too  few  in  numbers 
to  control  administration  according  to  organic  law  in 
any  case,  can  always,  upon  the  pretenses  made  in  this 
case,  or  on  any  other  pretenses,  or  arbitrarily  without 
any  pretense,  break  up  their  government,  and  thus 
practically  put  an  end  to  free  government  upon  the 
earth.  It  forces  us  to  ask :  "  Is  there,  in  all  republics, 
this  inherent  and  fatal  weakness?"  "Must  a  govern- 
ment, of  necessity,  be  too  strong  for  the  liberties  of  its 
own  people,  or  too  weak  to  maintain  its  own  ex- 
istence? " 

So  viewing  the  issue,  no  choice  was  left-  but  to  call 
out  the  war  power  of  the  Government ;  and  so  to  resist 


THE  fIRST  MESSAGE  91 

force   employed   for   its   destruction   by   force   for   its 
preservation. 

The  President  then  discussed  the  action  of  the 
border  States,  particularly  Virginia,  pursuant  to 
the  attack  on  Sumter. 


The  course  taken  in  Virginia  was  the  most  remark- 
able— perhaps  the  most  important.  A  convention 
elected  by  the  people  of  that  State  to  consider  the  very 
question  of  disrupting  the  Federal  Union  was  in  ses- 
sion at  the  capital  of  Virginia  when  Fort  Sumter  fell. 
To  this  body  the  people  had  chosen  a  large  majority 
of  professed  Union  men.  Almost  immediately  after  the 
fall  of  Sumter,  many  members  of  that  majority  went 
over  to  the  original  disunion  minority,  and  with  them 
adopted  an  ordinance  for  withdrawing  the  State  from, 
the  Union.  Whether  this  change  was  wrought  by  their 
great  approval  of  the  assault  upon  Sumter  or  their 
great  resentment  at  the  Government's  resistance  to  that 
assault,  is  not  definitely  known.  Although  they  sub- 
mitted the  ordinance  for  ratification  to  a  vote  of  the 
people,  to  be  taken  on  a  day  then  somewhat  more  than 
a  month  distant,  the  convention  and  the  Legislature 
(which  was  also  in  session  at  the  same  time  and 
place),  with  leading  men  of  the  State  not  members  of 
either,  immediately  commenced  acting  as  if  the  State 
were  already  out  of  the  Union.  They  pushed  military 
preparations  vigorously  forward  all  over  the  State. 
They  seized  the  United  States  armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  the  navy-yard  at  Gosport,  near  Norfolk. 
They  received — perhaps  invited — into  their  State  large 
bodies  of  troops,  with  their  warlike  appointments,  from 
the  so-called  seceded  States.  They  formally  entered 
into  a  treaty  of  temporary  alliance  and  cooperation  with 
the  so-called  "  Confederate  States,"  and  sent  members 
to  their  Congress  at  Montgomery.  And,  finally,  they 
permitted  the  insurrectionary  government  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  their  capital  at  Richmond. 

The  people  of  Virginia  have  thus  allowed  this  giant 
insurrection  to  make  its  nest  within  her  borders ;  and 
this  Government  has  no  choice  left  but  to  deal  with  it 
where  it  finds  it.  And  it  has  the  less  regret  as  the  loyal 


92  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

citizens  have,  in  due  form,  claimed  its  protection. 
Those  loyal  citizens  this  Government  is  bound  to  recog- 
nize and  protect,  as  being  Virginia. 

The  attitude  of  "  armed  neutrality  "  adopted 
by  Kentucky,  the  President  characterized  as 
*'  disunion  completed." 

Figuratively  speaking,  it  would  be  the  building  of  an 
impassable  wall  along  the  line  of  separation — and  yet 
not  quite  an  impassable  one,  for  under  the  guise  of 
neutrality  it  would  tie  the  hands  of  Union  men  and 
freely  pass  supplies  from  among  them  to  the  insurrec- 
tionists, which  it  could  not  do  as  an  open  enemy. 
.  .  .  It  recognizes  no  fidelity  to  the  Constitution,  no 
obligation  to  maintain  the  Union ;  and  while  very  many 
who  have  favored  it  are  doubtless  loyal  citizens,  it  is, 
nevertheless,  very  injurious  in  effect. 

The  President  proceeded  to  justify  his  orders 
to  Lieutenant-General  Scott  authorizing  him  at 
discretion  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus, 
an  order  which  had  been  harshly  criticised  as 
arbitrary  and  unconstitutional. 

The  provision  of  the  Constitution  that  "  the  privilege 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended,  un- 
less when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public 
safety  may  require  it,"  is  equivalent  to  a  provision — is 
a  provision — that  such  privilege  may  be  suspended 
when,  in  case  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety 
does  require  it.  It  was  decided  that  we  have  a  case  of 
rebellion,  and  that  the  public  safety  does  require  the 
qualified  suspension  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  which 
was  authorized  to  be  made.  Now  it  is  insisted  that 
Congress,  and  not  the  Executive,  is  vested  with  this 
power.  But  the  Constitution  itself  is  silent  as  to  which 
or  who  is  to  exercise  the  power;  and  as  the  provision 
was  plainly  made  for  a  dangerous  emergency,  it  can- 
not be  believed  the  framers  of  the  instrument  intended 
that  in  every  case  the  danger  should  run  its  course  until 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  93 

Congress  could  be  called  together,  the  very  assembling; 
of  which  might  be  prevented,  as  was  intended  in  this 
case,  by  the  rebellion. 

The  President  concluded  his  message  proper 
with  an  appeal  to  Congress  to  pass  those  meas- 
ures which  would  enable  him  to  suppress  the 
rebellion  quickly  and  decisively: 

It  is  now  recommended  that  you  give  the  legal  means 
for  making  this  contest  a  short  and  decisive  one :  that 
you  place  at  the  control  of  the  Government  for  the  work 
at  least  four  hundred  thousand  men  and  $400,000,000. 
That  number  of  men  is  about  one-tenth  of  those  of 
proper  ages  within  the  regions  where,  apparently,  all 
are  willing  to  engage ;  and  the  sum  is  less  than  a 
twenty-third  part  of  the  money  value  owned  by  the 
men  who  seem  ready  to  devote  the  whole.  A  debt  of 
$600,000.000  now  is  a  less  sum  per  head  than  was  the 
debt  of  our  Revolution  when  we  came  out  of  that 
struggle ;  and  the  money  value  in  the  country  now  bears 
even  a  greater  proportion  to  what  it  was  then  than 
does  the  population.  Surely  each  man  has  as  strong 
a  motive  now  to  preserve  our  liberties  as  each  had 
then  to  establish  them. 

A  right  result  at  this  time  will  be  worth  more  to  the 
world  than  ten  times  the  men  and  ten  times  the 
money.  The  evidence  reaching  us  from  the  country 
leaves  no  doubt  that  the  material  for  the  work  is  abun- 
dant, and  that  it  needs  only  the  hand  of  legislation  to 
give  it  legal  sanction,  and  the  hand  of  the  Executive 
to  give  it  practical  shape  and  efficiency.  One  of  the 
greatest  perplexities  of  the  Government  is  to  avoid  re- 
ceiving troops  faster  than  it  can  provide  for  them.  In 
a  word,  the  people  will  save  their  Government  if  the 
Government  itself  will  do  its  part  only  indifferently 
well. 

The  latter  half  of  the  message  was  in  its 
nature  an  address  to  the  country  upon  the  fal- 
lacies of  secession  and  the  constitutional  duty 
imposed  upon  the  President  to  suppress  it  by 
arms.  The  movers  of  secession,  said  Mr.  Lincoln, 


94  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

in  order  to  undermine  the  loyalty  of  the  South 
to  the  Union  "  invented  an  ingenious  sophism, 
which  if  conceded  was  followed  by  perfectly 
logical  'steps  through  all  the  incidents,  to  the 
complete  destruction  of  the  Union.  The  sophism 
itself  is  that  any  State  in  the  Union  may,  consist- 
ently with  the  national  Constitution,  withdraw 
from  the  Union  without  the  consent  of  the  Union 
or  of  any  other  State.  The  little  disguise  that 
the  supposed  right  is  to  be  exercised  only  for 
just  cause,  themselves  to  be  the  sole  judges  of  its 
justice,  is  too  thin  to  merit  any  notice." 

This  sophism,  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  is  based  upon 
the  false  doctrine  of  State  sovereignty.  "  Our 
States,"  he  said,  "  have  neither  more  nor  less 
power  than  that  reserved  to  them  in  the  Union  by 
the  Constitution — no  one  of  them  ever  having 
been  a  State  out  of  the  Union.  .  .  .  The  States 
have  their  status  in  the  Union,  and  they  have  no 
other  legal  status.  If  they  break  from  this,  they 
can  only  do  so  against  law  and  by  revolution. 
The  Union,  and  not  themselves  separately,  pro- 
cured their  independence  and  their  liberty.  .  .  . 
The  Union  is  older  than  any  of  the  States,  and, 
in  fact,  it  created  them  as  States." 

The  rights  of  the  States  reserved  to  them  by 
the  Constitution,  argued  Mr.  Lincoln,  are  ob- 
viously administrative  powers,  and  certainly  do 
not  include  a  power  to  destroy  the  Government 
itself.  "  This  relative  matter  of  national  power 
and  State  rights,  as  a  principle,  is  no  other  than 
the  principle  of  generality  and  locality.  What- 
ever concerns  the  whole  should  be  confined  to  the 
whole — to  the  General  Government ;  while  what- 
ever concerns  only  the  State  should  be  left  ex- 
clusively to  the  State." 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  95 

"  The  nation  purchased  with  money,"  con- 
tinued Mr.  Lincoln,  "  the  countries  out  of  which 
several  of  these  States  were  formed;  is  it  just 
that  they  shall  go  off  without  leave  and  without 
refunding?  .  .  .  The  nation  is  now  in  debt  for 
money  applied  to  the  benefit  of  these  so-called 
seceding  States  in  common  with  the  rest;  is  it 
just  that  .  .  .  the  remaining  States  pay  the 
whole?  .  .  .  Again,  if  one  State  may  secede, 
so  may  another ;  and  when  all  shall  have  seceded 
none  is  left  to  pay  the  debts.  .  .  The  principle 
itself  is  one  of  disintregation,  and  upon  which  no 
government  can  possibly  endure." 

It  may  be  affirmed,  without  extravagance,  that  the 
free  institutions  we  enjoy  have  developed  the  powers 
and  improved  the  condition  of  our  whole  people  be- 
yond any  example  in  the  world.  Of  this  we  now  have  a 
striking  and  an  impressive  illustration.  So  large  an  army 
as  the  Government  has  now  on  foot  was  never  before 
known  without  a  soldier  in  it  but  who  had  taken  his 
place  there  of  his  own  free  choice.  But  more  than  this ; 
there  are  many  single  regiments  whose  members,  one 
and  another,  possess  full  practical  knowledge  of  all  the 
arts,  sciences,  professions,  and  whatever  else,  whether 
useful  or  elegant,  is  known  in  the  world ;  and  there  is 
scarcely  one  from  which  there  could  not  be  selected  a 
President,  a  Cabinet,  a  Congress  and  perhaps  a  court, 
abundantly  competent  to  administer  the  Government 
itself.  Nor  do  I  say  this  is  not  true  also  in  the  army  of 
our  late  friends,  now  adversaries  in  this  contest ;  but 
if  it  is,  so  much  better  the  reason  why  the  Government 
which  has  conferred  such  benefits  on  both  them  and  us 
should  not  be  broken  up.  Whoever,  in  any  section,  pro- 
poses to  abandon  such  a  Government,  would  do  well  to 
consider  in  deference  to  what  principle  it  is  that  he  does 
it ;  what  better  he  is  likely  to  get  in  its  stead ;  whether 
the  substitute  will  give,  or  be  intended  to  give,  so  much 
of  good  to  the  people?  There  are  some  foreshadow- 
ings  on  this  subject.  Our  adversaries  have  adopted 
some  declarations  of  independence,  in  which,  unlike  the 


96  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

good  old  one,  penned  by  Jefferson,  they  omit  the  words, 
"  all  men  are  created  equal."  Why?  They  have  adopted 
a  temporary  national  constitution,  in  the  preamble  of 
which  unlike  our  good  old  one,  signed  by  Washing- 
ton, they  omit,  "  We,  the  people,"  and  substitute,  "  We, 
the  deputies  of  the  sovereign  and  independent  States." 
Why?  Why  this  deliberate  pressing  out  of  view  the 
rights  of  men  and  the  authority  of  the  people? 

This  is  essentially  a  people's  contest.  On  the  side 
of  the  Union  it  is  a  struggle  for  maintaining  in  the 
world  that  form  and  substance  of  government  whose 
leading  object  is  to  elevate  the  condition  of  men;  to  lift 
artificial  weights  from  all  shoulders ;  to  clear  the  paths 
of  laudable  pursuits  for  all ;  to  afford  all  an  unfettered 
start  and  a  fair  chance  in  the  race  of  life.  Yielding  to 
partial  and  temporary  departures,  from  necessity,  this  is 
the  leading  object  of  the  Government  for  whose  ex- 
istence we  contend. 

I  am  most  happy  to  believe  that  the  plain  people 
understand  and  appreciate  this.  It  is  worthy  of  note, 
that  while  in  this  the  Government's  hour  of  trial,  large 
numbers  of  those  in  the  army  and  navy  who  have  been 
favored  with  the  offices  have  resigned  and  proved  false 
to  the  hand  which  had  pampered  them,  not  one  common 
soldier  or  common  sailor  is  known  to  have  deserted 
his  flag. 

Great  honor  is  due  to  those  officers  who  remained 
true,  despite  the  example  of  their  treacherous  associ- 
ates; but  the  greatest  honor,  and  most  important  fact  of 
all,  is  the  unanimous  firmness  of  the  common  soldiers 
and  common  sailors.  To  the  last  man,  so  far  as  known, 
they  have  successfully  resisted  the  traitorous  efforts  of 
those  whose  commands  but  an  hour  before  they  obeyed 
as  absolute  law.  This  is  the  patriotic  instinct  of  plain 
people.  They  understand,  without  an  argument,  that 
the  destroying  the  Government  which  was  made  by 
Washington  means  no  good  to  them. 

Our  popular  Government  has  often  been  called  an  ex- 
periment. Two  points  in  it  our  people  have  already 
settled — the  successful  establishing  and  the  successful 
administering  of  it.  One  still  remains — its  successful 
maintenance  against  a  formidable  internal  attempt  to 
overthrow  it.  It  is  now  for  them  to  demonstrate  to  the 
world  that  those  who  can  fairly  carry  an  election  can 
also  suppress  a  rebellion;  that  ballots  are  the  rightful 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  97 

and  peaceful  successors  of  bullets;  and  that  when  bal- 
lots have  fairly  and  constitutionally  decided,  there  can 
be  no  successful  appeal  back  to  bullets ;  that  there  can 
be  no  successful  appeal,  except  to  ballots  themselves,  at 
succeeding  elections.  Such  will  be  a  great  lesson  of 
peace ;  teaching  men  that  what  they  cannot  take  by  an 
election,  neither  can  they  take  by  a  war ;  teaching  all 
the  folly  of  being  the  beginners  of  a  war. 

It  was  with  the  deepest  regret  that  the  Executive 
found  the  duty  of  employing  the  war  power  in  de- 
fence of  the  Government  forced  upon  him.  He  could 
but  perform  this  duty  or  surrender  the  existence  of 
the  Government.  No  compromise  by  public  servants 
could,  in  this  case,  be  a  cure ;  not  that  compromises  are 
not  often  proper,  but  that  no  popular  Government  can 
long  survive  a  marked  precedent  that  those  who  carry 
an  election  can  only  save  the  Government  from  im- 
mediate destruction  by  giving  up  the  main  point  upon 
which  the  people  gave  the  election.  The  people  them- 
selves, and  not  their  servants,  can  safely  reverse  their 
own  deliberate  decisions. 

As  a  private  citizen  the  Executive  could  not  have 
consented  that  these  institutions  shall  perish ;  much  less 
could  he,  in  betrayal  of  so  vast  and  so  sacred  a  trust 
as  the  free  people  have  confided  to  him.  He  felt  that 
he  had  no  moral  right  to  shrink,  nor  even  to  count  the 
chances  of  his  own  life  in  what  might  follow.  In  full 
view  of  his  great  responsibility  he  has,  so  far,  done 
v.-hat  he  has  deemed  his  duty.  You  will  now,  according 
to  your  own  judgment,  perform  yours.  He  sincerely 
hopes  that  your  views  and  your  actions  may  so  accord 
with  his,  as  to  assure  all  faithful  citizens  who  have 
been  disturbed  in  their  rights  of  a  certain  and  speedy 
restoration  to  them,  under  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws. 

And  having  thus  chosen  our  course  without  guile 
and  with  pure  purpose,  let  us  renew  our  trust  in  God, 
and  go  forward  without  fear  and  with  manly  hearts. 


Congress,  like  the  President,  rose  to  heroic 
stature  in  meeting  the  crisis  thrust  upon  the 
nation.  It  sat  for  a  month  and  in  that  time  did 
all  that  the  Executive  desired.  All  the  acts  of 


98  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  President  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion 
which  he  performed  were  declared  valid,  and  he 
was  authorized  to  accept  the  service  of  500,000 
volunteers,  and  $500,000,000  were  voted  to  prose- 
cute the  war. 

The  press  and  people  heartily  indorsed  the 
action  of  Congress  and  the  President;  and  Mr. 
Lincoln  entered  into  consideration  of  the  mighty 
problem  of  war  with  a  resolute  purpose  and  a 
single  aim  to  restore  the  Union  of  the  States  as 
they  were.  That  the  country  had  thus  settled 
down  to  the  serious  business  of  war,  and  that 
Congress  and  the  loyal  people  were  en  rapport 
with  the  Executive,  armed  that  branch  of  govern- 
ment with  the  mighty  power  of  unity  and  con- 
cord. If  there  could  have  been  celerity  and  effec- 
tiveness in  military  operations,  or  if  the  people 
had  remained  constant  and  patient,  all  would  have 
gone  well,  but  no  such  gratifying  conditions  ex- 
isted, for  military  matters  were  unsatisfactory. 
In  time  diversity  of  policy  and  feeling  was  engen- 
dered, the  President's  current  policy  and  ability 
were  criticised,  and  the  entente  cordiale  which 
had  existed  between  the  Administration  and  the 
people  was  strained. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  conception  of  the  situation  was 
tersely  stated  to  me,  with  the  license  and  unre- 
strained freedom  of  intimate  friendship,  on  the 
26th  day  of  July,  1861.  He  then  said:  "We 
must  make  a  feint  against  Richmond  and  in  that 
way  dislodge  them  [the  Rebels]  from  Manassas; 
we  must  pursue  as  rigidly  as  possible  the  block- 
ade; we  must  march  a  column  of  the  army  into 
East  Tennessee,  so  as  to  liberate  the  Union  sen- 
timent there;  and  then  we  must  rely  upon  the 
time  coming  when  the  people  down  South  will 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  99 

rise  and  say  to  their  leaders :  '  This  thing  has 
got  to  stop; '  for  [said  he  impressively],  it  is  no 
use  trying  to  conquer  those  people  if  they  remain 
united  and  bound  not  to  be  conquered." 

Leonard  Swett  said,  that  during  the  first  and 
second  years  of  the  war  Mr.  Lincoln  had  little 
hope  of  preserving  the  Union,  but  that  after  the 
issuance  and  reception  of  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  he  then  and  thereafter  expected 
to  prevail.  Such  is  my  own  view.  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  not  of  a  hopeful  and  enthusiastic,  but  of  a 
despondent  and  somber  character.  He  fully 
apprehended  the  odds  against  us,  including  the 
hostility  of  England  and  France,  and  the  sym- 
pathy of  border  State  slave-holders  with  their 
brethren  in  the  Cotton  States. 

The  disadvantage  which  the  Administration 
of  a  constitutional  government  labors  under,  in 
conducting  an  internecine  war,  was  exhibited  by 
the  sedulous  care  necessary  to  be  observed  in  not 
invading  the  area  of  constitutional  right,  or  in 
making  ample  apology  for  doing  so,  and  showing 
its  inherent  necessity.  Both  in  his  official  utter- 
ances and  in  his  loose  talk,  Lincoln  was  careful 
to  guarantee  to  all  classes  their  utmost  rights  and 
privileges,  and  to  "  curry  favor  "  personally  with 
all  classes  and  conditions  in  an  indirect,  unob- 
trusive, and  manly  way,  thus  weakening  the 
power  of  the  opposition,  and  gaining  accretions 
of  power  to  his  own  side. 

Monarchical  powers  do  none  of  these  things ; 
they  decide  on  the  war  in  the  Cabinet ;  order  the 
lines,  and  organize  the  army;  conscript  the 
needed  troops  or  hire  mercenaries,  as  may  be 
needed,  but  they  omit  to  take  the  people  into 
their  confidence.  While  Mr.  Lincoln  was  en- 


100  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

gaged  in  defining  his  proposition  in  all  ways  he 
could,  Jefferson  Davis  embraced  opportunities  to 
do  the  same  in  reference  to  his  government. 
Both  appealed  to  their  several  constituencies  for 
strength  to  uphold  their  governments,  and  both 
laid  their  claim  before  the  civilized  world  for  its 
approval. 

The  differences  between  the  two  governments 
and  the  modes  of  their  action  were  apparent ;  for, 
while  Mr.  Lincoln's  government  never  at  any 
time  showed  infringements  upon  constitutional 
liberty  beyond  a  moderate  draft,  the  issue  of  fiat 
money,  and  a  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  scarcely  exercised,  the  Davis  government, 
though  vaunting  its  devotion  to  enlarged  liberty 
and  almost  the  freedom  of  license,  became  an  ab- 
solute and  implacable  despotism:  fiercely  taking 
supplies  and  products,  enforcing  the  currency  of 
a  circulating  medium  of  neither  present  nor 
prospective  value,  and  robbing  the  fireside  and 
the  cradle  and  the  grave  by  press  gangs  to  re- 
cruit its  armies.  The  people  were  impoverished 
and  deprived  of  almost  every  vestige  of  liberty. 

Almost  the  sole  business  of  the  Southern  coun- 
try was  to  furnish  supplies  and  men  for  the 
army;  there  was  but  little  progress  in  emigra- 
tion, manufactures,  commerce,  science,  education 
or  the  arts ;  cruel,  unrelenting  war,  was  the  sole 
business,  and  all  of  the  current  and  floating  capi- 
tal having  been  engulfed  in  the  vortex,  the  fixed 
capital  and  reserved  wealth  were  rapidly  disap- 
pearing in  the  same  way. 

Despite  the  fact  that  State  rights  and  slavery 
were  the  twin  pillars  of  their  fabric  of  govern- 
ment, the  former  was  disregarded  entirely,  and 
the  protests  of  Governors  Brown,  of  Georgia,  and 


THE  FIRST  MESSAGE  101 

'Vance,  of  North  Carolina,  against  the  improper 
use  of  their  troops  were  wholly  disregarded. 
Had  Mr.  Lincoln  attempted  to  administer  his 
government  in  such  utter  disregard  of  constitu- 
tional rights  and  of  the  primary  principles  of  lib- 
erty, it  would  not  have  endured  for  a  single 
year. 


CHAPTER  VI 

BULL   RUN   AND    MILITARY    EMANCIPATION 

TEN  days  after  the  President  had  promulgated 
his  enheartening  message,  Congress,  as  well  as 
the  Northern  people,  were  mightily  encouraged 
by  the  report  of  General  McClellan  that  he  had 
defeated  the  "  crack  regiments  of  Eastern  Vir- 
ginia, aided  by  Georgians,  Tennesseeans,  and 
Carolinians,"  at  Rich  Mountain  and  Carrick's 
Ford,  killing  in  the  second  battle  their  general, 
Robert  S.  Garnett.  "  Our  success  is  complete," 
said  McClellan,  "  and  secession  is  killed  in  this 
country."  These  quickly  succeeding  and  decisive 
victories  recalled  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Italy, 
and  comparisons  were  drawn  between  the  "  Lit- 
tle Corporal  "  and  "  Little  Mac,"  as  McClellan 
was  affectionately  dubbed.  It  was  thought  that 
he  who  had  so  quickly  won  an  entire  province, 
virtually  a  State,  to  the  Union,  was  the  military 
genius  of  the  war,  and  the  commander  destined 
to  lead  the  soldiers  of  the  Union,  now  proved  to 
be  superior  to  the  boasted  Southern  chivalry, 
"  on  to  Richmond,"  the  speedy  capture  of  which 
would  undoubtedly  "  kill  secession  "  in  the  entire 
South. 

However,  these  anticipations  of  a  "  ninety  days' 
conquest "  were  rudely  shattered  by  the  defeat 
at  Bull  Run,  or  Manassas.  On  July  18  Johnston 

102 


BULL  RUN  103 

executed  a  stolen  march  which  completely  de- 
ceived Patterson,  his  opponent,  and  by  Saturday, 
July  20,  6,000  of  his  9,000  men  had  joined 
the  22,000  under  Beauregard,  in  time  to  resist 
McDowell's  attack  on  Sunday,  the  2ist,  and  the 
remaining  3,000  arrived  in  time  to  turn  the 
tide  of  victory  in  favor  of  the  Confederates. 
The  Union  retreat  became  a  disorderly  flight 
back  to  Washington.  Many  civilians  had  gone 
to  see  the  battle,  and  these,  mingling  with  the 
retreating  soldiers,  contributed  to  the  confusion. 
One  Congressman  was  captured  by  the  Rebels — 
a  salutary  lesson  to  his  colleagues  of  the  evil 
effects  of  over-confidence. 

Jefferson  Davis,  hurrying  from  Richmond, 
reached  the  scene  of  conflict  just  before  the  final 
denouement,  and,  impressing  a  cavalry  horse, 
reached  the  immediate  theater  of  operations  in 
time  to  exclaim  to  the  troops  of  a  division  just 
ordered  forward,  "  Forward !  my  brave  boys,  and 
win."  In  1880  I  spent  an  entire  day  with  Hon. 
5  T.  H.  Watts,  of  Alabama,  who  was  the  Attorney- 
General  of  the  Confederacy  for  a  time,  and  he 
told  me  very  much  of  his  side  of  the  rebellion; 
among  which  was  this  fact,  that  Davis  accepted 
the  Presidency  with  extreme  reluctance,  deeming 
his  forte  to  be  as  Commander  of  the  Army.  This 
idea  possessed  him  -throughout,  and  he  was 
in  a  frequent  state  of  nervous  irritation  at  what 
he  deemed  the  bad  policy  and  mistakes  of  his 
generals.  Governor  Watts  thought  that  if  the 
authorities  had  rated  his  military  qualities  as 
highly  as  he  did  himself,  -and  allowed  him  to 
take  supreme  command  of  the  army,  he  would 
willingly  at  any  time  have  resigned  the  Executive 
chair  for  that  purpose.  Governor  Watts  said 


104  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

he  and  Davis  had  often  talked  about  it,  both 
in  the  office  and  in  the  social  circle.  It  was, 
in  fact,  a  hobby  with  Davis.  Beauregard,  how- 
ever, in  his  report  on  the  battle  ignored  Davis' 
services,  if  any,  in  the  battle,  and  simply  said 
that  the  President  came  on  the  field  at,  or  toward, 
the  close  of  the  battle;  and  General  Johnston 
made  no  mention  of  the  President  at  all.  Davis 
never  forgave  either  of  these  gallant  officers, 
but,  in  all  ways  that  he  could,  crippled  and  in- 
jured each  of  them  throughout  the  war.  John- 
ston's preeminent  talents  generally  assured  him 
an  independent  command ;  but  Beauregard's  les- 
ser abilities  were  unable  to  enforce  such  a  posi- 
tion, and  he  was  relegated  to  subordinate  places. 
I  reached  Washington  from  Chicago  on  the 
Monday  evening  after  the  rout,  and  recollect  viv- 
idly the  disorganized  condition  of  the  capital ; 
the  weather  was  unusually — I  might  say,  phe- 
nomenally— hot;  showers  would  fall,  and  imme- 
diately it  seemed  as  if  the  heat  was  more  intense 
and  stifling  than  before.  The  night  brought  little 
relief.  Judiciary  Square  and  Capitol  Hill  af- 
forded comfortable  lodging  places  for  our  brave 
boys,  whose  mattress  was  Mother  Earth  and 
whose  covering  was  the  blue  dome  of  Heaven. 
At  each  street  pump  soldiers  might  be  seen 
washing  some  rude  article  of  clothing,  the  iron 
railings  of  the  elite  serving  in  lieu  of  clothes-lines 
for  laundry  uses ;  the  boys  would  break  up  in 
squads,  and  each  take  a  block  where  three  of 
them  together  would  visit  each  house  and  respect- 
fully solicit  their  breakfasts,  nor  was  the  request 
ever  denied,  and  their  dinners  and  suppers  were 
procured  similarly,  nor  was  there  any  complaint 
of  misbehavior.  General  Mansfield  was  intrusted 


Bi'LL  RU1\*  105 

with  the  duty  of  reorganization,  a  task  which  was 
accomplished  in  a  few  days. 

Lincoln  held  a  Cabinet  meeting  at  General 
Scott's  office  late  Sunday  afternoon  to  take  meas- 
ures to  save  the  capital.  Soldiers  were  hurried 
from  recruiting  stations  to  Washington.  McClel- 
lan  was  ordered  to  come  down  tc  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  with  all  his  available  troops. 

The  entire  country  was  thrown  into  a  panic 
from  which  it  was  some  time  in  recovering.  As 
an  evidence  of  the  general  demoralization  the  fol- 
lowing letter  to  Lincoln  from  Horace  Greeley, 
editor  of  the  New  York  Tribune,  may  be  cited : 

NEW  YORK,  Monday,  July  29,  1861.  (Midnight.) 
This  is  my  seventh  sleepless  night — yours,  too,  doubt- 
less— yet  I  think  I  shall  not  die,  because  I  have  no 
right  to  die.  I  must  struggle  to  live,  however  bitterly. 
But  to  business.  You  are  not  considered  a  great  man, 
and  I  am  a  helplessly  broken  one.  .  .  .  Can  the 
Rebels  be  beaten  after  all  that  has  occurred,  and  in 
view  of  the  actual  state  of  feeling  caused  by  our  late, 
awful  disaster?  If  they  can, — and  it  is  your  business 
to  ascertain  and  decide, — write  me  that  such  is  your 
judgment,  so  that  I  may  know  and  do  my  duty.  And 
if  they  cannot  be  beaten, — if  our  recent  disaster  is  fatal, 
— do  not  fear  to  sacrifice  yourself  to  your  country.  If 
the  Rebels  are  not  to  be  beaten, — if  that  is  your  judg- 
ment in  view  of  all  the  light  you  can  get, — then  every 
drop  of  blood  henceforth  shed  in  this  quarrel  will  be 
wantonly,  wickedly  shed,  and  the  guilt  will  rest  heav- 
ily on  the  soul  of  every  promoter  of  the  crime.  I  pray 
you  to  decide  quickly  and  let  me  know  my  duty.  .  .  . 
If  it  is  best  for  the  country  and  for  mankind  that  we 
make  peace  with  the  Rebels  at  once  and  on  their  own 
terms,  do  not  shrink  even  from  that. 

Lincoln  had  spent  sleepless  nights,  not  in  self- 
ish nursing  of  grief,  but  in  planning  for  the  sal- 
vation of  the  republic.  On  July  23  he  wrote 


106  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

memoranda  looking  to  the  vigorous  maintenance 
of  every  defensive  policy  that  had  been  entered 
upon,  and  on  July  27  he  added  to  these  memo- 
randa of  three  offensive  operations ;  recovery  of 
the  railroad  connections  lost  by  the  defeat,  and 
joint  movements  from  Cairo  on  Memphis,  and 
from  Cincinnati  on  East  Tennessee. 

Congress  ably  supported  the  President  in  this 
emergency.  On  July  22,  following  the  defeat  at 
Bull  Run,  John  J.  Crittenden,  an  aged  Represent- 
ative from  Kentucky,  the  State  where  the  policy 
of  neutrality  had  been  strongest,  voiced  the  spirit 
of  his  legislative  body  in  a  resolution  declaring 
that  the  war  had  been  forced  upon  the  country 
by  the  disunionists,  and  would  be  waged  by  the 
Federal  Government  not  for  subjugation,  "  but  to 
defend  and  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Consti- 
tution, and  to  preserve  the  Union  with  all  the 
dignity,  equality,  and  rights  of  the  several  States 
unimpaired;  and  that  as  soon  as  these  objects  are 
accomplished  the  war  ought  to  cease." 

This,  and  a  similar  resolution  offered  in  the 
Senate  by  Andrew  Johnson,  of  Tennessee,  were 
passed  with  but  few  dissenting  votes. 

On  July  27  General  McClellan  was  endued 
with  the  chief  command  at  Washington,  and  em- 
powered to  organize  a  new  army  out  of  the  three 
years'  regiments  beginning  to  pour  in  upon  the 
capital. 

History  does  not  recount  a  career  in  which  the 
road  to  immortal  fame  was  so  manifest,  obvious, 
and  clearly  defined  as  that  upon  which  McClellan 
now  entered.  He  had  a  good  army  record,  the 
prestige  of  excellent  scholarship,  fine  oppor- 
tunities for  military  observation,  admirable  social 
qualities,  an  excellent  moral  character,  a  fine 


BULL  RUN  107 

(parlor)  presence,  a  polished  address,  the  friend- 
ship of  the  commanding  General,  and  great  poli- 
tical influence.  Unfortunately,  he  fell  into  the 
embraces  of  society  people  at  Washington,  which 
was  a  clog  to  proper  vigor  and  progress  in  field 
operations,  especially  as  the  class  most  in  favor 
with  him  was  not  favorable  to  a  rigorous  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war.  In  addition,  he  accepted  the 
proffered  services  of  many  carpet  knights  as  vol- 
unteer and  other  staff  officers,  who,  when  in 
commission  and  on  dress  parade,  were  brilliant 
and  imposing  in  appearance,  but  constituted  only 
the  edging  and  passementerie,  and  not  the  sub- 
stance of  war. 

Instead  of  taking  up  his  headquarters  in  the 
field  with  his  army,  he  procured  an  aristocratic 
mansion  close  by  the  White  House,  and  fell  into 
luxurious  and  methodical  habits  of  empty  reviews 
and  dull  routine  instead  of  campaigning  and  field 
operations.  He  had  a  cavalry  bodyguard  which 
did  nothing  except  attend  him  in  his  diurnal  re- 
views. He  had  also  an  infantry  bodyguard 
which  did  nothing  but  attend  at  his  magnificent 
headquarters.  Two  French  princes  were  on  his 
staff ;  one  of  them  afterwards  said :  "  I  here  point 
out  a  characteristic  trait  of  the  American  people 
— delay !  "  It  is  needless  to  say  that  this  prince 
had  not  served  with  Grant,  Sherman,  or  Sheridan. 
John  Jacob  Astor  was  a  volunteer  on  his  staff, 
and  he  paid  all  his  own  expenses  and  lived  as  he 
was  wont  to  in  Fifth  Avenue,  served  by  a  chef 
and  a  steward.  This  was  patriotic  in  Mr.  Astor, 
but  it  was  not  war;  and  such  surroundings  emas- 
culated McClellan  of  vigor,  self-reliance,  and  the 
real  business  which  the  nation  had  employed  him 
to  do.  When  he  was  finally  forced  to  take  the 


io8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

field  after  seven  weary  months  of  fanfaronade 
and  pinchbeck  reviews,  it  required  six  immense 
four-horse  wagons,  drawn  by  twenty-four  horses, 
to  haul  the  baggage  of  himself  and  his  staff. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  House  was  debating 
the  Crittenden  resolution,  the  Senate  voted  to 
confiscate  the  slaves  employed  in  aid  of  the  rebel- 
lion. This  act  was  a  long  stride  onward  toward 
emancipation.  Credit  for  pointing  out  the  mili- 
tary principle  upon  which  the  confiscation  was 
justified  is  due  to  General  Butler.  He  was  in 
command  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  had  as  his  op- 
ponent John  B.  Magruder,  who  with  scant  troops, 
set  to  work  to  construct  earthworks,  putting  ne- 
groes at  the  task.  A  number  of  these  ran  away 
to  Fortress  Monroe.  Three  of  them  were  farm- 
hands, belonging  to  Colonel  Mallory,  who  de- 
manded their  return  under  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Act.  Now  General  Butler  had  been  the  keenest 
lawyer  in  Massachusetts,  and  he  took  a  reasonable 
legal  position  rather  than  a  military  course  in  re- 
fusing the  bold  demand.  He  replied  that  Virginia 
claimed  to  be  a  foreign  state,  and  therefore  its 
citizens,  at  least  those  that  indorsed  this  claim, 
could  not  consistently  assert  as  their  right  a  duty 
of  the  Nation  to  one  of  its  States. 

This  reasoning  led  to  an  even  more  advanced 
position,  which  was  concisely  summed  up  in  a 
single  phrase,  viz.,  that  negroes  employed  in  aid 
of  rebellion  were  "  contraband  of  war."  Since 
the  Southerners  regarded  slaves  as  chattels  they 
could  not  consistently  except  to  this  conclusion. 

The  Government  heartily  approved  General 
Butler's  course.  On  May  30  Secretary  Cameron 
of  the  War  Department  gave  him  a  formal  order 
authorizing  him  to  pursue  the  policy  he  had 


MILITARY  EMANCIPATION  109 

adopted,  and  this  was  subsequently  enacted  into 
law  by  Congress.  Even  the  border-State  Union 
men  did  not  voice  any  objections,  for  to  do  so 
would  impeach  their  loyalty.  The  public  gener- 
ally applauded  Butler.  When,  however,  Major- 
General  John  C.  Fremont,  in  command  of  the 
Western  Department,  consisting  of  Illinois  and 
all  the  region  between  the  Mississippi  and  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  attempted  to  gain  a  similar 
popular  acclaim  by  issuing  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility a  proclamation  confiscating  all  property  of 
persons  in  rebellion,  and  emancipating  their 
slaves,  neither  the  Administration  nor  the  country 
as  a  whole  supported  him.  General  Fremont  had 
already  proved  himself  an  incompetent  com- 
mander. His  neglect  to  reenforce  the  brave 
General  Lyon,  isolated  at  Springfield  in  south- 
western Missouri  among  gathering  Rebel  forces, 
had  led  to  the  defeat  and  death  of  Lyon  at  Wil- 
son's Creek  on  August  10 ;  and  his  egotism  in  re- 
fusing to  consult  with  the  civil  authorities  and  his 
subordinate  officers  had  thoroughly  demoralized 
his  entire  department. 

President  Lincoln  therefore  was  watching  for 
danger  in  that  quarter,  and  as  soon  as  he  was 
informed  of  Fremont's  proclamation  on  August 
30  of  military  emancipation,  wrote  him  on  Sep- 
tember 2  to  modify  it  so  that  it  should  conform 
to  the  Act  of  Congress  confiscating  property 
used  for  insurrection,  giving  as  a  reason  for  his 
objection  that  the  liberation  of  slaves  would 
alarm  Southern  Unionists,  and  perhaps  precipi- 
tate Kentucky  into  the  Confederacy. 

Before  Lincoln  received  a  reply  to  this,  he 
wrote  to  General  David  Hunter  a  letter  full  of 
shrewd  foresight  and  delicate  diplomacy: 


no  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

September  9,   1861. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  General  Fremont  needs  assistance 
which  it  is  difficult  to  give  him.  He  is  losing  the  confi- 
dence of  men  near  him,  whose  support  any  man  in  his 
position  must  have  to  be  successful.  His  cardinal  mis- 
take is  that  he  isolates  himself,  and  allows  nobody  to 
see  him ;  and  by  which  he  does  not  know  what  is  going 
on  in  the  very  matter  he  is  dealing  with.  He  needs  to 
have  by  his  side  a  man  of  large  experience.  Will  you 
not,  for  me,  take  that  place?  Your  rank  is  one  grade 
too  high  to  be  ordered  to  it ;  but  will  you  not  serve  the 
country  and  oblige  me  by  taking  it  voluntarily? 

Two  days  later  he  received  an  answer  from 
Fremont  to  his  letter  of  September  2.  It  was  full 
of  excuses  and  self-justification.  Mrs.  Fremont 
brought  it  in  person.  She  adopted  a  hostile  atti- 
tude toward  the  President,  and,  insinuating  that 
there  was  a  conspiracy  against  her  husband,  de- 
manded a  copy  of  the  President's  Missouri  corre- 
spondence. To  this  Lincoln  courteously  but  firmly 
replied : 

I  do  not  feel  authorized  to  furnish  you  with  copies 
of  letters  in  my  possession,  without  the  consent  of  the 
writers.  No  impression  has  been  made  on  my  mind 
against  the  honor  or  integrity  of  General  Fremont,  and 
I  now  enter  my  protest  against  being  understood  as 
acting  in  any  hostility  towards  him. 

The  situation  precipitated  by  General  Fre- 
mont's proclamation  was  most  critical.  The  bor- 
der States,  for  whose  adherence  to  the  Union  Lin- 
coln had  thus  far  most  successfully  played, 
seemed  about  to  escape  from  his  control.  Be- 
sides, soldiers  from  the  Northern  States,  who  had 
enlisted  to  save  the  Union  and  not  to  free  the 
negro,  were  greatly  disaffected  by  Fremont's 
proclamation.  On  the  other  hand  events  had 
rapidly  developed  many  conservative  Northern- 


MILITARY  EMANCIPATION  in 

ers  into  anti-slavery  radicals,  and  these,  together 
with  the  original  Abolitionists,  made  a  hero  of 
General  Fremont.  Such  persons  had  to  be 
treated  with  utmost  consideration. 

One  of  these  was  an  old  friend  and  adviser  of 
Lincoln,  Orville  H.  Browning,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Stephen  A.  Douglas  in  the  Senate.  On 
September  17  he  wrote  to  the  President  objecting 
to  his  attitude  toward  Fremont's  proclamation. 
To  this  letter  Lincoln  replied  on  the  22d : 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  Yours  of  the  i7th  is  just  received;  and 
coming  from  you,  I  confess  it  astonishes  me.  That 
you  should  object  to  my  adhering  to  a  law  which  you 
had  assisted  in  making  and  presenting  to  me  less  than 
a  month  before  is  odd  enough.  But  this  is  a  very 
small  part.  General  Fremont's  proclamation  as  to 
confiscation  of  property  and  the  liberation  of  slaves 
is  purely  political  and  not  within  the  range  of  military 
law  or  necessity.  If  a  commanding  general  finds  a 
necessity  to  seize  the  farm  of  a  private  owner  for 
a  pasture,  an  encampment,  or  a  fortification,  he  has  the 
right  to  do  so,  and  to  so  hold  it  as  long  as  the  neces- 
sity lasts ;  and  this  is  within  military  law,  because 
within  military  necessity.  But  to  say  the  farm  shall 
no  longer  belong  to  the  owner,  or  his  heirs  forever, 
and  this  as  well  when  the  farm  is  not  needed  for  mili- 
tary purposes  as  when  it  is,  is  purely  political,  with- 
out the  savor  of  military  law  about  it.  And  the  same 
is  true  of  slaves.  If  the  general  needs  them,  he  can 
seize  them  and  use  them;  but  when  the  need  is  past, 
it  is  not  for  him  to  fix  their  permanent  future  condition. 
That  must  be  settled  according  to  laws  made  by  law- 
makers, and  not  by  military  proclamations.  The  proc- 
lamation in  the  point  in  question  is  simply  "  dictator- 
ship." It  assumes  that  the  general  may  do  anything  he 
pleases— confiscate  the  lands  and  free  the  slaves  of  loyal 
people,  as  well  as  of  disloyal  ones.  And  going  the 
whole  figure,  I  have  no  doubt,  would  be  more  popular 
with  some  thoughtless  people  than  that  which  has  been 
done!  But  I  cannot  assume  this  reckless  position,  nor 
allow  others  to  assume  it  on  my  responsibility. 


112  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

You  speak  of  it  as  being  the  only  means  of  saving 
the  Government.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  itself  the  sur- 
render of  the  Government.  Can  it  be  pretended  that 
it  is  any  longer  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
— any  government  of  constitution  and  laws — wherein  a 
general  or  a  president  may  make  permanent  rules  of 
property  by  proclamation?  I  do  not  say  Congress 
might  not  with  propriety  pass  a  law  on  the  point  just 
such  as  General  Fremont  proclaimed.  I  do  not  say 
I  might  not,  as  a  member  of  Congress,  vote  for  it. 
What  I  object  to  is,  that  I,  as  President,  shall  ex- 
pressly or  impliedly  seize  and  exercise  the  permanent 
legislative  functions  of  the  Government. 

So  much  as  to  principle.  Now  as  to  policy.  No 
doubt  the  thing  was  popular  in  some  quarters,  and 
would  have  been  more  so  if  it  had  been  a  general 
declaration  of  emancipation.  The  Kentucky  legislature 
would  not  budge  till  that  proclamation  was  modified ; 
and  General  Anderson  telegraphed  me  that  on  the  news 
of  General  Fremont  having  actually  issued  deeds  of 
manumission,  a  whole  company  of  our  volunteers  threw 
down  their  arms  and  disbanded.  I  was  so  assured  as 
to  think  it  probable  that  the  very  arms  we  had  fur- 
nished Kentucky  would  be  turned  against  us.  I  think 
to  lose  Kentucky  is  nearly  the  same  as  to  lose  the 
whole  game.  Kentucky  gone,  we  cannot  hold  Missouri, 
nor,  as  I  think,  Maryland.  These  ah  against  us,  and  the 
job  on  our  hands  is  too  large  for  us.  We  would  as 
well  consent  to  separation  at  once,  including  the  sur- 
render of  this  capital.  On  the  contrary,  if  you  will 
give  up  your  restlessness  for  new  positions,  and  back 
me  manfully  on  the  grounds  upon  which  you  and  other 
kind  friends  gave  me  the  election  and  have  approved 
in  my  public  documents,  we  shall  go  through  trium- 
phantly. You  must  understand  I  took  my  course  on 
the  proclamation  because  of  Kentucky.  I  took  the 
same  ground  in  a  private  letter  to  General  Fremont 
before  I  heard  from  Kentucky. 

There  has  been  no  thought  of  removing  General 
Fremont  on  any  ground  connected  with  his  proclama- 
tion. ...  I  hope  no  real  necessity  for  it  exists  on  any 
ground. 

After  his  victory  over  General  Lyon,  the  Con- 
federate General  Price  advanced  northward  with- 


MILITARY  EMANCIPA TION  1 13 

out  opposition  till  on  September  18  he  met  the 
Chicago  Irish  Brigade  under  Colonel  James  A. 
Mulligan  at  Lexington  on  the  Missouri  River. 
Mulligan  had  held  the  place  against  great  odds 
for  more  than  two  days,  during  which  Fremont 
could  easily  have  sent  him  reinforcements,  but 
neglected  to  do  so.  Mulligan  was  forced  to  sur- 
render on  the  2Oth.  General  Scott  wrote  to  Fre- 
mont that  "  The  President  .  .  .  expects 
you  to  repair  the  disaster  at  Lexington  without 
loss  of  time." 

So  desirous  was  President  Lincoln  that  General 
Fremont  should  take  the  offensive  that,  in  a 
memorandum  which  he  made  about  October  i 
proposing  a  defensive  plan  of  campaign,  he  speci- 
fically exempted  him  from  the  general  inaction 
(see  p.  195). 

Nevertheless  General  Fremont  continued  inac- 
tive. Accordingly,  Secretary  Cameron  and  Ad- 
jutant-General Lorenzo  Thomas  went  to  Mis- 
souri to  investigate  the  situation,  and  if  advisable, 
to  remove  General  Fremont.  They  arrived  at 
Fremont's  camp  on  October  13,  and  on  the  I4th 
Cameron  wrote  the  President  informing  him  that 
he  had  shown  Fremont  the  order  for  his  removal 
and  that  the  General,  greatly  mortified,  had  made 
an  earnest  appeal  for  further  trial.  "  In  reply  to 
this  appeal,"  wrote  Cameron,  "  I  told  him  that  I 
would  withhold  the  order  until  my  return  to 
Washington,  giving  him  the  interim  to  prove  the 
reality  of  his  hopes  as  to  reaching  and  capturing 
the  enemy ;  giving  him  to  understand  that,  should 
he  fail,  he  must  give  place  to  some  other  officer. 
He  assured  me  that,  should  he  fail,  he  would  re- 
sign at  once." 

President  Lincoln  waited  until  October  24  for 


Ii4  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

signs  of  activity  by  Fremont  and,  none  forthcom- 
ing, he  sent  to  Brigadier-General  Samuel  R.  Cur- 
tis at  St.  Louis  an  order  to  General  Fremont  to 
turn  over  his  command  to  Major-General  David 
Hunter.  However,  he  gave  Curtis  instructions 
that  the  order  was  to  be  withheld  if,  by  the  time 
the  messenger  reached  Fremont,  the  general  had 
won  a  victory  or  was  in  the  midst  or  on  the  eve 
of  battle. 

General  Hunter  by  the  President's  orders  was 
on  hand  when  the  message  was  delivered.  Gen- 
eral Fremont  had  given  orders  to  attack  the  Con- 
federates who  were  supposed  to  be  at  Wilson's 
Creek.  Hunter  sent  a  reconaissance  to  this  place 
and  found  no  enemy  there.  General  Fremont 
thereupon  gracefully  resigned  his  command  to 
General  Hunter  and  returned  to  St.  Louis,  where 
he  was  publicly  welcomed  by  the  radical  faction 
of  the  Unionists.  General  Hunter,  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  of  the  President,  drew  back 
the  troops  from  Springfield  to  Rolla,  the  terminus 
of  a  railroad,  and  dispatched  most  of  them  to 
other  points  that  were  threatened.  Thereupon 
the  Confederate  Brigadier-General  Ben  McCul- 
loch  occupied  Springfield. 

On  November  9  the  Department  of  the  West 
was  divided  into  the  Department  of  Kansas  and 
the  Department  of  Missouri.  The  Department 
of  Kansas  included  the  State  of  Kansas  and 
the  Territories  of  Nebraska,  Colorado,  Dakota, 
and  Indian  Territory;  General  Hunter  was  as- 
signed to  its  command,  with  headquarters  at  Fort 
Leavenworth.  The  Department  of  Missouri  em- 
braced Arkansas,  Missouri,  Iowa,  Minnesota, 
Wisconsin,  Illinois,  and  that  part  of  Kentucky 
lying  west  of  the  Cumberland  River;  General 


MILITARY  EMANCIPA TION  1 1 5 

Henry  W.  Halleck  was  assigned  to  its  command, 
with  headquarters  at  St.  Louis. 

General  Halleck  set  himself  at  once  to  settle 
the  vexatious  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  army 
to  fugitive  slaves.  Contrary  to  Fremont's  policy 
he  issued  an  order  on  November  20  excluding 
these  fugitives  from  the  army  lines  on  the  ground 
that  they  conveyed  information  to  the  enemy. 
For  this  order  he  was  violently  attacked  by  the 
anti-slave  press  and  Congressmen,  who  averred 
that,  on  the  contrary,  the  fugitives  brought  in 
valuable  information  about  the  enemy. 

Bushwhacking  on  both  sides  had  brought  Mis- 
souri into  a  state  of  anarchy,  and  Halleck  turned 
his  attention  to  its  suppression.  Various  Confed- 
erate detachments  were  ravaging  northern  Mis- 
souri, and  he  sent  troops  to  drive  them  south- 
ward. He  assigned  to  General  John  Pope  the 
duty  of  intercepting  and  capturing  them  as  they 
crossed  the  Missouri  River.  On  December  19, 
near  Milford,  Colonel  Davis  of  Pope's  command 
captured  2,000  of  these  Confederates,  with  a 
great  quantity  of  arms,  horses,  and  supplies. 

General  Halleck  was  equally  severe  upon  the 
Union  bushwhackers.  In  the  beginning  of  the 
war  the  President  had  given  Senator  James  H. 
Lane,  of  Kansas,  authority  to  raise  a  brigade  in 
his  State.  The  men  who  enlisted  under  him  were 
\vild  spirits  who  had  taken  part  in  the  merciless 
strife  over  the  admission  of  Kansas,  and  they 
now  continued  the  same  order  of  barbaric  war- 
fare. Halleck  ordered  that  they  be  expelled  from 
his  department,  and  if  caught,  disarmed  and  held 
as  prisoners.  "  They  are  no  better  than  a  band 
of  robbers,"  he  wrote  to  McClellan.  "  They  cross 
the  line,  rob,  steal,  plunder,  and  burn  whatever 


Ii6  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

they  can  lay  hands  upon.  They  disgrace  the 
name  and  uniform  of  American  soldiers,  and  are 
driving  good  Union  men  into  the  ranks  of  the 
secession  army." 

Lincoln  tried  to  hold  Lane  and  his  soldiers 
within  bounds  by  making  him  clearly  understand 
that  he  was  under  command  of  General  Hunter. 
As  a  result,  Lane,  who  had  contemplated  an  ex- 
pedition against  Texas  which  should  bring  him 
great  glory,  became  disgruntled  and  inactive. 
Hunter,  disgusted  with  his  small  and  insubor- 
dinate forces,  and  believing  that  he  should  have 
had  the  command  assigned  to  General  Buell, 
wrote  to  the  President  expressing  his  humiliation 
and  disappointment. 

To  this  Lincoln  replied  on  December  31  but 
allowed  the  letter  to  remain  on  his  table  a  month, 
and  then  sent  it  by  special  conveyance  to  General 
Hunter,  directing  that  it  be  given  him  only  when 
he  was  in  good  humor.  As  one  of  the  most  char- 
acteristic letters  written  by  the  President  it  is 
here  presented  in  full : 

DEAR  SIR:  Yours  of  the  23d  is  received,  and  I  am 
constrained  to  say  it  is  difficult  to  answer  so  ugly 
a  letter  in  good  temper.  I  am,  as  you  intimate,  losing 
much  of  the  great  confidence  I  placed  in  you,  not  from 
any  'act  or  omission  of  yours  touching  the  public 
service,  up  to  the  time  you  were  sent  to  Leavenworth, 
but  from  the  flood  of  grumbling  dispatches  and  letters 
I  have  seen  from  you  since.  I  knew  you  were  being 
ordered  to  Leavenworth  at  the  time  it  was  done ;  and 
I  aver  that,  with  as  tender  a  regard  for  your  honor 
and  your  sensibilities  as  I  had  for  my  own,  it  never 
occurred  to  me  that  you  were  being  "  humiliated,  in- 
sulted and  disgraced " ;  nor  have  I,  up  to  this  day, 
heard  an  intimation  that  you  have  been  wronged,  com- 
ing from  any  one  but  yourself.  No  one  has  blamed 
you  for  the  retrograde  movement  from  Springfield,  nor 


MILITARY  EMANCIPA TION  1 1 7 

for  the  information  you  gave  General  Cameron;  and 
this  you  could  readily  understand,  if  it  were  not  for 
your  unwarranted  assumption  that  the  ordering  you  to 
Leayenworth  must  necessarily  have  been  done  as  a 
punishment  for  some  fault.  I  thought  then,  and  think 
yet,  the  position  assigned  to  you  is  as  responsible,  and 
as  honorable,  as  that  assigned  to  Buell — I  know  that 
General  McClellan  expected  more  important  results 
from  it.  My  impression  is  that  at  the  time  you  were 
assigned  to  the  new  Western  Department,  it  had  not 
been  determined  to  replace  General  Sherman  in  Ken- 
tucky; but  of  this  I  am  not  certain,  because  the  idea 
that  a  command  in  Kentucky  was  very  desirable,  and 
one  in  the  farther  West  undesirable,  had  never  occurred 
to  me.  You  constantly  speak  of  being  placed  in  com- 
mand of  only  3,000.  Now  tell  me,  is  this  not  mere 
impatience?  Have  you  not  known  all  the  while  that 
you  are  to  command  four  or  five  times  that  many? 

I  have  been,  and  am  sincerely  your  friend ;  and  if, 
as  such,  I  dare  to  make  a  suggestion,  I  would  say  you 
are  adopting  the  best  possible  way  to  ruin  yourself. 
"  Act  weU  your  part,  there  all  the  honor  lies."  He  who 
does  something  at  the  head  of  one  regiment,  will  eclipse 
him  who  does  nothing  at  the  head  of  a  hundred. 

Your  friend,  as  ever,  A.  LINCOLN. 

It  became  apparent  that  the  division  of  the  De- 
partment of  the  West  had  been  a  mistake,  and  on 
March  n,  1862,  the  two  commands  were  re- 
united under  Halleck,  and  Hunter  was  sent  to 
command  a  new  Department,  that  of  the  South, 
composed  of  Georgia,  Florida,  and  South  Caro- 
lina. 

The  division  of  feeling  concerning  the  action 
of  the  Government  in  regard  to  Fremont  tended 
to  foment  other  disorders,  and  to  create  other 
and  further  political  divisions,  and  to  render  life 
in  Missouri  not  worth  living,  for  there  was  no 
escape  from  the  political  complications  which 
equally  affected  men  and  women,  churches,  Sab- 
bath Schools,  and  even  made  its  appearance  with- 


n8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

in  the  sanctity  of  the  family  circle,  and  at  the 
family  altar.  Men  who  had  been  sworn  friends 
for  a  half  century  suddenly  became  bitter  and 
unrelenting  enemies.  Later,  when  the  Rebel 
army  had  been  driven  from  the  State,  the  Rebels 
of  Missouri,  who  had  not  had  the  courage  and 
manhood  to  enter  the  army,  resorted  to  guerrilla 
warfare.  They  infested  sparsely  populated 
neighborhoods,  stole  horses,  murdered  defense- 
less and  unarmed  men  and  women,  plundered 
banks,  and  committed  acts  even  more  reprehen- 
sible, making  life  in  the  rural  districts  of  Missouri 
as  wretched  and  uncomfortable  as  was  possible. 
The  culmination  of  these  atrocities  took  place  in 
the  raid  on  Lawrence,  Kan.,  on  August  21,  1863, 
by  which  all  the  men  in  the  place  were  cruelly 
massacred.  Stores  were  pillaged  and  burned, 
and  kindred  disorders  were  perpetrated. 

Governor  Gamble  got  up  an  effective  State 
militia,  and  soon  cleared  the  State  of  guerrillas; 
and  General  Thomas  Ewing,  Jr.,  commanding 
at  Kansas  City,  issued  Order  409  requiring  citi- 
zens of  the  border  counties  to  leave  their  farms 
and  resort  to  the  towns,  where  they  were  kept 
under  surveillance,  and  thus  debarred  the  privi- 
lege of  harboring  and  secreting  guerrillas  at  their 
homes.  General  Ewing  was  a  brother-in-law  to 
General  Sherman  and  had  been  his  law  partner. 
Although  he  was  a  son  of  Thomas  Ewing,  the  old 
veteran  Whig  statesman,  he  was  nevertheless  a 
candidate  for  Vice-President  at  the  Democratic 
convention  in  New  York  in  1868,  and  was  de- 
feated chiefly  by  an  exhibition  of  this  order  No. 
409,  which  Frank  Blair,  the  successful  candidate 
for  the  position,  had  procured,  duplicated,  and 
circulated  among  the  rebel  delegates,  of  whom 


MILITARY  EMANCIPATION  119 


Forrest,  the  hero  of  the  massacre  at  Fort  Pillow, 
was  one  of  the  most  highly  honored. 

General  Curtis  of  Iowa  was  put  in  command, 
succeeding  Halleck.  After  a  brief  and  stormy 
career,  he  was  removed  in  the  spring  of  1863, 
and  General  J.  M.  Schofield  put  in  his  place. 
Schofield  got  into  trouble  at  once;  there  was  an 
irreconcilable  hostility  and  rivalry  between  the 
two  Union  factions  in  Missouri,  and  no  com- 
mander could  please  both  sides. 

In  July  the  Missouri  State  Convention  passed 
an  act  amending  the  Constitution,  barring  slavery 
after  July  4,  1870.  That  gave  great  offense  to 
the  Radical  party,  who  desired  immediate  eman- 
cipation, and  political  excitement  became  more 
intense  than  ever.  In  September,  an  immense 
mass  convention  was  held  in  Jefferson  City,  at 
which  a  committee  was  appointed  to  visit  the 
President,  to  obtain  a  change  in  the  military  pol- 
icy, and  other  executive  action.  Likewise  a  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety  was  appointed  to  organ- 
ize and  arm  the  loyal  men  of  the  State  and,  fail- 
ing to  interest  the  President  in  their  behalf,  to 
call  on  the  people  in  their  sovereign  capacity  to 
"  take  such  measures  of  redress  as  the  emergency 
of  the  case  might  require;"  in  other  words,  a 
counter-revolution  was  proposed.  And  this 
committee  of  one  hundred  of  the  leading  citizens 
of  Missouri,  headed  by  Charles  D.  Drake,  later 
eminent  as  a  U.  S.  Senator  and  Chief  Judge  of 
the  Court  of  Claims,  visited  the  President,  and 
forcibly  stated  their  demands,  having  besides  the 
moral  courage  or  impudence  to  present  resolu- 
tions censuring  the  President  "  for  closing  his 
ears  to  the  just,  loyal,  and  patriotic  demands  of 
the  Radical  party,  while  he  endorsed  the  disloyal 


120  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and  oppressive  demands   of  Governor  Gamble, 
General  Schofield  and  their  adherents.  " 

The  President  heard  them  respectfully  and 
patiently;  and  on  October  5  presented  them  a 
letter  in  which  he  said : 

We  are  in  civil  war.  In  such  cases  there  always  is 
a  main  question,  but  in  this  case  that  question  is  a 
perplexing  compound — Union  and  slavery.  It  thus 
becomes  a  question  not  of  two  sides  merely,  but  of  at 
least  four  sides,  even  among  those  who  are  for  the 
Union,  saying  nothing  of  those  who  are  against  it. 
Thus,  those  who  are  for  the  Union  with,  but  not 
•without  slavery;  those  for  it  without,  but  not  with; 
those  for  it  with  or  without,  but  prefer  it  with;  and 
those  for  it  with  or  without,  but  prefer  it  without. 

Among  these,  again,  is  a  subdivision  of  those  who  are 
for  gradual,  but  not  for  immediate;  and  those  who  are 
for  immediate,  but  not  for  gradual  extinction  of  slavery. 

It  is  easy  to  conceive  that  all  these  shades  of  ooinion, 
and  even  more,  may  be  sincerely  entertained  by  honest 
and  truthful  men.  Yet,  all  being  for  the  Union,  by 
reason  of  these  differences,  each  will  prefer  a  different 
way  of  sustaining  the  Union.  At  once,  sincerity  is 
questioned,  and  motives  are  assailed.  Actual  war  com- 
ing, blood  grows  hot,  and  blood  is  spilled.  Thought 
is  forced  from  old  channels  into  confusion.  Deception 
breeds  and  thrives.  Confidence  dies,  and  universal  sus- 
picion reigns.  Each  man  feels  an  impulse  to  kill  his 
neighbor,  lest  he  be  killed  by  him.  Revenge  and  re- 
taliation follow.  And  all  this,  as  before  said,  may  be 
among  honest  men  only.  But  this  is  not  all.  Every 
foul  bird  comes  abroad,  and  every  dirty  reptile  rises 
up.  Tnese  add  crime  to  confusion.  Strong  measures 
deemed  indispensable  but  harsh  at  best,  such  men  make 
worse  by  maladministration.  Murders  for  old  grudges, 
and  murders  for  pelf,  proceed  under  any  cloak  that 
will  best  serve  for  the  occasion. 

These  causes  amply  account  for  what  has  occurred 
in  Missouri,  without  ascribing  it  to  the  weakness  or 
wickedness  of  any  general.  The  newspaper  files,  those 
chroniclers  of  current  events,  will  show  that  the  evils 
now  complained  of  were  quite  as  prevalent  under  Fre- 
mont, Hunter,  Halleck,  and  Curtis,  as  under  Schofield. 


MILITARY  EMANCIPATION  121 

Accordingly  the  President  sustained  General 
Schofield  and  Governor  Gamble  in  their  respect- 
ive administrations.  The  disorder  continuing, 
however,  on  January  24,  1864,  he  substituted 
General  Rosecrans  for  Schofield.  This,  however, 
did  not  end  the  strife — in  fact,  it  continued  until 
the  close  of  the  war,  and  even  afterwards. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    PRESIDENT    AND    GENERAL    MCCLELLAN 

ALL  this  while  troops  were  pouring  into  Wash- 
ington, where  they  were  organized,  equipped, 
and  drilled  by  General  McClellan  and  his  staff  of 
officers  with  great  expedition.  The  50.000  soldiers, 
of  whom  the  "  Young  Napoleon  '•'  took  command 
on  July  27,  swelled  in  three  months  to  168,318, 
with  more  troops  on  the  way.  Yet  by  a  strange 
paradox  General  McClellan  became  pessimistic 
in  just  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  his  army.  On 
taking  command  he  wrote  enthusiastically  to  his 
wife :  "  I  find  myself  in  a  new  and  strange  posi- 
tion here ;  President,  Cabinet,  General  Scott,  and 
all  deferring  to  me.  By  some  strange  operation 
of  magic  I  seem  to  have  become  the  power  in  the 
land."  Then  he  became  panic-stricken  over  the 
increase  of  the  enemy,  acquiring  the  hallucination 
that  the  Confederate  forces  in  Virginia,  which 
were  really  about  one-third  his  own,  greatly  out- 
numbered the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

On  August  4  he  presented  to  the  President  his 
plan  of  campaign,  which  was  the  same  as  the 
"  Anaconda  "  plan  of  General  Scott,  already  in- 
dorsed by  the  Government,  except  that  he 
would  thin  the  coil  which  was  to  surround  the 
-Confederacy  in  all  other  parts  but  where  he  was 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  123 

in  command,  which  portion  he  proposed  to  swell 
to  the  enormous  aggregate  of  273,000  men. 

On  August  16  he  wrote  to  his  wife:  "I  am 
here  in  a  terrible  place ;  the  enemy  have  from  three 
to  four  times  my  force ;  the  President,  the  old 
general  [Scott]  cannot  or  will  not  see  the  true 
state  of  affairs  .  .  .  [but]  Providence  is  aid- 
ing me  by  heavy  rains  which  are  swelling  the 
Potomac,  which  may  be  impassable  for  a  week; 
if  so,  we  are  saved." 

On  September  he  wrote  to  War  Secretary 
Cameron  demanding  that  his  army  be  reenforced 
at  once  "  by  all  the  disposable  troops  that  the  East 
and  West  and  North  can  furnish,"  as  well  as 
"  the  whole  of  the  regular  army,"  and  the 
choicest  of  its  officers.  So  loath  was  he  to  act  on 
the  offensive  until  he  had  what  he  considered  the 
proper  number  of  troops,  that  he  permitted  the 
enemy  unmolested  to  put  their  batteries  on  the 
Virginia  bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  so  to  cut  off 
transportation  by  water  to  and  from  the  national 
capital. 

Indeed,  the  first  battle  of  McClellan's  new  com- 
mand occurred  not  by  his  intention.  On  the 
evening  of  October  20  Brigadier-General  Charles 
P.  Stone  sent  troops  under  the  command  of  Colo- 
nel Edward  D.  Baker,  Lincoln's  old  comrade, 
who  had  resigned  from  the  Senate  to  enter  the 
army,  across  the  Potomac  into  Virginia  near 
Leesburg,  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force. 
They  met  the  enemy  at  Ball's  Bluff.  Baker  was 
a  man  of  fiery  courage,  and,  though  he  had  orders 
to  retire  if  advisable,  he  bravely  resisted  the 
enemy's  attack,  with  the  result  that  he  was  killed 
while  rallying  his  fleeing  troops,  and  nearly  all 
of  his  command  was  captured. 


124  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

General  Stone  was  made  a  scapegoat  for  the 
defeat,  being  incarcerated  for  six  months  in  Fort 
Lafayette  on  the  absurd  charge  of  treason.  Gen- 
eral McClellan's  prestige  was  even  increased  by 
the  disaster,  which  revealed  the  prowess  of  the 
enemy,  and  thereby  justified  the  Union  com- 
mander's policy  of  careful  preparation  to  meet 
him. 

On  November  i  McClellan's  ambition  was 
realized  by  the  retirement  of  the  "  old  general," 
Scott,  who  with  Lincoln  "  could  not  or  would  not 
see  the  true  state  of  affairs,"  and  by  his  own  ele- 
vation to  the  vacant  position  of  chief  commander. 
While  General  Scott  gave  his  advanced  age  and 
physical  infirmities  as  his  reason  for  resigning, 
the  real  cause  was  his  indignation  at  McClellan's 
treatment  of  him  in  "  going  over  his  head  "  to  the 
War  Department,  and  even  ignoring  his  positive 
orders.  McClellan's  treatment  of  his  chief  had 
not  passed  without  reproof  from  the  veteran.  At 
a  Cabinet  meeting  held  in  September,  at  the  head- 
quarters of  General  Scott,  the  President  asked 
what  was  the  number  of  troops.  McClellan,  who 
was  present,  said  he  had  no  reports  with  him, 
and  did  not  know.  As  the  meeting  was  breaking 
up,  General  Scott  said  that  he  wished  to  talk  to 
McClellan,  and  desired  the  President  and  Cabinet 
to  remain  and  hear.  McClellan  had  his  hand  on 
the  knob  of  the  door,  about  to  leave  the  room,  and 
seemed  very  much  embarrassed  by  the  situation. 
Scott  then  said : 

You  are  perhaps  aware,  General  McClellan,  that  you 
were  brought  to  these  headquarters  by  my  advice,  and 
by  my  orders,  after  consulting  the  President.  I  knew 
you  to  be  intelligent,  and  to  be  possessed  of  some  ex- 
cellent military  qualities,  and  after  our  late  disaster, 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  125 

it  appeared  to  me  that  you  were  a  proper  person  to 
organize  and  take  active  command  of  the  army.  I 
brought  you  here  for  that  purpose.  Many  things  have 
been,  as  I  expected  they  would  be,  well  done,  but  in 
some  respects  I  have  been  disappointed.  You  do  not 
seem  to  be  aware  of  your  true  position,  and  it  was  for 
this  reason  I  desired  that  the  President  and  these 
gentlemen  should  hear  what  I  have  to  say.  You  are 
here  upon  my  staff,  to  obey  my  orders,  and  should  daily 
report  to  me.  This  you  have  failed  to  do,  and  you 
appear  to  labor  under  the  mistake  of  supposing  that 
you,  and  not  I,  am  General-in-Chief,  and  in  command 
of  all  the  armies.  I,  more  than  you,  am  responsible 
for  military  operations,  but  since  you  came  here,  I  have 
been  in  no  condition  to  give  directions,  or  to  advise  the 
President,  because  my  Chief-of-Staff  neglects  to  make 
reports  to  me.  I  cannot  answer  simple  inquiries  which 
the  President  or  any  member  of  his  Cabinet  makes,  as 
to  the  number  of  troops  here.  They  must  go  to  the 
State  department,  and  not  come  to  military  headquarters 
for  that  information. 

At  a  later  period  the  General-in-Chief  thus 
lectured  his  overweening  subaltern. 

.4 

You  are  too  intelligent  and  too  good  a  disci- 
plinarian not  to  know  your  duties  and  the  proprieties 
of  military  intercourse.  You  seem  to  have  misap- 
prehended your  right  position.  I,  you  must  under- 
stand, am  General-in-Chief;  you  are  my  Chief-of- 
Staff.  When  I  brought  you  here,  you  had  my  confi- 
dence and  friendship.  I  do  not  say  you  have  yet  lost 
my  confidence  entirely.  Good-by,  General  McClellan. 

But  these  appeals  made  no  impression,  and  did 
not  cause  any  change  to  occur  in  McClellan's 
treatment  of  the  old  hero.  The  general  was  ap- 
proaching senility,  and  McClellan  was  satisfied 
that,  if  he  continued  his  contemptuous  neglect  and 
cavalier  treatment,  the  general  would  ask  to  be 
relieved. 

The  plan  worked  to  a  charm.     The  old  veteran 


126  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

had  great  pride  of  character;  had  been  conven- 
tionally honored  and  affectionately  revered  by  all 
the  juniors,  except  McClellan,  and  his  tempera- 
ment and  the  premonitory  symptoms  of  second 
childhood  made  the  ingratitude  of  McClellan 
especially  bitter  to  his  soul. 

Nothing  that  McClellan  did  or  omitted  to  do 
exhibits  his  character  in  a  more  somber  shade  than 
this  unworthy  treatment  of  General  Scott.  No 
other  officer  of  the  army,  no  matter  how  brusque 
and  unamiable  as  a  rule,  failed  to  entertain  and 
exhibit  a  profound  respect  for  the  grandest  mili- 
tary hero  of  our  history  after  Washington ;  it  was 
a  duty  incumbent  on  junior  officers  to  recognize 
and  obey  him,  and  all  but  McClellan  not  only 
did  this,  but  they  deemed  it  a  privilege  to 
honor  and  revere  him  as  well.  Now  these  re- 
quirements applied  with  tenfold  force  to  McClel- 
lan, for  Scott  had  passed  by  all  other  officers  of 
the  army,  of  whom  there  were  many  in  and  about 
Washington  at  that  time,  a*nd  singled  out  McClel- 
lan to  achieve  the  most  brilliant  destiny  of  that 
era,  had  he  been  true.  The  now  attenuated 
coterie  which  can  still  excuse  the  shortcomings 
of  McClellan's  career  should  not  be  oblivious  to 
the  facts  that,  at  the  start,  he  had  the  very  best 
wishes  and  sympathy  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  Win- 
field  Scott,  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  William  D.  Kelley 
and  men  closely  approaching  them  in  character; 
and  that  these  early  realized  the  methods  and  ani- 
mus of  McClellan,  so  that,  in  less  than  ninety 
days  from  the  commencement  of  his  brilliant 
career,  McClellan  had  lost  the  support  of  all  those 
who  might  be  considered  above  him  in  power, 
except  Lincoln.  By  Lincoln's  sufferance  alone  he 
remained  in  power  a  year.  Had  the  matter  been 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  127 

left  to  Scott,  Stanton,  Lincoln's  Cabinet,  or  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  McClel- 
lan's  inglorious  career  would  have  terminated 
at  least  eight  months  earlier  than  it  did. 

The  head  of  the  army,  kept  indoors  by  illness 
and  the  infirmities  of  age,  chafed  vainly  at  the 
supercilious  and  cavalier  treatment  accorded  to 
him  by  his  ambitious  junior.  Unable  to  endure 
it  longer,  on  the  3ist  of  October,  1861,  Scott 
took  leave  of  the  army.  And  the  President,  at- 
tended by  his  entire  Cabinet,  waited  on  the  dis- 
tinguished patriot,  and  assured  him  of  the  appre- 
ciation of  the  Administration  of  his  worth  and 
patriotism,  and  with  reluctance  parted  with  him, 
and  placed  him  on  the  retired  list  of  the  army. 

My  judgment  was  and  is  that,  if  Winfield  Scott 
had  been  twenty  years  younger,  or  if  he  had  not 
carried  about  British  lead  in  his  body  for  nearly 
a  half  century,  or  if  the  gout  had  left  him  alone 
so  that  his  body  had  been  equal  to  his  valor  and 
military  prowess,  he  would  have  marched  into 
Richmond  at  the  head  of  a  victorious  army 
almost  as  promptly  as  he  marched  in  military  ar- 
ray to  the  City  of  Mexico. 

McClellan  now  began  to  employ  the  same  tac- 
tics with  the  "  obstructionist  "  who  still  remained 
his  superior — President  Lincoln.  Lincoln  had 
great  faith  in  the  young  general,  and  a  friendly 
regard  that  even  promised  to  develop  into  affec- 
tion. He  personally  called  at  McClellan's  head- 
quarters a  number  of  times  early  in  November, 
and  placed  himself  at  the  General's  service. 
These  visits  were  abruptly  terminated  by  the 
rudeness  of  McClellan,  who,  returning  one  even- 
ing to  his  house  and  finding  that  the  President 
was  waiting  for  him  in  the  drawing-room, 


128  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

slipped  upstairs  and  went  to  bed.  On  another 
occasion  McClellan  failed  to  appear  at  a  confer- 
ence arranged  between  the  President,  McClellan, 
General  O.  M.  Mitchel,  and  Governor  Dennison, 
of  Ohio.  As  reported  by  General  Mitchel's  son 
and  aide,  F.  A.  Mitchel,  either  General  Mitchel 
or  Governor  Dennison  commented  upon  the  dis- 
respect shown  to  the  President  by  McClellan 
absenting  himself,  whereupon  Lincoln  remarked. 
"  Never  mind ;  I  will  hold  McClellan's  horse  if 
he  will  only  bring  us  success." 

While  the  President  refrained  for  a  time  from 
further  personal  visits  upon  General  McClellan, 
he  continued  to  offer  him  suggestions  by  letter. 
Early  in  December  he  did  so  in  the  form  of 
hypothetical  inquiries  about  a  forward  movement 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  the  road  from 
Alexandria  to  Richmond,  to  which  McClellan 
contemptuously  responded  with  studied  brevity 
and  restraint  of  confidence,  saying:  "  I  have  now 
my  mind  actively  turned  toward  another  plan  of 
campaign  that  I  do  not  think  at  all  anticipated  by 
the  enemy  nor  by  many  of  our  own  people." 

This  forward  movement  was  further  delayed 
by  McClellan's  illness  about  the  beginning  of  the 
year.  Because  of  this  inaction  the  President  was 
greatly  cast  down. 

General  Irvin  McDowell  has  described  this 
despondent  condition  of  the  President  in  a  memo- 
randum of  a  visit  he  made  him  on  January  10, 
1862.  This  account  was  submitted  to  the  Presi- 
dent in  1864  by  Henry  J.  Raymond,  who  desired 
to  use  it  in  his  "  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln."  The 
President  indorsed  upon  it :  "  See  nothing  for  me 
to  object  to  in  the  narrative  .  .  .  except  the 
phrase  attributed  to  me  of  the  Jacobinism  of 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAX  129 

Congress,  which  phrase  I  do  not  remember  using 
literally  or  in  substance,  and  which  I  wish  not  to 
be  published  in  any  event." 

General  McDowell's  account  is  in  part  as  fol- 
lows: 

Repaired  to  the  President's  house  at  eight  o'clock 
P.M.  Found  the  President  alone.  Soon  after,  we  were 
joined  by  Brigadier-General  Franklin,  the  Secretary  of 
State.  Governor  Seward,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  [Thomas  A.  Scott]. 
The  President  was  greatly  disturbed  at  the  state  of 
affairs.  Spoke  of  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  Treas- 
ury ;  of  the  loss  of  public  credit ;  of  the  Jacobinism  in 
Congress ;  of  the  delicate  condition  of  our  foreign 
relations ;  of  the  bad  news  he  had  received  from  the 
West,  particularly  as  contained  in  a  letter  from  Gen- 
eral Halleck  on  the  state  of  affairs  in  Missouri ;  of 
the  want  of  cooperation  between  General  Halleck  and 
General  Buell ;  but,  more  than  all,  the  sickness  of 
General  McClellan. 

The  President  said  he  was  in  great  distress,  and, 
as  he  had  been  to  General  McClellan's  house,  and  the 
General  did  not  ask  to  see  him,  and  as  he  must  talk 
to  somebody,  he  had  sent  for  General  Franklin  and 
myself,  to  obtain  our  opinion  as  to  the  possibility  of 
soon  commencing  active  operations  with  the  army  of 
the  Potomac. 

To  use  his  own  expression,  if  something  was  not 
soon  done,  the  bottom  would  be  out  of  the  whole 
affair ;  and  if  General  McClellan  did  not  want  to  use 
the  army  he  would  like  to  "  borrow  it,"  provided  he 
could  see  how  it  could  be  made  to  do  something. 

As  a  result  of  this  consultation,  and  of  suc- 
ceeding conferences  at  which  General  McQellan, 
who  had  recovered  from  his  illness,  and  other 
officers  were  present,  and  in  connection  with  his 
study  night  and  day  of  strategical  works  and  re- 
ports of  the  military  situation,  Mr.  Lincoln  issued 
the 


1 3o  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

PRESIDENT'S   GENERAL  WAR  ORDER   NO.   I. 
JANUARY  27,   1862. 

Ordered,  That  the  22d  day  of  February,  1862,  be 
the  day  for  a  general  movement  of  all  the  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  against  the  insurgent 
forces.  That  especially  the  army  at  and  about  Fortress 
Mon'roe ;  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  the  Army  of 
Western  Virginia ;  the  army  near  Munfordville,  Ky. ; 
the  army  and  flotilla  at  Cairo,  and  a  naval  force  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  be  ready  to  move  on  that  day. 

That  all  other  forces,  both  land  and  naval,  with  their 
respective  commanders,  obey  existing  orders  for  the 
time,  and  be  ready  to  obey  additional  orders  when 
duly  given. 

That  the  heads  of  departments,  and  especially  the 
Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy  with  all  their 
subordinates,  and  the  general-in-chief,  with  all  other 
commanders  and  subordinates  of  land  and  naval  forces, 
will  severally  be  held  to  their  strict  and  full  responsi- 
bilities for  prompt  execution  of  this  order. 

Taken  in  connection  with  the  recent  appoint- 
ment of  a  man  of  proved  executive  ability  as  Sec- 
retary of  War,  this  assumption  of  military  leader- 
ship by  the  President  inspired  new  hope  in  the 
country  and  filled  the  soldiers  of  the  field,  impa- 
tient for  advance,  with  high  enthusiasm. 

Three  days  later  this  was  supplemented  by 
the 

PRESIDENT'S  SPECIAL  WAR  ORDER  NO.   i. 
JANUARY  31,  1862. 

Ordered,  That  all  the  disposable  force  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  after  providing  safely  for  the  defense 
of  Washington,  be  formed  into  an  expedition  for  the 
immediate  object  of  seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon 
the  railroad  southwestward  of  what  is  known  as 
Manassas  Junction,  all  details  to  be  in  the  discretion 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  the  expedition  to  move 
before  or  on  the  22d  day  of  February  next. 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  131 

This  special  order  was  in  direct  conflict  with 
General  McClellan's  plan.  Accordingly,  on  Feb- 
ruary 3,  the  President  wrote  him  the  following 
letter : 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  vou  and  I  have  distinct  and  different 
plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — 
yours  to  be  down  the  Chesapeake,  up  the  Rappahan- 
nock  to  Urbana,  and  across  land  to  the  terminus  of  the 
railroad  on  the  York  River ;  mine  to  move  directly  to  a 
point  on  the  railroads  southwest  of  Manassas. 

If  you  will  give  me  satisfactory  answers  to  the  fol- 
lowing questions,  I  shall  gladly  yield  my  plan  to 
yours : 

First.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly  larger 
expenditure  of  time  and  money  than  mine? 

Second.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your 
plan  than  mine? 

Third.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable  by  your 
plan  than  mine? 

Fourth.  In  fact,  would  it  not  be  less  valuable  in  this, 
that  it  would  break  no  great  line  of  the  enemy's  com- 
munications, while  mine  would? 

Fifth.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  retreat  be  more 
difficult  by  your  plan  than  mine? 

In  reply  General  McClellan,  with  his  exag- 
gerated view  of  the  enemy's  strength,  vehemently 
opposed  attacking  him  at  Manassas  with  its 
"  strong  line  of  defense  enabling  him  to  remain 
on  the  defensive,  with  a  small  force  on  one  flank, 
while  he  concentrates  everything  on  the  other  for 
a  decisive  action."  Instead  he  urged  the  ad- 
vantages of  his  own  plan,  whereby  he  expected 
to  cut  off  the  enemy  in  detail,  take  Richmond, 
and  end  the  war. 

By  direction  of  the  President,  General  McClel- 
lan called  a  council  of  war  of  twelve  general 
officers,  who  voted  8  to  4  in  favor  of  McClellan's 
plan.  Accordingly  the  President  abandoned  his 


1 32  UN  COIN  THE  PRESIDENT 

plan  and  set  heartily  to  work  promoting  the  exe- 
cution of  McClellan's. 

Congress,  as  indicated  by  the  protest  of  its 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  the 
country  in  general,  which  had  come  to  distrust 
its  former  military  hero,  "  the  young  Napoleon," 
for  his  inaction,  were  greatly  displeased  and  dis- 
heartened by  the  President's  relinquishment  of 
the  helm  of  military  policy  he  had  seized  with  so 
vigorous  a  hand,  especially  since  his  "  Plan  of 
Campaign"  (see  p.  195)  had  already  resulted  in 
signal  victories. 

The  descent  upon  the  Atlantic  coast  was  in- 
augurated by  the  expedition  of  Flag-Officer  Silas 
H.  Stringham  and  Major-General  Butler  against 
Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark  commanding  Hatteras 
Inlet,  the  main  entrance  to  Albemarle  and 
Pamlico  Sounds  off  the  coast  of  North  Carolina. 
These  forts  were  surrendered  on  August  29,  to 
the  great  joy  of  Union  men  not  only  in  the  North 
but  in  North  Carolina.  At  the  suggestion  of 
the  President  a  meeting  was  held  in  New  York 
early  in  November  to  take  measures  to  relieve  the 
loyalists  of  Hatteras  who  had  suffered  by  the 
blockade.  George  Bancroft,  the  distinguished 
historian  and  statesman,  presided  at  the  meeting. 
He  reported  its  action  to  the  President  on  Novem- 
ber 15,  in  a  letter  which  closed  with  the  following 
paragraph : 

Your  administration  has  fallen  upon  times  which  will 
be  remembered  as  long  as  human  events  find  a  record. 
I  sincerely  wish  to  you  the  glory  of  perfect  success. 
Civil  War  is  the  instrument  of  Divine  Providence  to 
root  out  social  slavery.  Posterity  will  not  be  satisfied 
with  the  result  unless  the  consequences  of  the  war  shall 
effect  an  increase  of  free  States.  This  is  the  universal 
expectation  and  hope  of  men  of  all  parties. 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  133 

To  this  Lincoln  replied  on  the  i8th : 

The  main  thought  in  the  closing  paragraph  of  your 
letter  is  one  which  does  not  escape  my  attention,  and 
with  which  I  must  deal  in  all  due  caution,  and  with 
the  best  judgment  I  can  bring  to  it. 

On  October  29  an  expedition  under  Captain 
Samuel  F.  DuPont  and  General  Thomas  W. 
Sherman  sailed  from  Fortress  Monroe  against 
Port  Royal,  S.  C,  a  harbor  between  Charleston 
and  Savannah,  commanded  by  Forts  Beauregard 
and  Walker.  These  forts  were  captured  on 
November  7,  and  with  them  fell  into  Federal 
possession,  to  quote  from  General  Sherman's 
report,  "  the  whole  coast  from  the  North  Edisto 
to  Warsaw  Sound,"  and  "  a  network  of  waters, 
an  inland  water  communication,  running  all  the 
way  from  Charleston  to  Savannah." 

On  January  7  General  McClellan  gave  General 
Ambrose  E.  Burnside  command  of  the  newly 
created  Department  of  North  Carolina.  Acting 
in  conjunction  with  a  fleet  of  twenty  vessels 
under  Lieutenant  Louis  M.  Goldsborough,  on 
February  8  Burnside  captured  Roanoke  Island 
which,  dividing  Albemarle  and  Pamlico  Sounds, 
commanded  both  of  these  inland  waters.  Five 
forts,  32  guns,  300  stands  of  arms,  and  2,700  men 
were  taken.  Two  days  later  the  entire  Con- 
federate fleet  in  North  Carolina  waters  was 
destroyed  near  Elizabeth  City.  Thereafter  the 
fortified  places  on  the  North  Carolina  coast  were 
reduced  one  by  one — New  Berne  on  March  14, 
and  Beaufort  on  April  26,  being  the  most  con- 
siderable conquests.  An  advance  from  the  coast 
on  Goldsboro,  which  commanded  the  railroad 
running  southward  from  Richmond,  was  contem- 


'34 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


plated,  but  abandoned  in  July,  when  the  disasters 
of  McClellan  in  Virginia  forced  him  to  call  Burn- 
side's  troops  to  his  aid. 

During  the  month  of  March  a  combined  mili- 
tary and  naval  expedition  under  Flag-Officer 
Samuel  F.  DuPont  and  General  H.  G.  Wright, 
operating  from  Port  Royal,  occupied  all  the  At- 
lantic coast  from  that  harbor  south  to  St.  Augus- 
tine. 

Appalling  disaster,  however,  was  threatened  in 
Virginia  waters.  In  the  destruction  of  the  Gos- 
port  Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk,  Va.,  the  United 
States  steam-frigate  Merrimac  had  been  burned 
and  sunk.  The  Confederates  raised  the  hull, 
which,  together  with  her  engines,  was  found  to 
be  capable  of  restoration,  and  converted  her,  at 
the  Tredegar  Iron  Works  in  Richmond,  into  an 
ironclad  with  a  heavy  ram,  which  they  named 
the  Virginia.  At  noon,  on  Saturday,  March  8, 
she  steamed  out  of  the  James  River  accompanied 
by  five  armed  vessels,  two  steam  tugs  and  three 
side-wheel  steamers,  into  Hampton  Roads. 
Three  United  States  wooden  frigates,  the  Minne- 
sota, St.  Lawrence,  and  Roanoke,  lying  at  For- 
tress Monroe,  went  out  to  meet  her,  but  were 
grounded,  owing  to  unusually  low  water.  Two 
other  wooden  frigates,  the  sailing  vessel  Con- 
gress, and  the  Cumberland,  at  Newport  News, 
remained  to  give  battle.  They  proceeded  bravely 
against  the  steel-scaled  and  steel-nosed  leviathan 
with  no  hope  of  victory.  The  Virginia  met  the 
Cumberland  first,  rammed  her,  and,  as  she  was 
sinking,  poured  into  her  wooden  hull  a  hail  of 
iron  metal.  The  devoted  vessel  answered  broad- 
side with  broadside  until  the  last  gun  was  sub- 
merged, and  ship  and  crew  sank  beneath  the 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  135 

waves.  With  her  iron  ram  torn  off  in  the  en- 
counter, and  two  guns  put  out  of  action,  the  Vir- 
ginia then  attacked  the  Congress.  Knowing  that 
her  comrade's  fate  awaited  her  if  she  resisted, 
the  Union  vessel  ran  ashore  where  the  Confed- 
erate destroyer  could  not  follow.  Nevertheless 
the  Virginia  was  able  to  reach  her  with  her  guns, 
which  soon  silenced  those  of  the  Congress  and 
forced  her  to  surrender.  The  Union  vessel  caught 
fire,  which  reached  the  magazine,  causing  an  ex- 
plosion which  destroyed  her.  The  Virginia  and 
her  consorts  anchored  for  the  night  under  protec- 
tion of  the  Rebel  shore-batteries  at  Sewell's  Point, 
the  head  of  the  Norfolk  channel.  During  the 
night  tugs  managed  to  pull  the  St.  Lawrence  and 
Roanoke  off  the  shoals,  and  take  them  back  to 
Fortress  Monroe.  But  the  Minnesota  could  not 
be  moved,  and  remained  awaiting  her  fate  on  the 
morrow. 

The  Cabinet  at  Washington  met  early  next 
morning  in  utter  despair  of  saving  the  seaboard 
cities  of  the  Union.  To  prevent  the  approach 
of  the  impenetrable  war-monster  to  Washington, 
orders  were  given  to  sink  loaded  canal-boats  in 
the  Potomac  channel.  Yet  so  little  time  remained 
for  this  measure  that  Secretary  Stanton  pre- 
dicted that  that  very  Cabinet  meeting  might  be 
terminated  by  a  shell  fired  into  the  room  from  the 
Virginia. 

However,  the  salvation  of  the  Union  had  al- 
ready been  assured  by  the  provident  policy  of  the 
President  and  his  faithful  and  efficient  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  Gideon  Welles,  upon  whose  recom- 
mendations the  special  session  of  Congress  had 
appropriated  $1,500,000  for  experiment  in  con- 
structing the  best  possible  form  of  the  ironclad, 


136  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

which  naval  experts  foresaw  was  the  coming  type 
of  war-vessel.  The  board  of  officers  to  whom 
the  matter  was  intrusted  had  decided  upon  a  ves- 
sel "  invulnerable  to  shot,  and  of  light  draught," 
had  adopted  three  plans  of  such  an  iron-clad,  and 
had  ordered  a  vessel  to  be  constructed  in  accord- 
ance with  each  plan.  One  vessel,  that  according 
to  the  plan  of  John  Ericsson,  of  New  York,  an  in- 
ventor, of  Swedish  birth,  had  been  completed,  and 
was  on  her  way  to  Hampton  Roads,  at  the  time  of 
the  destruction  of  the  Cumberland  and  Congress. 
She  arrived  in  tow  on  Saturday  night  under  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  John  L.  Worden,  and  took 
her  station  near  the  grounded  Minnesota. 

The  Monitor,  as  the  new  invention  was 
modestly  named,  was  127  feet  over  all,  36  feet  in 
beam,  and  12  feet  draught,  and  with  closed  deck 
rising  but  a  few  feet  above  the  water-line.  She 
was  symmetrically  shaped  fore  and  aft,  each  end 
terminating  in  a  steel  point  for  ramming.  In  the 
center  rose  a  cylindrical  turret  nine  feet  high 
and  twenty  feet  in  diameter,  which  revolved, 
enabling  the  two  u-inch  Dahlgren  guns  it  car- 
ried upon  one  side  to  be  wheeled  around  after 
firing  and  recharged  in  safety  in  the  lee  of  the 
storm  of  war.  The  term  popularly  applied  to  it, 
"  a  cheesebox  on  a  raft "  very  aptly  describes  its 
appearance. 

The  Virginia  was  four  times  the  Monitor  in 
bulk  and  displacement,  and  had  five  times  the 
number  of  guns.  When  on  Sunday  morning  the 
two  iron-clads  approached  each  other  to  give 
battle  the  contrast  presented  was  that  of  a  giant 
and  pygmy,  an  inevitable  comparison  which  ap- 
peared in  all  reports  of  the  battle.  The  duel 
lasted  three  hours;  while  the  fire  of  each  was 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  137 

comparatively  ineffective,  the  lighter  draught  and 
greater  mobility  of  the  little  Monitor  enabled 
her  to  tire  out  her  big  antagonist  in  a  contest  of 
endurance,  and  the  Virginia,  leaking  badly,  at 
last  was  forced  to  retire. 

This  was  the  last  battle  of  the  Virginia.  When 
the  Confederates  abandoned  Norfolk  on  May  10, 
1862,  as  the  result  of  the  evacuation  of  Yor'ktown 
on  May  3,  they  burned  the  Gosport  Navy  Yard, 
and  also  beached  and  blew  up  the  Virginia  on 
May  ii.  It  was  also  the  Monitor's  last  battle.  In 
December,  1862,  while  being  towed  around  Cape 
Hatteras  by  the  Rhode  Island  to  join  in  the  con- 
quest of  the  Southern  coast,  she  foundered  in  a 
gale,  her  crew,  however,  having  been  transferred 
before  she  sank  to  the  Rhode  Island.  She  was 
commemorated  in  the  most  fitting  of  monuments 
— the  creation  of  a  fleet  of  ironclads  built  after 
her  model  and  bearing  her  name  as  a  generic 
designation. 

On  the  day  preceding  the  battle  of  the  Virginia 
and  Monitor,  the  President  had  issued  two  gen- 
eral war  orders,  Nos.  2  and  3.  No.  2  divided  that 
part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  intended  to  ad- 
vance upon  Richmond  into  four  army  corps,  com- 
manded respectively  by  Major-General  Irvin 
McDowell  and  Brigadier-Generals  E.  V.  Sumner, 
S.  P.  Heintzelman,  and  E.  D.  Keyes,  and  pro- 
vided that  a  reserve  be  left  for  the  defense  of 
Washington  under  Brigadier-General  James  S. 
Wadsworth.  It  also  ordered  the  formation  of  a 
fifth  army  corps  from  the  troops  of  Brigadier- 
General  Shields  and  Major-General  Nathaniel  P. 
Banks  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  placed 
General  Banks  in  its  command.  Order  No.  3 
gave  more  specific  directions  for  the  defense 


138  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

of  the  capital,  and  the  capture  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  upon  the  Potomac  between  Washington 
and  Chesapeake  Bay.  Special  War  Order  No. 
3  was  issued  by  the  President  on  March  n.  It 
relieved  General  McClellan  from  chief  command 
of  all  the  armies,  retaining  him  only  as  the  head 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  consolidated 
the  commands  of  Generals  Halleck  and  Hunter 
and  the  western  part  of  Buell's  into  the 
Department  of  the  Mississippi,  under  Halleck. 
It  created  a  third  department  out  of  the  eastern 
part  of  Buell's  command  and  West  Virginia, 
which  was  designated  as  the  Mountain  Depart- 
ment, and  was  placed  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  Fremont. 

In  most  leisurely  fashion  McClellan  conducted 
through  April  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  the  first 
place  to  be  reduced  in  his  plan  of  campaign 
-against  Richmond.  He  refused  to  be  hurried  by 
the  Government  at  Washington,  which  was  ex- 
ceedingly anxious  that  no  time  should  be  per- 
mitted the  .enemy  to  concentrate  its  forces  against 
him.  Instead,  he  clamored  for  reinforcements. 
In  reply,  President  Lincoln  wrote  him  on  April 
9,  stating  that  the  troops  left  to  defend  Washing- 
ton were  already  reduced  below  the  limit  of 
safety,  and  questioning  McClellan's  low  estimate 
of  the  strength  of  his  forces.  The  letter  closed 
as  follows : 

I  suppose  the  whole  force  which  has  gone  forward 
to  you  is  with  you  by  this  time;  and  if  so,  I  think 
it  is  the  precise  time  for  you  to  strike  a  blow.  By  delay 
the  enemy  will  relatively  gain  upon  you — that  is,  he 
will  gain  faster  by  fortifications  and  reinforcements 
than  you  can  by  reinforcements  alone. 

And  once  more  let  me  tell  you  it  is  indispensable 


139 

to  you  that  you  strike  a  blow.  I  am  powerless  to  help 
this.  You  will  do  me  the  justice  to  remember  I  always 
insisted  that  going  down  the  bay  in  search  of  a  field, 
instead  of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas,  was  only 
shifting  and  not  surmounting  a  difficulty;  that  we  would 
find  the  same  enemy  and  the  same  or  equal  intrench- 
ments  at  either  place.  The  country  will  not  fail  to 
note — is  noting  now — that  the  present  hesitation  to 
move  upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the  story  of 
Manassas  repeated. 

I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never  written  you 
or  spoken  to  you  in  greater  kindness  of  feeling  than 
now,  nor  with  a  fuller  purpose  to  sustain  you,  so 
far  as  in  my  most  anxious  judgment  I  consistently  can; 
but  you  must  act. 

During  the  first  two  weeks  of  April  General 
McClellan  delayed  storming  Yorktown,  although, 
according  to  the  testimony  of  its  Confederate 
commander,  Major-General  John  B.  Magruder, 
it  could  easily  have  been  captured.  On  April  17 
General  Joseph  E,  Johnston  took  command  of 
the  Confederate  forces,  53,000  strong  as  opposed 
to  133,000  Federal  troops  investing  Yorktown. 
Valuing  every  day's  delay,  he  determined  to  hold 
the  place  until  McClellan  should  at  last  feel  him- 
self strong  enough  to  assail  it,  and  then  retire  be- 
fore the  overwhelming  numbers.  On  May  3, 
finding  that  McClellan's  batteries  were  ready  to 
open  on  him,  Johnston  evacuated  Yorktown  with 
his  forces.  McClellan  on  the  4th  telegraphed  to 
Washington  of  his  "  victory." 

The  President  and  Secretaries  Chase  and  Stan- 
ton  determined  to  visit  the  seat  of  war  and  ob- 
serve conditions  for  themselves.  They  arrived  at 
Fortress  Monroe  on  May  6.  By  the  President's 
orders  the  fleet  made  an  attack  on  May  8  upon 
the  Confederate  batteries  at  Sewell's  Point,  dur- 
ing which  the  President  and  his  party  saw  the 


1 40  UNCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Virginia  retire  before  the  approach  of  the  Moni- 
tor. It  was  observed  that  Sewell's  Point,  de- 
fended by  the  ironclad,  was  too  strong  to  be 
taken. 

The  President,  after  talking  with  the  pilot  and 
studying  a  chart  of  the  waters,  selected  a  place 
where  a  landing  might  be  made,  and  here  on  May 
10  General  Wool  debarked  with  6,000  men,  and 
marched  upon  Norfolk.  This  precipitated  the 
evacuation  of  both  Sewell's  Point  and  Norfolk, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  Virginia,  which  the 
Confederates  had  already  determined  upon  when 
Yorktown  fell.  Secretary  Chase,  who  was  with 
Wool,  received  the  surrender  of  Norfolk,  and  the 
President  and  Stanton  next  day  visited  the  cap- 
tured town,  passing  the  ruined  hulk  of  the  Vir- 
ginia on  the  way.  "  So,"  wrote  Chase,  with 
excusable  extravagance  to  his  daughter,  "  has 
ended  a  brilliant  week's  campaign  of  the  Presi- 
dent; for  I  think  it  quite  certain  that  if  he  had 
not  come  down,  Norfolk  would  still  have  been  in 
possession  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Merrimac  as 
grim  and  defiant  and  as  much  a  terror  as  ever. 
The  whole  coast  is  now  virtually  ours." 

McClellan  was  caught  napping  by  John- 
ston's sudden  retreat  from  Yorktown,  and  there 
was  much  confusion  in  the  pursuit.  While 
McClellan  remained  at  Yorktown  preparing  an 
advance  on  Richmond  up  the  James  River,  Gen- 
eral Joseph  Hooker  came  upon  the  Confederate 
rear-guard  under  General  James  Longstreet  at 
Williamsburg,  and  hotly  engaged  him  during  the 
forenoon  of  May  5.  Owing  to  an  entire  lack  of 
support,  Hooker  was  beaten  back.  In  the  after- 
noon General  Winfield  S.  Hancock  regained  the 
lost  ground ;  this  General  McClellan,  who  arrived 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  141 

late  in  the  day,  was  satisfied  to  hold,  fearing  the 
"  superior  force  "  of  the  enemy.  Accordingly, 
Johnston  reached  Richmond  in  good  order  on  the 
1 7th,  and  occupied  the  strong  intrenchments  be- 
fore that  city. 

McClellan  protested  vigorously  to  the  Govern- 
ment against  the  organization  of  the  army  as 
determined  by  the  President  in  the  General  War 
Order  No.  2,  ascribing  to  it  the  lack  of  success 
in  the  Williamsburg  engagement.  In  reply  the 
President,  who  was  still  at  Fortress  Monroe,  sent 
an  order  authorizing  him  to  adopt  the  organiza- 
tion he  desired,  but  accompanied  it  with  a  private 
letter  of  frank  criticism : 

I  ordered  the  army  corps  organization  not  only  on 
the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  twelve  generals  whom 
you  had  selected  and  assigned  as  generals  of  division, 
but  also  on  the  unanimous  opinion  of  every  military 
man  I  could  get  an  opinion  from  (and  every  modern 
military  book),  yourself  only  excepted.  Of  course  I 
did  not  on  my  own  judgment  pretend  to  understand  the 
subject.  I  now  think  it  indispensable  for  you  to  know 
how  your  struggle  against  it  is  received  in  quarters 
which  we  cannot  entirely  disregard.  It  is  looked  upon 
as  merely  an  effort  to  pamper  one  or  two  pets  and  to 
persecute  and  degrade  their  supposed  rivals.  I  have  had 
no  word  from  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  or  Keyes.  The 
commanders  of  these  corps  are  of  course  the  three 
highest  officers  with  you,  but  I  am  constantly  told  that 
you  have  no  consultation  or  communication  with  them ; 
that  you  consult  and  communicate  with  nobody  but 
General  Fitz-John  Porter  and  perhaps  General  Franklin. 
I  do  not  say  these  complaints  are  true  or  just,  but  at 
ail  events  it  is  proper  you  should  know  of  their  exist- 
ence. Do  the  commanders  of  corps  disobey  your 
orders  in  anything? 

When  you  relieved  General  Hamilton  of  his  com- 
mand the  other  day,  you  thereby  lost  the  confidence 
of  at  least  one  of  your  best  friends  in  the  Senate.  And 
here  let  me  say,  not  as  applicable  to  you  personally, 


I42  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

that  senators  and  representatives  speak  of  me  in  their 
places  as  they  please  without  question,  and  that  officers 
of  the  army  must  cease  addressing  insulting  letters  to 
them  for  taking  no  greater  liberty  with  them. 

But  to  return.  Are  you  strong  enough — are  you 
strong  enough,  even  with  my  help — to  set  your  foot 

,  upon   the   necks   of   Sumner,    Heintzelman,   and    Keyes 
all  at  once?    This  is  a  practical  and  very  serious  ques- 

,'tion  for  you. 

The  success  of  your  army  and  the  cause  of  the  coun- 
try are  the  same,  and  of  course  I  only  desire  the  good 
of  the  cause. 

McClellan  at  once  proved  the  truth  of  the 
President's  criticism  that  he  made  favorites  of 
Porter  and  Franklin  by  reforming  the  army  into 
two  provisional  corps  and  placing  these  officers  in 
command.  At  the  earnest  request  of  McClellan 
for  reinforcements,  the  President,  who  was  now 
back  in  Washington,  ordered  General  McDowell 
to  march  upon  Richmond  with  35,000  or  40,000 
men  by  the  shortest  route.  "  McDowell,"  wrote 
Secretary  Stanton  to  McClellan  on  May  18,  "  is 
sent  forward  to  cooperate  in  the  reduction  of 
Richmond,  but  charged  in  attempting  this  not  to 
uncover  the  city  of  Washington;  and  you  will 
give  no  order,  either  before  or  after  your  con- 
junction, which  can  put  him  out  of  position  to 
cover  this  city." 

However,  General  McDowell  and  his  troops 
were  forced  to  be  retained  where  they  were 
owing  to  circumstances  that  are  indicated  in  the 
following  telegram  of  May  24  to  General  Halleck 
who,  like  McClellan,  was  crying  for  reenforce- 
ments : 

Several  dispatches  from  Assistant  Secretary  Scott 
and  one  from  Governor  Morton  asking  reinforcements 
for  you  have  been  received.  I  beg  you  to  be  assured 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  143 

we  do  the  best  we  can.  I  mean  to  cast  no  blame  when 
I  tell  you  each  of  our  commanders  along  our  line  from 
Richmond  to  Corinth  supposes  himself  to  be  confronted 
by  numbers  superior  to  his  own.  Under  this  pressure 
we  thinned  the  line  on  the  upper  Potomac,  until  yes- 
terday it  was  broken  at  heavy  loss  to  us,  and  General 
Banks  put  in  great  peril,  out  of  which  he  is  not  yet 
extricated,  and  may  be  actually  captured.  We  need 
men  to  repair  this  breach,  and  have  them  not  at  hand. 
My  dear  general,  I  feel  justified  to  rely  very  much  on 
you.  I  believe  you  and  the  brave  officers  and  men  with 
you  can  and  will  get  the  victory  at  Corinth. 

On  the  same  day  the  President  telegraphed 
McDowell  at  Fredericksburg  to  move  with  20,000 
men  for  the  Shenandoah  for  the  purpose  of  cap- 
turing Jackson  and  Ewell,  who  was  at  that  mo- 
ment fighting  Banks  near  Winchester.  General 
McDowell  obeyed  the  order  with  alacrity,  at 
which  the  President  expressed  by  telegraph  his 
gratification,  saying:  "The  change  (of  plans) 
was  as  painful  to  me  as  it  can  possibly  be  to  you 
or  to  anyone." 

On  the  following  day,  with  shrewd  inference 
of  what  is  now  known  to  have  been  the  real  situa- 
tion at  Richmond,  the  President  telegraphed  to 
McClellan : 

The  enemy  is  moving  north  in  sufficient  force  to 
drive  General  Banks  before  him — precisely  in  what 
force  we  cannot  tell.  He  is  also  threatening  Leesburg 
and  Geary,  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  from  both 
north  and  south — in  precisely  what  force  we  cannot  tell. 
I  think  the  movement  is  a  general  and  concerted  one, 
such  as  would  not  be  if  he  was  acting  upon  the  purpose 
of  a  very  desperate  defense  of  Richmond.  I  think  the 
time  is  near  when  you  must  either  attack  Richmond 
or  give  up  the  job  and  come  to  the  defense  of  Wash- 
ington. Let  me  hear  from  you  instantly. 

Later   in   the   day  the   President  telegraphed 


144  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

McClellan  more  detailed  information :  that  Banks, 
weakened  by  the  detail  of  a  part  of  his  forces 
for  the  march  on  Richmond,  was  retreating 
in  probable  rout  to  Martinsburg;  and  that  two 
other  Confederate  forces  of  10,000  each,  one  of 
them  led  by  Stonewall  Jackson,  were  pressing  for- 
ward in  the  same  direction.  "  Stripped  bare,  as 
we  are  here,"  said  the  President,  "  it  will  be  all 
we  can  do  to  prevent  them  crossing  the  Potomac 
at  Harper's  Ferry  or  above."  McDowell  and 
Fremont,  he  continued,  were  moving  to  get  in 
the  enemy's  rear.  "If  McDowell's  force,"  his 
telegram  concluded,  "  was  now  beyond  our  reach 
we  should  be  utterly  helpless.  Apprehension  of 
something  like  this,  and  no  unwillingness  to  sus- 
tain you,  had  always  been  my  reason  for  with- 
holding McDowell's  force  from  you.  Please 
understand  this  and  do  the  best  you  can  with  the 
force  you  have." 

On  May  21  forces  under  General  McClellan 
had  arrived  at  the  Chickahominy  about  ten  miles 
east  of  Richmond,  and  McClellan  set  to  work 
with  energy  and  enthusiasm  to  solve  the  difficult 
engineering  problem  of  quickly  bridging  a  river 
which  had  a  swamp  on  either  bank,  and  was  liable 
to  sudden  freshets.  The  work  was  completed  in 
little  more  than  a  week,  and  on  the  3Oth  Johnston 
was  informed  that  two  of  McClellan's  original 
five  army  corps  had  crossed  the  river.  The  Con- 
federate general  resolved  to  attack  them  next 
morning.  A  heavy  rainstorm  in  the  night,  which 
he  hoped  would  prevent  the  crossing  of  more  Fed- 
eral troops,  encouraged  him  in  the  project.  One 
of  the  Federal  divisions  was  at  Seven  Pines  on 
the  left  (east)  and  the  other  at  Fair  Oaks  on  the 
right  (west).  By  night  Johnston  had  driven 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  145 

back  the  left  division  toward  the  river.  The 
right,  however,  retained  its  position,  having  been 
reen  forced  by  General  Sumner  from  the  opposite 
bank,  who  with  soldierly  promptitude,  as  soon  as 
he  heard  firing,  had  anticipated  in  his  prepara- 
tions the  order  to  cross  the  river,  and,  marching 
his  men  over  a  bridge  that  was  on  the  point  of 
sweeping  away,  and  through  thick  mud,  had 
come  in  the  nick  of  time  to  the  rescue.  On  June 
i  the  battle  was  renewed  with  General  Robert  E. 
Lee  in  Confederate  command,  General  Johnston 
having  been  severely  wounded  in  the  first  day's 
battle.  The  Federal  right  regained  its  position. 
At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Lee  stopped  his 
attack,  and  at  night  withdrew  his  disheartened 
troops  to  Richmond. 

Increasing  rain  prevented  further  Federal 
troops  from  crossing  the  river,  and  both  divisions 
employed  themselves  intrenching.  General  Lee 
set  to  work  to  organize  and  reenforce  his  army 
for  the  desperate  conflict  which  he  saw  before 
him. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  President  was  arduously 
engaged  in  the  active  duties  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army,  which  had  devolved  upon  him 
after  General  McClellan's  reduction  from  the 
general  command.  His  particular  concern  was 
the  critical  situation  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
the  danger  of  which  he  and  Secretary  Stanton 
seemed  alone  to  realize.  Even  the  officers  in  the 
field  lightly  regarded  the  Confederate  movement 
down  the  valley.  McDowell,  whom  the  President 
ordered  to  strike  eastward  from  Fredericksburg 
and  follow  after  Jackson,  thought  that,  by  the 
time  he  reached  the  valley,  the  enemy  would  have 
retired.  Nevertheless  he  was  prompt  in  sending 


i46  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

I 

on  the  mission  a  detachment  under  Brigadier- 
General  James  Shields,  Lincoln's  old-time  antag- 
onist in  his  one  "  affair  of  honor,"  who  had 
proved  himself  in  the  Mexican  War  a  soldier  of 
courage  and  ability.  Shields  was  even  con- 
temptuous "  of  his  task,  boasting  that  he  could 
thrash  Jackson  without  assistance  and  asking 
disrespectfully  if  he  could  do  anything  else  for 
the  President. 

On  the  3oth  of  May  Shields  was  at  the  place 
appointed,  Fort  Royal,  in  advance  of  the  time 
set,  ready  to  intercept  Jackson,  whose  advance 
had  been  blocked  at  Harper's  Ferry,  if  he  should 
retreat  in  that  direction.  It  was  Fremont,  who 
had  been  ordered  to  block  the  other  possible  line 
of  Jackson's  retreat,  that  failed  to  appear  at  his 
station,  which  was  Harrisonburg  in  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley.  Indeed,  believing  that  Jackson 
would  remain  before  Harper's  Ferry,-  he  deliber- 
ately disobeyed  instructions,  and  proceeded  north 
by  the  more  convenient  valley  to  the  west  of  the 
Shenandoah  Mountains.  When  this  action  was 
discovered  at  Washington,  there  was  still  time  for 
him  to  intercept  Jackson,  who  had  not  yet  begun 
his  retreat,  lower  down  the  valley  at  Strasburg, 
and  the  President  ordered  him  to  do  so.  Still 
acting  upon  his  own  judgment,  Fremont  gave  his 
troops  an  entire  day  of  rest,  and,  in  consequence, 
arrived  at  Strasburg  just  after  Jackson's  rear- 
guard had  passed  through  it  in  retreat.  Had 
Fremont  occupied  the  place  the  day  before,  Jack- 
son would  have  been  caught  between  three 
commands  each  equal  in  size  to  his  own :  Fre- 
mont's in  front,  the  pursuing  column  of  Banks, 
and  Shields's  detachment  twelve  miles  to  the  east. 
A  few  weeks  after  this  (on  June  26)  the  Army  of 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  147 

Virginia  was*  formed  from  the  commands  of  Fre- 
mont, Banks,  and  McDowell,  and  placed  under 
General  John  Pope.  Fremont  refused  to  serve 
under  one  who  had  been  his  subordinate  (when 
he  commanded  the  Department  of  the  West),  and 
was  relieved  from  duty. 

In  place  of  Shields's  division,  which  had  been 
put  "  terribly  out  of  shape,  out  at  elbows,  and 
out  at  toes,"  by  the  campaign  against  Jackson, 
as  Lincoln  wrote  McClellan  on  June  15,  the 
President  sent  the  importunate  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  10,000  new  recruits,  and 
as  many  more  old  troops  from  Fortress  Monroe, 
where  General  Wool  was  replaced  by  General 
John  A.  Dix.  "  Doubtless,"  wrote  Mr.  Lincoln, 
"  the  battles  and  other  causes  have  decreased 
you  half  as  much  in  the  same  time;  but  then  the 
enemy  have  lost  as  many  in  the  same  way.  I 
believe  I  would  come  and  see  you  were  it  not 
that  I  fear  my  presence  might  divert  you  and  the 
army  from  more  important  matters." 

On  the  i8th  the  President  telegraphed  Mc- 
Clellan the  report  that  Lee  had  sent  10,000  to 
15,000  reinforcements  to  Jackson.  "This,"  said 
he,  "  is  as  good  as  a  reenforcement  to  you  of  an 
equal  force."  He  asked  McClellan  what  day  he 
could  attack  Richmond.  McClellan  promptly 
replied  that  the  army  were  about  to  advance  at 
once,  and  that  this  would  undoubtedly  bring  on  a 
general  engagement,  since  "  the  enemy  exhibit 
at  every  point  a  readiness  to  meet  us.  They 
certainly  have  great  numbers  and  extensive 
works,"  he  added;  and  he  drew  an  inference 
directly  contrary  to  the  President's  hopeful  de- 
duction from  the  fact  of  Jackson's  reenforce- 
ment, saying  that  it  illustrated  Lee's  strength  and 


148  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


confidence.     Lincoln  replied  on  the  iQth,  giving 
another  alternative  to  McClellan's  deduction: 

If  large  reinforcements  are  going  from  Richmond 
to  Jackson,  it  proves  one  of  two  things  :  either  that  they 
are  very  strong  at  Richmond,  or  do  not  mean  to  defend 
the  place  desperately. 

McClellan  soon  learned  that  Jackson  was  com- 
ing to  the  aid  of  Lee  rather  than  lessening  Lee's 
forces,  and  foregoing  his  former  logic,  and  ac- 
cepting Lincoln's,  he  clamored  even  more  loudly 
than  before  for  reinforcements.  To  this  appeal 
the  President  replied  on  June  26: 

Your  dispatch  suggesting  the  probability  of  your  be- 
ing overwhelmed  by  200,000,  and  talking  of  where  the 
responsibility  will  belong,  pains  me  very  much.  I  give 
you  all  I  can,  and  act  on  the  presumption  that  you 
will  do  the  best  you  can  with  what  you  have,  while 
you  continue,  ungenerously  I  think,  to  assume  that  I 
could  give  you  more  if  I  would.  I  have  omitted  and 
shall  omit  no  opportunity  to  send  you  reinforcements 
whenever  I  possibly  can. 

The  Federal  army  had  now  advanced  within 
four  miles  of  Richmond.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
26th  the  Confederates  made  a  desperate  attack 
on  the  Union  position  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  held 
by  Porter,  and  were  repulsed  with  great  loss. 
As  Longstreet,  one  of  the  Confederate  command- 
ers testified,  they  were  thoroughly  demoralized. 
Yet  McClellan  abandoned  this  strong  position, 
which  could  easily  have  been  further  strength- 
ened by  reinforcements,  and  ordered  Porter  to 
retire  to  a  more  protected  place,  where  McClellan 
evidently  considered  reinforcements  were  not 
needed,  for,  on  the  morrow,  when  Porter  was 
again  attacked  by  almost  the  entire  Southern 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  149 

army,  he  sent  no  troops  to  his  aid  until  late  in 
the  day,  when  he  ordered  Slocum's  division  to 
support  him.  This  was  the  Battle  of  Gaines's 
Mill,  or  the  Chickahominy.  Lee  commanded  his 
army  in  person.  Porter,  thinking  that  the  pur- 
pose of  his  chief  was  to  enter  Richmond  with 
the  rest  of  his  troops  while  the  enemy  was  thus 
engaged,  fought  the  unequal  contest  bravely  and 
serenely,  and  at  nightfall  retired  in  good  order, 
having  inflicted  a  loss  equal  to  his  own  on  the 
enemy. 

But  McClellan  was  deterred  from  his  march  to 
Richmond  by  the  demonstration  made  against 
him  by  Magruder  with  a  comparatively  small 
force,  which  the  apprehension  of  McClellan  mag- 
nified into  a  greater  one  than  that  attacking 
Porter.  Accordingly  he  changed  his  base  to  the 
James,  to  approach  the  Confederate  capital  from 
that  quarter.  On  the  29th  Sumner  repulsed  Ma- 
gruder at  Allen's  Farm,  and,  later  in  the  day,  he 
and  Franklin  completely  defeated  him  at  Savage's 
Station,  opening  the  way  for  a  direct  advance  on 
Richmond,  but  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back 
by  McClellan's  orders.  Again  the  golden  oppor- 
tunity was  lost,  when  on  the  next  day  Franklin 
held  his  position  at  Glendale  against  a  fierce  at- 
tack by  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  for  if  the 
Union  forces  had  been  concentrated  here,  in  the 
opinion  of  military  strategists,  Richmond  must 
have  fallen. 

On  July  i  came  the  general  engagement  to 
which  events  had  been  leading.  Lee,  inferring 
from  its  successive  retirements  from  strong  posi- 
tions that  his  enemy  was  demoralized,  drove  the 
whole  force  of  his  army  in  charge  after  charge 
upon  the  strong  position  of  the  Union  army  on 


1 5o  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Malvern  Hill,  without  effect  and  with  fearful 
loss  to  himself.  It  would  have  been  an  easy 
matter  for  McClellan  on  the  morrow  to  have  put 
to  rout  the  broken  enemy,  but,  persisting  in  his 
view  of  the  superior  force  of  Lee,  he  gave  the 
order  instead  to  retire  to  Harrison's  Landing  on 
the  James,  where  supplies  could  be  readily  landed 
for  a  siege  of  the  city. 

On  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill 
McClellan  wrote  a  bitter  letter  to  Secretary 
Stanton,  casting  the  blame  upon  the  Government. 
It  closed  as  follows : 

I  only  wish  to  say  to  the  President  that  I  think  he 
is  wrong  in  regarding  me  as  ungenerous  when  I  said 
that  my  force  was  too  weak.  ...  I  know  that  a  few 
thousand  more  men  would  have  changed  this  battle 
from  a  defeat  to  a  victory.  As  it  is,  the  Government 
must  not  and  cannot  hold  me  responsible  for  the  result. 
I  feel  too  earnestly  -to-night ;  I  have  seen  too  many  dead 
and  wounded  comrades  to  feel  otherwise  than  that  the 
Government  has  not  sustained  this  army.  If  you  do  not 
do  so  now,  the  game  is  lost.  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I 
tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any 
other  persons  in  Washington.  You  have  done  your 
best  to  sacrifice  this  army. 

Recognizing  the  sincerity  of  this  letter,  the 
President  overlooked  its  insolence  and  insubor- 
dination. He  answered  it,  promising  to  send  re- 
enforcements  as  rapidly  as  possible.  He  said : 

I  have  not  said  you  were  ungenerous  for  saying 
you  needed  reinforcements.  I  thought  you  were  ungen- 
erous in  assuming  that  I  did  not  send  them  as  fast 
as  I  could.  I  feel  any  misfortune  to  you  and  your 
army  quite  as  keenly  as  you  feel  it  yourself.  If  you 
have  had  a  drawn  battle,  or  a  repulse,  it  is  'the  price 
we  pay  for  the  enemy  not  being  in  Washington.  We 
protected  Washington,  and  the  enemy  concentrated  on 
you.  Had  we  stripped  Washington,  he  would  have 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  151 

been  upon  us  before  the  troops  could  have  gotten  to 
you.  Less  than  a  week  ago  you  notified  us  that  reen- 
forcements  were  leaving  Richmond  to  come  in  front 
of  us.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  case,  and  neither  you 
nor  the  Government  are  to  blame. 

On  the  same  day  the  President  telegraphed  to 
Halleck  to  send  25,000  of  his  troops  by  the  near- 
est route  to  Richmond.  Burnside  in  North  Car- 
olina was  also  ordered  to  contribute  all  the  troops 
he  could  spare  without  abandoning  his  position, 
and  as  a  result  was  forced  to  give  up  his  expedi- 
tion against  Goldsboro,  the  important  railroad 
centre,  on  the  eve  of  almost  certain  success.  At 
the  same  time  Lincoln  wrote  to  Secretary  Seward 
his  view  of  the  situation,  taking  that  shrewd  polit- 
ical counselor  into  confidence  upon  the  raising 
of  more  troops,  a  matter  which  required  the 
greatest  discretion: 

The  evacuation  of  Corinth  and  our  delay  by  the 
flood  in  the  Chickahominy  have  enabled  the  enemy 
to  concentrate  too  much  force  in  Richmond  for  Mc- 
Clellan  to  successfully  attack.  In  fact  there  soon 
will  be  no  substantial  rebel  force  anywhere  else.  But 
if  we  send  all  the  force  from  here  to  McClellan,  the 
enemy  will,  before  we  can  know  of  it,  send  a  force 
from  Richmond  and  take  Washington.  Or  if  a  large 
part  of  the  western  army  be  brought  here  to  McClellan, 
they  will  let  us  have  Richmond,  and  retake  Tennessee, 
Kentucky,  Missouri,  etc.  What  should  be  done  is 
to  hold  what  we  have  in  the  West,  open  the  Mississippi, 
and  take  Chattanooga  and  East  Tennessee  without 
more.  A  reasonable  force  should  in  every  event  be 
kept  about  Washington  for  its  protection.  Then  let 
the  country  give  us  a  hundred  thousand  new  troops  in 
the  shortest  possible  time,  which,  added  to  McClellan 
directly  or  indirectly,  will  take  Richmond  without 
endangering  any  other  place  which  we  now  hold,  and 
will  substantially  end  the  war.  I  expect  to  maintain 
this  contest  until  successful,  or  till  I  die,  or  am  con- 


152  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

quered,  or  my  term  expires,  or  Congress  or  the  coun- 
try forsake  me;  and  I  would  publicly  appeal  to  the 
country  for  this  new  force  were  it  not  that  I  fear  a 
general  panic  and  stampede  would  follow,  so  hard  it  is 
to  have  a  thing  understood  as  it  really  is.  I  think  the 
new  force  should  be  all,  or  nearly  all,  infantry,  princi- 
pally because  such  can  be  raised  most  cheaply  and 
quickly. 

On  June  30  the  President  solved  the  question 
of  calling  for  more  soldiers  without  causing  a 
panic  by  getting  the  loyal  State  Governors  to  sign 
a  request  that  more  troops  be  raised,  the  request 
being  dated  back  a  few  days.  In  accordance  with 
this  "  spontaneous  demand,"  on  July  i,  the  Presi- 
dent called  for  300,000  troops — three  times  the 
number  he  had  suggested  to  Secretary  Seward 
as  sufficient — assigning  to  each  State  its  quota. 
On  the  2d  he  wrote  General  McClellan  in  answer 
to  his  insistent  demand  for  50,000  reenforce- 
ments  to  be  sent  him  at  once,  to  be  patient, 
hold  his  position,  and  wait  for  the  new  levy.  On 
the  3d  he  offered  to  all  the  Governors  a  reduc- 
tion in  their  quota  if  they  hurried  forward  enough 
troops  to  sum  up  50,000,  which  he  believed  to  be 
sufficient  reinforcements  to  end  the  war  sub- 
stantially in  two  weeks. 

General  McClellan  had  for  some  time  been 
preparing  a  statement  of  his  "  general  views  con- 
cerning the  existing  state  of  the  rebellion,"  which, 
he  confessed,  did  not  "  strictly  come  within  the 
scope  of  his  official  duties."  This,  on  July  7,  he 
laid  before  the  President.  In  the  course  of  this 
lecture  on  executive  policy  he  said : 

A  declaration  of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slav- 
ery, will  rapidly  disintegrate  our  present  armies.  The 
policy  of  the  Government  must  be  supported  by  concen- 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN 


'53 


trations  of  military  power.  The  national  forces  should 
not  be  dispersed  in  expeditions,  posts  of  occupation, 
and  numerous  armies ;  but  should  be  mainly  collected 
into  masses  and  brought  to  bear  upon  the  armies  of 
the  Confederate  States.  Those  armies  thoroughly  de- 
feated, the  political  structure  which  they  support  would 
soon  cease  to  exist. 

In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy  which  you  may 
form,  you  will  require  a  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army ;  one  who  possesses  your  confidence,  understands 
your  views,  and  who  is  competent  to  execute  your 
orders  by  directing  the  military  forces  of  the  nation 
to  the  accomplishment  of  the  objects  by  you  proposed. 
I  do  not  ask  that  place  for  myself.  I  am  willing  to 
serve  you  in  such  position  as  you  may  assign  me, 
and  I  will  do  so  as  faithfully  as  ever  subordinate  served 
superior. 

I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and  as  I  hope 
forgiveness  from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter 
with  sincerity  towards  you  and  from  love  for  my 
country. 

On  July  8  the  President  visited  General  Mc- 
Clellan  at  his  headquarters  before  Richmond,  and 
catechised  him  and  his  corps  commanders  most 
searchingly  concerning  the  numbers,  health,  etc., 
of  their  forces,  the  position  and  condition  of  the 
enemy,  safety  of  retreat  from  Richmond,  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  present  position  before  it. 
Returning  to  Washington,  he  adopted  General 
McClellan's  suggestion  about  appointing  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  but  did  not  choose  the  man  for 
the  place  whom  the  adviser  had  in  mind.  It  was 
the  captor  of  Corinth  that  was  selected  rather 
than  the  befooled  strategist  before  Richmond. 
On  the  nth  the  President  issued  an  order  assign- 
ing Major-General  Henry  W.  Halleck  "  to  com- 
mand the  whole  land  forces  of  the  United  States, 
as  General-in-Chief,"  and  ordering  him  to  repair 
as  soon  as  possible  to  the  capital. 


154  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

In  order  to  prevent  misunderstanding  of  the 
military  situation,  the  President  determined  to 
take  the  public  into  his  confidence.  He  seized 
the  opportunity  presented  by  a  Union  meeting  at 
the  capital  on  August  6  to  make  an  address,  in 
which  he  confirmed  the  general  rumor  of  dis- 
agreement between  General  McClellan  and  Secre- 
tary Stanton,  and  at  the  same  time  dispelled  the 
panic  fear  which  was  spreading  among  the  people 
because  of  the  rumor,  by  showing  how  natural 
and  inevitable  was  the  clash  between  two  public 
servants  who  were  equally  zealous  in  performing 
their  duties,  the  one  by  increasing  his  particular 
army,  the  other  by  conserving  all  the  Union 
forces  and  preventing  waste  of  the  nation's 
greatest  resources,  the  lives  of  its  citizen-soldiers. 

Said  Mr.  Lincoln: 

Sometimes  we  have  a  dispute  about  how  many  men 
General  McClellan  has  had,  and  those  who  would  dis- 
parage him  say  that  he  has  had  a  very  large  number, 
and  those  who  would  disparage  the  Secretary  of  War 
insist  that  General  McClellan  has  had  a  very  small 
number.  The  basis  for  this  is,  there  is  always  a  wide 
difference  .  .  .  between  the  grand  total  on  McClellan's 
rolls  and  the  men  actually  fit  for  duty ;  and  those  who 
would  disparage  him  talk  of  the  grand  total  on  paper, 
and  those  who  would  disparage  the  Secretary  of  War 
talk  of  those  present  fit  for  duty.  General  McClellan 
lias  sometimes  asked  for  things  that  the  Secretary  of 
War  did  not  give  him.  General  McClellan  is  not  to 
blame  for  asking  for  what  he  wanted  and  needed,  and 
the  Secretary  of  War  is  not  to  blame  for  not  giving 
when  he  had  none  to  give.  And  I  say  here,  as  far  as 
I  know,  the  Secretary  of  War  has  withheld  no  one 
thing  at  any  time  in  my  power  to  give  him.  I  have 
no  accusation  against  him.  I  believe  he  is  a  brave  and 
able  man,  and  I  stand  here,  as  justice  requires  me  to 
do,  to  take  upon  myself  what  has  been  charged  on 
the  Secretary  of  War,  as  withholding  from  him. 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  155 

Halleck,  upon  assuming  the  general  military 
command,  visited  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on 
the  James.  Upon  his  return  to  Washington  he 
ordered  its  withdrawal  from  Richmond,  and  its 
union  with  the  newly  created  Army  of  Virginia 
under  Pope.  This  was  not  accomplished  until 
late  in  August. 

Pope,  in  taking  his  new  command,  had  aroused 
the  enmity  of  McClellan  and  his  subordinates  by 
an  address  in  which  he  instituted  a  contrast  be- 
tween the  aggressive  methods  of  the  Western 
commanders  and  the  defensive  tactics  of  the  East- 
ern. By  thus  rendering  harmonious  action  be- 
tween himself  and  his  future  coadjutors  impos- 
sible he  prepared  his  own  downfall. 

Pope  set  out  vigorously  to  drive  back  Jackson 
in  order  to  aid  McClellan 's  withdrawal  from 
Richmond.  Banks,  one  of  his  three  corps  com- 
manders, attacked  Jackson  at  Cedar  Mountain  on 
August  9  so  impetuously  that,  impressed  by  the 
Union  strength,  two  days  later  the  Confederate 
general  withdrew  to  the  Rapidan,  whither  Lee 
sent  Longstreet  with  54,000  men  to  oppose  Pope's 
advance  on  Richmond.  In  view  of  this  force, 
which  was  greater  than  his  own,  Pope  in  turn 
withdrew  behind  the  Rappahannock,  and  for  eight 
days  prevented  the  Confederates  from  crossing 
that  river.  Lee  then  sent  Jackson  around  to  the 
left  to  break  Pope's  line  of  communications.  This 
Jackson  did  by  occupying  Manassas  Junction. 
Pope  saw  the  opportunity  afforded  by  Jackson's 
separation  from  Longstreet  to  effect  Jackson's 
capture.  While  he  confronted  the  "  Stonewall 
Brigade  "  with  his  main  army,  and  while  McDow- 
ell was  holding  back  Longstreet,  Pope  ordered 
Porter  to  attack  Jackson  on  the  right  and  rear. 


156  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

This  Porter  did  not  do.  Pope  in  anger  ordered 
him  to  report  in  person  with  his  command  next 
morning.  This  Porter  did,  and,  in  the  afternoon 
of  that  day,  August  30,  without  waiting  for 
Franklin's  corps,  approaching  from  Alexandria 
with  culpable  slowness,  Pope  resolved  on  a 
decisive  battle.  Erroneously  thinking  that  Jack- 
son's was  the  stronger  of  the  two  Confederate 
divisions,  he  threw  his  main  force  against  the 
position  which  Jackson  had  taken  near  the  site  of 
the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  so  permitted 
Longstreet,  really  the  more  powerful  of  his 
opponents,  to  crush  the  Union  attack  from  the 
side  with  his  batteries.  Disastrously  defeated, 
Pope  retreated  to  Centreville.  On  the  morrow 
Lee  did  not  follow  up  his  victory  with  a  direct 
attack,  but  pursued  his  favorite  tactics  by  send- 
ing Jackson  to  flank  the  Union  right  wing.  Pope 
was  prepared  for  this,  and  repulsed  him  at  Chan- 
tilly,  though  with  the  loss  of  two  brave  and 
efficient  Union  generals,  Philip  Kearny  and 
Isaac  I.  Stephens. 

Pope,  attributing  Porter's  disobedience  and 
Franklin's  delay  to  hostility  against  him,  asked 
consent  of  Halleck  to  withdraw  the  army  to  the 
intrenchments  before  Washington,  where  it  could 
toe  reorganized.  This  was  granted,  and  the 
retreat  was  safely  accomplished.  A  court-mar- 
tial was  instituted,  and  it  cashiered  Porter  for 
disobedience.  Porter  justified  himself  for  fail- 
ing to  obey  his  superior's  order  by  the  lateness 
of  the  hour  when  he  received  it,  and  by  the 
strength  and  nearness,  unsuspected  by  Pope,  of 
Longstreet.  After  a  contest  of  a  quarter  of  a 
century  he  was  reinstated  in  command.  It  de- 
veloped that  Franklin's  slowness  in  reenforcing 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  157 

Pope  had  been  due  to  McClellan's  inertia,  if  not 
to  his  positive  disinclination  to  assist  his  fellow 
commander. 

Owing  to  the  discord  between  its  commanders, 
and  the  lack  of  confidence  of  its  soldiers  in  their 
leaders,  the  army  was  thoroughly  demoralized. 
And,  by  a  strange  paradox,  the  man  who  was 
chiefly  responsible  for  this  situation  was  the  only 
one  that  could  restore  the  army's  morale.  The 
President  realized  this,  and,  against  the  advice 
of  almost  all  his  ministers,  on  September  2  placed 
General  McClellan  in  charge  of  the  defense  of 
Washington.  McClellan  justified  the  appoint- 
ment by  setting  to  work  "  like  a  beaver,"  as 
Lincoln  expressed  it,  and  within  five  days  he  had 
the  army  in  excellent  shape  even  to  take  the 
offensive. 

On  September  3  General  Pope  at  his  own 
request  was  relieved  from  command  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia.  He  was  assigned  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Northwest,  where  shortly  afterwards 
he  completely  quelled  an  insurrection  of  the  Min- 
nesota Indians. 

Lee  crossed  the  Potomac  near  Leesburg,  Va., 
on  September  4-7,  and  encamped  near  Frederick, 
Md.,  intending  to  move  northward  into  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  choose  the  field  upon  which  to  fight  a 
decisive  battle  with  McClellan.  He  was  deceived, 
however,  in  his  expectations  that  Maryland  would 
rise  in  revolt  against  the  Union,  and  "  cast  from 
her  neck  the  tyrant's  heel  "  when  the  opportunity 
for  doing  so  was  afforded.  Instead,  he  found  the 
State  inimical  to  him  as  an  invader  of  its  soil. 
Furthermore,  the  Federal  Government  did  not 
withdraw  in  panic  its  garrison  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  as  he  had  hoped  it  would.  Accordingly 


158  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

he  sent  a  division  under  Jackson  to  capture  Har- 
per's Ferry,  and  for  greater  safety  crossed  the 
Blue  Ridge  to  Boonesboro  with  the  rest  of  his 
army.  In  the  meantime  McClellan  was  march- 
ing toward  Frederick,  very  slowly,  in  spite  of  the 
proddings  of  the  President,  who,  informed  that 
the  movement  of  Jackson  was  a  retreat  across  the 
Potomac,  was  anxious  that  the  enemy  should  not 
"  get  off  without  being  hurt."  On  the  I3th 
McClellan  arrived  at  Frederick,  where  he  had  the 
good  fortune  to  discover  Lee's  entire  plan  of 
campaign.  Instead  of  striking  the  divided  Con- 
federate Army  at  once,  however,  he  waited  till 
the  morrow,  by  which  time  the  rear-guard  of 
the  Jackson  division  was  able  to  hold  back  for 
a  day  the  Federal  detachment  sent  under  Franklin 
to  the  relief  of  Harper's  Ferry,  by  a  stubborn 
resistance  at  Crampton's  Gap,  and  so  to  enable 
Jackson  to  rejoin  Lee,  who  was  hastening  south 
to  the  meeting,  his  rear-guard  having  held  back 
for  a  day  the  Federal  detachment  sent  against 
him,  by  sharp  resistance  at  Turner's  Gap. 
Another  day  was  lost  by  McClellan's  slowness, 
and  on  the  i/th  both  armies  were  arrayed  against 
each  other  at  Antietam  Creek,  near  Sharpsburg, 
Lee  having  succeeded  in  uniting  all  his  forces, 
and  obtaining  the  advantage  of  position  on  the 
field  of  contest.  McClellan  with  superior  num- 
bers won  the  battle  which  ensued  by  brute 
strength,  losing  about  12,000  killed  and  wounded 
to  Lee's  11,000.  On  the  i8th  and  igth  the  Con- 
federate general  withdrew  his  broken  army, 
reduced  to  less  than  three-fourths  of  the  num- 
bers with  which  he  had  invaded  Maryland,  across 
the  Potomac,  entirely  unmolested.  The  "  hurt  " 
which  McClellan  had  given  him  was  severe,  but 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  159, 

not  the  completely  disabling  blow  which  the 
President  had  expected,  and  which  such  a  com- 
mander as  Grant,  had  he  been  in  McClellan's 
place,  would  have  inflicted  upon  the  demoralized 
enemy  in  its  retreat. 

The  failure  of  General  McClellan  to  crush 
General  Lee's  army  when  it  was  in  his  power,  and 
so  to  end  the  war  in  the  East,  caused  a  murmur 
to  run  throughout  the  country  that  McClellan 
and  his  officers  were  deliberately  prolonging  the 
conflict  for  purposes  of  their  own.  Color  was 
given  to  this  rumor  by  the  reply  of  an  officer, 
Major  John  K.  Key,  brother  of  a  colonel  upon 
General  McClellan's  staff,  to  the  inquiry  of  Major 
Levi  C.  Turner,  a  judge-advocate,  "  Why  was 
not  the  Rebel  army  bagged  immediately  after 
Antietam  ?  "  Key  answered :  "  That  is  not  the 
game.  The  object  is  that  neither  army  shall  get 
much  advantage  of  the  other,  that  both  shall  be 
kept  in  the  field  till  they  are  exhausted,  when  we 
will  make  a  compromise  and  save  slavery."  This 
conversation  was  reported  directly  to  the  Presi- 
dent, and,  bringing  its  participants  before  him  on 
September  27,  he  secured  from  Key  an  ac- 
knowledgment that  his  sentiments  had  been  cor- 
rectly reported.  Thereupon  the  President  dis- 
missed Major  Key  from  the  service. 

About  two  months  later  Mr.  Key,  affected  by 
the  recent  loss  of  a  son  in  the  army,  wrote  a 
pleading  letter  to  the  President  protesting  his 
loyalty,  which  he  thought  had  been  impugned  by 
his  dismissal.  The  President  replied,  expressing 
sympathy  with  him  in  the  death  of  his  "  brave 
and  noble  son,"  and  expressly  disclaiming  that  he 
had  charged  Mr.  Key  with  disloyalty.  The 
reason  for  the  dismissal  he  gave  as  follows : 


160  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

I  had  been  brought  to  fear  that  there  was  a  class 
of  officers  in  the  army,  not  very  inconsiderable  in 
numbers,  who  were  playing  a  game  to  not  beat  the 
enemy  when  they  could,  on  some  peculiar  notion  as 
to  the  proper  way  of  saving  the  Union ;  and  when  you 
were  proved  to  me,  in  your  own  presence,  to  have 
avowed  yourself  in  favor  of  that  "  game,"  and  did  not 
attempt  to  controvert  the  proof,  I  dismissed  you  as  an 
example  and  a  warning  to  that  supposed  class. 

General  McClellan  remained  north  of  the  Poto- 
mac demanding  reinforcements  of  men  and 
horses,  and  more  equipments  and  supplies  in 
order  to  drive  Lee  southward,  for  the  Confeder- 
ate general,  in  seeming  contempt  for  his  opponent, 
held  his  ground  near  the  Potomac,  and,  indeed, 
early  in  October,  sent  his  most  dashing  cavalry 
general,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  on  a  raid  into  Maryland, 
which  successfully  encompassed  the  entire  North- 
ern Army.  The  Federal  Government  faithfully 
fulfilled,  so  far  as  it  was  able,  the  demands  made 
upon  it,  but  McClellan  complained  that  he  did 
not  receive  all  the  reinforcements  which,  it  was 
told  him,  were  sent  forward.  Lincoln,  in  despair, 
remarked,  "  Sending  men  to  that  army  is  like 
shoveling  fleas  across  a  barnyard;  not  half  of 
them  get  there,"  and  early  in  October  went  to  the 
front  to  observe  conditions  for  himself.  There 
he  found  over  100,000  men,  fully  equipped  and 
ready  for  action.  But  their  commander  turned 
aside  all  of  the  President's  suggestions  for 
an  immediate  forward  movement.  Sorrowfully 
remarking  to  a  friend,  "  They  call  it  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  it  is  only  Mc- 
Clellan's  bodyguard,"  Lincoln  left  the  great 
encampment,  and  returned  to  Washington,  with 
the  resolution,  it  would  appear  from  his  subse- 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  161 

quent  correspondence  with  General  McClellan, 
to  stir  him  to  action,  and,  if  he  failed  to  respond, 
to  replace  him  with  a  more  energetic  com- 
mander.* 

On  October  6,  through  Halleck,  the  President 
ordered  McClellan  "  to  cross  the  Potomac,  and 
give  battle  to  the  enemy,  or  drive  him  south." 
"  Your  army,"  said  Halleck,  "  must  move  now, 
while  the  roads  are  good.  .  .  .  You  will 
immediately  report  what  line  you  adopt  and  when 
you  intend  to  cross  the  river." 

In  response  to  this  peremptory  order,  Mc- 
Clellan urged  the  impossibility  of  supplying  the 
army  on  its  advance  until  certain  pending  ar- 
rangements were  completed.  To  this  Lincoln 
sharply  replied  on  October  13  as  follows: 

You  remember  my  speaking  to  you  of  what  I  called 
your  overcautiousness.  Are  you  not  overcautious  when 
you  assume  that  you  cannot  do  what  the  enemy  is 
constantly  doing?  Should  you  not  claim  to  be  at  least 
his  equal  in  prowess,  and  act  upon  the  claim? 

As  I  understand,  you  telegraphed  General  Halleck 
that  you  cannot  subsist  your  army  at  Winchester  unless 
the  railroad  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  that  point  be  put 
in  working  order.  But  the  enemy  does  now  subsist  his 
army  at  Winchester,  at  a  distance  nearly  twice  as  great 
from  railroad  transportation  as  you  would  have  to  do 
without  the  railroad  last  named.  He  now  wagons  from 
Culpeper  Court-House,  which  is  just  about  twice  as 
far  as  you  would  have  to  do  from  Harper's  Ferry. 
He  is  certainly  not  more  than  half  as  well  provided 
with  wagons  as  you  are.  I  certainly  should  be  pleased 
for  you  to  have  the  advantage  of  the  railroad  from 
Harper's  Ferry  to  Winchester;  but  it  wastes  all  the  re- 

*  General  Keyes  related  an  almost  identical  con- 
versation as  occurring  between  the  President  and  him- 
self at  Harrison's  Landing,  when  McClellan  was  besieg- 
ing Richmond. 


i6*  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

rnainder  of  autumn  to  give  it  to  you,  and,  in  fact, 
ignores  the  question  of  time,  which  cannot  and  must  not 
be  ignored. 

Again,  one  of  the  standard  maxims  of  war,  as  you 
know,  is,  "  to  operate  upon  the  enemy's  communica- 
tions as  much  as  possible,  without  exposing  your  own." 
You  seem  to  act  as  if  this  applies  against  you,  but  can- 
not apply  in  your  favor.  Change  positions  with  the 
enemy,  and  think  you  not  he  would  break  your  com- 
munication with  Richmond  within  the  next  twenty-four 
hours?  You  dread  his  going  into  Pennsylvania.  But 
if  he  does  so  in  full  force,  he  gives  up  his  communica- 
tions to  you  absolutely,  and  you  have  nothing  to  do  but 
to  follow  and  ruin  him;  if  he  does  so  with  less  than 
full  force,  fall  upon  and  beat  what  is  left  behind  all 
the  easier. 

Exclusive  of  the  water  line,  you  are  now  nearer 
Richmond  than  the  enemy  is  by  the  route  that  you  can 
and  he  must  take.  Why  can  you  not  reach  there  before 
him,  unless  you  admit  that  he  is  more  than  your  equal 
on  a  march?  His  route  is  the  arc  of  a  circle,  while 
yours  is  the  chord.  The  roads  are  as  good  on  yours 
as  on  his.  ...  I  say  "  try  "  ;  if  we  never  try,  we  shall 
never  succeed.  If  he  make  a  stand  at  Winchester,  .  .  . 
I  would  fight  him  there,  on  the  idea  that  if  we  cannot 
beat  him  when  he  bears  the  wastage  of  coming  to  us, 
we  never  can  when  we  bear  the  wastage  of  going  to 
him.  .  .  .  We  should  not  so  operate  as  to  merely  drive 
him  away.  As  we  must  beat  him  somewhere,  or  fail 
finally,  we  can  do  it,  if  at  all,  easier  near  to  us  than 
far  away.  If  we  cannot  beat  the  enemy  where  he  now 
is,  we  never  can,  he  again  being  within  the  intrench- 
mnts  of  Richmond.  Recurring  to  the  idea  of  going  to 
Richmond  on  the  inside  track,  the  facility  of  supplying 
from  the  side  away  from  the  enemy  is  remarkable,  as 
it  were,  by  the  different  spokes  of  a  wheel,  extending 
from  the  hub  towards  the  rim,  and  this  whether  you 
move  directly  by  the  chord,  or  on  the  inside  arc,  hug- 
ging the  Blue  Ridge  more  closely.  ...  I  should  think 
it  preferable  to  take  the  route  nearest  the  enemy,  dis- 
abling him  to  make  an  important  move  without  your 
knowledge,  and  compelling  him  to  keep  his  forces  to- 
gether for  dread  of  you.  The  gaps  [in  the  Blue  Ridge] 
would  enable  you  to  attack  if  you  should  wish.  For 
a  great  part  of  the  way  you  would  be  practically  between 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  163 

the  enemy  and  both  Washington  and  Richmond,  en- 
abling us  to  spare  you  the  greatest  number  of  troops 
from  here.  When,  at  length,  running  to  Richmond 
ahead  of  him  enables  him  to  move  this  way,  if  he  does 
so,  turn  and  attack  him  in  the  rear.  But  I  think  he 
should  be  engaged  long  before  such  point  is  reached. 
It  is  all  easy  if  our  troops  march  as  well  as  the 
enemy,  and  it  is  unmanly  to  say  they  cannot  do  it. 
This  letter  is  in  no  sense  an  order. 

McClellan  still  delayed  obeying  the  President's 
instructions,  wasting  in  his  camp  week  after 
week  of  fine  marching  weather.  To  promptings 
from  Washington  he  made  excuse  after  excuse. 
Finally,  on  his  report  of  October  24,  that  his 
horses  were  unfit  for  duty,  he  was  cuttingly  re- 
buked by  the  President,  who  telegraphed :  "  Will 
you  pardon  me  for  asking  what  the  horses  of 
your  army  have  done  since  the  battle  of  Antietam 
that  fatigues  anything  ?  " 

As  in  the  promulgation  of  his  emancipation 
policy  (see  p.  254),  Lincoln  in  despair  resorted 
to  the  lot  of  events.  He  decided  to  remove  Mc- 
Clellan if  Lee  safely  escaped  behind  the  Blue 
Ridge.  By  November  i  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac had  crossed  the  river  whence  it  received  its 
name,  and  behind  whose  protection  its  long 
retirement  had  tinged  with  satire  the  appellation. 
Thereupon  Lee  began  his  retreat  and  by  No- 
vember 5  was  at  Culpeper  Court  House  far 
to  the  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  President 
thereupon  issued  an  order  replacing  General 
McClellan  with  Major-General  Burnside,  who 
had  won  the  honor  by  his  successful  campaign  in 
.North  Carolina.  At  the  same  time  he  re- 
placed Major-General  Porter  with  Major-Gen- 
eral Hooker.  General  McClellan  retired  to 


1 64  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

private  life,  shortly  to  reappear  in  public  affairs 
as  the  Presidential  candidate  of  the  opposition 
party. 

The  magnanimity  of  the  great  President  did 
not  end  with  McClellan's  expulsion  from  the 
army,  but  the  succeeding  year  Mr.  Lincoln  sent  a 
message  to  him  that  if  he,  McClellan,  would  pre- 
side at  a  Union  meeting  to  be  held  in  Union 
Square,  New  York,  and  make  a  Union  speech, 
he,  Lincoln,  would  stand  aside  at  the  next  elec- 
tion, and  do  all  in  his  power  to  make  McClellan 
his  successor ;  to  this  McClellan  agreed  in  writing 
and  the  meeting  was  arranged,  but  McClellan 
backed  out  just  before  the  meeting  was  held,  and 
then  denied  ever  having  promised  to  preside. 
He  probably  thought  it  would  be  distasteful  to 
the  "  peace-at-any-price  "  crowd  which  held  him 
in  hand. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

BURNSIDE,    HOOKER,    AND    MEADE 

GENERAL  AMBROSE  E.  BURNSIDE  was,  through 
the  instrumentality  of  General  McClellan,  his 
classmate,  made  cashier  of  the  Illinois  Central 
Railroad  Company,  at  Chicago,  at  the  same  time 
that  McClellan  was  vice-president  and  chief 
engineer,  and  I  was  brought  frequently  in  con- 
tact with  him  in  an  official  capacity.  He  was  a 
man  of  commanding  presence,  then  as  always 
thereafter,  and  equally  affable,  courteous,  and 
accommodating.  During  the  war,  it  chanced  that 
I  was  on  duty  in  the  city  (Cincinnati)  where  he 
had  his  headquarters,  and  my  acquaintance  with 
him  was  renewed,  and  to  it  was  added  the  ac- 
quaintance and  friendship  of  his  staff  officers, 
which  I  esteemed  to  be  a  great  honor,  as  well  as  a 
great  pleasure.  General  Burnside  in  my  judg- 
ment was  fully  as  accomplished,  valiant,  and  ef- 
ficient a  soldier  as  Hooker  or  Meade,  but  lacked 
self-confidence.  The  President  considered  that  he 
was  not  properly  supported  by  Hooker  and  some 
others.  When  Burnside,  with  extreme  reluc- 
tance and  self-distrust,  took  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  on  November  8,  he 
promptly  formulated  a  plan  of  movement  which 
he  wrote  out  and  sent  to  the  War  Department  on 
the  succeeding  day.  It  was,  in  general  terms: 

165 


1 66  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

to  make  a  feint  of  moving  to  the  southwest  of 
Warrenton  on  Culpeper  or  Gordonsville,  under 
cover  of  which  he  would  advance  his  army  to,  and 
capture  Fredericksburg ;  then,  making  that  fine 
strategic  point  a  base  of  operation,  and  Aquia 
Landing  a  base  of  supplies,  to  operate  on  that 
line  against  Richmond.  This  plan  was  fore- 
doomed to  failure.  Lacking  the  engineering  abil- 
ity of  McClellan,  Burnside  had  opposed  to  him 
the  greatest  engineer  of  the  Confederacy,  if  not, 
indeed,  of  the  war,  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  in- 
trenched in  the  strongest  fortifications.  Had 
Burnside's  appointment  been  made  before  Antie- 
tam,  with  his  superior  forces  and  energetic  tactics 
he  would  undoubtedly  have  annihilated  the  Con- 
federate general  in  pitched  battle  on  the  open 
fields  of  Maryland  and  in  the  retreat  of  the  de- 
moralized enemy  through  the  valleys  of  north- 
western Virginia.  Burnside  recommended  the 
division  of  the  army  into  three  parts :  right,  left, 
and  centre,  each  under  command  of  the  senior 
generals,  Sumner,  Franklin,  and  Hooker  respect- 
ively. 

To  this  plan  the  Government  acceded,  and 
professed  faith  in  its  success  provided  he  moved 
rapidly,  and  General  Halleck,  the  Commander- 
in-chief  and  General  Meigs,  the  Quartermaster- 
General,  at  once  visited  his  headquarters  and  had 
a  full  and  satisfactory  conference  about  it.  As 
an  indispensable  part  of  the  plan  a  pontoon  train 
should  have  been  started  from  Washington  for 
Falmouth  at  once,  and  the  General  supposed 
it  had  been  ordered  by  Halleck,  but,  on  account 
of  a  misunderstanding,  it  was  not  started  till  the 
iQth,  or  one  week  from  the  time  it  was  ordered, 
and  did  not  reach  the  army  till  the  25th.  The 


BURNSIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE   167 

• 

evidence  indicates  no  fault  on  the  part  of  General 
Burnside,  but  must  be  charged  to  apathy,  in- 
difference, red  tape,  and  inherent  difficulties  at 
Washington.  Meanwhile  the  army  was  put  in 
motion  and  Sumner  reached  Falmouth,  opposite 
Fredericksburg,  on  the  I7th,  and  found  no  pon- 
toon train.  The  army  was  therefore  compelled  to 
lie  there  and  wait  for  the  pontoons,  and  it  was  not 
till  the  loth  day  of  December  that  these  were 
finally  laid.  The  army  moved  across  on  the 
nth  and  i2th.  On  the  i3th  the  Federal  forces, 
led  by  their  bravest  generals,  charged  upon 
the  fortifications,  and  were  beaten  back  with 
fearful  loss.  At  last  the  reserves  under  "  Fight- 
ing Joe  Hooker,"  who  had  protested  against  the 
waste  of  life  in  the  impossible  attempt,  were  sent 
against  the  works.  They  fought  desperately, 
even  attempting  to  rush  the  Confederate  batteries 
on  Marye's  Heights  in  a  bayonet  charge.  Beaten 
back  with  a  loss  of  one  man  in  four,  they  with- 
drew at  dusk. 

Since  Hooker  had  advised  against  the  attack, 
Burnside  believed  that  he  had  been  half-hearted 
in  it,  and  so  determined  to  lead  a  charge  in  person 
on  the  morrow.  From  this  he  was  dissuaded  by 
his  other  division  generals,  Sumner  and  Franklin, 
and  on  the  night  of  the  I5th  he  withdrew  across 
the  river. 

In  his  report  to  the  Government  on  the  i/th, 
General  Burnside  assumed  all  the  blame  for  the 
disaster.  The  President,  in  acknowledgment  of 
his  manly  spirit  and  in  congratulation  of  the 
bravery  of  his  troops,  wrote,  on  December  22, 
the  following: 


1 68  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

• 

CONGRATULATIONS  TO  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC: 

I  have  just  read  your  commanding  general's  report 
of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  Although  you  were 
not  successful,  the  attempt  was  not  an  error,  nor  the 
failure  other  than  accident.  The  courage  with  which 
you,  in  an  open  field,  maintained  the  contest  against 
an  intrenched  foe,  and  the  consummate  skill  and  suc- 
cess with  which  you  crossed  and  recrossed  the  river 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  show  that  you  possess  all 
the  qualities  of  a  great  army,  which  will  yet  give 
victory  to  the  cause  of  the  country  and  of  popular 
government. 

The  country,  in  the  midst  of  high  hopes  of  good 
fortune  under  the  new  commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  was  appalled  by  this  defeat, 
greater  than  any  disaster  of  McClellan's ;  a  muti- 
nous spirit  spread  in  the  army  itself,  many  officers 
resigning,  and  many  privates  deserting;  even  the 
generals  voiced  their  censure,  General  Hooker 
denouncing  the  President  as  well  as  General 
Burnside  for  the  defeat,  and  saying  that  nothing 
would  go  well  until  the  country  had  a  dictator. 

In  the  face  of  this  universal  disapproval,  Burn- 
side  determined  to  go  ahead  with  his  plan  of 
campaign.  Thereupon,  on  January  i,  1863,  the 
President  wrote  to  the  General-in-chief,  Halleck, 
requesting  him  to  confer  with  Burnside  and  his 
officers  upon  it,  and,  by  approving  or  disap- 
proving it,  assume  the  responsibility  for  results. 
He  closed  his  letter  with  the  sentence,  "  Your 
military  skill  is  useless  to  me  if  you  do  not  do 
this." 

Halleck,  offended  by  the  harshness  of  the 
President's  tone,  offered  his  resignation.  Mr. 
Lincoln,  feeling  himself  in  the  wrong,  withdrew 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE       169 

his  letter,  whereupon  General  Halleck  consented 
to  remain  in  his  position. 

Finding  that  his  general  officers  were  opposed 
to  the  forward  movement  which  commended  it- 
self to  his  judgment,  General  Burnside  offered  to 
the  President  on  January  5  the  choice  of  in- 
dorsing the  movement  or  accepting  his  resigna- 
tion. To  this  General  Halleck  replied,  approving- 
ing  the  movement,  but  leaving  Burnside  to  decide 
upon  the  "  time,  place,  and  character  "  of  cross- 
ing the  Rappahannock.  This  letter  the  President 
indorsed,  saying: 

I  deplore  the  want  of  concurrence  with  you  in 
opinion  by  your  general  officers,  but  I  do  not  see  the 
remedy.  Be  cautious,  and  do  not  understand  that  the 
Government  or  country  is  driving  you.  I  do  not  yet 
see  how  I  could  profit  by  changing  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  and  if  I  did,  I  should  not 
wish  to  do  it  by  accepting  the  resignation  of  your 
commission. 

The  march  to  Banks's  Ford,  where  it  was  in- 
tended to  cross  the  river,  was  made  on  January 
21.  Rain  began  to  fall,  rendering  the  ground  so 
muddy  that  it  became  impassable  for  wagons 
and  artillery,  and  the  expedition  had  to  return 
to  camp,  amid  the  jeers  of  the  soldiers. 

Stung  by  the  criticisms  of  General  Hooker  and 
others  of  his  subordinates,  General  Burnside,  on 
January  23,  again  offered  an  alternative  to  the 
President — the  dismissal  of  the  offending  officers 
or  the  acceptance  of  his  resignation.  This  time 
the  President  accepted  the  resignation,  appointing 
Burnside  to  the  Department  of  Ohio,  with  head- 
quarters at  Cincinnati. 

In  spite  of  General  Hooker's  insubordination, 
the  President  felt  that,  more  than  any  other 


170  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT  ' 

officer,  he  possessed  the  confidence  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  therefore,  on  January  25, 
appointed  him  as  its  head.  Next  day  he  sent  him 
.a  letter  frankly  criticising  his  unsoldierly  conduct 
towards  General  Burnside  and  the  Government. 
It  read : 

GENERAL  :  I  have  placed  you  at  the  head  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Of  course  I  have  done  this  upon 
what  appear  to  me  to  be  sufficient  reasons,  and  yet 
I  think  it  best  for  you  to  know  that  there  are  some 
things  in  regard  to  which  I  am  not  quite  satisfied  with 
you.  I  believe  you  to  be  a  brave  and  skilful  soldier, 
which  of  course  I  like.  I  also  believe  that  you  do 
not  mix  politics  with  your  profession,  in  which  you 
are  right.  You  have  confidence  in  yourself,  which 
is  a  valuable  if  not  an  indispensable  quality.  You  are 
ambitious,  which,  within  reasonable  bounds,  does  good 
rather  than  harm ;  but  I  think  that  during  General 
Burnside's  command  of  the  army  you  have  taken  coun- 
sel of  your  ambition  and  thwarted  him  as  much  as  you 
could,  in  which  you  did  a  great  wrong  to  the  country 
and  to  a  most  meritorious  and  honorable  brother  officer. 
I  have  heard,  in  such  a  way  as  to  believe  it,  of  your 
recently  saying  that  both  the  army  and  the  Government 
needed  a  dictator.  Of  course  it  was  not  for  this,  but 
in  spite  of  it,  tl.at  I  have  given  you  the  command. 
Only  those  generals  who  gain  success  can  set  up  dic- 
tators. What  I  now  ask  of  you  is  military  success,  and 
I  will  risk  the  dictatorship.  The  Government  will  sup- 
port you  to  the  utmost  of  its  ability,  which  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  it  has  done  and  will  do  for  all 
commanders.  I  much  fear  that  the  spirit  which  you 
have  aided  to  infuse  into  the  army,  of  criticising  their 
commander  and  withholding  confidence  from  him,  will 
now  turn  upon  you.  I  shall  assist  you  as  far  as  I 
can  to  put  it  clown.  Neither  you  nor  Napoleon,  if  he 
were  alive  again,  could  get  any  good  out  of  an  army 
while  such  a  spirit  prevails  in  it ;  and  now  beware  of 
rashness.  Beware  of  rashness,  but  with  energy  and 
.sleepless  vigilance  go  forward  and  give  us  victories. 

General   Halleck  and   Secretary    Stanton   de- 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE       171 

sired  the  appointment  of  General  Rosecrans,  in- 
stead of  that  of  General  Hooker,  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  it  was  probably 
with  the  unfortunate  appointment  of  General 
Pope  in  mind  that  the  President  chose  a  com- 
mander who  already  possessed  the  confidence  of 
his  officers  and  men.  General  Hooker  was 
greatly  moved  by  the  President's  letter  reproving 
him  for  his  treatment  of  his  predecessor.  "  He 
talks  to  me  like  a  father,"  he  said ;  "  I  shall  not 
answer  the  letter  until  I  have  won  him  a  great 
victory." 

He  set  to  work  with  enthusiasm  disciplining 
and  drilling  his  men,  until,  when  spring  opened, 
it  was  with  reason  that  he  called  his  army  "  the 
finest  on  the  planet." 

On  April  n  he  presented  to  the  President  his 
plan  of  campaign  against  Richmond.  On  this 
Lincoln  indorsed  the  very  cogent  criticism : 

My  opinion  is  that,  just  now,  with  the  enemy  di- 
rectly ahead  of  us,  there  is  no  eligible  route  for  us 
into  Richmond ;  and  consequently  a  question  of  pref- 
erence between  the  Rappahannock  route  and  the  James 
River  route  i;  a  contest  about  nothing.  Hence  our 
prime  object  is  the  enemy's  army  in  front  of  us,  and  is 
not  with  or  about  Richmond  at  all  unless  it  be  inci- 
dental to  the  main  object. 

What  then?  The  two  armies  are  face  to  face  with 
a  narrow  river  between  them.  Our  communications  are 
shorter  and  safer  than  are  those  of  the  enemy.  For 
this  reason  we  can,  with  equal  powers,  fret  him  more 
than  he  can  us.  I  do  not  think  that  by  raids  towards 
Washington  he  can  derange  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
at  all.  He  has  no  distant  operations  which  can  call 
any  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  away ;  we  have  such 
operations  which  may  call  him  away,  at  least  in  part. 
While  he  remains  intact,  I  do  not  think  we  should  take 
the  disadvantage  of  attacking  him  in  his  intrenchments ; 
but  we  should  continually  harass  and  menace  him,  so 


1 72  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

that  he  shall  have  no  leisure  nor  safety  in  sending  away 
detachments.  If  he  weakens  himself,  then  pitch  into 
him. 

By  the  3Oth  of  April  Hooker  had  crossed  both 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan  above  Fred- 
ericksburg  under  cover  of  a  feigned  attack  below 
the  town  by  three  army  corps  under  General 
John  Sedgwick.  Hooker  did  not  pursue  the  ad- 
vantage of  this  surprise,  but  on  May  i  advanced 
cautiously  toward  Lee  from  Chancellorsville, 
a  small  town  lying  about  ten  miles  west  of  Fred- 
ericksburg. 

At  night  Hooker,  in  the  words  of  General  Lee, 
his  opponent,  "  assumed  a  position  of  great 
natural  strength,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a 
dense  forest,  filled  with  a  tangled  undergrowth, 
in  the  midst  of  which  breastworks  of  logs  had 
been  constructed,  with  trees  felled  in  front,  so  as 
to  form  an  almost  impenetrable  abatis.  His 
artillery  swept  the  few  narrow  roads  by  which 
his  position  could  be  approached  from  the  front, 
and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods."  However, 
the  extreme  right  of  the  line,  under  General 
Oliver  O.  Howard,  was  unprotected.  Around 
this,  on  the  2d,  Jackson  made  a  forced  march, 
and  late  in  the  afternoon  took  the  right  wing  of 
the  army  in  reverse,  driving  it  in  confusion 
toward  the  center.  In  his  ardor  General  Jackson 
rode  ahead  of  his  men,  and,  turning  to  rejoin 
them,  was  killed  from  a  shot  from  one  of  his  own 
soldiers.  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  succeeded  him. 
On  the  morning  of  the  3d  Stuart  attacked  desper- 
ately the  compacted  front  before  him  near  the 
Chancellor  House,  which  formed  Hooker's  head- 
quarters. As  Hooker  was  standing  on  the  ve- 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE       173 

randa,  a  cannon  ball  struck  one  of  the  pillars  and 
hurled  it  against  him.  For  some  time  he  lay  un- 
conscious, and  it  would  appear  that  he  did  not 
thoroughly  recover  his  wits  during  ,the  day. 
Certainly  his  orders  were  the  reverse  of  what  was 
to  be  expected  of  a  general  with  his  militant  so- 
briquet. He  withdrew  from  his  strong  position 
which  his  troops  were  bravely  and  successfully 
defending,  and  clearly  indicated  to  the  soldiers 
that  he  was  preparing  to  retreat  over  the  river, 
by  reforming  them  in  an  arc  in  front  of  the 
United  States  Ford  below  the  junction  of  the 
Rapidan  and  Rappahannock.  He  had  already 
ordered  Sedgwick,  who  had  made  the  attack  on 
the  east  which  deceived  Lee,  to  march  to  his  aid 
through  Fredericksburg. 

Hooker  complained  that  Sedgwick  failed  to  obey 
his  order  with  all  possible  energy  and  dispatch, 
and  this  charge  was  sustained  by  an  investiga- 
tion by  a  committee  of  Congress.  Military 
opinion,  however,  has  generally  exonerated 
Sedgwick.  He  had  to  fight  his  way  by  flanking 
movements  through  Fredericksburg,  and  on  the 
3d  at  Salem  Church,  on  the  road  to  Chancellors- 
ville,  he  had  a  pitched  battle  with  the  Confeder- 
ate rear-guard,  reenforced  by  the  main  army. 
He  continued  fighting  on  the  4th,  and  then,  find- 
ing his  advance  was  blocked,  crossed  the  river  by 
Hooker's  permission.  Hooker  that  night  held  a 
council  of  war  with  his  division  commanders,  the 
result  of  which  was  that  the  army  withdrew 
across  the  river  on  the  5th. 

As  soon  as  the  President  heard  the  sad  tidings 
of  this  second  disaster  to  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, he  and  Halleck  took  a  steamer  to  Hook- 
er's headquarters.  Arriving  there  in  the  gener- 


174  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

al's  absence,  he  wrote  him  the  following  note, 
assuring  him  of  confidence  and  cooperation : 

The  recent  movement  of  your  army  is  ended  with- 
out effecting  its  object,  except,  perhaps,  some  important 
breakings  of  the  enemy's  communications.  What  next? 
If  possible,  I  would  be  very  glad  of  another  move- 
ment early  enough  to  give  us  some  benefit  from  the  fact 
of  the  enemy's  communication  being  broken;  but  neither 
for  this  reason  nor  any  other  do  I  wish  anything  done 
in  desoeration  or  rashness.  An  early  movement  would 
also  help  to  supersede  the  bad  moral  effect  of  the 
recent  one,  which  is  said  to  be  considerably  injurious. 
Have  you  already  in  your  mind  a  plan  wholly  or 
partially  formed?  If  you  have,  prosecute  it  without 
interference  from  me.  If  you  have  not,  please  inform 
me,  so  that  I,  incompetent  as  I  may  be,  can  try  and 
assist  in  the  formation  of  some  plan  for  the  army. 

On  his  return  to  Washington,  the  President 
telegraphed  encouraging  news  to  General  Hooker, 
informing  him  of  General  Grant's  capture  of 
Grand  Gulf;  of  Federal  cavalry  raids  near  Rich- 
mond, that,  on  the  information  of  an  exchanged 
prisoner,  could  have  easily  captured  the  city  had 
the  raiders  known  its  weakness,  there  being  "  not 
a  sound  pair  of  legs  in  Richmond ;  "  and  of  a 
captured  despatch  of  General  Lee  telling  of  the 
"  fearful  loss  "  he  had  sustained  in  the  recent 
battle. 

General  Hooker  replied  to  the  President's  note 
intimating  that  he  was  contemplating  a  forward 
movement  as  soon  as  he  had  tested  the  temper  of 
his  troops.  He  wrote  again  on  the  I3th,  explain- 
ing his  delay,  and  saying  that  he  hoped  to  be  able 
to  commence  his  movement  upon  the  morrow. 
To  this  the  President  replied  that,  "  the  enemy 
having  reestablished  his  communications,  re- 
gained his  positions,  and  actually  received  ree'n- 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      175 

forcements,"  any  attempt  of  Hooker's  to  cross 
the  Rappahannock  at  this  time  was  not  practic- 
able. He  advised  the  general  to  hold  the  enemy 
at  bay  with  occasional  attacks  and  cavalry  raids, 
and  to  put  his  own  army  in  good  condition.  If, 
however,  Hooker  believed  he  could  succeed  at 
the  intended  movement,  the  President  would  not 
restrain  him.  But,  said  Lincoln,  "  bearing  upon 
this  last  point,  I  must  tell  you  that  I  have  some 
painful  intimations  that  some  of  your  corps  and 
division  commanders  are  not  giving  you  their 
entire  confidence.  This  would  be  ruinous,  if  true, 
and  you  should  therefore,  first  of  all,  ascertain 
the  real  facts  beyond  all  possibility  of  doubt." 

Upon  this  hint  it  was  easy  for  Hooker  to- 
discover  who  were  the  offending  officers.  Yet, 
because  of  the  more  active  disloyalty  he  had 
shown  toward  Burnside,  he  was  compelled  to 
exercise  forbearance  and  discretion  instead  of 
taking  drastic  action,  as  Burnside  had  proposed. 
Thereby,  while  he  did  not  prevent  his  downfall, 
he  delayed  it. 

By  the  first  of  June  it  became  apparent  that 
Lee  was  contemplating  another  invasion  of  the 
North.  On  the  5th  of  the  month  General 
Hooker  advised  the  President  that  in  the  case  of 
such  a  movement  the  enemy  ought  to  be  attacked 
in  the  rear  at  Fredericksburg.  Lincoln  turned 
over  the  proposition  to  Halleck  for  consideration, 
and  in  the  meantime  gave  it  as  his  opinion  to- 
Hooker  that  such  an  attack  was  inadvisable.  He 
said,  using  a  characteristic  simile: 

I  would  not  take  the  risk  of  being  entangled  upon 
the  river,  like  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a  fence  and 
liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs  front  and  rear  without  a 
fair  chance  to  gore  one  way  or  kick  the  other.  If 


176  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Lee  would  come  to  my  side  of  the  river,  I  would  keep 
on  the  same  side,  and  fight  him  or  act  on  the  defense, 
according  as  might  be  my  estimate  of  his  strength 
relatively  to  my  own. 

While  this  correspondence  was  going  on  the 
Confederate  movement  was  already  in  progress, 
following  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  up 
toward  the  Blue  Ridge.  It  was  headed  by  the 
strong  force  of  the  Confederate  cavalry. 
Against  this  Hooker  sent  his  cavalry  under  Gen- 
erals Alfred  Pleasonton  and  David  McM.  Gregg. 
Pleasonton  met  the  enemy  at  Brandy  Station 
before  Gregg  arrived,  and  engaged  him  fiercely, 
forcing  the  Confederate  movement  to  change  its 
course  westward  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
Feeling  that  Washington  was  less  immediately 
threatened,  Hooker  proposed  to  march  directly 
upon  Richmond,  trusting  to  be  able  to  hurry  his 
troops  back  after  the  capture  of  the  Confederate 
capital  in  time  to  save  the  Federal.  But  the 
President  would  not  agree  to  this.  On  the  loth 
he  telegraphed  Hooker : 

If  you  had  Richmond  invested  to-day,  you  would  not 
be  able  to  take  it  in  twenty  days ;  meanwhile  your 
communications,  and  with  them  your  army,  would 
be  ruined.  I  think  Lee's  army,  and  not  Richmond,  is 
your  objective  point.  If  he  comes  toward  the  upper 
Potomac,  follow  on  his  flank  and  on  his  inside  track, 
shortening  your  lines  while  he  lengthens  his.  Fight 
him,  too,  when  opportunity  offers.  If  he  stays  where 
he  is,  fret  him  and  fret  him. 

Hooker's  plan  was  one  that  Lee  hoped  he  would 
attempt,  since  the  Confederate  general  was  ready 
to  risk  the  capture  of  Richmond  for  the  chance 
of  taking  Washington.  He  had  already  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  "  swap  queens  "  in  the 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE       177 

game  of  war.  It  was  the  wearing  down  of  his 
lesser  strength  by  equal  losses  on  both  sides,  such 
as  Lincoln's  plan  involved,  that  Lee  dreaded. 
Through  his  foolhardiness,  Major-General 
Robert  H.  Milroy,  commanding  a  Federal  de- 
tachment at  Winchester  in  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, allowed  himself  to  be  surrounded  on  the 
1 3th.  On  the  i4th  the  President  telegraphed 
Hooker : 

So  far  as  we  can  make  out  here,  the  enemy  have 
Milroy  surrounded  at  Winchester  and  Tyler  at  Martins- 
burg.  If  they  could  hold  out  a  few  days,  could  you 
help  them  ?  If  the  head  of  Lee's  army  is  at  Martins- 
burg  and  the  tail  of  it  on  the  plank  road  between 
Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  the  animal  must  be 
very  slim  somewhere.  Could  you  not  break  him? 

But  Milroy  had  already  been  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss.  On  the  I5th  the  Confederate  van 
under  Ewell  was  crossing  the  Potomac  at 
Williamsport.  The  President  immediately  called 
for  100,000  militia  from  Maryland,  Pennsylvania, 
Ohio,  and  West  Virginia  to  serve  for  six  months. 
On  the  1 6th  he  wrote  to  Hooker,  who  was  com- 
plaining of  Halleck  withholding  confidence  and 
support  from  him,  that  the  complaint  was 
groundless  and  that  the  two  must  act  in  concert 
in  the  crisis  that  confronted  the  country.  He 
said: 

I  believe  you  are  aware  that  since  you  took  command 
of  the  army  I  have  not  believed  you  had  any  chance 
to  effect  anything  till  now.  As  it  looks  to  me,  Lee's 
now  returning  toward  Harper's  Ferry  gives  you  back 
the  chance  that  I  thought  McClellan  lost  last  fall.  Quite 
possibly  I  was  wrong  both  then  and  now ;  but,  in  the 
great  responsibility  resting  upon  me,  I  cannot  be  en- 
tirely silent.  Now,  all  I  ask  is  that  you  will  be  in  such 


178  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

mood  that  we  can  get  into  our  action  the  best  cordial 
judgment  of  yourself  and  General  Halleck,  with  my 
poor  mite  added,  if  indeed  he  and  you  shall  think  it 
entitled  to  any  consideration  at  all. 

Later  in  the  day,  to  prevent  misunderstanding, 
he  telegraphed  General  Hooker,  placing  him  in 
"strict  military  relation  to  General  Halleck  of  a 
commander  of  one  of  the  armies  to  the  general- 
in-chief  of  all  the  armies." 

Leaving  Stuart's  cavalry  to  obstruct  the 
parallel  advance  of  the  Federal  troops,  Lee 
rushed  the  rest  of  his  army  after  Ewell  across 
the  Potomac,  in  the  vicinity  of  Hagerstown. 
Thence  he  marched  along  the  rich  Cumberland 
Valley  into  Pennsylvania,  causing  the  inhabitants 
to  flee  before  him.  Ewell  occupied  Carlisle ;  and 
Early,  York.  Harrisburg,  the  State  capital,  was 
menaced,  as  well  as  other  cities  on  the  Susque- 
hanna.  Along  this  •  river  the  newly  enlisted 
militia  gathered  to  stop  Lee's  advance  upon 
Philadelphia  and  the  other  Eastern  cities,  in  all  of 
which  panic  reigned. 

Stuart's  cavalry  was  entirely  ineffectual  in 
hindering  Hooker,  and  indeed,  was  so  harassed 
itself,  that  it  failed  to  regain  the  main  army 
either  in  time  or  condition  to  render  much  serv- 
ice in  the  decisive  battle.  Hooker  waited  to 
cross  the  Potomac  until  Lee's  troops  had  all 
passed  it;  and  then  proceeded  to  follow  after 
him.  Fearing  his  enemy's  strength,  he  asked 
Halleck  to  let  him  add  to  his  army  of  pursuit 
the  now  useless  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry. 
This  the  general-in-chief  refused  him.  There- 
upon, the  date  being  June  27,  Hooker  telegraphed 
to  Halleck  that  he  was  not  able  with  his  forces  to 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      179 

garrison  both  Harper's  Ferry  and  Washington 
and  at  the  same  time  fight  the  superior  force  of 
the  enemy  in  front,  and  so  he  tendered  his  resig- 
nation. This  the  President  at  once  accepted,  and 
appointed  to  the  vacant  place  Major-General 
George  G.  Meade,  who  by  strange  nemesis,  had 
been  the  chief  critic  of  Hooker  among  the 
division  generals,  as  Hooker  had  formerly  been 
of  Burnside.  Meade  desired  not  to  have  his 
former  chief  under  him,  and  so  Hooker  was  sent 
to  the  West,  where,  in  the  battles  about  Chat- 
tanooga, he  won  back  his  old  reputation  as  a 
fighting  division  general. 

General  Meade  made  few  changes  in  his  pred- 
ecessor's plan  of  campaign;  he  compromised 
upon  the  question  of  adding  the  garrison  at 
Harper's  Ferry  to  his  army  of  attack,  by  accepting 
half  of  it.  By  the  3Oth  his  left  wing  had  crossed 
the  Pennsylvania  line,  south  of  Gettysburg,  while 
the  right  remained  in  Maryland  thirty  miles  to 
the  southwest.  Learning,  however,  that  Lee 
was  returning  to  attack  him,  Meade  determined 
to  take  up  his  position  of  defense  along  Pipe 
Creek  in  Maryland,  near  to  and  parallel  with  the 
State  line.  But  on  July  i,  before  the  formation 
could  be  made,  the  van  of  Lee's  forces  was  upon 
Meade's  left  wing,  the  First  Corps,  which,  under 
General  John  F.  Reynolds,  was  guarding  the 
roads  from  Chambersburg  and  Hagerstowq, 
which  entered  Gettysburg  on  the  west. 

Reynolds  realized  that  his  duty  was  to  check 
the  advance  of  the  superior  forces  at  any  cost, 
until  Meade  could  bring  up  his  troops  and  estab- 
lish his  lines  of  battle.  Part  of  the  cost  that  he 
paid  was  his  own  life.  On  his  death  General 
Abner  Doubleday  took  command.  For  a  time 


i8o  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  advantage  was  with  the  Federal  troops.  The 
Eleventh  Corps  then  arrived  on  the  field,  and  its 
commander,  General  O.  O.  Howard,  being  higher 
in  rank,  superseded  Doubleday.  But  the  Con- 
federate forces  also  received  accessions  in  the 
form  of  Ewell's  and  Early 's  cavalry,  and  the 
Eleventh  Corps  was  beaten  back  through  Gettys- 
burg. It  halted  on  Cemetery  Hill,  south  of  the 
town. 

Meade  remained  in  headquarters  at  Taneytown 
throughout  the  day,  still  intending  to  mass  his 
army  on  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  for  the  defense 
of  Washington  and  Baltimore;  Manchester  and 
Taneytown  forming  the  extremes  of  the  line. 
It  would  appear  that  this  absence  from  a  battle 
that  was  raging  within  his  hearing  did  not  com- 
mend itself  to  the  army.  At  noon  he  obtained 
news  of  the  death  or  severe  wounding  of  Reyn- 
olds, and  he  sent  Hancock  forward  to  assume 
command  and  also  to  report  to  Meade  if  the 
ground  was  favorable  for  a  general  engagement. 
Hancock  returned  at  night  and  reported  favor- 
ably as  to  the  field,  and  Meade  then  abandoned 
the  idea  of  the  Pipe  Creek  campaign  and  rode  to 
Howard's  headquarters  at  Cemetery  Hill,  reach- 
ing there  at  eleven  o'clock  at  night.  An  im- 
mediate concentration  of  the  army  was  ordered 
and  a  posting  of  the  various  divisions  was  begun. 
Howard  with  the  Eleventh,  Doubleday  with  the 
First,  and  Hancock  with  the  Second,  held  the 
center.  The  Twelfth,  under  Slocum,  formed  the 
right;  the  Third,  under  Sickles,  constituted  the 
left.  The  Fifth,  under  Sykes,  was  posted  in  re- 
serve to  the  right.  Sedgwick,  with  the  Sixth,  was 
at  Manchester,  thirty-two  miles  distant  from 
Gettysburg,  and  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening 


BURNS1DE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE   181 

he  got  orders  to  march  to  Taneytown,  and 
about  nine  o'clock  received  another  order  to 
make  a  forced  march  to  Gettysburg.  He  reached 
there  at  2  o'clock  p.  M.  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
2d.  and  was  ordered  in  reserve  to  the  right, 
taking  the  place  of  Sykes's  Corps,  which  latter 
corps  was  then  posted  to  the  extreme  left  of  the 
line.  The  center  and  headquarters  were  on 
Cemetery  Hill ;  the  right  extended  down  to 
Rocky  Creek,  and  so  on  to  Wolf  Hill;  and  the 
left  reached  to  an  eminence  called  Round  Top. 
The  army  line  was  in  shape  like  a  crescent  and 
had  a  great  advantage  of  position.  Meade  had 
one  hundred  guns,  which  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Hunt ;  Lee  had  one  hundred  and 
fifty  guns. 

Both  sides  remained  on  the  defensive  until  2.29 
p.  M.,  when  Longstreet  prepared  to  attack 
Sickles  with  his  whole  corps,  to  be  followed  by 
A.  P.  Hill.  Sickles,  having  been  informed  of  the 
design  of  Longstreet  by  Berhan,  of  the  sharp- 
shooters, who  had  made  a  reconnoissance  in  force, 
moved  out  further  and  disconnected  his  corps 
from  the  center,  his  right  resting  on  Round  Top. 
The  battle  was  opened  by  the  Rebel  artillery, 
which  was  responded  to  by  Sickles'  guns,  and  the 
enemy  came  defiantly  on  with  the  "  Rebel  yell," 
but  were  met  with  volley  after  volley  of  grape 
and  canister,  and  sent  back  in  confusion.  An- 
other intact  line,  however,  advanced  from  out  of 
the  woods,  and  Warren,  Meade's  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral, ordered  up  reinforcements,  which  were  slow 
in  coming.  Meanwhile  Sickles  was  slowly 
forced  back  by  superior  numbers.  At  this 
juncture,  the  Fifth  came  up,  steadied  the  Third, 
and,  united,  they  repelled  Longstreet  and  Hill, 


1 82  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

but  Sickles  lost  his  leg  here,  and  was  borne  off 
the  field,  Birney  assuming  his  command. 

Anderson  then  assailed  the  center;  Hancock 
met  the  attack  with  heroic  valor,  being  wounded 
in  the  thigh,  while  Gibbon  was  wounded  in  the 
shoulder.  The  Rebel  onslaught  was  here  ter- 
rific ;  in  some  instances  the  antagonists  fought 
with  clubbed  guns,  and  hand-to-hand.  The 
First  and  Second  were  thrown  into  confusion, 
when  Sedgwick  came  up  opportunely  with  the 
Sixth,  relieved  the  ill  fortunes,  and  repulsed  the 
enemy  with  great  loss.  Our  right  had  been 
severely  drawn  upon  to  aid  the  center  and  left ; 
and  Ewell  made  a  furious  onslaught  on  Slocum's 
extreme  right,  designing  to  turn  it.  After  a 
bloody  conflict,  the  First  and  part  of  the  Sixth 
came  and  took  part,  repulsing  the  Rebels,  and 
night  closed  on  the  scene,  with  Union  victories 
throughout.  All  houses,  barns,  and  outbuildings 
were  occupied  as  hospitals ;  the  floors  were  filled 
with  wounded  and  dying,  and  the  surgeons  and 
nurses  were  busy  without  a  moment  for  rest  or 
sleep,  all  night,  amputating  legs  or  arms,  probing 
for  bullets,  stanching  wounds,  administering 
morphine,  etc.  It  was  no  unusual  sight  to  see  a 
soldier  handing  some  memento  or  trinket,  a  ring, 
or  a  lock  of  hair,  or  a  pistol,  or  a  watch,  or  a 
button,  to  a  comrade  or  a  surgeon,  with  a  charge 
to  deliver  it  to  the  one  he  loved  best.  Friday 
morning  the  gallant  Sickles  was  sent  to  Washing- 
ton to  have  his  leg  properly  attended  to. 

At  daylight  the  Rebels  resumed  the  offensive 
by  pouring  artillery  charges  into  our  ranks,  and 
Slocum,  with  Humphreys's  and  Sykes's  divisions 
of  the  Third  Corps,  charged  resolutely  upon 
Ewell's  Corps;  after  a  gallant  contest  on  both 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      183 

sides,  for  six  hours,  our  forces  prevailed,  and 
Evvell  was  overpowered  and  the  battle  ceased 
for  two  or  three  hours.  Lee  was  now  in 
a  desperate  condition,  which  he  determined  to 
retrieve  by  a  coup-de-main  on  the  key  to  our 
position  on  Cemetery  Hill,  where  our  headquar- 
ters were.  To  that  end,  he  dexterously  ranged 
his  guns  to  the  number  of  an  hundred,  in  a 
sort  of  semicircle,  all  bearing  on  the  hill,  and 
upon  the  stroke  of  one,  unexpectedly  to  our 
troops,  one  hundred  or  more  guns  simultaneously 
burst  forth,  dealing  death  and  destruction  to  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps,  who  were  not  in 
battle  line.  Many  were  killed  and  many  dis- 
abled, and  every  man  that  could  escape  did  so, 
but  the  terrible  cannonade  continued  for  an  hour 
and  a  half,  being  replied  to  by  our  batteries  on 
the  side  hills.  This  terrible  cannonade  was  kept 
up  till  four  o'clock,  when  General  Hunt  slack- 
ened our  fire  so  that  the  guns,  which  were  much 
heated,  might  cool.  The  enemy  thought  they  had 
silenced  our  guns  permanently,  and  a  charge 
under  Pickett  was  ordered.  On  came  the 
Rebels,  their  whole  destiny  being  borne  on  the 
advancing  banners ;  they  were  met  with  a  terrific 
artillery  fire  from  forty  guns,  but  though  mowed 
down,  they  pressed  on  with  bravery  and  despera- 
tion. They  crossed  the  Emmetsburg  road,  and 
were  near  to  our  infantry.  Gibbon  was  in  com- 
mand ;  he  watched  closely,  saying,  "  Steady,  boys, 
— don't  fire  till  I  command."  The  Rebels  set  up 
the  "  Rebel  yell,"  and  came  double-quick,  with 
fixed  bayonets.  "  Fire !  "  cried  Gibbon ;  one 
simultaneous  sheet  of  flame  and  smoke  enveloped 
the  whole  front,  and  down  went  half  the  Rebels ; 
the  rest  kept  on,  and  were  mowed  down  with 


1 84  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

grape  and  canister,  till  it  was  unendurable— 
those  who  survived  threw  down  their  arms  and 
guns  and  gave  themselves  up.  A  great  many 
others  of  the  Rebels  gave  up  besides,  and  our 
forces  were  overburdened  with  prisoners.  The 
Rebel  loss  was  25,000  killed,  wounded,  and  miss- 
ing; and  14,000  prisoners.  The  Union  loss  was 
23,000  in  all. 

The  "  high-water  mark  "  of  the  Rebellion  was 
here  attained;  henceforth  the  Rebellion  ebbed 
until  the  bottom  was  reached,  at  Appomattox. 
Had  our  side  been  vanquished  as  Lee's  army  was, 
the  victor  would  have  taken  his  choice  of  march- 
ing on  to  Baltimore  and  Washington,  or  to 
Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia. 

Meade,  however,  did  not  realize  the  extent  of 
the  disaster  to  Lee,  and  was  disheartened  by  his 
own  losses,  especially  the  disablement  by  wounds 
of  Sickles,  Hancock,  and  other  generals  upon 
whom  he  specially  relied.  Therefore,  though 
Hancock,  from  his  stretcher,  wrote  him  urging 
immediate  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  Meade  decided 
to  wait  until  the  next  day,  which  was  the  Fourth 
of  July.  Yet  even  this  auspicious  day  passed 
without  action,  Meade  deciding  that  it  should 
be  spent  in  burying  the  dead,  caring  for  the 
wounded,  and  bringing  up  supplies.  A  storm 
came  up  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  under  cover 
of  this,  and  the  succeeding  night,  Lee  began  to 
retreat.  By  morning,  when  his  movement  was 
discovered,  he  had  passed  through  Fairfield  Pass, 
where  he  left  a  strong  rear-guard,  and  was  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 

The  President,  grieved  to  learn  that  Meade  had 
allowed  the  enemy  to  slip  out  of  his  hands,  heard 
with  joy  on  the  same  day  that  Major-General 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE       18$ 

William  H.  French  had  destroyed  the  pontoon 
bridge  by  which  Lee  expected  to  retreat  across 
the  Potomac.  Then  his  high  hopes  for  ending  the 
war  by  capturing  the  enemy's  chief  general  and 
army  were  cast  down  by  indications  that  Meade 
and  French,  and  other  officers  in  the  field,  pre- 
ferred that  the  enemy  should  be  allowed  to  escape. 
Troops  were  so  slowly  advancing  down  the 
Cumberland  Valley  that,  in  Lincoln's  words,  they 
were  "  quite  as  likely  to  capture  the  man  in  the 
moon  "  as  any  part  of  Lee's  army.  On  July  6 
the  President  telegraphed  from  the  Soldiers' 
Home  in  Washington,  where  he  was  accustomed 
to  spend  much  of  the  heated  term,  to  the  general- 
in-chief,  saying: 

MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK:  I  left  the  telegraph  office 
a  good  deal  dissatisfied.  You  know  I  did  not  like  the 
phrase — in  [Meade's]  Orders,  No.  68,  I  believe — 
"  Drive  the  invaders  from  our  soil."  Since  that,  I  see 
a  dispatch  from  General  French,  saying  the  enemy 
is  crossing  his  wounded  over  the  river  in  flats,  with- 
out saying  why  he  does  not  stop  it,  or  even  intimating 
a  thought  that  it  ought  to  be  stopped.  Still  later,  an- 
other dispatch  from  General  Pleasonton,  by  direction  of 
General  Meade,  to  General  French,  stating  that  the 
main  army  is  halted  because  it  is  believed  the  rebels 
are  concentrating  "  on  the  road  toward  Hagerstown, 
beyond  Fairfield,''  and  is  not  to  move  until  it  is  ascer- 
tained that  the  rebels  intend  to  evacuate  Cumberland 
Valley. 

These  things  all  appear  to  me  to  be  connected  with 
a  purpose  to  cover  Baltimore  and  Washington,  and  to 
get  the  enemy  across  the  river  again  without  a  further 
collision,  and  they  do  not  appear  connected  with  a 
purpose  to  prevent  his  crossing  and  to  destroy  him.  I 
do  fear  the  former  purpose  is  acted  upon  and  the  latter 
is  rejected, 

If  you  are  satisfied  the  latter  purpose  is  entertained,, 
and  is  judiciously  pursued,  I  am  content.  If  you  are  not 
so  satisfied,  please  look  to  it. 


186  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

By  repeated  urgings  from  Halleck,  Meade 
brought  his  army  up  to  the  Potomac  by  the  loth 
in  front  of  the  strong  intrenchments  which 
Lee  had  thrown  up  to  protect  himself  while 
repairing  the  bridge.  Upon  the  I2th  Meade 
called  a  council  of  war  of  his  officers.  The 
majority  overruled  his  own  desire  to  fight  Lee. 
Upon  reporting  this  decision  next  day  to  Wash- 
ington he  was  sharply  reproved  by  Halleck  for 
calling  the  council,  and  was  ordered  not  to  let 
the  enemy  escape.  Upon  the  following  morning 
Lee  crossed  the  river.  Meade,  knowing  that 
the  President  held  him  responsible  for  the 
enemy's  escape,  asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  com- 
mand. This  request  Mr.  Lincoln  refused 
through  Halleck.  In  every  way  he  tried  to  make 
the  best  of  the  disappointing  situation.  Feeling 
that  another  change  of  command  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  for  the  time  inadvisable,  and 
that  the  present  commander  should  feel  that  the 
Government  was  heartily  supporting  him,  the 
President  refrained  from  any  remark  that  Meade 
could  construe  as  censure,  and  forced  himself  to 
look  only  at  the  positive  services  the  general  had 
rendered  the  Union.  This  is  indicated  in  a  letter 
from  him  to  General  Howard  upon  July  21. 

I  was  deeply  mortified  by  the  escape  of  Lee  across 
the  Potomac,  because  the  substantial  destruction  of  his 
army  would  have  ended  the  war,  and  because  I  believed 
such  destruction  was  perfectly  easy — believed  that  Gen- 
eral Meade  and  his  nolle  army  had  expended  all  the 
skill,  and  toil,  and  blood,  up  to  the  ripe  harvest,  and 
then  let  the  crop  go  to  waste. 

Perhaps  my  mortification  was  heightened  because  I 
had  always  believed — making  my  belief  a  hobby,  possi- 
bly— that  the  main  Rebel  army  going  north  of  the  Poto- 
jnac  could  never  return,  if  well  attended  to;  and  because 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      187 

I  was  so  greatly  flattered  in  this  belief  by  the  operations 
at  Gettysburg.  A  few  days  having  passed,  I  am  now 
profoundly  grateful  for  what  was  done,  without  criti- 
cism for  what  was  not  done. 

General  Meade  has  my  confidence,  as  a  brave  and 
skillful  officer  and  a  true  man. 

The  success  of  the  navy  continued  throughout 
1863.  Admiral  DuPont  had  maintained  a  very 
successful  blockade  of  the  Atlantic  coast.  On 
the  27th  of  February  Commander  Worden,  of 
Monitor  fame,  went  in  with  the  monitor  Montauk 
under  the  very  guns  of  Fort  McAllister  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Ogeechee  River,  and,  coolly 
receiving  the  fire  of  the  fort,  destroyed  with  his 
shells  the  blockade-runner  Nashville,  which  was 
stranded  in  the  river.  On  April  7  DuPont 
attacked  the  defenses  of  Charleston  with  his 
whole  strength  of  ironclads  and  met  with  com- 
plete failure.  He  retired,  informing  the  Govern- 
ment that  it  was  impossible  to  take  Charleston 
by  naval  attack.  On  April  14  the  President, 
being  desirous  to  hold  Carolinian  reenforce- 
ents  from  Lee,  gave  orders  to  Admiral  DuPont 
and  General  Hunter  to  act  in  cooperation  in 
renewing  the  attack,  either  in  earnest  or  as  a 
demonstration  merely. 

"  Once  again  before  Charleston,  do  not  leave 
till  further  orders  from  here."  Admiral  DuPont 
chose  to  consider  this  order  as  a  rebuke  for  his 
failure  to  take  Charleston  at  the  first  attempt, 
and  an  ignoring  of  his  opinion  that  the  sea- 
defenses  were  impregnable.  Accordingly  he 
asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  command,  as  soon  as 
it  was  convenient  for  the  Government  to  do  so, 
promising  to  obey  his  instructions  faithfully  in 
the  meantime.  He  was  relieved  late  in  June  by 


1 88  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Admiral  John  A.  Dahlgren.  Shortly  before  this, 
on  June  17,  a  monitor  of  his  fleet,  the  Weehawken, 
had  captured  the  swiftest  and  most  powerful 
ironclad  of  the  Confederacy,  the  Atlanta,  in  an 
engagement  which  lasted  only  a  quarter  of  an 
hour,  and  in  which  the  Weehawken  fired  only 
four  shots. 

Early  in  June  General  Hunter  had  also  been 
relieved  of  his  command,  being  replaced  by  Gen- 
eral Quincy  A.  Gillmore,  who  possessed  unusual 
ability  as  an  engineer,  and  was  therefore  better 
fitted  than  Hunter  to  reduce  such  a  stronghold  as 
the  Confederacy  had,  by  this  time,  made  of  the 
city  of  its  birth.  The  President  wrote  to  General 
Hunter  a  letter  of  commendation  for  his  dis- 
tinguished services,  assuring  him  that  he  had 
been  superseded  for  causes  which  seemed  suf- 
ficient for  the  Government,  but  which  conveyed 
no  imputation  upon  his  "  known  energy,  efficiency 
and  patriotism."  Secretary  Welles  sent  a  sim- 
iliar  letter  to  Admiral  DuPont,  for,  while  an  un- 
sparing critic  of  official  misconduct,  in  a  case 
like  this  the  "  Father  Neptune  "  of  the  Cabinet 
was  as  kindly-hearted  as  "  Father  Abraham " 
himself. 

During  the  summer  of  1863  General  Gillmore 
and  Admiral  Dahlgren  cooperated  in  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  strong  harbor  defenses  of  Charleston, 
meeting  with  gratifying  success  in  view  of  the 
smallness  of  Gillmore's  forces,  a  large  part  of 
which  was  negro  troops.  On  the  9th  of  July 
Morris  Island  was  taken  with  the  exception  of 
that  part  of  it  commanded  by  Fort  Wagner. 
Two  assaults  were  made  on  this  fort,  one  on  July 
ii  and  the  other  on  July  18.  Of  the  second  as- 
sault, which  took  place  at  nightfall,  a  negro  regi- 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      189 

ment  led  the  advance.  They  were  met  by  a  deadly 
fire  from  the  defenders  of  the  fort,  which  killed 
their  colonel,  Robert  George  Shaw,  a  young  Mas- 
sachusetts Abolitionist,  and  swept  them  back  in 
disorder.  Two  brigades  gained  a  foothold  upon 
the  works,  but  were  dislodged  by  the  severe  fire 
of  the  enemy  which  killed  their  commanders. 
The  total  loss  was  great,  1,500  men.  The  death 
of  Colonel  Shaw  was  especially  deplored  in  the 
North.  The  indignity  that  the  enemy  intended 
to  his  remains  by  "  burying  him  under  a  layer 
df  his  negroes  "  was  celebrated  by  Northern  poets 
as  the  highest  and  most  fitting  honor  that  could 
have  been  accorded  him,  and  in  later  years 
Harvard  University,  his  Alma  Mater,  erected  to 
him  one  of  the  most  artistic  memorials  in 
America,  the  work  of  Augustus  St.  Gaudens. 

General  Gillmore  advanced  his  works  toward 
the  enemy  by  constructing  parallel  after  parallel. 
He  built  a  battery  (christened  by  his  soldiers  the 
"  Swamp  Angel  ")  upon  a  morass,  whence  he 
threw  shells  a  distance  of  five  miles  into  Charles- 
ton. On  the  1 7th  of  August,  by  a  combined 
bombardment  of  land  batteries  and  gunboats, 
Gillmore  and  Dahlgren  pounded  Fort  Sumter 
into  a  pile  of  ruins.  And  on  September  5  they 
began  a  furious  attack  upon  Fort  Wagner,  which 
resulted  on  the  7th  in  its  evacuation  by  the  enemy. 

The  burial  of  the  dead  at  Gettysburg  was  a 
duty  which  fell  upon  Pennsylvania  and  Governor 
Curtin  of  that  State,  who  set  about  performing 
it  in  a  fitting  manner.  The  governors  of  the  six- 
teen other  Northern  States  that  were  represented 
in  the  battle  gave  him  their  hearty  cooperation 
in  his  design,  which  was  to  form  a  permanent 
national  cemetery  upon  the  battlefield.  Thurs- 


190 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


day,  November  19,  was  set  for  the  dedication 
ceremonies,  and  Edward  Everett,  a  veteran 
orator  of  Massachusetts,  was  selected  to  deliver 
the  chief  address.  President  Lincoln  was  in- 
vited, in  the  words  of  the  committee,  to  "for- 
mally set  apart  these  grounds  to  their  sacred  use 
by  a  few  appropriate  remarks." 

Mr.  Everett  delivered  a  long  and  eloquent 
oration,  befitting  the  occasion  and  honorable 
to  the  distinguished  orator.  Mr.  Lincoln  then 
gave  his  simple  tribute,  which  would  consign  him 
to  immortality  if  he  had  no  other  title  thereto. 
When  he  had  concluded,  Mr.  Everett  seized  him 
with  a  fervent  grasp  of  the  hand  and  exclaimed 
wistfully :  "  Ah,  Mr.  Lincoln !  how  gladly  I 
would  exchange  all  my  hundred  pages  to  be  the 
author  of  your  twenty  lines." 

This  is  the  authoritative  text  of  the  President's 
speech : 

Fourscore  and  seven  years  ago  our  fathers  brought 
forth  on  this  continent  a  new  nation,  conceived  in 
liberty,  and  dedicated  to  the  proposition  that  all  men 
are  created  equal. 

Now  we  are  engaged  in  a  great  civil  war,  testing 
whether  that  nation,  or  any  nation  so  conceived  and  so 
dedicated,  can  long  endure.  We  are  met  on  a  great 
battle-field  of  that  war.  We  have  come  to  dedicate 
a  portion  of  that  field  as  a  final  resting-place  for  those 
who  here  gave  their  lives  that  that  nation  might  live. 
It  is  altogether  fitting  and  proper  that  we  should  do 
this. 

But,  in  a  larger  sense,  we  cannot  dedicate — we  can- 
not consecrate — we  cannot  hallow — this  ground.  The 
brave  men,  living  and  dead,  who  struggled  here,  have 
consecrated  it  far  above  our  poor  power  to  add  or 
detract.  The  world  will  little  note  nor  long  remember 
what  we  say  here,  but  it  can  never  forget  what  they 
did  here.  It  is  for  us,  the  living  rather,  to  be  dedicated 
here  to  the  unfinished  work  which  they  who  fought 


BURN  SIDE,  HOOKER,  AND  MEADE      191 

here  have  thus  far  so  nobly  advanced.  It  is  rather 
for  us  to  be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task  remain- 
ing before  us — that  from  these  honored  dead  we  take 
increased  devotion  to  that  cause  for  which  they  gave 
the  last  full  measure  of  devotion;  that  we  here  highly 
resolve  that  these  dead  shall  not  have  died  in  vain ; 
that  this  nation,  under  God,  shall  have  a  new  birth  of 
freedom ;  and  that  government  of  the  people,  by  the 
people,  for  the  people  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST 

IN  striking  contrast  to  the  favorable  conditions 
inaugurating  the  career  of  McClellan  were  the 
straitened  circumstances  under  which  began  the 
upward  rise  of  the  man  destined  to  become  the 
great  soldier  of  the  war — Ulysses  S.  Grant.  In 
the  Mexican  War  he  had  been  faithful  over  the 
few  things  committed  to  his  charge  as  lieutenant, 
chiefly  in  expeditiously  handling  with  a  few  men 
a  large  supply  train.  After  this  war,  when 
going  in  1852  with  his  regiment  to  California  by 
way  of  Panama,  he  displayed  the  same  skill  and 
dispatch  in  his  care  and  transportation  of  sol- 
diers who  had  been  stricken  with  cholera  on  the 
Chagres  River,  and  left  behind  in  his  charge  to 
be  sent  forward  as  circumstances  best  permitted. 
Grant  was  appointed  Colonel  of  the  Twenty-first 
Illinois  Volunteers  by  Governor  Yates,  and 
assumed  command  on  June  17.  The  regiment 
was  noted  for  insubordination,  and  Grant  at  once 
set  to  work,  in  citizen's  clothes  and  with  a  stick 
for  a  sword,  drilling  them,  patiently  and  perti- 
naciously, but  with  little  success  in  reducing 
them  to  soldierly  order.  Accordingly,  when 
orders  came  to  take  the  regiment  to  Quincy, 
111.,  whence  they  were  to  be  sent  against  the  bush- 
whackers in  northern  Missouri,  Grant  seized  the 

192 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  193 

opportunity  afforded  for  more  drastic  discipline 
by  marching  them  thither,  instead  of  transport- 
ing them  by  rail. 

On  July  31  he  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  a  sub-district  under  General  Pope,  and  on 
August  7  he  was  appointed  a  brigadier-general 
of  volunteers.  On  August  28  General  Fremont 
sent  him  to  southeastern  Missouri  to  concentrate 
the  scattered  Federal  forces  in  the  region,  and 
to  drive  out  the  enemy,  particularly  from  Bel- 
mont  on  the  Mississippi  River,  where  it  was 
rumored  that  a  rebel  battery  was  established. 
Grant  discovered  that  the  Confederates  under 
General  Leonidas  Polk  were  advancing  along 
the  Kentucky  shore,  and  before  they  could  be 
prevented  would  seize  Columbus,  which  is  situ- 
ated on  a  high  bluff  commanding  the  river. 
Accordingly  he  abandoned  operations  in  Mis- 
souri, and  quickly  formed  an  expedition,  with 
which,  on  September  5  and  6,  he  descended  from 
Cairo,  111.,  his  headquarters,  upon  Paducah,  Ky., 
the  possession  of  which,  from  its  position  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee  River  and  near  that 
of  the  Cumberland,  was  even  more  strategically 
important  than  that  of  Columbus.  Having  ar- 
ranged for  the  fortification  of  the  place,  he  re- 
turned to  Cairo  to  forward  reinforcements. 

At  the  time  of  Grant's  descent  on  Paducah, 
General  Anderson  was  transferring  his  head- 
quarters from  Cincinnati  to  Louisville.  With 
his  two  efficient  subordinates,  Brigadier-Generals 
William  T.  Sherman  and  George  H.  Thomas,  he 
set  about  resisting  the  Confederate  invasion  of 
Kentucky,  which  had  assumed  threatening  pro- 
portions, General  F.  K.  Zollicoffer  entering  the 
State  through  Cumberland  Gap  on  September 


I94  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

10,  shortly  after  General  Polk  had  captured 
Columbus. 

In  cooperation  with  these  movements,  the 
secession  militia  of  the  State  under  General 
Simon  B.  Buckner  occupied  Bowling  Green  on 
the  1 8th,  and  threatened  to  move  on  Frankfort, 
the  State  capital,  and  disperse  the  Union  Legis- 
lature there  assembled. 

There  was  not  only  consternation  throughout 
northern  Kentucky  over  this  advance,  but  also 
serious  apprehension  in  the  States  north  of  the 
Ohio  River.  Governor  Oliver  P.  Morton  of  In- 
diana wrote  to  President  Lincoln  asking  for 
arms  and  troops  for  the  defense  of  the  southern 
boundary  of  his  State,  and  in  compliance  the 
President  sent  ten  heavy  guns,  directing  the 
Governor  to  supply  the  troops.  Later,  Governor 
Morton  wrote  again,  urging  the  importance  of 
defending  Louisville.  To  this  Lincoln  replied 
on  September  29  in  a  letter  which  displays  his 
thorough  grasp  of  the  military  situation : 

As  to  Kentucky,  you  do  not  estimate  that  State  as 
more  important  than  I  do,  but  I  am  compelled  to  watch 
all  points.  While  I  write  this  I  am,  if  not  in  range,  at 
least  in  hearing  of  cannon-shot  from  an  army  of  ene- 
mies more  than  100,000  strong.  I  do  not  expect  them 
to  capture  this  city;  but  I  know  they  would  if  I  were 
to  send  the  men  and  arms  from  here  to  defend  Louis- 
ville, of  which  there  is  not  a  single  hostile  armed 
soldier  within  forty  miles,  nor  any  force  known  to  be 
moving  upon  it  from  any  distance.  It  is  true,  the  army 
in  our  front  may  make  a  half-circle  around  southward 
and  move  on  Louisville,  but  when  they  do  we  will  make 
a  half-circle  around  northward  and  meet  them ;  and 
in  the  meantime  we  will  get  up  what  forces  we  can  from 
other  sources  to  also  meet  them. 

Within  a  day  or  so  after  writing*  this  letter  to 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  195 

Governor  Morton,  the  President  elaborated  his 
military  policy  in  the  following: 

MEMORANDA  FOR  A  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN. 

On  or  about  the  5th  of  October  (the  exact  date  to  be* 
determined  hereafter)  I  wish  a  movement  made  to 
seize  and  hold  a  point  on  the  railroad  connecting 
Virginia  and  Tennessee  near  the  mountain-pass  called 
Cumberland  Gap.  That  point  is  now  guarded  against 
us  by  Zollicoffer,  with  6,000  or  8,000  rebels  at  Bar- 
boursville.  Kv., — say  twenty-five  miles  from  the  Gap, 
toward  Lexington.  We  have  a  force  of  5,000  or  6,000 
under  General  Thomas,  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  about 
twenty-five  miles  from  Lexington  and  seventy-five  from 
Zollicoffer's  camp,  on  the  road  between  the  two.  There 
is  not  a  railroad  anywhere  between  Lexington  and  the 
point  to  be  seized,  and  along  the  whole  length  of  which 
the  Union  sentiment  among  the  people  largely  predomi- 
nates. We  have  military  possession  of  the  railroad  from 
Cincinnati  to  Lexington,  and  from  Louisville  to  Lex- 
ington, and  some  home  guards,  under  General  Critten- 
den,  are  on  the  latter  line.  We  have  possession  of 
the  railroad  from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  Tenn.,  so 
far  as  Muldraugh's  Hill,  about  forty  miles,  and  the 
rebels  have  possession  of  that  road  all  south  of  there. 
At  the  Hill  we  have  a  force  of  8,000,  under  General 
Sherman,  and  about  an  equal  force  of  rebels  is  a  very 
short  distance  south,  under  General  Buckner. 

We  have  a  large  force  at  Paducah,  and  a  smaller 
at  Fort  Holt,  both  on  the  Kentucky  side,  with  some 
at  Bird's  Point,  Cairo,  Mound  City,  Evansville,  and 
New  Albany,  all  on  the  other  side,  and  all  which,  with 
the  gunboats  on  the  river,  are  perhaps  sufficient  to 
guard  the  Ohio  from  Louisville  to  its  mouth. 

About  supplies  of  troops,  my  general  idea  is  that 
all  from  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Iowa,  Illinois,  Missouri, 
and  Kansas,  not  now  elsewhere,  be  left  to  Fremont. 
All  from  Indiana  and  Michigan,  not  now  elsewhere,  be 
sent  to  Anderson  at  Louisville.  All  from  Ohio  needed 
in  Western  Virginia  be  sent  there,  and  any  remainder 
be  sent  to  Mitchel  at  Cincinnati,  for  Anderson.  All 
east  of  the  mountains  be  appropriated  to  McClellan  and 
to  the  coast. 


196  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

As  to  movements,  my  idea  is  that  the  one  for  the 
coast  and  that  on  Cumberland  Gap  be  simultaneous, 
and  that  in  the  meantime  preparation,  vigilant  watching, 
and  the  defensive  only  be  acted  upon ;  this,  however, 
not  to  apply  to  Fremont's  operations  in  northern  and 
middle  Missouri.  That  before  these  movements  Thomas 
and  Sherman  shall  respectively  watch  but  not  attack 
Zollicoffer  and  Buckner.  That  when  the  coast  and  Gap 
movements  shall  be  ready  Sherman  is  merely  to  stand 
fast,  while  all  at  Cincinnati  and  all  at  Louisville,  with 
all  on  the  line,  concentrate  rapidly  at  Lexington,  and 
thence  to  Thomas's  camp,  joining  him,  and  the  whole 
thence  upon  the  Gap.  It  is  for  the  military  men  to 
decide  whether  they  can  find  a  pass  through  the  moun- 
tains at  or  near  the  Gap  which  cannot  be  defended 
by  the  enemy  with  a  greatly  inferior  force,  and  what 
is  to  be  done  in  regard  to  this. 

The  coast  and  Gap  movements  made,  Generals  Mc- 
Clellan  and  Fremont,  in  their  respective  departments, 
will  avail  themselves  of  any  advantages  the  diversions 
may  present. 

General  Anderson  was  in  poor  health,  and,  in 
view  of  the  grave  responsibility  thrust  upon  him 
of  repelling  the  Confederate  advance  through 
Kentucky,  he  resigned  his  position  on  October  8. 
General  Sherman  was  appointed  to  succeed  him. 

From  the  beginning  Sherman  had  prophesied 
that  the  war  would  be  a  long  and  bitter  conflict, 
and  had  received  the  sobriquet  of  "  Crazy  Billy  " 
because  of  this  prediction.  On  assuming  com- 
mand, he  at  once  began  to  urge  upon  the  Gov- 
ernor the  necessity  of  supplying  troops  to  his 
command.  About  the  middle  of  October,  Secre- 
tary Cameron,  returning  from  his  visit  to  Fre- 
mont, stopped  at  Louisville  to  see  Sherman. 

President  Lincoln,  with  his  great  political 
genius  and  warm  sympathy  for  the  Southern 
Unionists,  had  his  mind  and  heart  set  upon  re- 
lieving the  loyalists  of  East  Tennessee,  so  sorely 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  197 

oppressed  by  the  Confederate  Government. 
Knowing  the  desire  of  his  chief,  Secretary  Cam- 
eron urged  upon  General  Sherman  that  Cumber- 
land Gap  should  be  occupied  and  the  East  Ten- 
nessee and  Virginia  railroad  be  seized,  thus  cut- 
ting off  "  the  artery  that  supplied  the  rebellion." 
General  Thomas  had  already  expressed  his  will- 
ingness to  undertake  this  movement  if  four  regi- 
ments were  supplied  him.  The  Government, 
however,  had  picked  upon  General  Ormsby  M. 
Mitchel  for  the  duty,  whereat  General  Thomas 
was  offended  and  asked  to  be  relieved.  Sherman, 
however,  now  superior  to  both  Thomas  and 
Mitchel,  persuaded  Thomas  to  remain  in  his  com- 
mand, intimating  that  he  would  be  his  choice  for 
the  task  when  the  time  came  to  execute  it. 

But  Sherman  was  not  ready  to  take  the  of- 
fensive with  his  scant  forces,  and  he  directed 
Thomas  merely  to  hold  Zollicoffer  in  check.  He 
himself  grew  despondent  because  of  the  failure 
of  the  Government  to  increase  his  forces,  which 
"  were  too  small  to  do  good,  and  too  large  to 
sacrifice,"  and  so,  on  November  6,  he  asked 
that  his  command  be  transferred  to  some  one  of 
"  more  sanguine  mind,"  since  he  was  "  forced  to 
order  according  to  his  convictions." 

Accordingly,  on  November  9,  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Ohio  was  formed  out  of  Sherman's 
forces,  and  General  Don  Carlos  Buell,  a  per- 
sonal friend  of  McClellan,  now  General-in-Chief, 
was  placed  in  command,  with  McClellan's  par- 
ticular injunctions  to  capture  East  Tennessee, 
and,  if  possible,  Nashville.  By  Lincoln's  special 
request  Sherman  was  retained  in  the  Louisville, 
command. 

Grant  had  not  yet  made  good  soldiers  out  of 


198  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

his  troops,  as  was  shown  in  the  battle  of  Bel- 
mont.  Belmont  was  a  steamboat  landing  on 
the  Missouri  shore  opposite  Columbus,  and  here 
the  Confederates  had  established  an  encampment. 
Against  this  Grant  led  an  expedition  on  Novem- 
ber 6  and  7,  capturing  the  fortified  camp  after 
a  closely  contested  engagement.  But  his  troops 
gave  themselves  up  to  disorderly  rejoicing,  and 
thereby  offered  the  Confederate  General  Polk 
an  opportunity  to  retrieve  his  defeat  by  throw- 
ing reinforcements  across  the  river  and  driv- 
ing the  victors  from  the  field  in  confusion. 

The  movement  urged  by  President  Lincoln 
for  the  capture  of  East  Tennessee,  or,  rather,  for 
the  relief  of  the  oppressed  loyalists  there,  was 
shelved  by  Buell,  who  had  been  appointed  for  the 
express  purpose  of  executing  it,  in  favor  of  a 
movement  along  the  more  direct  and  less  ar- 
duous route  through  Bowling  Green  against 
Nashville,  which,  in  view  of  his  small  force, 
seemed  much  more  feasible  to  him;  for  having 
an  essentially  military  mind,  he  could  not  appre- 
ciate the  political  importance  of  the  relief  of  the 
Tennessee  loyalists  that  loomed  so  large  in  Lin- 
coln's eyes  as  a  means  of  dividing  the  South  not 
only  into  separate,  disconnected  geographical 
sections,  but  also  into  parties  of  opposing  po- 
litical sentiment.  Lincoln  believed  that  if  the 
Tennessee  loyalists  were  supported  the  suppressed 
Union  sentiment  would  be  encouraged  to  revive 
throughout  the  entire  South,  and  lead  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  secessionists. 

In  spite  of  Lincoln's  instructions,  and  a  tele- 
gram from  McClellan,  who  heartily  supported 
the  President  in  his  plan,  and  a  pleading  message 
from  Andrew  Johnson  and  Horace  Maynard  that 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  199 

he  move  to  the  relief  of  their  fellow  Tennesseean 
loyalists,  "  oppressed  and  pursued  as  beasts  of 
the  forest,"  Buell  kept  on  concentrating  troops  at 
Louisville,  though  he  returned  assuring,  but 
evasive,  answers  to  Washington.  Finally,  on 
January  4,  1862,  Lincoln  sent  a  direct  inquiry: 
"  Have  arms  gone  forward  for  East  Tennessee  ?  " 
In  reply  Buell,  for  the  first  time,  revealed  his  in- 
tentions, which  were  to  do  nothing  that  "  should 
render  at  all  doubtful  the  success  of  a  movement 
against  the  great  power  of  the  rebellion  in  the 
West,  which  is  mainly  arrayed  on  the  line  from 
Columbus  to  Bowling  Green,  and  can  speedily 
be  concentrated  at  any  point  of  that  line  which 
is  attacked  singly." 

To  this  cool  confession  Lincoln  replied  on 
January  6,  with  great  forbearance: 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  has  been  received,  and  it 
disappoints  and  distresses  me.  I  have  shown  it  to  Gen- 
eral McClellan,  who  says  he  will  write  you  to-day.  I 
am  not  competent  to  criticise  your  views,  and  there- 
fore what  I  offer  is  in  justification  of  myself.  Of  the 
two,  I  would  rather  have  a  point  on  the  railroad  south 
of  Cumberland  Gap  than  Nashville.  First,  because  it 
cuts  a  great  artery  of  the  enemy's  communication,  which 
Nashville  does  not ;  and  secondly,  because  it  is  in  the 
midst  of  loyal  people,  who  would  rally  around  it,  while 
Nashville  is  not.  Again,  I  cannot  see  why  the  move- 
ment on  East  Tennessee  would  not  be  a  diversion  in 
your  favor,  rather  than  a  disadvantage,  assuming  that 
a  movement  towards  Nashville  is  the  main  object.  But 
my  distress  is  that  our  friends  in  East  Tennessee  are 
being  hanged  and  driven  to  despair,  and  even  now,  I 
fear,  are  thinking  of  taking  rebel  arms  for  the  sake 
of  personal  protection.  In  this  we  lose  the  most  val- 
uable stake  we  have  in  the  South.  My  dispatch,  to 
which  yours  is  an  answer,  was  sent  with  the  knowl- 
edge of  Senator  Johnson  and  Representative  Maynard 
of  East  Tennessee,  and  they  will  be  upon  me  to  know 


200  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  answer,  which  I  cannot  safely  show  them.  They 
would  despair,  possibly  resign  to  go  and  save  their  fam- 
ilies somehow,  or  die  with  them.  I  do  not  intend  this 
to  be  an  order  in  any  sense,  but  merely,  as  intimated 
before,  to  show  you  the  grounds  of  my  anxiety. 

General  McClellan  heartily  indorsed  the  move- 
ment against  East  Tennessee,  since  this  would 
undoubtedly  divert,  for  defense  of  that  region, 
Confederate  troops  from  reen  forcing  the  army 
which  opposed  him,  and  whose  numbers  he  so 
greatly  magnified.  He  was  sick  at  the  time,  and, 
possibly  embittered  by  his  illness,  he  wrote  Gen- 
eral Buell  a  letter  which,  while  polite  in  phrase, 
was  stinging  in  its  censure.  He  told  his  sub- 
ordinate that  he  had  deceived  him  and  disar- 
ranged his  plans.  His  letter  closed  with  a  cut- 
ting inference  that  Buell  was  consulting  his  own 
ambition  rather  than  furthering  the  plans  of  his 
chief  and  the  highest  good  of  the  nation. 

Interesting  as  Nashville  may  be  to  the  Louisville 
interests,  it  strikes  me  that  its  possession  is  of  very 
secondary  importance  in  comparison  with  the  immense 
results  that  would  arise  from  the  adherence  to  our 
cause  of  the  masses  in  East  Tennessee,  West  North 
Carolina,  North  Georgia,  and  Alabama ;  results  that 
I  feel  assured  would  ere  long  flow  from  the  movement 
I  allude  to. 

Nevertheless  Buell  adhered  to  his  plans,  which 
he  thought  too  far  advanced  to  be  relinquished. 
General  Halleck,  who  had  been  asked  by  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  to  cooperate  with  General  Buell  by 
attacking  Columbus,  in  reply  on  January  9,  ex- 
pressed his  disapproval  of  the  movement 
against  Bowling  Green  as  inviting  a  disaster 
similar  to  Bull  Run.  He  said :  "  To  operate  on 
exterior  lines  against  an  enemy  occupying  a  cen- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  201 

tral  position  will  fail,  as  it  always  has  failed, 
ninety-nine  cases  out  of  a  hundred." 

Upon  this  letter  Lincoln  wrote  on  January  10 
the  heart-sick  indorsement :  "  It  is  exceedingly 
discouraging.  As  everywhere  else  nothing  can 
be  done." 

Realizing  that  the  War  Department  required 
thorough  reorganization,  the  President  next  day 
procured  the  resignation  of  Simon-  Cameron, 
Secretary  of  War,  by  appointing  him  Minister  to 
Russia,  replacing  him  in  the  War  Department  t>y 
Edwin  M.  Stanton. 

For  three  days  after  Lincoln  wrote  his  melan- 
choly indorsement  upon  Halleck's  letter,  he 
cogitated  upon  the  parallel  that  general  had 
drawn  between  the  cases  of  Bull  Run  (Manas- 
sas)  and  Bowling  Green.  On  the  I3th  he  wrote 
to  both  Buell  and  Halleck  a  letter,  in  which  he 
said: 

I  state  my  general  idea  of  this  war  to  be  that  we 
have  the  greater  numbers,  and  the  enemy  has  the  greater 
facility  of  concentrating  forces  upon  points  of  collision ; 
that  we  must  fail  unless  we  can  find  some  way  of  mak- 
ing our  advantage  an  overmatch  for  his ;  and  that  this 
can  only  be  done  by  menacing  him  with  superior  forces 
at  different  points  at  the  same  time,  so  that  we  can 
safely  attack  one  or  both  if  he  makes  no  change ;  and 
if  he  weakens  one  to  strengthen  the  other,  forbear 
to  attack  the  strengthened  one,  but  seize  and  hold  the 
weakened  one,  gaining  so  much.  To  illustrate.  Sup- 
pose, last  summer,  when  Winchester  ran  away  to  re- 
enforce  Manassas,  we  had  forborne  to  attack  Manassas, 
but  had  seized  and  held  Winchester.  .  .  .  Applying  the 
principle  to  your  case,  my  idea  is  that  Halleck  shall 
menace  Columbus  and  "  down  river "  generally,  while 
you  menace  Bowling  Green  and  East  Tennessee.  If 
the  enemy  shall  concentrate  at  Bowling  Green,  do  not 
retire  from  his  front,  yet  do  not  fight  him  there  either, 
but  seize  Columbus  and  East  Tennessee,  one  or  both, 


202  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

left  exposed  by  the  concentration  at  Bowling  Green. 
It  is  a  matter  of  no  small  anxiety  to  me,  and  one  which 
I  am  sure  you  will  not  overlook,  that  the  East  Ten- 
nessee line  is  so  long  and  over  so  bad  a  road. 

In  the  meantime  General  Halleck  had  decided 
to  meet  the  President's  wishes  in  part,  and,  on 
the  same  day  that  he  wrote  his  discouraging  let- 
ter to  the  President,  had  ordered  General  Grant 
and  Flag-Officer  Foote  to  make  a  combined  mili- 
tary and  naval  demonstration  to  the  south  of  Pa- 
ducah,  which  should  lead  the  enemy  to  suppose 
an  attack  was  to  be  made  on  Fort  Donelson  at 
Dover,  Tenn.,  on  the  Cumberland  River.  This 
reconnaissance,  made  during  the  following  week, 
discovered  the  weakness  of  Fort  Henry,  on  the 
Tennessee  River,  parallel  with  Fort  Donelson. 

General  Buell  had  also  responded  to  the  prod- 
dings  from  Washington  so  far  as  to  order  Gen- 
eral Thomas  to  attack  General  Zollicoffer  at  his 
fortified  camp  at  Mill  Springs  on  the  Cumber- 
land River,  whither  Zollicoffer  had  advanced 
from  Cumberland  Gap.  Here,  on  January  19, 
with  six  regiments  Thomas  defeated  ten  of  the 
enemy's.  General  Zollicoffer  was  killed,  and,  de- 
moralized by  the  death  of  their  leader,  the  Con- 
federates dispersed  among  the  mountains,  leaving 
Cumberland  Gap  open  for  entrance  into  East 
Tennessee.  Had  not  Grant  already  shown  the 
way  by  which  Western  Tennessee  could  be  cap- 
tured, Buell  would  undoubtedly  have  invaded  the 
State  by  this  eastern  door. 

Grant,  the  man  of  action,  by  repeated  urging, 
had  secured  an  order  from  Halleck  to  attack 
Fort  Henry.  Taking  15,000  men  on  trans- 
ports, and  accompanied  by  Foote  with  seven 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  203 

gunboats,  he  steamed  up  the  Tennessee  River, 
landing  four  miles  below  the  fort  on  February 
4.  He  captured  it  easily  on  the  5th,  since  Gen- 
eral Lloyd  Tilghman,  its  commander,  convinced 
that  it  would  fall,  had  sent  all  his  forces  but  one 
artillery  company  on  to  Fort  Donelson.  Grant 
telegraphed  to  his  chief,  "  Fort  Henry  is  ours.  I 
shall  take  and  destroy  Fort  Donelson  on  the 
8th." 

The  Confederate  general,  Albert  Sidney  John- 
ston, at  once  fell  back  from  Bowling  Green, 
sending  8,000  men  under  Generals  Buckner  and 
Floyd  to  Fort  Donelson  (alsoreenforced  by  4,000 
under  Pillow  from  Columbus),  and  14,000  men 
under  Hardee  to  the  defense  of  Nashville.  Ris- 
ing waters  delayed  the  plans  of  Grant  a  week.  In 
the  meantime  President  Lincoln  threw  his  whole 
soul  into  encouragement  of  the  enterprise,  as  his 
telegram  to  Halleck  on  the  i6th  gives  evidence. 


You  have  Fort  Donelson  safe,  unless  Grant  shall  be 
overwhelmed  from  outside ;  to  prevent  which  latter  will, 
I  think,  require  all  the  vigilance,  energy,  and  skill  of 
yourself  and  Buell,  acting  in  full  cooperation.  Colum- 
bus will  not  get  at  Grant,  but  the  force  from  Bowling 
Green  will.  They  hold  the  railroad  from  Bowling 
Green  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort  Donelson,  with 
the  bridge  at  Clarksville  undisturbed.  It  is  unsafe  to 
rely  that  they  will  not  dare  to  expose  Nashville  to- 
Buell.  A  small  part  of  their  force  can  retire  slowly 
towards  Nashville,  breaking  up  the  railroad  as  they 
go,  and  keep  Buell  out  of  that  city  twenty  days.  Mean- 
time Nashville  will  be  abundantly  defended  by  forces 
from  all  South  and  perhaps  from  here  at  Manassas. 
Could  not  a  cavalry  force  from  General  Thomas  on  the 
Upper  Cumberland  dash  across  almost  unresisted,  and 
cut  the  railroad  at  or  near  Knoxville,  Tenn.  ?  In 
the  midst  of  a  bombardment  at  Fort  Donelson,  why 
could  not  a  gunboat  run  up  and  destroy  the  bridge 


204  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

at  Clarksville?  Our  success  or  failure  at  Fort  Donel- 
son  is  vastly  important,  and  I  beg  you  to  put  your 
soul  in  the  effort.  I  send  a  copy  of  this  to  Buell. 

Even  while  this  telegram  was  in  transmission 
Buckner  was  proposing  to  Grant  an  armistice  to 
arrange  terms  of  capitulation,  to  which  Grant 
replied :  "  No  terms  except  unconditional  and  im- 
mediate surrender  can  be  accepted.  I  propose 
to  move  immediately  upon  your  works." 

To  these  "  ungenerous  and  unchivalric  terms." 
as  Buckner  characterized  them,  the  Confed- 
erate general  felt  himself  compelled  to  yield, 
and  thereupon  he  surrendered.  That  same  day 
Grant  telegraphed  to  Halleck :  "  We  have  taken 
Fort  Donelson  and  from  12,000  to  15,000  prison- 
ers, including  Generals  Buckner  and  Bushrod  R. 
Johnson ;  also  about  20,000  stands  of  arms,  48 
pieces  of  artillery,  17  heavy  guns,  from  2,000  to 
4,000  horses  and  large  quantities  of  commissary 
stores." 

Because  of  this  sweeping  victory  the  whole 
country  rang  with  Grant's  praises  and,  recog- 
nizing in  him  the  uncompromising  spirit  destined 
to  end  the  war,  it  dubbed  him  from  the  striking 
phrase  in  his  reply  to  Buckner — which  by  happy 
chance  bore  the  initials  of  his  Christian  names — 
"  Unconditional  Surrender  Grant." 

General  Halleck  lost  no  time  in  attempting  to 
secure  honor  and  an  increase  of  power  for  him- 
self out  of  the  victory  of  his  subordinate.  On 
February  17  he  telegraphed  to  General  McClellan: 

Make  Buell,  Grant,  and  Pope  major-generals  of 
volunteers,  and  give  me  command  in  the  West.  I  ask 
this  in  return  for  Fort  Henry  and  Donelson. 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  205 

On  the  next  day  Halleck  sent  a  frantic  mes- 
sage to  Buell,  in  which  he  said  : 

To  remove  all  question  as  to  rank  I  have  asked  the 
President  to  make  you  a  major-general.  Come  down 
to  the  Cumberland  and  take  command.  The  battle  of 
the  West  is  to  be  fought  in  that  vicinity.  .  .  .  Throw 
all  your  troops  in  the  direction  of  the  Cumberland. 

It  was  Halleck's  intention  to  have  Buell  move 
up  the  Cumberland,  while  Grant  acted  on  the 
Tennessee,  with  himself  in  command  of  both 
movements.  This  command  he  demanded  of  Mc- 
Clellan  in  telegrams  on  the  iQth  and  2Oth.  Mc- 
Clellan  answered,  temporizing  until  he  should 
hear  from  Buell.  Secretary  Stanton,  on  behalf 
of  the  President,  who  was  at  the  bedside  of  his 
dying  son,  William  Wallace  Lincoln,  telegraphed 
to  Halleck  on  the  22d  that  the  President  did  not 
think  any  change  in  military  organization  ad- 
visable, and  desired  Halleck  and  Buell  to  coop- 
erate as  equals. 

Meantime  General  Grant  and  Flag-Officer 
Foote,  unconcerned  by  this  contest  for  honors, 
had  occupied  Clarksville.  Buell  hurried  forward 
a  division  of  his  troops  under  Major-General 
William  Nelson,  and  by  Grant's  orders  these  oc- 
cupied Nashville  on  the  25th.  On  May  i  Halleck 
ordered  Grant  to  proceed  farther  into  Tennessee 
upon  a  railroad-destroying  and  telegraph-cutting 
expedition.  Owing  to  rising  waters,  Grant  did 
not  at  once  obey  the  order ;  he  also  failed  to  re- 
port to  Halleck.  His  chief  reported  to  Wash- 
ington that  Grant  had  become  insubordinate, 
probably  because  of  a  sense  of  importance  he  had 
acquired  from  the  popular  acclaim  of  his  capture 
of  Fort  Donelson.  McClellan,  with  Stanton's 


206  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

approval,  answered :  "  Do  not  hesitate  to  arrest 
him  at  once,  if  the  service  requires  it,  and  place 
C.  F.  Smith  [who  led  the  second  division  at  the 
storming  of  Fort  Donelson]  in  command." 
Halleck  at  once  ordered  Grant  to  remain  at  Fort 
Henry,  and  he  gave  the  command  of  the  pro- 
posed expedition  into  Tennessee  to  Smith.  Grant, 
giving  an  explanation  of  his  seeming  insubor- 
dination, obeyed.  Later,  he  asked  to  be  relieved 
from  duty;  not  only  did  Halleck  refuse  this  re- 
quest, but,  because  convinced  that  Grant  had 
been  guilty  of  only  a  technical  violation  of  mili- 
tary discipline,  he  reinstated  him  in  his  old  com- 
mand on  March  13. 

While  Grant  was  justifying  Halleck's  objec- 
tion to  a  frontal  attack  on  Johnston  at  Bowling 
Green  by  cutting  in  behind,  Brigadier-General 
Samuel  R.  Curtis,  another  subordinate  of  the 
commander  of  the  Western  Department,  had 
rendered  the  Confederate  general  Price's  posi- 
tion at  Springfield,  Mo.,  untenable,  and  caused 
him  to  retreat  fighting  into  Arkansas.  On 
February  18,  in  announcing  the  victory  of  Fort 
Donelson  to  his  troops,  General  Curtis  congratu- 
lated them  on  their  own  heroic  achievement  : 

You  have  moved  in  the  most  inclement  weather,  over 
the  worst  of  roads,  making  extraordinary  long  marches, 
subsisting  mainly  on  meat  without  salt,  and  for  the 
past  six  days  you  have  been  under  the  fire  of  the 
fleeing  enemy.  You  have  driven  him  out  of  Missouri, 
restored  the  Union  flag  to  the  virgin  soil  of  Arkansas, 
and  triumphed  in  two  contests. 

The  Confederate  commander  of  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  district  south  of  Price's,  Major-Gen- 
eral Earl  Van  Dorn,  marching  north,  joined 
Price  and  McCulloch's  detachments  and,  assum- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  207 

ing  command  of  the  combined  forces,  attacked 
Curtis  on  March  6  at  Pea  Ridge,  Ark.,  and 
flanked  him  during  the  night.  Curtis  re-formed 
his  line  and  resisted  the  Confederate  attack 
throughout  the  next  day,  killing  General  McCul- 
loch  and  other  Confederate  officers.  On  the  8th 
Curtis  took  the  offensive  and  so  completely 
routed  the  enemy  that  their  scattered  portions 
were  never  again  united. 

Upon  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  the  Con- 
federates occupied  and  fortified  Island  No.  10  in, 
a  bend  in  the  Mississippi  River,  on  the  line  be- 
tween Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  New 
Madrid,  Mo.,  a  few  miles  to  the  north  and 
down  the  river.  Halleck  sent  General  Pope 
against  New  Madrid,  who,  on  March  3,  cut  off 
the  enemy's  reinforcements  and  supplies  by 
erecting  batteries  on  the  river  below.  On  the 
I3th  the  Confederates  evacuated  the  town,  going 
up  the  river  to  Island  No.  10.  Thereupon  Flag- 
Officer  Foote  was  summoned  from  Cairo  with 
nine  gunboats  to  reduce  the  place.  Two  of  his 
vessels  ran  safely  by  the  enemy's  batteries  at 
night  to  act  as  protection  in  transporting  Pope's 
soldiers  to  the  Tennessee  shore,  where  Island  No. 
10  might  be  attacked.  To  serve  as  transports 
four  steamboats  and  six  coal  barges  were 
brought  to  New  Madrid  with  great  engineering 
skill,  partly  by  bayou  and  partly  overland, 
across  the  chord  of  the  arc  of  the  river  in  which 
the  island  lies. 

The  Confederates  did  not  wait  to  be  attacked, 
but  on  April  7  began  a  retreat  southward 
through  Tennessee,  leaving  a  small  garrison  to 
surrender  to  Foote.  Pope  intercepted  the  fugi- 
tives, and  took  6,000  prisoners. 


2o8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

The  railroad-wrecking  expedition  under  Gen- 
eral C.  F.  Smith  had  established  a  base  for  its 
operations  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  within  striking 
distance  of  Corinth,  Miss.,  an  important  rail- 
road town.  Grant,  resuming  his  command  on 
March  15,  assembled  five  divisions  of  his  forces 
at  this  point.  By  March  23  Generals  Beauregard 
and  A.  S.  Johnston  had  united  their  armies  at 
Corinth.  On  Saturday,  April  5,  they  stole  a 
march  on  Grant,  encamping  that  night  two  miles 
from  Pittsburg  Landing.  At  five  o'clock  next 
morning  they  began  the  attack  by  driving  in  the 
Federal  pickets.  Although  taken  by  surprise, 
the  nearest  Federal  division  under  Generals 
Sherman  and  B.  M.  Prentiss  quickly  formed  in 
battle  near  Shiloh  Church  and  stubbornly  op- 
posed the  Confederate  advance.  But,  although 
reenforced  by  the  other  divisions ,  they  were 
slowly  pressed  backward  upon  the  left  and 
right,  the  center  under  Prentiss,  reenforced  by 
General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  division,  standing 
firm  by  Grant's  orders.  The  battle  continued  all 
day,  and,  by  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the 
Union  center,  commanded  by  Prentiss  alone — for 
Wallace  had  been  mortally  wounded — was  cap- 
tured. But  the  Confederate  troops  were  some- 
what demoralized  by  the  loss  of  General  John- 
ston, who  had  been  killed  two  hours  before,  and, 
worn  out  by  the  gallant  resistance  of  the  center, 
which  they  called  "  the  Hornet's  Nest."  they 
hesitated  to  press  on  in  their  course.  This  was 
against  the  Federal  left,  which  had  fallen  back 
to  the  river,  where  it  was  protected  by  a  line  of 
artillery  on  a  crest  at  right  angles  to  the  river, 
and  by  the  gunboats  which  commanded  the  hoi- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  209 

lo\v  between  the  armies.  The  Federal  line 
shortened  the  right,  closing  up  the  central  gap. 
Its  position  was  stronger  than  before,  and,  since 
the  forces  were  fairly  equal,  40,000  attacking 
Confederates  to  33,000  defending  Federals,  and 
the  losses  were  the  same,  about  10,000  on  each 
side,  Beauregard,  now  in  sole  command  of  the 
Confederates,  realized  that  he  would  have  a  still 
harder  contest  on  the  morrow  if  he  would  drive 
the  Federals  into  the  river. 

Grant  had  been  absent  on  Saturday  at  Savan- 
nah, nine  miles  down  the  river  on  the  eastern 
bank,  awaiting  reinforcements  from  Buell,  which 
arrived  on  that  day.  He  landed  at  the  battle- 
field early  Sunday  morning,  April  6.  Grasping 
the  situation  he  summoned  to  his  aid  his  sixth 
division  under  General  Lew.  Wallace,  stationed 
at  Crump's  Landing  six  miles  down  the  river  on 
the  western  bank,  and  Buell's  forces  at  Savan- 
nah. The  arrival  of  these  at  nightfall  and  on  the 
next  morning  swelled  the  effective  Federal 
forces  to  nearly  50,000  men,  and  justified  Buell 
and  Grant  taking  the  offensive  in  the  morning. 
This  they  did,  driving  back  the  disheartened  and 
demoralized  Confederates  to  Corinth. 

While  the  Federal  army  was  forcing  its  way 
down  the  Mississippi,  the  Federal  navy  was 
coming  up  the  river  from  its  mouth  in  a  progress 
of  even  more  glorious  conquest.  In  September, 
1861,  Ship  Island,  midway  between  Mobile  and 
New  Orleans,  had  been  occupied  by  the  Federal 
Government,  and,  on  November  15,  a  council, 
consisting  of  the  President,  General  McClellan, 
Secretary  Welles,  his  assistant  secretary,  Fox, 
and  Commander  David  D.  Porter,  determined 
upon  an  expedition  from  Ship  Island  as  a  base 


2  TO  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

against  New  Orleans.  The  expedition  was 
placed  in  command  of  Captain  David  G.  Far- 
ragut,  a  Southerner,  who  had  proved  his  loyalty 
to  the  Government  he  had  served  for  almost  half 
a  century  by  leaving  his  home  at  Norfolk  and 
coming  North  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Early  in  February  Farragut  sailed  from 
Hampton  Roads  for  Ship  Island  in  the  steam- 
sloop  Hartford,  which  he  made  his  flagship.  After 
him  followed  Porter  with  a  mortar  flotilla,  and 
General  Butler  with  6,000  soldiers.  On  April  18 
Porter's  flotilla  appeared  before  Forts  Jackson 
and  St.  Philip,  the  defenses  of  New  Orleans  on 
either  side  of  the  river  below  the  city.  For  five 
days  Porter  bombarded  these  forts,  especially 
Fort  Jackson,  furiously.  Upon  the  fifth  Farra- 
gut sent  in  his  ships,  two  gunboats  having  previ- 
ously cut  away  by  night  a  barrier  of  rafts  and 
hulks  stretched  across  the  river.  He  ran  the 
gauntlet  in  two  divisions  of  respectively  eight 
and  nine  ships,  pouring  in  broadsides  upon  the 
forts  as  they  passed  them  and  receiving  a  hail  of 
metal  in  return,  by  which  all  the  ships  were  more 
or  less  riddled.  Three  of  the  gunboats  were  so 
injured  that  they  returned  to  the  mortar  flotilla. 

The  Hartford  was  set  burning  by  a  fire-raft, 
but  the  flames  were  quickly  extinguished. 
Beyond  the  forts  the  fleet  encountered  the  Con- 
federate gunboat  flotilla,  including  an  ineffective 
ram  called  the  Manassas,  and  destroyed  them  all. 

The  few  Confederate  forces  in  New  Orleans 
destroyed  their  war  material  and  evacuated  the 
city  before  Farragut  arrived,  on  April  25.  For 
several  days  the  Mayor  of  the  city  temporized 
about  surrendering  it.  During  this  period  a 
Union  flag,  that  had  been  hoisted  over  the  Mint 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  211 

by  Farragut's  order,  was  hauled  down  and 
trampled  upon  by  citizens,  one  of  whom  was 
hanged  by  General  Butler  some  weeks  later  for 
the  act.  Finally  Farragut  sent  marines,  who  re- 
placed the  Rebel  flags  on  the  public  buildings 
with  Union  ones  and  took  forcible  possession  of 
the  city. 

Already,  on  the  28th,  Fort  Jackson,  in  which 
there  was  a  mutiny,  and  Fort  St.  Philip  capitu- 
lated, leaving  the  way  clear  for  Butler's  troops  to 
enter  the  city.  On  May  i  Farragut  turned  its 
possession  over  to  him.  Of  Butler's  strong  and 
effective  military  administration  of  New  Orleans, 
in  which  he  fed  the  hungry  of  the  city,  cleaned 
its  streets,  prevented  the  entrance  of  yellow 
fever,  and  sternly  punished  and  repressed  insult 
to  his  Government  as  represented  by  the  Union 
flag  and  the  persons  of  Union  soldiers,  there  is 
not  space  here  to  tell  in  detail,  or  to  present  a 
justification.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Lincoln 
heartily  approved  of  this  administration.  On  De- 
cember 12,  1862,  the  President  sent  a  message  to 
Congress  with  a  present  of  three  swords, 
formerly  the  property  of  General  David  E. 
Twiggs  of  Mexican  War  fame,  which  had  been 
forwarded  to  him  by  General  Butler,  and  recom- 
mended that,  if  Congress  should  dispose  of  them 
in  compliment  of  military  service,  General  Butler 
be  entitled  to  the  first  consideration.  This  recom- 
mendation was,  of  course,  adopted. 

Farragut  proceeded  up  the  Mississippi  and,  by 
May  20,  when  he  arrived  before  Vicksburg,  he 
had  captured  all  the  important  places  on  the 
river  between  New  Orleans  and  that  city.  It 
was  evident  that  the  Confederates  designed  to 
concentrate  all  their  available  strength  to  hold 


212  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Vicksburg,  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the  West."  To- 
ward it  Beauregard  fell  back  with  his  50,000  men 
from  Corinth  on  May  29,  when  Halleck,  who  as- 
sumed command  of  the  Federal  forces  after  the 
battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  had  made  Corinth 
untenable  by  a  careful  and  leisurely  siege.  On 
June  6  the  Federal  gunboats  engaged  in  a  spec- 
tacular contest  with  the  Confederate  flotilla  be- 
fore Memphis,  and  won  a  signal  victory,  sink- 
ing four  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  and  pursuing 
and  capturing  three  of  the  four  that  remained. 
The  Confederate  strength  in  the  West  was  now 
confined  and  concentrated  in  central  Mississippi. 
Halleck's  departure  to  Washington,  to  become 
General-in-Chief  of  the  Union  armies,  left  two 
generals  in  command  of  the  Western  armies  at 
the  front,  Grant  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Buell  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland.  Grant  held  his  line  from  Mem- 
phis to  Corinth,  but  because  of  the  scantiness  of 
his  forces,  detachments  having  been  sent  to 
strengthen  Buell,  and  the  new  levies  going  all  to 
McClellan,  was  unable  to  take  the  offensive. 
This  the  enemy  did  about  the  middle  of  Septem- 
ber, General  Price  attacking  and  capturing  luka, 
twenty  miles  southeast  of  Corinth,  in  a  move- 
ment designed  to  join  his  forces  with  Van 
Dorn's,  near  Ripley,  thirty  miles  southwest  of 
Corinth.  Grant  sent  Generals  Rosecrans  and  E. 
O.  C.  Ord  to  recapture  the  town  and  prevent  the 
junction  of  the  Confederate  forces.  Owing  to 
lack  of  concert  between  the  Union  detachments, 
Rosecrans  bore  the  brunt  of  the  battle  alone,  and, 
on  September  19  was  repulsed,  the  enemy  suc- 
cessfully withdrawing  to  Ripley.  Van  Dorn  took 
command  of  the  united  forces,  and,  on  October 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  213 

3,  attacked  Corinth,  intending  to  break  his  way 
through  the  Union  line  at  this  point  to  join  Gen- 
eral Braxton  Bragg  in  Kentucky.  Rosecrans,  in 
command  of  Corinth,  beat  the  enemy  back,  and 
Ord,  coming  to  Rosecrans'  aid  from  Bolivar, 
Tenn.,  hastened  Van  Dorn's  retreat.  General 
Rosecrans  was  promoted  to  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  for  his  victory,  re- 
placing Buell,  whose  delay  in  going  to  the  aid  of 
the  loyal  East  Tennesseeans  had  lost  him  the  con- 
fidence of  the  President. 

General  Buell  had  spent  a  large  portion  of  the 
summer  in  preparing  to  attack  Chattanooga,  the 
gateway  from  the  South  into  East  Tennessee. 
It  was  the  enemy,  however,  that  took  the  of- 
fensive. General  Braxton  Bragg,  in  charge  of 
the  forces  against  Buell,  late  in  August  sent 
General  Kirby  Smith  with  a  detachment  through 
Cumberland  Gap  into  eastern  Kentucky,  where, 
on  the  29th,  he  defeated  a  smaller  Union  force 
under  General  William  Nelson.  Marching  north- 
ward, he  occupied  Lexington  and  Frankfort,  the 
state  capital,  where  he  established  a  Confederate 
State  Government.  He  even  threatened  Cincin- 
nati, causing  a  hasty  muster  for  the  defense  of 
that  place  of  Ohio  farmers,  who  flocked  into  the 
city  with  their  shotguns  and  rifles,  from  which 
they  received  the  name  of  "  Squirrel-hunters." 

Bragg  set  out  for  Louisville  through  central 
Tennessee.  Buell,  believing  that  his  objective 
point  was  Nashville,  massed  his  forces  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  thirty-five  miles  to  the  southeast,  to 
intercept  him.  But  Bragg  slipped  by,  and  so 
secured  a  considerable  start  in  the  race  for  Louis- 
ville. However,  Bragg  lingered  on  the  way  to 
capture  a  Union  garrison  at  Munfordville,  Ky., 


214  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

thus  enabling  Buell  and  Thomas  to  overtake  him. 
Lacking  supplies,  Bragg  feared  to  risk  battle, 
and  turned  aside  from  the  road  to  Louisville  to 
Bardstown,  in  order  to  be  near  Kirby  Smith  at 
Lexington,  whom  he  had  furnished  with  extra 
supplies  and  equipment  for  the  Kentucky  volun- 
teers they  expected  to  enroll  —  an  anticipation 
which  utterly  failed  of  fulfilment. 

Arriving  at  Louisville,  General  Buell  found  an 
order  awaiting  him,  which  directed  him  to  turn 
over  his  command  to  General  Thomas.  Thomas 
earnestly  protested  to  the  Government  against 
the  order,  and  it  was  withdrawn.  Buell,  with 
Thomas  as  his  second  in  command,  then  ad- 
vanced against  the  enemy.  On  October  8  they 
came  upon  Bragg  at  Perryville,  near  Harrods- 
burg,  where  he  had  ordered  Smith  to  join  him 
with  his  forces.  Chiefly  by  the  gallantry  of 
Brigadier-General  Philip  H.  Sheridan  the  bat- 
tle was  won  for  the  Union  forces.  Following 
hard  after  the  retreating  enemy,  Buell  drove  him 
into  East  Tennessee,  where  he  desisted  from  pur- 
suit and  returned  to  Nashville.  For  his  failure 
to  follow  Bragg  the  President  severely  repri- 
manded him  in  a  telegram  sent  through  Halleck, 
on  the  i  th. 


The  capture  of  East  Tennessee  should  be  the  main 
object  of  your  campaign.  You  say  it  is  the  heart  of 
the  enemy's  resources  ;  majce  it  the  heart  of  yours. 
Your  army  can  live  there  if  the  enemy's  can.  You 
must  in  a  great  measure  live  upon  the  country,  paying 
for  your  supplies  Where  proper,  and  levying  contribu- 
tions where  necessary.  I  am  directed  by  the  President 
to  say  to  you  that  your  army  must  enter  East  Ten- 
nessee this  fall,  and  that  it  ought  to  move  there  while 
the  roads  are  passable.  Once  between  the  enemy  and 
Nashville,  there  will  be  no  serious  difficulty  in  reopen- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  215 

ing  your  communications  with  that  place.  He  does  not 
understand  why  we  cannot  march  as  the  enemy  marches, 
live  as  he  lives,  and  fight  as  he  fights,  unless  we  admit 
the  inferiority  of  our  troops  and  of  our  generals.  Once 
hold  the  valley  of  the  upper  Tennessee,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  guerrillas  in  that  State  and  Kentucky  will  soon 
cease. 

To  this  General  Buell  shrewdly  replied :  "  In- 
stead of  imitating  the  enemy's  plan  [cutting  loose 
from  communications  and  marching  with  in- 
sufficient supplies],  I  should  say  that  his  failure 
had  been  in  a  measure  due  to  his  peculiar  meth- 
od." Finding  Buell  incorrigible,  the  Government, 
on  October  24,  ordered  him  to  turn  over  his 
command  to  General  Rosecrans,  the  victor  of 
Corinth.  Rosecrans  began  to  accumulate  sup- 
plies at  Nashville,  as  if  to  go  into  winter  quar- 
ters. General  Bragg  thereupon  went  into  winter 
quarters  at  Murfreesboro,  about  thirty  miles 
southeast  of  Nashville,  on  the  road  to  Chat- 
tanooga, sending  half  of  his  cavalry,  the  one  arm 
of  service  in  which  he  was  greatly  superior  to 
Rosecrans,  some  against  Grant  and  some  to  Ken- 
tucky. Hearing  of  this,  Rosecrans  marched 
against  him,  arriving  before  Murfreesboro  on 
December  30.  Here  they  found  Bragg's  army 
intrenched  north  of  the  town  to  the  east  and 
west  of  a  stream  called  Stone  or  Stone's  River. 
Major-Generals  A.  McD.  McCook,  George  M. 
Thomas,  and  Thomas  L.  Crittenden  commanded 
respectively  the  right,  center,  and  left  of  the 
Federal  line.  These  were  opposed  respectively 
by  Lieutenant-General  William  J.  Hardee,  Lieu- 
tenant-General Leonidas  Polk,  and  Major-Gen- 
eral  John  C.  Breckinridge,  with  Major-General 
John  P.  McCown  commanding  the  reserves. 


2i6  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Rosecrans's  plan  of  battle  and  Bragg's  were 
identical :  Holding  firm  on  the  right  and  turning 
upon  the  center  as  a  pivot,  to  bend  back  and 
flank  the  enemy's  right,  thus  getting  to  his  rear 
and  on  the  road  to  his  headquarters.  Bragg  was 
more  successful  in  his  plan  at  the  beginning  than 
Rosecrans.  By  the  use  of  McCown's  reserves, 
he  overlapped  McCook  and  crushed  his  extreme 
right,  pressed  back  his  center,  but  was  held  by 
his  left  under  Sheridan.  Rosecrans  was  forced 
to  desist  from  his  attack  on  the  Confederate 
right  under  Breckinridge,  and,  holding  him  en- 
gaged sufficiently  to  prevent  him  reenforcing  the 
Confederate  left,  he  diverted  Thomas's  forces  to 
the  defense  of  the  Federal  right.  The  winter's 
day  came  to  a  close  with  the  lines  of  battle  at  right 
angles  to  those  of  the  morning.  Rosecrans  drew 
in  his  left  toward  the  center  during  the  night,  ob- 
serving which  on  the  morrow  Bragg  telegraphed 
to  Richmond  that  the  enemy  had  yielded  his 
strong  point  and  was  falling  back.  "  We  occupy 
the'  whole  field,  and  shall  follow.  .  .  .  God  has 
granted  us  a  happy  New  Year."  All  of  the  sec- 
ond day  Rosecrans  held  the  defensive  in  his  com- 
pact formation ;  then,  on  January  2,  he  sent 
Crittenden  forward  again  to  occupy  his  old  posi- 
tion. Breckinridge  assailed  him  impetuously, 
and  was  driven  back  in  rout,  losing  2,000  men  in 
forty  minutes.  On  the  3d  Crittenden  would 
have  captured  Murfreesboro  had  not  the  con- 
tinuing rain  made  the  ground  impassable  for 
artillery.  Bragg,  repulsed  in  his  attempt  to  turn 
the  Federal  right,  therefore  prepared  to  retreat, 
doing  so  at  midnight  of  the  3d.  Rosecrans  oc- 
cupied Murfreesboro  on  the  4th,  but  refrained 
from  pursuit  owing  to  the  heavy  condition  of  the 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  217 

roads.  Rosecrans  had  won  Kentucky  and  West- 
ern Tennessee  for  the  Union,  and  he  and  his 
troops  well  deserved  the  congratulations  sent  by 
the  President  on  the  5th :  "  Please  tender  to  all, 
and  accept  for  yourself,  the  nation's  gratitude  for 
your  and  their  skill,  endurance,  and  dauntless 
courage." 

Rosecrans  was  not  magnanimous  enough  to 
receive  this  praise  as  the  highest  reward  of 
service,  but  clamored  for  military  honors  at  the 
expense  of  his  fellow  generals,  in  particular, 
Grant,  whose  commission  as  major-general  of 
volunteers  ante-dated  his.  Rosecrans  asked  that 
his  commission  should  date  from  December, 
1861,  which  would  give  him  precedence  over  the 
captor  of  Fort  Donelson.  But  the  President,  dis- 
gusted with  his  mean  and  selfish  ambition,  put 
back  the  date  only  to  March  2,  1862,  and  wrote 
him  a  letter  in  which  he  said  : 

Now  as  to  your  request  that  your  commission  should 
date  from  December,  1861.  Of  course  you  expected 
to  gain  something  by  this ;  but  you  should  remember 
that  precisely  so  much  as  you  should  gain  by  it  others 
would  lose  by  it.  If  the  thing  you  sought  had  been 
exclusively  ours,  we  would  have  given  it  cheerfully; 
but,  being  the  right  of  other  men,  we  having  a  merely 
arbitrary  power  over  it,  the  taking  it  from  them  and 
giving  it  to  you  became  a  more  delicate  matter  and 
more  deserving  of  consideration.  Truth  to  speak,  I 
do  not  appreciate  this  matter  of  rank  on  paper  as  you 
officers  do.  The  world  will  not  forget  that  you  fought 
the  battle  of  Stone  River,  and  it  will  never  care  a  fig 
whether  you  rank  General  Grant  on  paper  or  he  so 
ranks  you. 

In  the  meantime  General  Grant  was  attending 
quietly  to  his  duty,  working  in  close  connection 
with  Halleck,  between  whom  and  himself  there 


3i8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

now  existed  the  utmost  harmony.  On  Novem- 
ber ii  the  General-in-Chief  telegraphed  him: 
"  You  have  command  of  all  troops  s-ent  to  your 
department,  and  have  permission  to  fight  the 
enemy  where  you  please."  Grant,  therefore,  set 
out  to  capture  Vicksburg,  which  was  under 
Lieutenant-General  John  C.  Pemberton,  with 
whom  the  Confederate  Government  had  replaced 
Van  Dorn  after  the  latter's  defeat  at  Corinth.  In 
the  course  of  a  month  Grant  extended  the  con- 
quest of  Mississippi  as  far  south  as  Grenada, 
causing  the  Confederate  Government  to  place 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  command  and 
against  him.  Grant  then  ordered  Sherman  to 
lead  a  cooperating  expedition  against  Vicks- 
burg by  the  Mississippi  River.  Sherman  started 
on  the  2Oth  of  December.  Then  the  superiority 
of  the  enemy  in  cavalry  made  itself  felt: 
Lieutenant-General  Nathan  B.  Forrest,  the  most 
brilliant  cavalry  leader  of  the  western  Confeder- 
ates, broke  Grant's  lines  of  communication  with 
the  North,  and  General  Van  Dorn,  in  a  similar 
cavalry  raid,  captured  on  December  20  his  sup- 
plies at  Holly  Springs,  thereby  effectually  check- 
ing Grant's  advance.  Sherman  arrived  at  Milli- 
ken's  Bend,  twenty  miles  above  Vicksburg,  on 
December  25.  Cut  off  from  communication  with 
his  chief,  he  was  ignorant  of  his  movements. 
Nevertheless,  after  two  days'  reconnaissance,  he 
ordered  General  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  and  Colonel 
John  F.  De  Courcey  to  charge  with  their  bri- 
gades upon  the  enemy's  strong  works  at  Chicka- 
saw  Bluffs,  several  miles  up  the  Yazoo  from  its 
mouth,  and  north  of  Vicksburg.  They  were 
beaten  back  with  the  loss  of  one  man  in  three. 
Sherman  retired  to  Milliken's  Bend,  where  he 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  219 

found  General  McQernand  waiting  with  orders 
from  Washington  through  Grant  to  supersede 
him.  Sherman,  smarting  under  the  degradation, 
asked  McClernand  for  a  chance  to  redeem  his  ill- 
fortune  by  attacking  an  important  fort  forty 
miles  up  the  Arkansas  River,  called  by  the  Con- 
federates Fort  Hindman,  and  by  the  Federals 
Arkansas  Post.  McClernand  thought  so  well  of 
the  proposition  that  he  led  the  expedition  him- 
self. With  the  aid  of  Porter's  flotilla  he  cap- 
tured the  fort  on  January  n,  1863. 

The  President  had  been  influenced  by  political 
considerations  to  give  the  command  to  McCler- 
nand, who  was  a  Democrat,  and  a  former  mem- 
ber of  Congress.  Grant  was  incensed  that  a 
civilian  soldier  had  been  forced  upon  him,  taking- 
the  place  of  his  favorite  subordinate,  Sherman,  a 
West  Pointer,  and  he  resented  the  success  of  Mc- 
Clernand in  a  manner  that  would  have  been 
harsh  even  if  the  expedition  had  ended  in  failure. 
McClernand  replied  with  natural  indignation,  in 
an  insolent  and  insubordinate  tone.  Halleck,  who- 
had  already  been  in  controversy  with  McCler- 
nand. gave  Grant  a  loose  rein  in  the  matter,  with 
the  result  that  McClernand  eventually  was  re- 
lieved from  the  command.  On  January  22  the 
President  wrote  a  conciliatory  and  at  the  same 
time  reproving  letter  to  the  man  whose  ambitions 
he  himself  had  unwisely  and  unadvisedly  at- 
tempted to  further. 

I  have  too  many  family  controversies,  so  to  speak, 
already  on  my  hands  to  voluntarily,  or  so  long  as  I 
can  avoid  it,  take  up  another.  You  are  now  doing- 
well — well  for  the  country  and  well  for  yourself — much 
better  than  you  could  possibly  be  if  engaged  in  open 
war  with  General  Halleck.  Allow  me  to  beg  that,  for 


220  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

your  sake,   for  my   sake,   and  for  the  country's   sake, 
you  give  your  whole  attention  to  the  better  work. 

Your  success  upon  the  Arkansas  was  both  brilliant 
and  valuable,  and  is  fully  appreciated  by  the  country 
and  government. 

It  was  on  the  29th  of  January,  1863,  that 
Grant  had  taken  personal  charge  of  the  opera- 
tions against  Vicksburg,  which  ended  in  the  cap- 
ture of  that  stronghold.  Upon  that  day  he  ar- 
rived at  Young's  Point,  the  headquarters  of  the 
Union  army  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi, 
opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  River.  His 
forces  were  50,000  soldiers,  and  a  fleet  of  gun- 
boats under  Admiral  Porter,  carrying  280  guns. 
The  problem  presented  was  to  reach  the  high 
grounds  behind  Vicksburg,  the  only  point  from 
which  the  place  could  be  successfully  reduced, 
To  gain  this  position  it  was  necessary  for  the 
troops  to  get  below  the  town  and  cross  over  to 
the  east  bank  of  the  river.  Grant  wasted  several 
months  in  constructing  a  canal  across  the  loop  of 
the  river,  which  bent  to  the  east  at  Vicksburg, 
and,  upon  the  failure  of  this  engineering  work 
owing  to  floods,  in  trying  to  divert  the  course  of 
the  river  itself  through  Lake  Providence  into  the 
Red  River,  an  enterprise  which  was  also  unsuc- 
cessful. Then  General  Grant  determined  to  take 
the  bull  by  the  horns  and  run  the  Vicksburg 
batteries  with  the  gunboats  and  transports, 
marching  his  forces  across  the  peninsula  on  the 
west  bank.  The  passage  of  the  batteries  was 
successfully  accomplished  on  the  night  of  April 
16.  Ordering  Sherman  to  make  a  feigned  at7 
tack  on  Raines's  Bluff  to  hold  Pemberton's  forces 
in  Vicksburg,  on  the  3Oth  of  the  month  Grant 
crossed  the  river  with  his  main  army,  and  on  the 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  221 

following  day  defeated  a  force  under  Brigadier- 
General  J.  S.  Bowen,  near  Port  Gibson.  On  May 
3  he  entered  Grand  Gulf,  which  had  been  evacu- 
ated by  the  enemy.  By  this  time  B.  H.  Grierson, 
whom  Grant  had  sent  through  Mississippi  upon 
a  destructive  cavalry  raid,  had  joined  Banks's 
army  at  Baton  Rouge.  The  President  expected 
that  Grant  would  proceed  south  and  assist  Banks 
and  Farragut  in  the  reduction  of  Port  Hudson,  a 
Confederate  stronghold,  twenty  miles  north  of 
Baton  Rouge,  and  thus  effect  a  junction  of  all 
the  Federal  forces  on  the  Lower  Mississippi,  and 
clear  the  river  for  supplies  from  New  Orleans, 
in  the  campaign  against  Vicksburg.  But  Grant 
feared  more  a  union  of  the  Confederate  forces 
than  he  desired  an  increase  of  his  own.  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  moving  from  Jackson, 
fifty  miles  east  of  Vicksburg,  to  reenforce  Pem- 
berton.  Grant  determined  to  prevent  this  junc- 
tion at  any  cost.  He  ordered  Sherman,  whose 
demonstration  against  Pemberton  had  success- 
fully accomplished  its  object,  to  join  him  at 
Grand  Gulf;  when  Sherman  did  so  on  the  6th, 
Grant  cut  loose  from  his  supplies  and  moved 
rapidly  against  Johnston.  On  the  i2th  he  met 
him  at  Raymond  marching  westward,  and  de- 
feated him  and  dispersed  his  troops.  On  the  I4th 
he  captured  Jackson.  Then  he  marched  swiftly 
toward  Vicksburg.  On  the  i6th  he  attacked 
Pemberton  in  a  strong  position  at  Champion's 
Hill,  and  completely  routed  him.  The  enemy 
made  a  stand  at  Big  Black  River,  but  was  driven 
across  it  on  the  i/th  with  heavy  loss.  On  the 
1 8th  Pemberton  was  completely  invested  in 
Vicksburg  and  so  cut  off  from  all  supplies.  For 
six  weeks  Grant  bombarded  the  city.  By  this 


222  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

time  Pemberton's  stores  were  exhausted,  and, 
realizing  the  hopelessness  of  his  situation,  he 
capitulated  to  Grant's  terms  of  "  unconditional 
surrender."  The  victor  was  generous,  however; 
he  paroled  all  the  prisoners,  supplied  them  with 
rations,  and  allowed  each  officer  to  retain  his  side 
arms,  and,  if  mounted,  his  horse.  On  the  Fourth 
of  July  the  garrison,  over  30,000  strong,  marched 
out  through  the  Union  troops,  who,  by  Grant's 
orders,  refrained  from  offensive  conduct  and  re- 
marks. On  July  9  Port  Hudson,  the  last  remain- 
ing Confederate  stronghold  on  the  Mississippi, 
surrendered  to  Banks,  and  once  again,  to  use  the 
language  of  Lincoln,  "  the  Father  of  Waters 
went  unvexed  to  the  sea." 

Upon  the  same  day  that  Meade  refrained  from 
crushing  the  broken  ranks  of  Lee  at  Gettysburg, 
Grant  received  the  surrender  of  Pemberton  at 
Vicksburg.  This  was  a  victory  complete  and  sat- 
isfying to  Lincoln.  When  the  news  of  it  arrived 
in  Washington,  citizens  of  the  capital  gathered 
at  the  White  House  to  serenade  the  President. 
He  responded  on  the  theme  of  notable  Fourths  of 
July.  Referring  to  the  important  events  that  had 
occurred  in  our  country's  history  upon  the  an- 
niversary of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  he 
concluded  the  list  with  the  recent  victories  which 
•enforced  the  principles  of  that  declaration,  al- 
though not  forbearing  to  hint  at  the  "  trying 
want  of  success  "  that  accompanied  the  eastern 
triumph. 

In  the  presence  of  the  supreme  military  genius 
exhibited  by  Grant,  the  President  humbly  ac- 
knowledged his  former  presumption  in  criticising 
his  plan  of  campaign.  On  the  i3th  of  the  month 
he  wrote  him  the  following  letter  : 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST 


223 


I  do  not  remember  that  you  and  I  ever  met  per- 
sonally. I  write  this  now  as  a  grateful  acknowledgment 
for  the  almost  inestimable  service  you  have  done  the 
country.  I  wish  to  say  a  word  further.  When  you 
first  reached  the  vicinity  of  Vicksburg,  I  thought  you 
should  do  what  you  finally  did — march  the  troops  across 
the  neck,  run  the  batteries  with  the  transports,  and 
thus  go  below ;  and  I  never  had  any  faith,  except  a 
general  hope  that  you  knew  better  than  I,  that  the 
Yazoo  Pass  expedition  and  the  like  could  succeed. 
When  you  got  below  and  took  Port  Gibson,  Grand.  Gulf, 
and  vicinity,  I  thought  you  should  go  down  the  river 
and  join  General  Banks,  and  when  you  turned  north- 
ward, east  of  the  Big  Black,  I  feared  it  was  a  mistake. 
I  now  wish  to  make  the  personal  acknowledgment  that 
you  were  right  and  I  was  wrong. 

Rosecrans,  on  the  plea  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
increase  the  forces  of  the  enemy  against  Grant 
before  Vicksburg  by  attacking  Bragg,  and  so 
causing  him  to  join  Johnston,  remained  inactive 
until  near  the  close  of  the  Vicksburg  campaign, 
save  for  cavalry  raids,  which,  on  the  suggestion 
of  the  President,  he  had  made  in  order  to  counter 
the  bold  forays  of  the  Confederate  horse.  Of 
these  expeditions  on  either  side  the  most  spectacu- 
lar was  the  raid  by  the  Confederate  general,  John 
H.  Morgan,  through  Kentucky  and  southern  In- 
diana and  Ohio,  in  July,  1863.  After  terrifying 
the  entire  Middle  West  for  thirty  days,  he  was 
defeated  and  captured  while  trying  to  recross  the 
Ohio  River.  Incarcerated  in  the  Ohio  peni- 
tentiary in  retaliation  for  the  refusal  of  the  Con- 
federate Government  to  exchange  Colonel  A.  D. 
Streight,  a  Union  cavalryman  who  had  been  cap- 
tured while  on  a  raid,  Morgan  contrived  to- 
escape  and  return  to  the  South,  where  he  was 
received  with  acclaim  by  the  people,  and  with  re- 
buke by  his  commmander  for  disobeying  orders 


224  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

in  extending  his  raid  beyond  Kentucky,  and  so 
putting  himself  beyond  recall  in  the  hour  of  the 
main  army's  need. 

Beginning  June  24,  in  nine  days,  during  which 
there  occurred  a  succession  of  violent  storms, 
Rosecrans  executed  a  series  of  rapid  and  brilliant 
movements  which  culminated  in  expelling  Bragg 
from  Tennessee.  The  Confederate  general  with- 
drew to  Chattanooga.  Rosecrans  was  slow  to 
follow  him  up  and  attack  him.  Although  the 
bridges  and  railroad  tracks  were  repaired  by  July 
1 8,  he  delayed  his  movement  against  Chatta- 
nooga almost  a  month  longer,  complaining  to 
Washington  of  lack  of  horses  and  supplies,  and 
of  the  disaffection  of  the  Administration  towards 
him.  Accordingly,  on  August  10,  the  President 
wrote  him  a  very  frank  letter,  telling  exactly  the 
feeling  he  had  toward  him,  and  criticising  his 
past  and  present  inaction,  the  former  directly, 
and  the  latter  indirectly  in  the  rhetorical  figure  of 
interrogation  of  which  Lincoln  was  a  master. 

I  think  you  must  have  inferred  more  than  General 
Halleck  has  intended,  as  to  any  dissatisfaction  of  mine 
with  you.  I  am  sure  you,  as  a  reasonable  man,  would 
not  have  been  wounded  could  you  have  heard  all  my 
words  and  seen  all  my  thoughts  in  regard  to  you. 
I  have  not  abated  in  my  kind  feeling  for  you  and 
confidence  in  you.  I  have  seen  most  of  your  dispatches 
to  General  Halleck — probably  all  of  them.  After  Grant 
invested  Vicksburg  I  was  very  anxious  lest  Johnston 
should  overwhelm  him  from  the  outside,  and  when 
it  appeared  certain  that  part  of  Bragg's  force  had  gone 
and  was  going  to  Johnston,  it  did  seem  to  me  it  was 
exactly  the  proper  time  for  you  to  attack  Bragg  with 
what  force  he  had  left.  In  all  kindness  let  me  say  it 
so  seems  to  me  yet.  Finding  from  your  dispatches  to 
General  Halleck  that  your  judgment  was  different,  and 
being  very  anxious  for  Grant,  I,  on  one  occasion,  told 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST 


=  25 


General  Halleck  I  thought  he  should  direct  you  to 
decide  at  once  to  immediately  attack  Bragg  or  to  stand 
on  the  defensive  and  send  part  of  your  force  to  Grant. 
He  replied  he  had  already  so  directed  in  substance. 
Soon  after,  dispatches  from  Grant  abated  my  anxiety 
for  him,  and  in  proportion  abated  my  anxiety  about 
any  movement  of  yours.  When  afterward,  however,  I 
saw  a  dispatch  of  yours  arguing  that  the  right  time 
for  you  to  attack  Bragg  was  not  before,  but  would 
be  after,  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  it  impressed  me  very 
strangely,  and  I  think  I  so  stated  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  General  Halleck.  It  seemed  no  other  than 
the  proposition  that  you  could  better  fight  Bragg  when 
Johnston  should  be  at  liberty  to  return  and  assist  him 
than  you  could  before  he  could  so  return  to  his 
assistance. 

Since  Grant  has  been  entirely  relieved  by  the  fall 
of  Vicksburg,  by  which  Johnston  is  also  relieved,  it  has 
seemed  to  me  that  your  chance  for  a  stroke  has  been 
considerably  diminished,  and  I  have  not  been  pressing 
you  directly  or  indirectly.  True,  I  am  very  anxious  for 
East  Tennessee  to  be  occupied  by  us ;  but  I  see  and 
appreciate  the  difficulties  you  mention.  The  question 
occurs.  Can  the  thing  be  done  at  all?  Does  prepara- 
tion advance  at  all  ?  Do  you  not  consume  supplies 
as  fast  as  you  get  them  forward?  Have  you  more 
animals  to-day  than  you  had  at  the  battle  of  Stone's 
River  ?  And  yet  have  not  more  been  furnished  you 
since  then  than  your  entire  present  stock?  I  ask  the 
same  questions  as  to  your  mounted  force. 

Do  not  misunderstand :  I  am  not  casting  blame  upon 
you;  I  rather  think  by  great  exertion  you  can  get  to 
East  Tennessee ;  but  a  very  important  question  is,  Can 
you  stay  there?  I  make  no  order  in  the  case — that  I 
leave  to  General  Halleck  and  yourself. 

And  now  be  assured  once  more  that  I  think  of  you 
in  all  kindness  and  confidence,  and  that  I  am  not 
watching  you  with  an  evil  eye. 

Rosecrans  shortly  after  this,  with  that  remark- 
able energy  of  which  he  was  capable  when  once 
he  had  entered  upon  a  movement,  plunged  into  a 
campaign  which  was  none  the  less  brilliant  be- 
cause the  most  bloodless  stroke  of  the  war;  yet, 


226  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

although  thus  employed,  his  contentious  mind 
sought  out  and  seized  upon  an  opening  in  Lin- 
coln's letter  into  which  he  could  force  the  wedge 
of  controversy.  The  President,  however,  re- 
fused to  be  drawn  into  dispute,  as  his  answer  of 
August  31  indicates  : 

When  I  wrote  you  before,  I  did  not  intend,  nor 
do  I  now,  to  engage  in  an  argument  with  you  on  mili- 
tary questions.  You  had  informed  me  you  were  im- 
pressed through  General  Halleck  that  I  was  dissatisfied 
with  you :  and  I  could  not  bluntly  deny  that  I  was,  with- 
out unjustly  implicating  him.  I  therefore  concluded  to 
tell  you  the  plain  truth,  being  satisfied  the  matter  would 
thus  appear  much  smaller  than  it  would  if  seen  by  mere 
glimpses.  I  repeat  that  my  appreciation  of  you  has  not 
abated.  I  can  never  forget  whilst  I  remember  any- 
thing that  about  the  end  of  last  year,  and  beginning 
of  this,  you  gave  us  a  hard-earned  victory,  which,  had 
there  been  a  defeat  instead,  the  nation  could  scarcely 
have  lived  over. 

Neither  can  I  forget  the  check  you  so  opportunely 
gave  to  a  dangerous  sentiment  which  was  spreading  in 
the  North. 

On  August  14  Rosecrans  began  his  long  de- 
ferred movement.  He  deceived  Bragg  into 
thinking  that  the  attack  was  to  come  from  the 
north  by  making  a  demonstration  from  that  di- 
rection, under  cover  of  which  he  crossed  the  Ten- 
nessee river  to  the  south  and  west  of  Chatta- 
nooga with  his  main  army,  and  by  September  6 
had  occupied  the  northwestern  slope  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  threatening  Bragg's  line  of  communi- 
cations. Thereupon  the  Confederate  commander 
evacuated  the  city.  On  the  Qth  it  was  occupied 
by  Rosecrans's  troops.  Bragg,  however,  had  not 
retreated.  Joined  by  Buckner's  forces,  which 
had  retreated  from  Knoxville  before  the  ap- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  227 

proach  of  Burnside  from  the  north,  and  by  a  de- 
tachment of  Johnston's  army,  he  concentrated  his 
troops  in  a  valley  to  the  east  of  the  parallel 
ranges  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  opposite  to  the  Union  center  under 
Thomas.  There  he  prepared  to  take  the  Union 
army  in  detail  as  its  three  corps  came  stringing 
along,  a  day's  march  apart,  in  pursuit  of  an 
enemy  whom  they  supposed  to  be  in  full  flight. 
Thomas's  corps  arrived  first,  pouring  through  a 
gap  in  Lookout  Mountain.  But  the  division 
commander,  General  T.  C.  Hindman,  whom 
Bragg  ordered  to  begin  the  attack,  through  sheer 
perversity  delayed  doing  so  until  Thomas,  realiz- 
ing his  danger,  had  withdrawn  into  the  mountain 
passes  behind  him,  thereby  incurring  the  censure 
of  Rosecrans  for  undue  caution.  Bragg  then 
ordered  General  Polk  to  attack  Crittenden's 
corps,  which,  his  cavalry  informed  him,  was 
marching  hard  after  Bragg  up  the  valley.  But 
while  Polk  was  awaiting  Crittenden  in  a  place  of 
strong  defense,  Crittenden,  realizing  his  isola- 
tion, had  withdrawn  from  his  advanced  position. 
Thus  Braggs'  plan  completely  miscarried.  Rose- 
crans, learning  the  situation,  set  to  work  to  con- 
centrate his  army  along  the  road  from  Chatta- 
nooga, heading  south  to  Lafayette.  But  Mc- 
Cook,  commander  of  the  right  wing,  had  been 
sent  far  to  the  south  to  intercept  the  enemy's  re- 
treat, and  he  was  four  days  in  effecting  the  de- 
sired junction  with  the  Union  center. 

The  two  armies  now  faced  each  other  along 
Chickamauga  Creek.  The  battle  began  on  the 
I9th.  Bragg  attempted  to  turn  the  Union  left, 
but  this  was  thwarted  by  Rosecrans  shifting 
Thomas's  corps  to  the  rear  of  Crittenden's.  That 


228  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

night  Longstreet  arrived  from  Virginia,  and 
Bragg,  dividing  his  army  in  two,  gave  him  com- 
mand of  the  left  division  and  Polk  command  of 
the  right.  Polk  made  a  furious  assault  on  the 
2Oth,  chiefly  against  Thomas.  But  the  Union 
general  stood  firm.  Longstreet's  attack  was  de- 
layed, and  came  upon  the  Union  right,  which  had 
been  weakened  to  support  the  left,  with  the 
crushing  force  of  an  unexpected  blow,  sweeping 
back  such  brave  and  capable  generals  as  McCook 
and  Sheridan.  Rosecrans  thought  the  day  was 
lost,  and  rode  to  Chattanooga  to  prepare  for  re- 
treat. 

Then  Thomas,  having  withstood  the  attack 
upon  him,  came  to  the  rescue.  He  threw  his 
troops  in  a  line  across  the  valley,  which  his 
soldiers,  with  desperate  valor,  clubbing  their 
muskets  when  ammunition  was  lacking,  held  the 
rest  of  the  afternoon,  thus  earning  for  their  com- 
mander the  sobriquet  of  "  Rock  of  Chicka- 
mauga."  At  night  Thomas,  whom  Rosecrans 
had  placed  in  chief  command,  withdrew  the  army 
in  good  order  to  Rossville  beyond  Missionary 
Ridge. 

Rosecrans  had  already  notified  Washington  of 
the  disaster.  The  President,  with  remarkable 
calm,  wrote  to  General  Halleck  on  the  2ist, 
recommending  that  "  means  to  the  utmost  of  our 
ability"  be  furnished  Rosecrans  to  hold  Chatta- 
nooga, and  that  he  be  not  pushed  beyond  this. 

If  he  can  only  maintain  this  position,  without  more, 
this  rebellion  can  only  eke  out  a  short  and  feeble  exist- 
ence, as  an  animal  sometimes  may  with  a  thorn  in  its 
vitals. 

At  the  same  time  he  sent  an  encouraging  mes- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST  229 

sage  to  Rosecrans,  assuring  him  of  the  con- 
fidence of  the  Administration  and  promising  him 
utmost  support,  a  promise  which  he  set  about  ful- 
filling by  urging  forward  the  slowly  moving 
Burnside  at  Knoxville,  getting  him  reenforce- 
ments  from  Sherman,  and  sending  him  two  small 
army  corps,  Howard's  and  Slocum's,  under  gen- 
eral command  of  Hooker.  He  further  encour- 
aged him  by  transmitting  Bragg's  report  of  his 
heavy  losses,  especially  in  officers,  which  ap- 
peared in  the  Richmond  papers. 

Bragg  laid  siege  to  Chattanooga,  cutting  off  all 
communications  save  over  the  mountains  to  the 
north.  On  October  4  the  President  suggested 
to  Rosecrans  as  the  "  best  move  of  counteract- 
ing "  this  raid  on  his  communications,  to  make 
frequent  demonstrations  against  the  enemy.  "  I 
understand,"  said  he,  "  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  is  very  near  you,  so  near  that  you  could 
'  board  at  home,'  so  to  speak,  and  menace  or  at- 
tack him  any  day."  In  reply  to  Rosecrans's  sug- 
gestion that  he  offer  a  general  amnesty  to  the 
Rebels,  to  give  moral  strength  to  the  Union  cause 
and  weaken  the  enemy,  the  President  wrote  :  "  I 
intend  doing  something  like  what  you  suggest 
whenever  the  case  shall  appear  ripe  enough  to 
have  it  accepted  in  the  true  understanding  rather 
than  as  a  confession  of  weakness  and  fear." 

Studying  the  situation,  the  President  came  to  a 
conclusion  regarding  the  purpose  of  the  enemy 
which  proved  to  be  a  remarkably  accurate  fore- 
cast. On  October  12  he  wrote  to  Rosecrans: 
"  I  now  think  the  enemy  will  not  attack  Chat- 
tanooga, and  I  think  you  will  have  to  look  out 
for  his  making  a  concentrated  drive  at  Burnside. 
You  and  Burnside  now  have  him  by  the  throat; 


130  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and  he  must  break  your  hold  or  perish."  Despite 
this  encouragement,  Rosecrans  became  more  and 
more  despondent.  Already  poorly  supplied  with 
food,  he  feared  that  the  Confederates  would 
break  his  communications  with  Burnside,  and 
starve  him  out.  Charles  A.  Dana,  assistant  sec- 
retary of  war,  was  with  the  army,  and  he  re- 
ported that  there  were  indications  that  Rosecrans 
was  contemplating  a  retreat.  In  order  to  pre- 
vent this  disastrous  movement,  Secretary  Stan- 
ton  met  General  Grant  by  appointment  at  Louis- 
ville, and  gave  him  command  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  including  all  the 
armies  in  the  West  north  of  Banks's  department. 
Grant  had  the  option  of  either  retaining  Rose- 
crans as  the_head  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, or  replacing  him  with  Thomas.  He  chose 
Thomas,  and  at  once  telegraphed  him  instruc- 
tions to  hold  Chattanooga,  to  which  Thomas  re- 
plied :  "  We  will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve." 

By  an  energetic  movement  entirely  unex- 
pected by  the  enemy,  Grant  crossed  the  river  and 
occupied  Lookout  Valley.,  On  October  29  Long- 
street  made  a  night  attack  upon  Hooker's  divi- 
sion in  the  valley,  and  was  driven  back. 

Bragg  then  ordered  Longstreet  to  make  the 
movement  against  Burnside  which  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  anticipated,  and  which,  indeed,  had  been 
suggested  by  the  Confederate  President  in  a 
visit  to  the  besieging  army  before  Chattanooga. 
It  was  not  until  November  15  that  Longstreet 
was  ready  to  begin  this  movement.  On  this  date 
Sherman,  who  had  succeeded  Grant  in  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  arrived  in  Chat- 
tanooga, slightly  in  advance  of  his  forces.  Grant 
had  heretofore  been  held  back  by  the  wise  insub- 


THE  ARMY  IN  THE' WEST  231 

ordination  of  Thomas  from  an  attack  on  Bragg's 
strong  position  on  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  which  was  intended  to  retain  Longstreet 
from  attacking  Burnside.  Now  he  set  in  motion 
a  general  attack  on  Lookout  Mountain.  This 
took  place  on  November  24,  and  proved  to  be  one 
of  the  most  gallant  and  successful  actions  in  the 
war.  The  soldiers  of  Hooker's  division,  to  quote 
from  their  general's  report,  "  passed  directly 
under  the  muzzles  of  the  enemy's  guns  on  the 
summit,  climbing  over  ledges  and  boulders,  up 
hill  and  down,  furiously  driving  the  enemy  from 
his  camp  and  from  position  after  position." 

Bragg  now  concentrated  all  his  forces  on  Mis- 
sionary Ridge.  Here,  on  the  25th,  the  daring  of 
the  charge  on  Lookout  Mountain  was  outdone  by 
Thomas's  soldiers.  They  were  ordered  to  take 
the  rifle  pits,  half-way  up  the  mountains,  and  halt 
there.  They  took  the  pits,  and,  finding  them 
commanded  by  batteries  higher  up,  of  their  own 
volition  continued  the  charge  up  the  slope. 
On  reaching  the  summit  of  the  Ridge,  they  dis- 
persed the  Confederates  there,  turning  their  own 
batteries  upon  them  as  they  fled  down  the  farther 
side  of  the  mountain.  General  Sheridan,  who 
was  in  the  van  of  the  charge,  pressed  the  pur- 
suit even  by  moonlight,  and  stormed  a  second 
ridge,  where  the  retreating  enemy  had  made  a 
stand. 

In  the  meantime  Longstreet  was  besieging 
Knoxville  so  closely  that  little  news  escaped  from 
Burnside.  General  John  G.  Foster  was  sent  with 
a  relieving  force  to  replace  Burnside,  but  was 
able  to  get  only  within  hearing  distance  of  Knox- 
ville. As  recorded  by  F.  B.  Carpenter,  the 
President,  upon  hearing  from  Foster  that  "  fir- 


232  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

ing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Knoxville,"  re- 
membered that  he  was  "  glad  of  it,"  explaining 
the  reason  of  his  gratification  by  telling  a  story  : 

It  reminds  me  of  Mistress  Sallie  Ward,  a  neighbor 
of  mine,  who  had  a  very  large  family.  Occasionally 
one  of  her  numerous  progeny  would  be  heard  crying  in 
some  out-of-the-way  place,  upon  which  Mrs.  Ward 
would  exclaim,  "  There's  one  of  my  children  that  isn't 
dead  yet." 

Upon  the  retreat  of  Bragg  from  Qiattanooga, 
Grant  sent  Sherman  with  his  own  and  Howard's 
corps  to  the  rescue  of  Burnside.  Longstreet, 
hearing  of  Bragg's  defeat,  made  a  desperate  at- 
tempt on  November  29  to  storm  Burnside's  forti- 
fications, but  was  beaten  back  with  heavy  loss. 
On  December  3  he  began  a  retreat  toward  the 
fertile  valley  of  the  Holston  River,  where  he 
passed  the  winter.  Foster  arrived  at  Knoxville 
on  December  10,  and  assumed  command  on  the 
following  day.  Sherman  returned  with  his  forces 
to  Chattanooga. 


CHAPTER  X 

GENERAL  GRANT 

[In  order  that  this  study  of  Lincoln's  character  as 
revealed  in  his  most  significant  acts  and  utterances 
might  not  swell  to  the  dimensions  of  a  history  of  the 
Civil  War  as  well  as  a  biography  of  the  President,  the 
account  of  the  close  of  the  war  has  been  greatly  abbre- 
viated. In  this  Grant  was  the  dominant  figure,  and  the 
reader  is,  therefore,  referred  to  any  biography  of  this 
general  for  the  details  of  his  final  campaign.] 

ON  March  2,  1864,  chiefly  through  the  exer- 
tions of  Grant's  friend,  Elihu  B.  Washburne, 
Congressman  from  Illinois,  a  bill  was  passed  re- 
viving the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General,  and  in- 
vesting the  holder  with  the  command  of  all  the 
Federal  armies.  To  this  position  the  President 
promptly  appointed  Grant. 

At  request  of  the  President,  Grant;  came  on  to 
Washington  on  March  9,  and  Lincoln  handed 
him  the  commission,  it  being  the  third  one  that 
ever  was  issued,  and  made  to  its  recipient  a 
speech,  as  follows  : 

The  expression  of  the  nation's  approbation  of  what 
you  have  already  done,  and  its  reliance  on  you  for  what 
remains  to  do  in  the  existing  great  struggle,  is  novr 
presented  with  this  commission,  constituting  you  Lieu- 
tenant-General of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

With  this  high  honor  devolves  on  you  an  additional 
responsibility.  As  the  country  herein  trusts  you,  sp, 

233 


234  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

under  God,  it  will  sustain  you.  I  scarcely  need  add, 
that  with  what  I  here  speak  for  the  country  goes  my 
own  hearty  personal  concurrence. 

Grant,  with  eyes  riveted  on  the  floor,  re- 
.sponded : 

MR.  PRESIDENT: — I  accept  this  commission,  with 
gratitude  for  the  high  honor  conferred. 

With  the  aid  of  the  noble  armies  that  have  fought  on 
so  many  fields  for  our  common  country,  it  will  be  my 
earnest  endeavor  not  to  disappoint  your  expectations. 

I  feel  the  full  weight  of  the  responsibility  now  de- 
volving on  me,  and  I  know  that  if  they  are  met,  it 
will  be  due  to  those  armies ;  and  above  all,  to  the 
iavor  of  that  Providence  which  leads  both  nations 
and  men. 

The  Lieutenant-General  then  visited  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  and  returned  to  Washington, 
where  Mrs.  Lincoln  prepared  an  elegant  dinner 
in  his  honor,  inviting  the  leaders  in  politics  and 
fashion  to  meet  him.  After  concluding  his  busi- 
ness with  the  War  Department,  Mr.  Lincoln 
said  he  must  stay  to  the  dinner.  The  General 
said :  "  I  can't  do  it — I  must  leave  by  the  first 
train,  to  keep  my  appointment  with  Sherman." 
"  We  can't  let  you  go,"  said  the  President ;  "  one 
train  later  will  answer  your  purpose."  "  I  can't 
do  it,"  said  the  Lieutenant-General  impatiently; 
"  I  already  have  had  too  much  of  the  show  busi- 
ness ;"  and  the  state  dinner  was  eaten  without  its 
principal  guest.  After  consulting  at  length  with 
Sherman,  who  had  taken  his  place  as  commander 
of  the  military  division  of  Mississippi,  Grant  re- 
turned to  Washington,  but  in  order  to  finish  his 
talk  with  Sherman  the  latter  accompanied  him 
as  far  as  Cincinnati.  On  March  17  Grant  an- 
nounced that  his  headquarters  would  be  with  the 


GENERAL  GRANT  235 

Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  evident  that  the 
day  of  employing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  solely 
for  dress  parades  had  passed,  and  that  the  stern 
business  of  the  war  had  begun.  At  this  time  the 
aggregate  of  the  army  was  nearly  1,000,000,  with 
about  30,000  more  on  detached  service.  On 
March  28  the  Lieutenant-General  took  up  his 
quarters  at  Culpeper  Court  House,  on  April  4  he 
issued  instructions  for  a  plan  of  campaign  to 
Sherman,  and  on  the  Qth  to  Meade,  commanding 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  President  heartily  indorsed  these  plans,  as 
is  indicated  in  a  letter  of  April  30 : 

Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  April  30,  1864. 
Lieutenant-General  Grant : 

Not  expecting  to  see  you  again  before  the  spring  cam- 
paign opens,  I  wish  to  express  in  this  way  my  entire  sat- 
isfaction with  what  you  have  done  up  to  this  time,  so 
far  as  I  understand  it.  The  particulars  of  your  plans 
I  neither  know  nor  seek  to  know.  You  are  vigilant 
and  self-reliant ;  and,  pleased  with  this,  I  wish  not  to 
obtrude  any  constraints  or  restraints  upon  you.  While 
I  am  very  anxious  that  any  great  disaster  or  capture  of 
our  men  in  great  numbers  shall  be  avoided,  I  know 
these  points  are  less  likely  to  escape  your  attention  than 
they  would  be  mine.  If  there  is  anything  wanting  which 
is  within  my  power  to  give,  do  not  fail  to  let  me 
know  it.  And  now,  with  a  brave  army  and  a  just  cause, 
may  God  sustain  you. 

The  5th  of  May  had  been  designated  as  the 
time  when  the  campaign  was  to  be  opened  sim- 
ultaneously by  Meade  in  the  East  and  by  Sher- 
man in  the  West;  and  at  midnight  on  May  3-4 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  crossed  the  Rapidan, 
and  was  entirely  across  by  the  night  of  the  4th, 
and  the  forces  were  engaged  early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  5th,  the  day  fixed.  Sherman  took  the 


236  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

field  and  commenced  his  campaign  on  the  5th 
likewise  ;  the  former  receiving  the  appellation  of 
the  "  Wilderness"  campaign  and  the  latter  being 
designated  as  the  "  Atlantic"  campaign.  In 
Georgia,  Johnson,  the  Rebel  general,  adopted  the 
Fabian  policy  of  retreating  and  drawing  his  ad- 
versary away  from  his  base  of  supplies,  and  when 
November  came,  Sherman's  army  held  Atlanta, 
with  his  adversary  in  his  rear.  He  left  him 
there,  however,  confronted  by  Thomas  at  Nash- 
ville and,  cutting  loose  from  his  base,  marched 
unresisted  to  Savannah,  where  he  arrived  on 
December  21.  On  January  19  succeeding,  he 
marched  north,  and  on  the  26th  of  April,  1865, 
he  received  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army. 

The  policy  and  results  of  Grant's  campaign 
were  different:  his  aim  and  object  was  not  to 
occupy  or  fight  for  territory,  but  to  destroy  Lee's 
army ;  for  he  reasoned  that,  as  long  as  the  army 
remained  intact,  so  long  would  the  war  continue. 
So  on  May  n,  at  night,  the  Lieutenant-General 
summarized  the  result  thus: 

We  have  now  ended  the  sixth  day  of  very  hard  fight- 
ing. The  result  up  to  this  time  is  very  much  in  our 
favor.  But  our  losses  have  been  heavy  as  well  as  those 
of  the  enemy.  We  have  lost  to  this  time,  eleven  gen- 
eral officers  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  probably 
twenty  thousand  men.  I  think  the  loss  of  the  enemy 
must  be  greater — we  having  taken  over  four  thousand 
prisoners  in  battle,  whilst  he  has  taken  from  us  but  few, 
except  a  few  stragglers.  I  am  now  sending  back  to 
Bell  Plain  all  my  wagons  for  a  fresh  supply  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition,  and  purpose  to  fight  it  out 
on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  summer. 

The  arrival  of  reinforcements  here  will  be  very  en- 
couraging to  the  men,  and  I  hope  they  will  be  sent  as 
fast  as  possible,  and  in  as  great  numbers.  My  object 
in  having  them  sent  to  Bell  Plain  was  to  use  them 


GENERAL  GRANT  237 

as  an  escort  to  our  supply  trains.  If  it  is  more  con- 
venient to  send  them  out  by  train  to  march  from  the 
railroad  to  Bell  Plain  or  Fredericksburg,  send  them  so. 
I  am  satisfied  the  enemy  are  very  shaky,  and  are  only- 
kept  up  to  the  mark  by  the  greatest  exertions  on  the 
part  of  their  officers,  and  by  keeping  them  intrenched 
in  every  position  they  take.  Up  to  this  time,  there 
is  no  indication  of  any  portion  of  Lee's  army  being 
detached  for  the  defense  of  Richmond. 

On  the  I2th  he  sent  the  following  dispatch : 

The  eighth  day  of  the  battle  closes,  leaving  between 
three  and  four  thousand  prisoners  in  our  hands  for  the 
day's  work,  including  two  general  officers  and  over 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery.  The  enemy  are  obstinate  and 
seem  to  have  found  the  last  ditch.  We  have  lost  no 
organizations,  not  even  that  of  a  company,  whilst  we 
have  destroyed  and  captured  one  division  (Johnson's), 
one  brigade  (Dale's),  and  one  regiment  entire  from 
the  enemy. 

During  that  awful  week  the  President  suf- 
fered intense  agony  of  mind,  at  the  fearful  loss 
of  life  in  the  Wilderness.  The  carnage  was  sim- 
ply horrible  and  with  no  prospect  of  immediate 
abatement,  for  the  tenacity  of  the  opposing  com- 
manders was  as  enduring  as  life  itself. 

Carpenter  relates  in  his  interesting  and  valu- 
able "  Six  Months  in  the  White  House "  that 
during  that  week  the  President  scarcely  slept  at 
all ;  that  he  met  him  "  pacing  a  narrow  hallway, 
clad  in  an  old  faded  wrapper,  with  a  pair  of  slip- 
pers, run  down  at  the  heel,  great  rings  under  his 
eyes  " — an  image  of  grief  and  misery.  Losses 
from  May  5  to  June  12  were  6,586  killed;  26,047 
wounded  ;  6,626  missing — a  frightful  list ! 

By  the  middle  of  June  the  army  had  reached 
and  invested  Petersburg,  which  was  understood, 
on  both  sides,  to  be  the  key  to  Richmond. 


233  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

The  President  now  was  convinced  that  Grant 
was  a  man  of  his  own  inflexible  temper,  resolved 
to  crush  the  enemy  and  so  end  the  war.  Ren- 
dered distrustful  of  the  War  Department  in  this 
respect  by  his  repeated  sad  experiences,  the 
President  sent  a  cipher  telegram  to  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General,  which  is  perhaps  the  most  cynical 
thing  he  ever  penned : 

I  have  seen  your  dispatch  in  which  you  say,  "  I  want 
Sheridan  put  in  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  field, 
•with  instructions  to  put  himself  south  of  the  enemy, 
and  follow  him  to  the  death.  Wherever  the  enemy 
goes,  let  our  troops  go  also."  This,  I  think,  is  exactly 
right  as  to  how  our  forces  should  move;  but  please 
look  over  the  dispatches  you  may  have  received  from 
here,  ever  since  you  made  that  order,  and  discover,  if 
you  can,  that  there  is  any  idea  in  the  head  of  anyone 
here  of  "  putting  our  army  south  of  the  enemy,"  or  of 
following  him  to  the  "  death,"  in  any  direction.  I  re- 
peat to  you,  it  will  neither  be  done  nor  attempted, 
unless  you  watch  it  every  day  and  hour,  and  force  it. 

A.  LINCOLN. 

Two  weeks  later  he  sent  a  characteristic  tele- 
gram of  encouragement: 

August  17,  1864.    10.30  A.M. 

I  have  seen  your  dispatch  expressing  your  unwilling- 
ness to  break  your  hold  where  you  are.  Neither  am 
I  willing.  Hold  on  with  a  bulldog  grip,  and  chew  and 
choke  as  much  as  possible. 

After  remaining  in  a  state  of  siege  all  the 
summer,  fall,  and  winter,  with  some  episodes, 
such  as  the  unsuccessful  springing  of  a  mine,  and 
occasional  raids,  the  Rebels  were  forced  to  evacu- 
ate Petersburg  on  the  morning  of  April  3,  and 
Grant's  army  took  immediate  possession;  while, 
at  the  same  time,  Weitzel's  command  occupied 
Richmond,  it  having  also  been  evacuated  on  the 


GENERAL  GRANT  239* 

night  of  the  2d  by  the  Army  and  Government,  the 
latter  leaving  by  the  (only)  Danville  road.  The 
pursuit  of  Lee  and  his  army  and  the  surrender 
at  Appomattox  are  the  most  familiar  episodes  in 
our  American  history.  On  the  night  of  March 
3  the  President  sent  the  following  dispatch  to 
Grant: 

The  President  directs  me  to  say  that  he  wishes  you 
to  have  no  conference  with  General  Lee  unless  it  be  for 
capitulation  of  General  Lee's  army,  or  on  some  minor 
or  purely  military  matter.  He  instructs  me  to  say 
that  you  are  not  to  decide,  discuss,  or  confer  upon  any 
political  questions.  Such  questions  the  President  holds 
in  his  own  hands,  and  will  submit  them  to  no  military 
conferences  or  conventions.  Meanwhile  you  are  to  press 
to  the  utmost  your  military  advantages. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

Yet  the  Lieutenant-General  did,  by  the  terms 
of  the  agreement,  absolve  everybody  surren- 
dered, including  Lee,  from  the  consequences  of 
their  treason,  which  was  a  highly  important  and 
significant  act,  but  it  was  overlooked  at  the  time 
as  it  was  in  harmony  with  the  policy  of  the 
Administration.  Lee  being  thereafter  indicted 
by  the  judicial  authorities,  the  Administration  of 
Andrew  Johnson  was  desirous  to  press  the  indict- 
ment; but  Grant  promptly  notified  the  Adminis- 
tration that  he  should  resign  if  it  was  pressed ; 
and  the  prosecution  was  abandoned. 

The  surrender  came  at  Appomattox  upon  the 
9th  of  April,  two  days  after  Lincoln,  from  the 
army  headquarters  at  City  Point,  had  telegraphed 
to  Grant: 

General  Sheridan  says,  "If  the  thing  is  pressed  I 
think  that  Lee  will  surrender."  Let  the  thing  be 
pressed. 


240  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

When  Grant  was  riding  to  camp  after  the  sur- 
render he  heard  the  firing  of  salutes.  He  gave 
orders  at  once  to  cease  such  manifestations  of 
exultation,  saying :  "  The  war  is  over ;  the  Rebels 
are  again  our  countrymen,  and  the  best  sign  of 
rejoicing  after  the  victory  will  be  to  abstain  from 
all  demonstrations  in  the  field." 

The  number  of  Grant's  captures  during  the 
campaign  beginning  with  the  battle  of  the  Wil- 
derness was  66,512.  The  Union  losses  for  the 
same  period  were  12,663  killed,  49,559  wounded, 
and  20,498  missing — a  total  of  82,720. 


CHAPTER  XI 

EMANCIPATION 

SECRETARY  WELLES  said,  in  an  article  appear- 
ing in  the  Galaxy,  October,  1877 : 

Emancipation  had  constituted  no  part  of  the  policy 
of  the  President  at  the  time  of  his  inauguration,  and, 
when  finally  decreed,  he  connected  with  it,  as  an  essen- 
tial and  indispensable  part  of  his  policy,  a  plan  of 
deportation  of  the  colored  population.  Long  before 
he  yielded  to  emancipation,  and  in  the  belief  that  it 
was  necessary  to  rid  the  country  of  the  African  race, 
he  had  schemes  for  their  migration  more  advanced  than 
those  of  the  colonizationists.  From  a  conviction  that 
the  white  and  black  races  could  not  abide  together  on 
terms  of  social  and  political  equality,  he  thought  they 
could  not  peaceably  occupy  the  same  territory — that 
one  must  dominate  the  other.  Opposed  to  the  whole 
system  of  enslavement,  but  believing  the  Africans  were 
mentally  an  inferior  race,  he  believed  that  any  attempt 
to  make  them  and  the  whites  one  people  would  tend 
to  the  degradation  of  the  whites  without  materially 
elevating  the  blacks,  but  that  separation  would  promote 
the  happiness  and  welfare  of  each.  .  .  .  The  two  (de- 
portation and  emancipation)  were,  in  his  mind,  indis- 
pensably and  indissolubly  connected.  Colonization  in 
fact  had  precedence  with  him,  ...  he  wished  it  dis- 
tinctly understood  that  deportation  was  in  his  mind 
inseparably  connected  with  this  measure,  that  he  con- 
sidered the  two  to  be  parts  of  one  system,  and  that 
they  must  be  carried  forward  together.  .  ..  .  There 
was  not  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  who  did  not  coincide 
with  the  President  as  to  the  desirableness  of  relieving 
the  country  of  a  conflict  or  of  an  amalgamation  of  the 
two  races,  one  or  both  of  which  results  lay  in  the 
future,  were  they  to  occupy  the  same  territory.  .  .  . 

241 


242  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

They  would  increase  in  numbers,  have  leaders  of  their 
own,  or  of  a  mixed  race  of  exceptional  ability  and  am- 
bition, and  also  white  demagogues  to  excite  and  mis- 
lead them,  until,  if  they  remained  with  us,  a  war  more 
terrible  than  that  in  which  we  were  now  engaged  might 
be  expected.  .  .  .  Colonization  he  believed  to  be  the 
only  remedy. 

In  Lincoln's  first  annual  message  on  December 
2,  1 86 1,  he  asked  Congress  to  provide  means  for 
colonizing  negroes  who  had  been  confiscated  by 
Union  troops  as  contraband  of  war  under  the 
act  of  August  6.  "  If  a  new  law  upon  the  same 
subject  [confiscation  of  slaves]  shall  be  proposed, 
its  propriety  will  be  duly  considered.  The 
Union  must  be  preserved ;  and  hence  all  indis- 
pensable means  must  be  employed.  We  should 
not  be  in  haste  to  determine  that  radical  and  ex- 
treme measures,  which  may  reach  the  loyal  as 
well  as  the  disloyal,  are  indispensable." 

From  the  debates  upon  resolutions  that  were 
offered  in  Congress,  and  referred  to  the  appro- 
priate committees,  it  developed  that  the  Presi- 
dent could  go  no  farther  than  he  had  done  in  the 
disposition  of  slaves  belonging  to  Rebel  masters, 
and  receive,  legislative  backing.  The  principle 
was  generally  asserted  that  slaves  should  be 
freed  whenever  and  wherever  this  would  tend 
to  weaken  the  rebellion.  Indeed,  the  orders  is- 
sued by  McClellan  and  Halleck  prohibiting  fugi- 
tive slaves  from  coming  within  the  army  lines 
were  severely  censured. 

One  year  of  warfare  had  accomplished  the  oc- 
cupation of  the  border  States,  including  West 
Virginia,  but  had  made  no  impression  upon  the 
seceding  States.  In  order  that  the  occupied  ter- 
ritory might  be  permanently  attached  to  the  free 


EMANCIPATION  243 

States  in  interest,  with  no  case  of  a  triumph  of 
Southern  arms,  the  President  now  bent  his  ener- 
gies to  secure  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  this  sec- 
tion. In  his  Annual  Message  he  had  proposed 
to  Congress  the  passage  of  a  joint  resolution 
offering  pecuniary  aid  to  any  State  which  should 
adopt  gradual  and  compensated  emancipation. 
On  March  6  he  sent  a  special  message  to  Con- 
gress on  the  subject,  presenting  the  feasibility  of 
the  proposition  from  a  financial  point  of  view. 

Any  member  of  Congress,  with  the  census  tables  and 
treasury  reports  before  him,  can  readily  see  for  himself 
how  very  soon  the  current  expenditures  of  this  war 
would  purchase,  at  fair  valuation,  all  the  slaves  in  any 
named  State.  Such  a  proposition  on  the  part  of  the 
General  Government  sets  up  no  claim  of  a  right  by 
Federal  authority  to  interfere  with  slavery  within  State 
limits,  referring,  as  it  does,  the  absolute  control  of  the 
subject  in  each  case  to  the  State  and  its  people  imme- 
diately interested.  It  is  proposed  as  a  matter  of  per- 
fectly free  choice  with  them.  .  .  . 

The  proposition  now  made,  though  an  offer  only,  I 
hope  it  may  be  esteemed  no  offense  to  ask  whether  the 
pecuniary  consideration  tendered  would  not  be  of  more 
value  to  the  States  and  private  persons  concerned  than 
are  the  institution  and  property  in  it,  in  the  present 
aspect  of  affairs? 

While  it  is  true  that  the  adoption  of  the  proposed 
resolution  would  be  merely  initiatory,  and  not  within 
itself  a  practical  measure,  it  is  recommended  in  the 
hope  that  it  would  soon  lead  to  important  practical 
results.  In  full  view  of  my  great  responsibility  to  my 
God  and  to  my  country,  I  earnestly  beg  the  attention 
of  Congress  and  the  people  to  the  subject. 

In  private  letters,  one  to  Henry  J.  Raymond 
of  the  New  York  Times  on  March  9,  and  an- 
other to  James  A.  McDougall  on  March  14, 
the  President  presented  statistics  which  very  con- 
clusively supported  his  general  statement.  To 


244  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Raymond,  whose  paper  had  objected  to  the  ex- 
pense involved  in  the  proposition,  he  wrote: 

Have  you  noticed  the  facts  that  less  than  one-half  day's 
cost  of  this  war  would  pay  for  all  the  slaves  in  Dela- 
ware at  $400  per  head — that  eighty-seven  days'  cost  of 
this  war  would  pay  for  all  in  Delaware,  Maryland, 
District  of  Columbia,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri  at  the 
same  price?  Were  those  States  to  take  the  step,  dp  you 
doubt  that  it  would  shorten  the  war  more  than  eighty- 
seven  days,  and  thus  be  an  actual  saving  of  expense? 

Please  look  at  these  things  and  consider  whether 
there  should  not  be  another  article  in  the  Times. 

On  March  10  the  President  invited  Congress- 
men from  the  border  States  to  the  Executive 
Mansion  to  discuss  the  proposed  measure. 

They  were  very  distrustful  of  the  President's 
ultimate  intentions  in  regard  to  slavery;  indeed, 
one  of  them  put  to  him  the  pointed  query :  "  Do 
you  look  to  any  policy  beyond  the  acceptance  or 
rejection  of  this  scheme  ?  "  To  this  he  replied 
very  directly,  as  reported  by  one  of  the  Repre- 
sentatives present,  John  W.  Cresfield  of  Mary- 
land, that  he  should  lament  the  refusal  of  the 
slave  States  to  accept  the  offer  but  he  had  no 
designs  beyond  their  refusal  of  it,  and  that  he 
should  occupy  that  house  for  three  years,  and  as 
long  as  he  remained  there  Maryland  had  nothing 
to  fear,  either  for  her  institutions  or  her  inter- 
ests, on  the  points  referred  to. 

Reciting  the  resolution  he  had  presented  to 
Congress  in  his  special  message  of  March  6,  he 
continued : 

The  resolution,  in  the  language  above  quoted,  was 
adopted  by  large  majorities  in  both  branches  of  Con- 
gress, and  now  stands  an  authentic,  definite,  and  solemn 
proposal  of  the  nation  to  the  States  and  people  most 


EMANCIPATION  245 

immediately  interested  in  the  subject-matter.  To  the 
people  of  those  States  I  now  earnestly  appeal.  I  do 
not  argue — I  beseech  you  to  make  arguments  for  your- 
selves. You  cannot,  if  you  would,  be  blind  to  the  signs 
of  the  times.  I  beg  of  you  a  calm  and  enlarged  con- 
sideration of  them,  ranging,  if  it  may  be,  far  above 
personal  and  partisan  politics.  This  proposal  makes 
common  cause  for  a  common  object,  casting  no  re- 
proaches upon  any.  It  acts  not  the  Pharisee.  The 
change  it  contemplates  would  come  gently  as  the  dews 
of  heaven,  not  rending  or  wrecking  anything.  Will 
you  not  embrace  it?  So  much  good  has  not  been  done, 
by  one  effort,  in  all  past  time,  as  in  the  providence  of 
God  it  is  now  your  high  privilege  to  do.  May  the 
vast  future  not  have  to  lament  that  you  have  neg- 
lected it. 

A  resolution  embodying  the  President's  recom- 
mendation was  introduced  in  the  House  on 
March  10,  and  in  the  Senate  on  March  24.  In 
the  debates  which  ensued  it  was  weakly  sup- 
ported by  the  anti-slavery  Representatives  and 
Senators  who  were  ready  for  a  more  radical 
measure,  and  vehemently  opposed  by  the  pro- 
slavery  legislators,  who  declared  it  to  be  an  un- 
constitutional interference  with  a  State  institu- 
tion. The  resolution  passed  both  legislative 
chambers,  and  it  was  signed  by  the  President  on 
April  10.  While  no  slave  State  took  advantage 
of  its  provisions,  the  fact  that  any  or  all  might 
have  done  so  destroyed  the  force  of  the  objection 
to  the  ultimate  Emancipation  Proclamation  that 
the  North  was  unwilling  to  share  the  cost  of 
abolishing  a  system  which,  however  evil,  had 
grown  up  with  the  legal  sanction  of  the  national 
government. 

President  Lincoln  stood  loyally  by  his  resolu- 
tion. On  May  9,  1862,  General  David  Hunter, 
of  the  Department  of  the  South,  in  a  proclaim- 


246  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

tion  placing  the  States  of  the  department  under 
martial  law,  declared  that,  since  slavery  and  mar- 
tial law  are  incompatible  in  a  free  country,  the 
persons  in  these  States — Georgia,  Florida,  and 
South  Carolina — heretofore  held  as  slaves  were 
declared  forever  free.  Upon  this  order  on  May 
16  the  President  wrote  the  indorsement,  "  No 
commanding  general  shall  do  such  a  thing  upon 
my  responsibility  without  consulting  me."  On 
the  igth  he  issued  a  general  proclamation, 
repudiating  and  annulling  Hunter's  proclama- 
tion. In  this  he  said : 

I  further  make  known  that,  whether  it  be  competent 
for  me,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy, 
to  declare  the  slaves  of  any  State  or  States  free,  and 
whether,  at  any  time,  in  any  case,  it  shall  have  become 
a  necessity  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Gov- 
ernment to  exercise  such  supposed  power,  are  questions 
which,  under  my  responsibility,  I  reserve  to  myself,  and 
which  I  cannot  feel  justified  in  leaving  to  the  decision 
of  commanders  in  the  field.  These  are  totally  different 
questions  from  those  of  police  regulations  in  armies 
and  camps. 

In  the  one  portion  of  the  Union  over  which  the 
Federal  Government  had  complete  and  unques- 
tioned jurisdiction,  the  District  of  Columbia, 
compensated  emancipation  which  also  provided 
for  colonizing  the  freedmen  was  adopted  by  Con- 
gress, the  bill  being  signed  by  the  President  on 
the  1 6th  of  April.  In  1849,  when  he  was  a  mem- 
ber of  Congress,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  introduced  a 
bill  abolishing  slavery  in  the  District.  The  pres- 
ent act  was  therefore  especially  gratifying  to 
him  as  the  first  fruit  of  his  long  and  continuous 
battle  for  the  cause  of  emancipation — the  earnest 
of  complete  triumph  that  was  shortly  to  be  con- 
summated. 


EMANCIPATION  247 

By  midsummer  the  drift  of  sentiment  in  the 
country  toward  emancipation  of  the  slaves  had 
developed  into  a  strong  current  which  the  opposi- 
tion to  the  Administration,  beginning  to  center 
about  General  McClellan,  was  vainly  trying  to 
stem.  On  July  17  Congress  passed  an  "  Act  to 
suppress  insurrection,  to  punish  treason  and  re- 
bellion, to  seize  and  confiscate  the  property  of 
rebels,"  etc.,  which  by  proclaiming  the  forfeiture 
of  slaves  of  Rebels  to  the  Government,  was  virtu- 
ally an  emancipation  proclamation.  This  act  the 
President  approved,  although  before  he  was  in- 
formed of  its  passage  he  had  prepared  a  draft  of 
a  message  to  Congress  ably  criticising  the  con- 
stitutionality of  some  of  its  provisions.  Un- 
doubtedly, in  giving  his  approval  he  had  in  mind 
to  issue  shortly  his  broad  and  thoroughly  con- 
stitutional Emancipation  Proclamation  which 
should  cure  all  defects  in  the  act.  Indeed,  it  may 
be  said  that  Congress  was  "  forcing  his  hand," 
rather  as  his  partner  than  antagonist. 

The  President,  by  Seward's  advice,  had  been 
waiting  for  a  Union  victory  before  he  issued  the 
Preliminary  Emancipation  Proclamation  which 
had  been  agreed  upon  in  Cabinet  councils. 

Mr.  F.  B.  Carpenter,  the  artist  who  lived  at 
the  White  House  in  1864  while  engaged  in 
painting  his  noted  picture,  "  The  First  Reading 
of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  before  the 
Cabinet,"  has  recorded  Lincoln's  own  account  of 
these  early  deliberations  upon  the  momentous 
state  paper.  Said  the  President: 

It  had  got  to  be  midsummer,  1862.  Things  had  gone 
on  from  bad  to  worse,  until  I  felt  that  we  had  reached 
the  end  of  our  rope  on  the  plan  of  operations  we  had 
been  pursuing;  that  we  had  about  played  our  last  card, 


248  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and  must  change  our  tactics,  or  lose  the  game !  I  now 
determined  upon  the  adoption  of  the  emancipation  pol- 
icy ;  and.  without  consultation  with,  or  the  knowledge 
of  the  Cabinet,  I  prepared  the  original  draft  of  the 
proclamation,  and,  after  much  anxious  thought,  called 
a  Cabinet  meeting  upon  the  subject.  This  was  the  last 
of  July,  or  the  first  part  of  the  month  of  August, 
1862.  This  Cabinet  meeting  took  place,  I  think,  upon 
a  Saturday.  All  were  present,  excepting  Mr.  Blair, 
the  Postmaster-General,  who  was  absent  at  the  opening 
of  the  discussion,  but  came  in  subsequently.  I  said  to 
the  Cabinet  that  I  had  resolved  upon  this  step,  and  had 
not  called  them  together  to  ask  their  advice,  but  to  lay 
the  subject-matter  of  a  proclamation  before  them;  sug- 
gestions as  to  which  would  be  in  order,  after  they  had 
heard  it  read.  Various  suggestions  were  offered.  Sec- 
retary Chase  wished  the  language  stronger  in  reference 
to  the  arming  of  the  blacks.  Mr.  Blair,  after  he  came 
in,  deprecated  the  policy,  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
cost  the  Administration  the  fall  elections.  Nothing, 
however,  was  offered  that  I  had  not  already  fully  antic- 
ipated and  settled  in  my  own  mind,  until  Secretary 
Seward  spoke.  He  said  in  substance:  "Mr.  President, 
I  approve  of  the  proclamation,  but  I  question  the  ex- 
pediency of  its  issue  at  this  juncture.  The  depression 
of  the  public  mind,  consequent  upon  our  repeated 
reverses,  is  so  great  that  I  fear  the  effect  of  so  im- 
portant a  step.  It  may  be  viewed  as  the  last  measure  of 
an  exhausted  government,  a  cry  for  help ;  the  govern- 
ment stretching  forth  its  hands  to  Ethiopia,  instead  of 
Ethiopia  stretching  forth  her  hands  to  the  government." 
His  idea  was  that  it  would  be  considered  our  last 
shriek,  on  the  retreat.  "  Now,"  continued  Mr.  Seward, 
"  whrle  I  approve  the  measure,  I  suggest,  sir,  that  you 
postpone  its  issue,  until  you  can  give  it  to  the  country 
supported  by  military  success,  instead  of  issuing  it,  as 
would  be  the  case  now,  upon  the  greatest  disasters  of 
the  war ! "  The  wisdom  of  the  view  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  struck  me  with  very  great  force.  It  was  an 
aspect  of  the  case  that,  in  all  my  thought  upon  the 
subject,  I  had  entirely  overlooked.  The  result  was 
that  I  put  the  draft  of  the  proclamation  aside,  ^s  you 
do  your  sketch  for  a  picture,  waiting  for  a  victory. 
From  time  to  time  I  added  or  changed  a  line,  touching 
it  up  here  and  there,  anxiously  watching  the  progress 


EMANCIPATION  449 

of  events.  Well,  the  next  news  we  had  was  of  Pope's 
disaster,  at  Bull  Run.  Things  looked  darker  than 
ever.  Finally,  came  the  week  of  the  battle  of  Antietam. 
I  determined  to  wait  no  longer.  The  news  came,  I 
think,  on  Wednesday,  that  the  advantage  was  on  our 
side.  I  was  then  staying  at  the  Soldiers'  Home  (three 
miles  out  of  Washington).  Here  I  finished  writing  the 
second  draft  of  the  preliminary  proclamation;  came  up 
on  Saturday;  called  the  Cabinet  together  to  hear  it, 
and  it  was  published  the  following  Monday. 

After  the  President  had  determined  to  issue 
the  Proclamation,  he  set  himself  to  forestall  the 
objections  which  he  knew  the  document  would 
call  forth,  such  as :  that  it  was  intended  to  estab- 
lish negro  equality ;  that  it  proved  the  insincerity 
of  the  declared  purpose  of  the  Administration  to 
save  the  Union  by  showing  this  to  have  been 
from  the  beginning  to  free  the  slave,  etc.  On 
August  14,  addressing  a  deputation  of  negroes 
on  the  subject  of  colonization,  he  said,  in  regard 
to  the  vexed  question  of  race  equality: 

Why  should  the  people  of  your  race  leave  the  coun- 
try? It  is  because  you  and  we  are  different  races. 
We  have  between  us  a  broader  physical  difference  than 
exists  between  any  other  two  races.  Whether  this  is 
right  or  wrong  I  need  not  discuss;  but  this  physical 
difference  is  a  great  disadvantage  to  us  both.  Your 
race  suffer  greatly,  many  of  them,  by  living  among  us, 
while  ours  suffer  from  your  presence.  This  affords  a 
reason  why  we  should  be  separated.  Your  race  is 
suffering,  in  my  judgment,  the  greatest  wrong  inflicted 
on  any  people.  But  even  when  you  cease  to  be  slaves, 
you  are  yet  far  remote  from  being  placed  on  an  equality 
with  the  white  race.  You  are  cut  off  from  many  of 
the  advantages  which  the  other  race  enjoys.  The  aspi- 
ration of  men  is  to  enjoy  equality  with  the  best  when 
free,  but  on  this  broad  continent  not  a  single  man  of 
your  race  is  made  the  equal  of  a  single  man  of  ours. 
Go  where  you  are  treated  the  best,  and  the  ban  is  still 
upon  you.  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  this, — but  to 


35° 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


present  it  as  a  fact  with  which  we  have  to  deal.  I  can- 
not alter  it  if  I  would.  ...  I  believe  in  its  general 
•evil  effects  on  the  white  race.  See  our  present  condi- 
tion— white  men  cutting  one  another's  throats — none 
knowing  how  far  it  will  extend.  .  .  .  But  for  your  race 
among  us  there  could  not  be  war,  although  many  men 
engaged  on  either  side  do  not  care  for  you  one  way 
or  the  other.  ...  It  is  better  for  us  both,  therefore, 
to  be  separated. 

In  regard  to  the  paramount  purpose  of  the 
war,  the  President,  on  August  22,  refuted  the 
assumption  in  an  open  letter  of  Horace  Greeley, 
in  the  Tribune  of  the  2Oth,  that  slavery,  rather 
than  the  salvation  of  the  Union,  was  the  real 
issue.  He  said: 

As  to  the  policy  I  "  seem  to  be  pursuing,"  as  you 
say,  I  have  not  meant  to  leave  anyone  in  doubt. 

I  would  save  the  Union.  I  would  save  it  the  short- 
est way  under  the  Constitution.  The  sooner  the  na- 
tional authority  can  be  restored,  the  nearer  the  Union 
will  be  "  the  Union  as  it  was."  If  there  be  those  who 
would  not  save  the  Union  unless  they  could  at  the 
same  time  save  slavery.  I  do  not  agree  with  them.  If 
there  be  those  who  would  not  save  the  Union  unless  they 
could  at  the  same  time  destroy  slavery,  I  do  not  agree 
with  them.  My  paramount  object  in  this  struggle  is  to 
save  the  Union,  and  is  not  either  to  save  or  to  destroy 
slavery.  If  I  could  save  the  Union  without  freeing  any 
slave,  I  would  do  it ;  and  if  I  could  save  it  by  free- 
ing all  the  slaves,  I  would  do  it ;  and  if  I  could  save  it 
by  freeing  some  and  leaving  others  alone,  I  would  also 
do  that.  What  I  do  about  slavery  and  the  colored 
race,  I  do  because  I  believe  it  helps  to  save  the  Union ; 
and  what  I  forbear,  I  forbear  because  I  do  not  believe 
it  would  help  to  save  the  Union.  I  shall  do  less  when- 
ever I  shall  believe  what  I  am  doing  hurts  the  cause, 
.and  I  shall  do  more  whenever  I  shall  believe  doing  more 
will  help  the  cause.  I  shall  try  to  correct  errors  when 
shown  to  be  errors,  and  I  shall  adopt  new  views  so 
,fast  as  they  shall  appear  to  be  true  views. 

I    have    here    stated    my    purpose    according    to    my 


EMANCIPATION  251 

view  of  official  duty;  and  I  intend  no  modification  of 
my  oft-expressed  personal  wish  that  all  men  every- 
where could  be  free. 

But  the  most  astute  of  the  President's  pre- 
paratory statements  was  his  reply,  on  September 
13,  to  a  committee  from  the  religious  denomina- 
tions of  Chicago  asking  him  to  issue  a  proclama- 
tion of  emancipation.  In  this  he  reviewed  the 
arguments  for  the  proclamation  as  if  he  were  an 
opponent  of  them,  and  so,  by  admitting  their 
cogency,  he  put  himself,  when  ultimately  he  did 
issue  the  proclamation,  in  the  politically  advan- 
tageous position  of  being  forced  to  do  so.  Also, 
by  bringing  expediency  as  a  consideration  to  the 
fore,  he  prepared  the  country  for  an  indefinite 
postponement  of  emancipation,  which  would  be 
the  case  if  there  was  delay  in  achieving  the  victory 
upon  which  its  promulgation  depended.  The 
President  said : 

The  subject  presented  in  the  memorial  is  one  upon 
which  I  have  thought  much  for  weeks  past,  and  I  may 
even  say  for  months.  I  am  approached  with  the  most 
opposite  opinions  and  advice,  and  that  by  religious  men 
who  are  equally  certain  that  they  represent  the  divine 
will.  I  am  sure  that  either  the  one  or  the  other  class 
is  mistaken  in  that  belief  and  perhaps  in  some  respects 
both.  I  hope  it  will  not  be  irreverent  for  me  to  say 
that  if  it  is  probable  that  God  would  reveal  his  will 
to  others  on  a  point  so  connected  with  my  duty,  it 
might  be  supposed  he  would  reveal  it  directly  to  me ; 
for,  unless  I  am  more  deceived  in  myself  than  I  often 
am,  it  is  my  earnest  desire  to  know  the  will  of  Provi- 
dence in  this  matter.  And  if  I  can  learn  what  it  is, 
I  will  do  it.  These  are  not,  however,  the  days  of  mira- 
cles, and  I  suppose  it  will  be  granted  that  I  am  not  to 
expect  a  direct  revelation.  I  must  study  the  plain 
physical  facts  of  the  case,  ascertain  what  is  possible, 
and  learn  what  appears  to  be  wise  and  right.  .  .  . 


252  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

What  good  would  a  proclamation  of  emancipation  from 
me  do,  especially  as  we  are  now  situated?  I  do  not 
want  to  issue  a  document  that  the  whole  world  will 
see  must  necessarily  be  inoperative,  like  the  Pope's  bull 
against  the  comet !  Would  my  word  free  the  slaves, 
when  I  cannot  even  enforce  the  Constitution  in  the 
rebel  States?  Is  there  a  single  court,  or  magistrate, 
or  individual  that  would  be  influencd  by  it  there?  And 
what  reason  is  there  to  think  it  would  have  any  greater 
effect  upon  the  slaves  than  the  late  law  of  Congress, 
which  I  approved,  and  which  offers  protection  and 
freedom  to  the  slaves  of  rebel  masters  who  come  within 
our  lines?  Yet  I  cannot  learn  that  that  law  has  caused 
a  single  slave  to  come  over  to  us.  And  suppose  they 
could  be  induced  by  a  proclamation  of  freedom  from 
me  to  throw  themselves  upon  us,  what  should  we  do 
with  them  ?  How  can  we  feed  and  care  for  such  a 
multitude?  General  Butler  wrote  me  a  few  days  since 
that  he  was  issuing  more  rations  to  the  slaves  who  have 
rushed  to  him  than  to  all  the  white  troops  under  his 
command.  They  eat,  and  that  is  all ;  though  it  is  true 
General  Butler  is  feeding  the  whites  also  by  the  thou- 
sand ;  for  it  nearly  amounts  to  a  famine  there.  If, 
now,  the  pressure  of  the  war  should  call  off  our  forces 
from  New  Orleans  to  defend  some  other  point,  what  is 
to  prevent  the  masters  from  reducing  the  blacks  to 
slavery  again ;  for  I  am  told  that  whenever  the  rebels 
take  any  black  prisoners,  free  or  slave,  they  immediately 
auction  them  off !  They  did  so  with  those  they  took 
from  a  boat  that  was  aground  in  the  Tennessee  River 
a  few  days  ago.  And  then  I  am  very  ungenerously 
attacked  for  it !  For  instance,  when,  after  the  late  bat- 
tles at  and  near  Bull  Run,  an  expedition  went  out  from 
Washington  under  a  flag  of  truce  to  bury  the  dead  and 
bring  in  the  wounded,  and  the  rebels  seized  the  blacks 
who  went  along  to  help,  and  sent  them  into  slavery, 
Horace  Greeley  said  in  his  paper  that  the  Government 
would  probably  do  nothing  about  it.  What  could  I  do? 

Now,  then,  tell  me,  if  you  please,  what  possible  result 
of  good  would  follow  the  issuing  of  such  a  proclama- 
tion as  you  desire?  Understand,  I  raise  no  objections 
against  it  on  legal  or  constitutional  grounds,  for,  as 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  in  time  of 
war  I  suppose  I  have  a  right  to  take  any  measure  which 
may  best  subdue  the  enemy;  nor  do  I  urge  objections  of 


EMANCIPATION  253 

a  moral  nature,  in  view  of  possible  consequences  of 
insurrection  and  massacre  at  the  South.  I  view  this 
matter  as  a  practical  war  measure,  to  be  decided  on 
according  to  the  advantages  or  disadvantages  it  may 
offer  to  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 

The  committee  at  this  point  replied  to  the 
President's  objection  that  the  measure  was  inex- 
pedient, by  contending  that  it  would  secure  at 
once  the  sympathy,  heretofore  in  suspense,  of 
England  and  France,  and,  indeed,  of  the  whole 
civilized  world ;  further,  that,  as  slavery  was 
clearly  the  root  of  the  rebellion,  it  must  be  eradi- 
cated if  the  war  was  to  be  decisively  ended.  The 
President  said: 

I  admit  that  slavery  is  at  the  root  of  the  rebellion, 
or  at  least  its  sine  qua  non.  The  ambition  of  politicians 
may  have  instigated  them  to  act,  but  they  would  have 
been  impotent  without  slavery  as  their  instrument.  I 
will  also  concede  that  emancipation  would  help  us  in 
Europe,  and  convince  them  that  we  are  incited  by  some- 
thing more  than  ambition.  I  grant,  further,  that  it 
would  help  somewhat  at  the  North,  though  not  so 
much,  I  fear,  as  you  and  those  you  represent  imagine. 
Still,  some  additional  strength  would  be  added  in  that 
way  to  the  war,  and  then,  unquestionably,  it  would 
weaken  the  rebels  by  drawing  off  their  laborers,  which 
is  of  great  importance ;  but  I  am  not  so  sure  we  could 
do  much  with  the  blacks.  If  we  were  to  arm  them, 
I  fear  that  in  a  few  weeks  the  arms  would  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  rebels ;  and,  indeed,  thus  far,  we  have  not 
had  arms  enough  to  equip  our  white  troops.  I  will 
mention  another  thing,  though  it  meet  only  your  scorn 
and  contempt.  There  are  fifty  thousand  bayonets  in 
the  Union  army  from  the  Border  Slave  States.  It 
would  be  a  serious  matter  if,  in  consequence  of  a  proc- 
lamation such  as  you  desire,  they  should  go  over  to  the 
rebels.  I  do  not  think  they  all  would — not  so  many, 
indeed,  as  a  year  ago,  or  as  six  months  ago — not  so 
many  to-day  as  yesterday.  Every  day  increases  their 
Union  feeling.  They  are  also  getting  their  pride  en- 


254  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

listed,  and  want  to  beat  the  rebels.  Let  me  say  one 
thing  more :  I  think  you  should  admit  that  we  already 
have  an  important  principle  to  rally  and  unite  the  peo- 
ple, in  the  fact  that  constitutional  government  is  at 
stake.  This  is  a  fundamental  idea,  going  down  about 
as  deep  as  anything. 

In  dismissing  the  committee  the  President  said 
assuringly : 

Do  not  misunderstand  me  because  I  have  mentioned 
these  objections.  They  indicate  the  difficulties  that  have 
thus  far  prevented  my  action  in  some  such  way  as  you 
desire.  I  have  not  decided  against  a  proclamation  of 
liberty  to  the  slaves,  but  hold  the  matter  under  advise- 
ment. And  I  can  assure  you  that  the  subject  is  on  my 
mind,  by  day  and  night,  more  than  any  other.  What- 
ever shall  appear  to  be  God's  will,  I  will  do.  I  trust 
that  in  the  freedom  with  which  I  have  canvassed  your 
views  I  have  not  in  any  respect  injured  your  feelings. 

Already  the  President  had  laid  the  event  in  the 
hands  of  God  by  vowing  to  issue  the  proclama- 
tion if  Lee  were  driven  back  over  the  Potomac. 
This  result  of  the  battle  of  Antietam  was  not  at 
-once  apparent.  As  Lincoln  said  to  George  S. 
Boutwell :  "  The  battle  of  Antietam  was  fought 
Wednesday,  and  until  Saturday  I  could  not  find 
out  whether  we  had  gained  a  victory  or  lost  a 
battle.  It  was  then  too  late  to  issue  the  proc- 
lamation that  day ;  and  ...  I  fixed  it  up  a  little 
Sunday,  and  Monday  [September  22]  I  let  them 
have  it." 

Secretary  Chase  recorded  in  his  diary  the 
President's  address  to  his  ministers  upon  this,  the 
most  momentous  occasion  in  the  nation's  history. 

All  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  were  in  attendance. 
There  was  some  general  talk,  and  the  President  men- 
tioned that  Artemus  Ward  had  sent  him  his  book. 


EMANCIPATION  255 

Proposed  to  read  a  chapter  which  he  thought  very 
funny.  Read  it,  and  seemed  to  enjoy  it  very  much ;  the 
heads  also  (except  Stanton),  of  course.  The  chapter 
was  "  High-handed  Outrage  at  Utica."  The  President 
then  took  a  graver  tone,  and  said,  "  Gentlemen :  I  have, 
as  you  are  aware,  thought  a  great  deal  about  the  rela- 
tion of  this  war  to  slavery ;  and  you  all  remember  that, 
several  weeks  ago,  I  read  to  you  an  order  I  had  pre- 
pared on  this  subject,  which,  on  account  of  objections 
made  by  some  of  you,  was  not  issued.  Ever  since  then 
my  mind  has  been  much  occupied  with  this  subject, 
and  I  have  thought,  all  along,  that  the  time  for  acting 
on  it  might  probably  come.  I  think  the  time  has  come 
now.  I  wish  it  was  a  better  time.  I  wish  that  we 
were  in  a  better  condition.  The  action  of  the  army 
against  the  rebels  has  not  been  quite  what  I  should 
have  best  liked.  But  they  have  been  driven  out  of 
Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania  is  no  longer  in  danger  of 
invasion.  When  the  rebel  army  was  at  Frederick,  I 
determined,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  driven  out  of 
Maryland,  to  issue  a  proclamation  of  emancipation,  such 
as  I  thought  most  likely  to  be  useful.  I  said  nothing 
to  anyone,  but  I  made  the  promise  to  myself  and  [hesi- 
tating a  little]  to  my  Maker.  The  rebel  army  is  now 
driven  out,  and  I  am  going  to  fulfil  that  promise.  I 
have  got  you  together  to  hear  what  I  have  written  down. 
I  do  not  wish  your  advice  about  the  main  matter,  for 
that  I  have  determined  for  myself.  This  I  say  with- 
out intending  anything  but  respect  for  any  one  of  you. 
But  I  already  know  the  views  of  each  on  this  ques- 
tion. They  have  been  heretofore  expressed,  and  I  have 
considered  them  as  thoroughly  and  carefully  as  I  can. 
What  I  have  written  is  that  which  my  reflections  have 
determined  me  to  say.  If  there  is  anything  in  the  ex- 
pressions I  use,  or  in  any  minor  matter,  which  any  one 
of  you  thinks  had  best  be  changed,  I  shall  be  glad  to 
receive  the  suggestions.  One  other  observation  I  will 
make.  I  know  very  well  that  many  others  might,  in 
this  matter  as  in  others,  do  better  than  I  can;  and  if 
I  was  satisfied  that  the  public  confidence  was  more  fully 
possessed  by  any  one  of  them  than  by  me,  and  knew 
of  any  constitutional  way  in  which  he  could  be  put 
in  my  place,  he  should  have  it.  I  would  gladly  yield 
it  to  him.  But,  though  I  believe  that  I  have  not  so- 
much  of  the  confidence  of  the  people  as  I  had  some  time 


-256  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

since,  I  do  not  know  that,  all  things  considered,  any 
other  person  has  more ;  and  however  this  may  be,  there 
is  no  way  in  which  I  can  have  any  other  man  put 
where  I  am.  I  am  here;  I  must  do  the  best  I  can, 
and  bear  the  responsibility  of  taking  the  course  which 
I  feel  I  ought  to  take." 

In  accordance  with  the  request  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
Secretary  Seward  suggested  a  few  minor 
changes  in  the  document,  which  were  indorsed 
by  his  colleagues  and  accepted  by  the  President. 
The  proclamation  then  received  the  unqualified 
approval  of  the  entire  Cabinet  except  Postmaster- 
General  Blair,  who,  while  personally  in  favor  of 
it,  expressed  apprehension  of  its  evil  effect  on 
the  border  States  and  the  army,  which  contained 
many  opponents  of  abolition.  He  asked  leave  to 
file  a  paper  which  he  had  prepared  on  the  sub- 
ject, with  the  proclamation.  This  the  Presi- 
dent readily  granted.  Secretary  Blair,  however, 
changed  his  mind  over  night,  and  next  morning 
withdrew  his  objections.  The  proclamation  was 
published  in  the  newspapers  of  the  23d.  As  the 
President  said  in  response  to  a  serenade  from 
approving  Washington  citizens  at  the  White 
House  that  evening:  "It  [was]  now  for  the 
country  and  the  world  to  pass  judgment,  and, 
may  be,  take  action  upon  it."  The  proclamation, 
after  solemnly  affirming  that  the  purpose  of  the 
war  was,  and  should  continue  to  be,  the  res- 
toration of  the  Union,  and  promising  measures 
of  compensated  emancipation  to  those  slave 
States  which  should  adhere  or  return  to  the 
Union,  and  of  colonization  to  the  freedmen,  de- 
clared that  on  January  i,  1863,  "all  persons 
held  as  slaves  within  any  State,  or  designated 
part  of  a  State,  the  people  whereof  shall  then  be 


EMANCIPATION  257 

in  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  shall  be 
then,  thenceforward,  and  forever  free." 

The  country  quickly  gave  its  approval  of  the 
proclamation  in  the  most  official  way  possible  at 
the  time.  When  Confederate  invasion  of  Penn- 
sylvania was  imminent,  Governor  Andrew  G. 
Curtin  of  that  State  had  invited  the  governors  of 
the  Northern  States  to  meet  at  Altoona  on  Sep- 
tember 24  to  consult  on  emergency  measures  for 
the  common  defense.  Before  this  date  arrived 
the  defeat  of  Lee  had  removed  the  original  pur- 
pose of  the  convocation,  and  the  governors,  after 
spending  a  day  or  so  at  Altoona  in  a  helpful  ex- 
change of  information  upon  military  methods 
employed  by  their  several  States,  proceeded  to 
Washington  and  presented  a  written  address  to 
the  President,  pledging  their  support  in  sup- 
pressing the  rebellion,  with  the  recommendation 
that  an  army  of  100,000  men  be  held  in  reserve 
at  home  ready  for  such  emergencies  as  that 
which  had  recently  occurred.  To  this  was  added 
an  indorsement  of  the  new  proclamation.  All 
the  governors  of  the  loyal  States,  those  who  were 
present,  and  the  absentees  to  whom  it  was  shortly 
sent,  signed  that  portion  relating  to  the  sup- 
pression of  rebellion,  and  all  but  the  governors 
of  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Kentucky 
and  Missouri  signed  the  indorsement  of  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation. 

The  measure  was  acclaimed  by  the  newspapers 
in  general  and  by  men  of  prominence  all  over 
the  country.  Nevertheless  the  President  de- 
plored the  absence  of  material  results.  On  Sep- 
tember 28  he  wrote  to  Vice-President  Hamlin  in 
reply  to  his  congratulation  upon  the  Proclama- 
tion: 


258  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

It  is  six  days  old,  and  while  commendation  in  news- 
papers and  by  distinguished  individuals  is  all  that  a  vain 
man  could  wish,  the  stocks  have  declined,  and  troops 
come  forward  more  slowly  than  ever.  This,  looked 
soberly  in  the  face,  is  not  very  satisfactory.  We  have 
fewer  troops  in  the  field  at  the  end  of  the  six  days 
than  we  had  at  the  beginning — the  attrition  among  the 
old  outnumbering  the  addition  by  the  new.  The  North 
responds  to  the  proclamation  sufficiently  in  breath ;  but 
breath  alone  kills  no  rebels. 

In  the  fall  elections  to  Congress  the  ranks  of 
the  opposition  to  the  President's  policy  were 
greatly  increased. 

Abroad,  however,  the  Proclamation  secured  im- 
mediately and  enduringly  the  sympathy  of  the 
common  people  and  their  representative  states- 
men for  the  Northern  cause,  and  so  sounded  the 
knell  of  Southern  expectations  of  foreign  aid  and 
intervention. 

On  January  i,  1863,  none  of  the  'Stales,  or  por- 
tions of  States,  in  rebellion  having  laid  down  their 
arms,  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  therein  was 
formally  proclaimed,  as  declared  in  the  Prelimi- 
nary Proclamation. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  temperamental  despondency,  that 
in  practical  affairs  inclined  him  toward  pessimism, 
in  spiritual  matters  led  him  into  fatalism.  From 
the  time  of  the  Proclamation  onward  he  believed 
himself  to  be  but  a  "  humble  instrument  in  the 
hands  of  our  Heavenly  Father,"  as  he  remarked 
in  a  reply,  late  in  September,  to  an  address  by  a 
Friend,  Mrs.  Eliza  P.  Gurney.  He  continued : 

I  have  desired  that  all  my  words  and  acts  may  be 
according  to  His  will,  and  that  it  might  be  so,  I  have 
sought  His  aid;  but  if,  after  endeavoring  to  do  my  best 
in  the  light  which  He  affords  me,  I  find  my  efforts 
fail,  I  must  believe  that  for  some  purpose,  unknown  to 


EMANCIPATION  259 

me,  He  wills  it  otherwise.  If  I  had  had  my  way,  this 
war  would  never  have  been  commenced.  If  I  had  been 
allowed  my  way,  this  war  would  have  been  ended  be- 
fore this ;  but  we  find  it  still  continues,  and  we  must 
believe  that  He  permits  it  for  some  wise  purpose  of 
His  own,  mysterious  and  unknown  to  us,  and,  though 
with  our  limited  understandings  we  may  not  be  able 
to  comprehend  it,  yet  we  cannot  but  believe  that  He  who 
made  the  world  still  governs  it. 

In  the  same  strain  he  wrote,  a  day  or  so  later, 
the  following  meditation  on  the  Divine  Will : 

The  will  of  God  prevails.  In  great  contests  each 
party  claims  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  God. 
Both  may  be,  and  one  must  be,  wrong.  God  cannot  be 
for  and  against  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time.  In 
the  present  civil  war  it  is  quite  possible  that  God's  pur- 
pose is  something  different  from  the  purpose  of  either 
party ;  and  yet  the  human  instrumentalities,  working 
just  as  they  do,  are  of  the  best  adaptation  to  effect 
his  purpose.  I  am  almost  ready  to  say  that  this  is 
probably  true ;  that  God  wills  this  contest,  and  wills 
that  it  shall  not  end  yet.  By  his  mere  great  power  on 
the  minds  of  the  now  contestants,  he  could  have  either 
saved  or  destroyed  the  Union  without  a  human  contest. 
Yet  the  contest  began. 


CHAPTER  XII 

OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR 

THE  President's  fear  that  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  would  alienate  many  supporters  of 
the  Administration  was  verified  in  the  succeeding 
election.  Horatio  Seymour,  a  Democrat  of  the 
extremely  conservative  type,  was  elected  Governor 
of  New  York,  and  many  Republican  Congress- 
men were  replaced  by  Democrats,  especially  in  the 
Middle  West.  And  yet  Lincoln  was  afflicted  by 
the  recriminations  of  the  radicals  of  his  party, 
who  blamed  him  for  losing  the  confidence  of  the 
country  by  his  feeble  conduct  of  the  war.  To  one 
such  fault-finder,  General  Carl  Schurz,  he  replied 
in  a  spirited  letter  in  which  he  did  not  refrain 
from  thrusting  by  keen  innuendo  at  the  weak 
points  in  his  critic's  armor,  for  the  righteous  ire 
of  the  President  was  roused  by  strictures  upon 
brother  officers  from  one  who  had  failed  to  ex- 
hibit any  marked  military  ability  in  the  disastrous 
second  battle  of  Bull  Run : 

November  24,  1862. 

I  have  just  received  and  read  your  letter  of  the 
2Oth.  The  purport  of  it  is  that  we  lost  the  late  elec- 
tions and  the  Administration  is  failing  because  the  war 
is  unsuccessful,  and  that  I  must  not  flatter  myself  that 
I  am  not  justly  to  blame  for  it.  I  certainly  know  that 
if  the  war  fails,  the  Administration  fails,  and  that  I 
will  be  blamed  for  it,  whether  I  deserve  it  or  not.  And 

260 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       261 

I  ought  to  be  blamed  if  I  could  do  better.  You  think 
I  could  do  better;  therefore,  you  blame  me  already. 
I  think  I  could  not  do  better ;  therefore  I  blame  you  for 
blaming  me.  I  understand  you  now  to  be  willing  to 
accept  the  help  of  men  who  are  not  Republicans,  pro- 
vided they  have  "  heart  in  it."  Agreed.  I  want  no 
others.  But  who  is  to  be  the  judge  of  hearts,  or  of 
"heart  in  it"?  If  I  must  discard  my  own  judgment 
and  take  yours,  I  must  also  take  that  of  others ;  and 
by  the  time  I  should  reject  all  I  should  be  advised 
to  reject,  I  should  have  none  left,  Republicans  or 
others — not  even  yourself.  For  be  assured,  my  dear 
sir,  there  are  men  who  have  "  heart  in  it "  that  think 
you  are  performing  your  part  as  poorly  as  you  think 
I  am  performing  mine.  I  certainly  have  been  dissatisfied 
with  the  slowness  of  Buell  and  McClellan ;  but  before  I 
relieved  them  I  had  great  fears  I  should  not  find  suc- 
cessors to  them  who  would  do  better ;  and  I  am  sorry 
to  add  that  I  have  seen  little  since  to  relieve  those 
fears. 

The  President  sent  his  second  Annual  Message 
to  Congress  on  December  i,  1862.  In  it  he  first 
reviewed  foreign  relations,  ascribing  the  con- 
tinued recognition  abroad  of  the  Confederate 
States  as  belligerents  to  the  injury  of  commercial 
interests  caused  by  the  Federal  blockade.  He 
showed,  however,  that  in  England  there  was  aris- 
ing a  "  respect  for  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  rights  of  their  moral  and  loyal 
citizens,"  this  being  indicated  in  a  treaty  between 
this  country  and  Great  Britain  for  the  suppression 
of  the  slave  trade,  signed  on  April  7.  Upon  his 
favorite  project  of  colonization  the  President  was 
forced  to  report  that  no  countries  were  willing  to 
accept  the  freedmen  as  citizens  except  Liberia 
and  Hayti,  and  to  these  the  freedmen  were  unwill- 
ing to  migrate. 

Of  the  country's  finances,  as  conducted  by  the 
wonder-working  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the 


262  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

President   made   a  wholly   encouraging   report. 
He  said: 

The  vast  expenditures  incident  to  the  military  and 
naval  operations  required  for  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion  have  hitherto  been  met  with  a  promptitude 
and  certainty  unusual  in  similar  circumstances,  and 
the  public  credit  has  been  fully  maintained. 

Of  the  success  of  the  issue  of  "  greenbacks  "  as 
legal  tender  by  Act  of  February  25,  1862,  the 
President  reported : 

The  suspension  of  specie  payments  by  the  banks, 
soon  after  the  commencement  of  your  last  session,  made 
large  issues  of  United  States  notes  unavoidable.  In  no 
other  way  could  the  payment  of  the  troops,  and  the 
satisfaction  of  other  just  demands,  be  so  economically 
or  so  well  provided  for.  The  judicious  legislation  of 
Congress,  securing  the  receivability  of  these  notes  for 
loans  and  internal  duties,  and  making  them  a  legal 
tender  for  other  debts,  has  made  them  a  universal  cur- 
rency, and  has  satisfied,  partially  at  least,  and  for  the 
time,  the  long-felt  want  of  a  uniform  circulating 
medium,  saving  thereby  to  the  people  immense  sums  in 
discounts  and  exchanges. 

A  National  Bank  Act  had  been  drawn  up  under 
the  direction  of  Secretary  Chase.  The  President 
earnestly  advocated  its  passage : 

A  return  to  specie  payments,  however,  at  the  earliest 
period  compatible  with  due  regard  to  all  interests  con- 
cerned, should  ever  be  kept  in  view.  Fluctuations  in 
the  value  of  currency  are  always  injurious,  and  to 
reduce  these  fluctuations  to  the  lowest  possible  point 
will  always  be  a  leading  purpose  in  wise  legislation. 
Convertibility — prompt  and  certain  convertibility — into 
coin  is  generally  acknowledged  to  be  the  best  and 
surest  safeguard  against  them ;  and  it  is  extremely 
doubtful  whether  a  circulation  of  United  States  notes, 
payable  in  coin,  and  sufficiently  large  for  the  wants 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       263 

of  the  people,  can  be  permanently,  usefully,  and  safely 
maintained. 

Is  there,  then,  any  other  mode  in  which  the  necessary 
provision  for  the  public  wants  can  be  made,  and  the 
great  advantages  of  a  safe  and  uniform  currency 
secured  ? 

I  know  of  none  which  promises  so  certain  results, 
and  is  at  the  same  time  so  unobjectionable,  as  the 
organization  of  banking  associations  under  a  general  act 
of  Congress  well  guarded  in  its  provisions.  To  such 
associations  the  Government  might  furnish  circulating 
notes,  on  the  security  of  United  States  bonds  deposited 
in  the  treasury.  These  notes,  prepared  under  the  su- 
pervision of  proper  officers,  being  uniform  in  appear- 
ance and  security,  and  convertible  always  into  coin, 
would  at  once  protect  labor  against  the  evils  of  a 
vicious  currency,  and  facilitate  commerce  by  cheap  and 
safe  exchanges. 

A  moderate  reservation  from  the  interest  on  the 
bonds  would  compensate  the  United  States  for  the  prep- 
aration and  distribution  of  the  notes  and  a  general 
supervision  of  the  system,  and  would  lighten  the  burden 
of  that  part  of  the  public  debt  employed  as  securities. 
The  public  credit,  moreover,  would  be  greatly  improved 
and  the  negotiation  of  new  loans  greatly  facilitated  by 
the  steady  market  demand  for  government  bonds  which 
the  adoption-  of  the  proposed  system  would  create. 

It  is  an  additional  recommendation  of  the  measure, 
of  considerable  weight  in  my  judgment,  that  it  would 
reconcile,  as  far  as  possible,  all  existing  interests,  by 
the  opportunity  offered  to  existing  institutions  to  re- 
organize under  the  act,  substituting  only  the  secured 
uniform  national  circulation  for  the  local  and  various 
circulation,  secured  and  unsecured,  now  issued  by  them. 

The  President  reported  the  successful  estab- 
lishment and  operation  of  the  Department  of 
Agriculture,  created  by  the  Act  of  Congress  of 
May  15.  He  then  came  to  the  "central  act  of 
his  administration," — to  employ  his  own  phrase, 
uttered  on  a  subsequent  occasion, — the  Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation.  He  confined  the  rest  of  his 
message  to  the  first  provision  of  the  Proclamation, 


264  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

that  of  "  compensated  emancipation,"  so  earnestly 
did  he  desire  to  do  justice  to  the  loyal  border 
States,  and  so  convinced  was  he  that  it  provided  a 
means  for  the  amicable  restoration  of  the  Union. 

Our  national  strife  springs  .  .  .  not  from  the  land 
we  inhabit,  not  from  our  national  homestead.  There  is 
no  possible  severing  of  this  but  would  multiply,  and 
not  mitigate,  evils  among  us.  In  all  its  adaptations  and 
aptitudes  it  demands  union  and  abhors  separation.  In 
fact,  it  would  ere  long  force  reunion,  however  much  of 
blood  and  treasure  the  separation  might  have  cost. 

Our  strife  pertains  to  ourselves — to  the  passing  gen- 
erations of  men ;  and  it  can  without  convulsion  be 
hushed  forever  with  the  passing  of  one  generation. 

The  President  therefore  proposed  amendments 
to  the  Constitution  which  would  provide  compen- 
sation in  United  States  bonds  to  those  States  or 
loyal  individuals  which  should  free  the  slaves 
under  their  control  at  any  time  before  January  i, 
1900,  and  which  would  authorize  Congress  to 
colonize  freedmen  abroad.  The  articles  he  dis- 
cussed at  length,  advocating  them  as  embodying  a 
plan  of  mutual  concession  between  loyal  and 
honest  slaveholders  and  loyal  and  honest  Aboli- 
tionists. 

Doubtless  some  of  those  who  are  to  pay,  and  not  to 
receive,  will  object.  Yet  the  measure  is  both  just  and 
economical.  In  a  certain  sense  the  liberation  of  slaves 
is  the  destruction  of  property — property  acquired  by 
descent  or  by  purchase,  the  same  as  any  other  property. 
It  is  no  less  true  for  having  been  often  said,  that  the 
people  of  the  South  are  not  more  responsible  than  are 
the  people  of  the  North ;  and  when  it  is  remembered  how 
unhesitatingly  we  all  use  cotton  and  sugar  and  share 
the  profits  of  dealing  in  them,  it  may  not  be  quite 
safe  to  say  that  the  South  has  been  more  responsible 
than  the  North  for  its  continuance.  If,  then,  for  a 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       265 

common  object  this  property  is  to  be  sacrificed,  is  it 
not  just  that  it  be  done  at  a  common  charge? 

Of  the  economic  advantage  of  this  plan  the 
President  said,  prophesying  a  population  at  the 
end  of  the  century  of  100,000,000: 

The  proposed  emancipation  would  shorten  the  war, 
perpetuate  peace,  insure  this  increase  of  population,  and 
proportionately  the  wealth  of  the  country.  With  these, 
we  should  pay  all  the  emancipation  would  cost,  together 
with  our  other  debt,  easier  than  we  should  pay  our  other 
debt  without  it. 

On  the  subject  of  the  competition  of  the  freed- 
men  with  white  laborers  the  President  remarked 
at  length,  presenting  very  sound  economic  argu- 
ments as  to  the  advantages  of  freeing  the  negroes 
and  retaining  them  in  the  country,  and  very  un- 
sound arguments  as  to  the  advantages  of  deport- 
ing them.  Mr.  Lincoln's  economic  propositions 
were  strangely  opposed  to  his  economic  principles. 
While  he  was  continually  uttering  the  sound  aph- 
orism that  "  Labor  was  prior  to,  and  independent 
of  capital  "  (he  used  this  expression  in  his  Agri-  * 
cultural  Address  at  Milwaukee,  September  30, 
1859,  and  repeated  and  elaborated  it  in  his  First 
Annual  Message),  he  did  not  fully  realize  that 
this  independence  was  due  to  the  fact  that  labor 
created  its  own  wage,  but,  on  the  contrary,  he 
acted  upon  what  is  known  as  the  "wage  fund  " 
theory  (so  named  by  John  Stuart  Mill  who, 
shortly  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  death,  discarded  it  as 
erroneous),  namely,  that  capital  bought  labor 
exactly  as  it  did  commodities,  and  therefore  the 
amount  and  rate  of  wages  were  entirely  and  con- 
tinuously dependent  upon  the  labor  supply  in  the 


266  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

market.     Said  Mr.  Lincoln  in  the  present  mes- 
sage: 

With  deportation  [of  negroes]  even  to  a  limited  ex- 
tent, enhanced  wages  to  white  labor  is  mathematically 
certain.  Labor  is  like  any  other  commodity  in  the  mar- 
ket— increase  the  demand  for  it,  and  you  increase  the 
price  of  it.  Reduce  the  supply  of  black  labor  by 
colonizing  the  black  laborer  out  of  the  country,  and 
by  precisely  so  much  you  increase  the  demand  for, 
and  wages  of,  white  labor. 

Nowhere  is  the  fact  more  clearly  recognized  to- 
day than  in  the  South  that,  had  its  black  labor 
been  deported  after  the  war,  the  revival  of  indus- 
try in  that  region,  with  its  consequent  increase  in 
both  amount  and  rate  of  returns  to  capital  and 
labor,  would  have  been  far  slower  and  less  vigor- 
ous than  actually  occurred. 

The  President  supplemented  that  portion  of  his 
Annual  Message  relating  to  the  finances  by  a 
special  message  of  January  17,  1863,  giving  his 
approval  to  an  additional  issue  of  $100,000.000 
in  United  States  notes,  for  payment  of  the  army 
and  navy,  of  which  there  was  immediate  and 
urgent  need,  as  the  pay  of  the  soldiers  and  sailors 
was  greatly  in  arrears.  With  his  superficial 
economic  mind,  he  omitted  to  discuss  the  vital 
danger  of  an  increase  of  currency,  £he  impair- 
ment of  real  value  of  debts,  and,  confounding 
nominal  with  real  prices,  he  wasted  his  apprehen- 
sions upon  the  injury  wrought  by  "  increase  in 
the  cost  of  living  "  to  labor — whose  wages,  if  he 
had  stopped  to  consider,  must  rise  in  the  same 
ratio  as  prices  of  commodities. 

While  giving  this  approval,  however,  I  think  it  my 
duty  to  express  my  sincere  regret  that  it  has  been 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR        267 

found  necessary  to  authorize  so  large  an  additional 
issue  of  United  States  notes,  when  this  circulation,  and 
that  of  the  suspended  banks  together,  have  become 
already  so  redundant  as  to  increase  prices  beyond  real 
values,  thereby  augmenting  the  cost  of  living,  to  the 
injury  of  labor,  and  the  cost  of  supplies — to  the  injury 
of  the  whole  country.  It  seems  very  plain  that  con- 
tinued issues  of  United  States  notes,  without  any  check 
to  the  issues  of  suspended  banks,  and  without  adequate 
provision  for  the  raising  of  money  by  loans,  and  for 
funding  the  issues,  so  as  to  keep  them  within  due  limits, 
must  soon  produce  disastrous  consequences;  and  this 
matter  appears  to  me  so  important  that  I  feel  bound  to 
avail  myself  of  this  occasion  to  ask  the  special  attention 
of  Congress  to  it. 

As  a  commentary  upon  that  portion  of  the  An- 
nual Message  relating  to  the  selfish  interests  of 
the  commercial^  classes  abroad  as  causing  the  con- 
tinued recognition  of  the  Confederate  States  as 
belligerents,  it  will  be  interesting  to  note  two  let- 
ters written  by  the  President  shortly  after  the 
Message,  to  the  workingmen  of  England  who 
were  loyal  to  the  cause  of  the  Union  in  spite  of  the 
distress  wrought  among  them  through  the  cutting 
off  by  the  blockade  of  the  supply  of  raw  cotton 
to  the  mills  of  Europe. 

On  January  19,  1863,  he  wrote  a  letter  to  the 
cotton-spinners  of  Manchester  who  had  sent  him 
an  address  in  support  of  the  Union.  After  giv- 
ing them  an  account  of  his  stewardship  in  the 
cause  of  free  labor  and  civilization,  he  said : 

I  know  and  deeply  deplore  the  sufferings  which  the 
workingmen  at  Manchester,  and  in  all  Europe,  are 
called  to  endure  in  this  crisis.  It  has  been  often  and 
studiously  represented  that  the  attempt  to  overthrow 
this  government,  which  was  built  upon  the  foundation 
of  human  rights,  and  to  substitute  for  it  one  which 
should  rest  exclusively  on  the  basis  of  human  slavery, 
was  likely  to  obtain  the  favor  of  Europe.  Through  the 


268  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

action  of  our  disloyal  citizens,  the  workingmen  of 
Europe  have  been  subjected  to  severe  trials,  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  their  sanction  to  that  attempt. 
Under  the  circumstances,  I  cannot  but  regard  your 
decisive  utterances  upon  the  question  as  an  instance  of 
sublime  Christian  heroism  which  has  not  been  surpassed 
in  any  age  or  in  any  country.  It  is  indeed  an  energetic 
and  reinspiring  assurance  of  the  inherent  power  of 
truth,  and  of  the  ultimate  and  universal  triumph  of 
justice,  humanity,  and  freedom.  I  do  not  doubt  that 
the  sentiments  you  have  expressed  will  be  sustained  by 
your  great  nation ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  I  have  no 
hesitation  in  assuring  you  that  they  will  excite  ad- 
miration, esteem,  and  the  most  reciprocal  feelings  of 
friendship  among  the  American  people.  I  hail  this 
interchange  of  sentiment,  therefore,  as  an  augury  that 
whatever  else  may  happen,  whatever  misfortune  may 
"befall  your  country  or  my  own,  the  peace  and  friend- 
ship which  now  exist  between  the  two  nations  will 
be,  as  it  shall  be  my  desire  to  make  them,  perpetual. 

On  February  2,  upon  receiving  a  similar  ad- 
dress from  the  "  Workingmen  of  London,"  he 
replied  with  a  letter  in  the  same  vein. 

Congress  followed  the  recommendations  of  the 
President's  Message  to  pass  Legal  Tender  and 
National  Bank  Acts,  but  failed  to  legislate  upon 
the  subject  of  compensated  emancipation;  the 
Senators  and  Representatives  from  the  border 
States  holding  that  Congress  under  the  Constitu- 
tion had  no  authority  to  appropriate  public  money 
for  such  a  purpose. 

In  other  respects,  Congress  loyally  upheld  the 
hands  of  the  President.  It  ratified  his  suspension 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  the  cases  of  per- 
sons suspected  of  treason,  and  broadly  authorized 
him  to  suspend  the  writ  in  the  future  "  at  such 
times,  and  in  such  places,  and  with  regard  to  such 
persons,  as  in  his  judgment  the  public  safety  may 
require."  An  act  was  passed  to  enroll  and  draft 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       269 

in  the  national  service  the  militia  of  the  whole 
country,  each  State  contributing  its  quota  in  the 
ratio  of  its  population.  On  December  31,  i862z 
Congress  authorized  the  President  to  admit  West 
Virginia  into  the  Union,  upon  its  making  certain 
changes  in  its  proposed  constitution.  These 
changes  having  been  made,  the  President  admitted 
it  by  proclamation  on  April  20,  1863.  Two  Con- 
gressmen, chosen  in  New  Orleans  at  an  election 
ordered  by  the  military  governor  of  the  State, 
Brigadier-General  G.  F.  Shepley,  were  seated 
after  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  constitutional- 
ity of  their  election. 

So  earnest  was  the  President  in  his  desire  for 
the  ending  of  the  war  by  the  restoration  of  the 
Union,  that  he  was  ready  to  eliminate  all  partisan 
advantages  and  personal  ambitions  to  attain  the 
object.  Henry  Winter  Davis  of  Maryland,  who 
was  a  leader  of  the  radical  faction  in  Congress 
which  was  becoming  more  and  more  hostile  to  the 
Administration,  asked  him  in  March  for  his 
opinion  on  the  Speakership  of  the  new  House  of 
Representatives.  Lincoln  replied  on  the  i8th : 

The  supporters  of  the  war  should  send  no  man  to 
Congress  who  will  not  pledge  himself  to  go  into  caucus 
with  the  unconditional  supporters  of  the  war,  and  to 
abide  the  action  of  such  caucus  and  vote  for  the  person 
therein  nominated  for  Speaker.  Let  the  friends  of  the 
government  first  save  the  government,  and  then  ad- 
minister it  to  their  own  liking. 

In  accordance  with  this  principle,  Lincoln  also 
made  overtures  to  the  conservatives,  hoping  to 
commit  them  to  a  vigorous  enforcement  of  the 
war.  As  has  been  stated  already  (p.  164),  he 
was  willing  to  support  McClellan's  aspirations  for 


270  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  Presidency  if  the  deposed  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  would  openly  speak  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war.  In  a  similar  self-sacri- 
ficing spirit  he  subjected  himself  to  a  rebuff  from 
Horatio  Seymour,  Governor  of  New  York,  and 
probably  the  leading  member  of  the  Democratic 
.  party.  He  wrote  him  on  March  23 : 

You  and  I  are  substantially  strangers,  and  I  write 
this  chiefly  that  we  may  become  better  acquainted.  I, 
for  the  time  being,  am  at  the  head  of  a  nation  that  is 
in  great  peril,  and  you  are  at  the  head  of  the  greatest 
State  of  that  nation.  As  to  maintaining  the  nation's 
life  and  integrity,  I  assume  and  believe  there  cannot 
be  a  difference  of  purpose  between  you  and  me.  If 
we  should  differ  as  to  the  means,  it  is  important  that 
such  difference  should  be  as  small  as  possible;  that  it 
should  not  be  enhanced  by  unjust  suspicions  on  one 
side  or  the  other.  In  the  performance  of  my  duty 
the  cooperation  of  your  State,  as  that  of  others,  is 
needed — in  fact,  is  indispensable.  This  alone  is  a  suffi- 
cient reason  why  I  should  wish  to  be  at  a  good  under- 
standing with  you.  Please  write  me  at  least  as  long  a 
letter  as  this,  of  course  saying  in  it  just  what  you 
think  fit. 

Governor  Seymour  responded  but  coldly  to  this 
warm  invitation. 

Davis  shortly  became  the  President's  bitterest 
antagonist  in  his  own  party,  and  Seymour  his 
most  troublesome  adversary  in  the  ranks  of  the 
opposition,  while  McClellan  opposed  him  for  the 
Presidency  in  1864.  That  Lincoln  had  left  nothing 
undone  which  could  win  their  favor  and  friend- 
ship, to  a  lesser  man  might  have  been  a  matter 
for  regret ;  to  him,  if  he  thought  upon  it  at  all,  it 
undoubtedly  brought  the  consolation  of  duty  per- 
formed. 

During  this  period  the  President  applied  him- 
self to  the  subject  of  negro  enlistment  in  the  army. 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       271 

His  old  fear  that  the  former  slaves  would  make 
inefficient  soldiers  had  been  outweighed  by  con- 
sideration of  the  great  moral  force  of  the  policy. 
To  Governor  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tennessee,  who 
was  contemplating  the  raising  in  his  State  of  a 
negro  military  force,  he  wrote  on  March  26 : 

In  my  opinion  the  country  now  needs  no  specific  thing 
so  much  as  some  man  of  your  ability  and  position  to 
go  to  this  work.  When  I  speak  of  your  position,  I 
mean  that  of  an  eminent  citizen  of  a  slave  State  and 
himself  a  slaveholder.  The  colored  population  is  the 
great  available  and  yet  unavailed  of  force  for  restor- 
ing the  Union.  The  bare  sight  of  fifty  thousand  armed 
and  drilled  black  soldiers  upon  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  would  end  the  rebellion  at  once ;  and  who 
doubts  that  we  can  present  that  sight  if  we  but  take 
hold  in  earnest?  If  you  have  been  thinking  of  it,  please 
do  not  dismiss  the  thought. 

Although  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
Confederate  Government  had  been  urged  by  vari- 
ous of  its  soldiers  and  statesmen  to  arm  the 
negroes,  such  action  by  the  North  evoked  dire 
threats  of  reprisal.  White  officers  of  colored 
troops  were  to  be  treated  as  outlaws,  and  shot 
when  captured.  This  was  a  challenge  which  the 
Abolitionists  were  eager  to  accept.  To  them  the 
war  now  assumed  the  character  of  a  holy  crusade. 
Many  of  them  offered  the  Government  their  serv- 
ices as  officers  of  negro  regiments. 

A  letter  of  the  President  to  General  Banks  at 
New  Orleans  is  a  record  of  such  devotion.  It  is 
dated  March  29,  1863. 

Hon.  Daniel  Ullman,  with  a  commission  of  a  briga- 
dier-general and  two  or  three  hundred  other  gentlemen 
as  officers,  goes  to  your  department  and  reports  to  you, 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  colored  brigade.  To  now 


272  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

avail  ourselves  of  this  element  of  force  is  very  im- 
portant, if  not  indispensable.  I  therefore  will  thank 
you  to  help  General  Ullman  forward  with  his  under- 
taking as  much  and  as  rapidly  as  you  can ;  and  also  to 
carry  the  general  object  beyond  his  particular  organ- 
ization if  you  find  it  practicable.  The  necessity  of  this 
is  palpable  if,  as  I  understand,  you  are  now  unable 
to  effect  anything  with  your  present  force ;  and  which 
force  is  soon  to  be  greatly  diminished  by  the  expiration 
of  terms  of  service,  as  well  as  by  ordinary  causes.  I 
shall  be  very  glad  if  you  will  take  hold  of  the  matter  in 
earnest. 

General  David  Hunter  had  already  organized 
negro  troops  in  his  department.  From  the  be- 
ginning the  experiment  was  an  unqualified  suc- 
cess. It  was  a  pleasure  to  the  President  that  he 
could  now  write  a  letter  of  congratulation  to  the 
Abolitionist  general  whom  less  than  a  year  before 
he  had  been  compelled  to  reprimand  for  his  pre- 
mature act  of  emancipation. 

I  am  glad  to  see  the  accounts  of  your  colored  force 
at  Jacksonville,  Fla.  I  see  the  enemy  are  driving  at 
them  fiercely,  as  is  to  be  expected.  It  is  important  to 
the  enemy  that  such  a  force  shall  not  take  shape  and 
grow  and  thrive  in  the  South,  and  in  precisely  the  same 
proportion  it  is  important  to  us  that  it  shall.  Hence  the 
utmost  caution  and  vigilance  is  necessary  on  our  part. 
The  enemy  will  make  extra  efforts  to  destroy  them, 
and  we  should  do  the  same  to  preserve  and  increase 
them. 

In  all  their  subsequent  battles  the  negro  sol- 
diers acquitted  themselves  with  such  valor  that  in 
the  war  reports  the  sentence,  "  the  colored  troops 
fought  bravely,"  became  a  stock  expression. 

On  the  occasion  of  their  soldierly  conduct  at 
the  assault  of  Port  Hudson  late  in  May,  1863, 
George  Henry  Boker  wrote  a  poem  called  "  The 
Black  Regiment,"  in  which  he  extolled  their  pa- 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR        273 

triotism,  and  pleaded  for  their  recognition  as  com- 
rades by  the  white  soldiers. 

"  Freedom  !  "  their  battle  cry, — 
"  Freedom  !  or  leave  to  die !  " 
Ah !  and  they  meant  the  word, 
Not  as  with  us  'tis  heard, 
Not  a  mere  party  shout; 
They  gave  their  spirits  out, 

Hundreds  on  hundreds  fell; 

Oh,  to  the  living  few, 
Soldiers,  be  just  and  true. 
Hail  them  as  comrades  tried; 
Fight  with  them  side  by  side; 
Never,  in  field  or  tent, 
Scorn  the  black  regiment ! 

On  June  i,  through  Senator  Charles  Sumner 
of  Massachusetts,  the  President  made  a  tentative 
offer  to  General  Fremont  to  place  him  in  com- 
mand of  all  the  negro  troops  to  be  raised.  The 
offer  was  not  accepted.  Had  it  been,  Fremont 
at  the  close  of  the  war  would  have  commanded  an 
army  of  almost  200,000  men,  second  in  number 
only  to  Grant's. 

The  threat  of  the  Confederates  to  remand  cap- 
tured negro  soldiers  to  slavery  evoked  an  "  Order 
of  Retaliation  "  from  the  President,  issued  July 
3-' 

It  is  the  duty  of  every  government  to  give  protection 
to  its  citizens  of  whatever  class,  color,  or  condition,  and 
especially  to  those  who  are  duly  organized  as  soldiers 
in  the  public  service.  The  law  of  nations,  and  the 
usages  and  customs  of  war,  as  carried  on  by  civilized 
powers,  permit  no  distinction  as  to  color  in  the  treat- 
ment of  prisoners  of  war  as  public  enemies.  To  sell 
or  enslave  any  captured  person  on  account  of  his  color, 
and  for  no  offense  against  the  laws  of  war,  is  a  relapse 


274  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

into  barbarism  and  a  crime  against  the  civilization  of 
the  age. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  will  give  the 
same  protection  to  all  its  soldiers,  and  if  the  enemy  shall 
sell  or  enslave  anyone  because  of  his  color,  the  offense 
shall  be  punished  by  retaliation  upon  the  enemy's  pris- 
oners in  our  possession. 

It  is  therefore  ordered  that  for  every  soldier  of  the 
United  States  killed  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war,  a 
rebel  soldier  shall  be  executed ;  and  for  everyone  en- 
slaved by  the  enemy  or  sold  into  slavery,  a  rebel  soldier 
shall  be  placed  at  hard  labor  on  the  public  works,  and 
continued  at  such  labor  until  the  other  shall  be  re- 
leased and  receive  the  treatment  due  to  a  prisoner 
of  war. 

Either  the  threat  of  the  Confederates  was  an 
idle  one,  or  Lincoln's  order  deterred  them  from 
putting  it  into  execution,  for  with  but  one  impor- 
tant exception  they  gave  negroes  captured  in  bat- 
tle the  same  treatment  that  was  accorded  white 
prisoners.  At  the  storming  of  Fort  Pillow,  Ten- 
nessee, on  April  12,  1863,  the  Confederate  Gen- 
eral Forrest  massacred  at  least  three  hundred  of 
the  garrison,  mostly  negroes  and  their  white  offi- 
cers, after  these  had  thrown  down  their  arms. 

A  rumor  of  this  fiendish  act  came  to  the  Presi- 
dent just  before  he  delivered  an  address  at  a 
Sanitary  Fair  in  Baltimore  on  April  18,  1864,  and 
in  his  speech  he  solemnly  promised  that,  if  the 
charge  against  Forrest  proved  upon  investigation 
to  be  true,  retribution  would  be  surely  executed. 
He  said : 

There  seems  to  be  some  anxiety  in  the  public  mind 
whether  the  Government  is  doing  its  duty  to  the  col- 
ored soldier,  and  to  the  service,  at  this  point.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  and  for  some  time,  the  use  of 
colored  troops  was  not  contemplated ;  and  how  the 
change  of  purpose  was  wrought  I  will  not  now  take 


OTHER  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAR       275 

time  to  explain.  Upon  a  clear  conviction  of  duty  I 
resolved  to  turn  that  element  of  strength  to  account ; 
and  I  am  responsible  for  it  to  the  American  people,  to 
the  Christian  world,  to  history,  and  in  my  final  account 
to  God.  Having  determined  to  use  the  negro  as  a 
soldier,  there  is  no  way  but  to  give  him  all  the  pro- 
tection given  to  any  other  soldier.  ...  If  after  all  that 
has  been  said  it  shall  turn  out  that  there  has  been  no 
massacre  at  Fort  Pillow,  it  will  be  almost  safe  to  say 
there  has  been  none,  and  will  be  none,  elsewhere.  If 
there  has  been  the  massacre  of  three  hundred  there, 
or  even  the  tenth  part  of  three  hundred,  it  will  be  con- 
clusively proved;  and  being  so  proved,  the  retribution 
shall  as  surely  come.  It  will  be  matter  of  grave  con- 
sideration in  what  exact  course  to  apply  the  retribution; 
but  in  the  supposed  case  it  must  come. 

A  Congressional  investigation  proved  that  the 
rumor  was  true,  and  had  not  been  exaggerated. 
Yet  the  brutality  revealed  was  so  monstrous  that 
the  tender-hearted  President  refrained,  in  spite 
of  his  promise,  from  a  retribution  which,  to  be 
effective,  would  have  to  be  coextensive  with  the 
offense,  and,  because  visited  in  cold  blood  upon 
innocent  prisoners,  even  more  brutal  than  the 
massacre,  which  was  perpetrated  in  the  blood- 
lust  of  conquest. 

Accordingly,  the  public  interest  being  concen- 
trated at  the  time  on  the  bloody  campaign  of 
Grant  in  Virginia,  the  Fort  Pillow  incident  was 
allowed  by  the  Government  to  pass  without  action 
upon  it. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  war,  when  the  collapse 
of  the  Rebellion  was  in  plain  sight,  the  Confed- 
erate Government  debated  the  question  of  arming 
the  slaves ;  the  measure  failed  by  one  vote.  Mr. 
Lincoln  expressed  his  sentiments  upon  this  unique 
phase  of  the  conflict  begun  in  defense  of  slavery 
in  a  speech  on  the  occasion  of  a  presentation  of  a 


2 76  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

captured  Rebel  flag  to  Governor  Morton  of  In- 
diana. 

While  I  have  often  said  that  all  men  ought  to  be 
free,  yet  would  I  allow  those  colored  persons  to  be 
slaves  who  want  to  be,  and  next  to  them  those  white 
people  who  argue  in  favor  of  making  other  people 
slaves.  I  am  in  favor  of  giving  an  appointment  to  such 
white  men  to  try  it  on  for  these  slaves.  I  will  say  one 
thing  in  regard  to  the  negro  being  employed  to  fight  for 
them.  I  do  know  he  cannot  fight  and  stay  at  home 
and  make  bread  too.  And  as  one  is  about  as  important 
as  the  other  to  them,  I  don't  care  which  they  do.  I  am 
rather  in  favor  of  having  them  try  them  as  soldiers. 
They  lack  one  vote  of  doing  that,  and  I  wish  I  could 
send  my  vote  over  the  river  so  that  I  might  cast  it  in 
favor  of  allowing  the  negro  to  fight.  But  they  cannot 
fight  and  work  both.  We  now  see  the  bottom  of  the 
enemy's  resources. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

NORTHERN    RESISTANCE  TO    MILITARY  AUTHORITY 

THE  bloodiest  episode  of  the  War,  outside  of 
the  actual  operations  in  the  field,  was  the  resist- 
ance to  the  enforcement  of  the  draft  ordered  by 
act  of  Congress.  Of  course  this  was  not  a  very 
popular  law  anywhere,  but  it  was  carried  into  ef- 
fect generally  with  no  trouble  and  even  when  it 
was  troublesome  it  was  not  serious,  except  in  New 
York  City.  Here  the  resistance  to  the  draft  al- 
most engendered  a  counter-revolution.  On  Sat- 
urday, July  ii,  the  draft  commenced  and  pro- 
ceeded quietly,  the  sullen  crowds  which  gathered 
in  the  streets  confining  their  opposition  to  sup- 
pressed rage  and  portentous  scowls  and  mutter- 
ings.  On  Sunday,  however,  the  opposition  began 
to  become  coherent  and  gather  to  a  big  black 
ominous  cloud,  and  when  the  draft  was  resumed 
on  the  next  day,  an  unrelenting  mob  broke  into 
the  room,  destroyed  the  wheel  which  contained 
the  names,  and  set  fire  to  the  building.  The  fire- 
men appeared,  but  the  rioters  refused  to  let  them 
do  anything,  and  they  were  obliged  to  look  on  and 
see  the  entire  block  needlessly  sacrificed.  The 
Superintendent  of  Police  attempted  to  enforce 
order,  and  was  seized  by  the  insensate  mob,  and 
barely  escaped  with  his  life.  Of  course,  the  Rebel 
emissaries  were  active,  inciting  to  new  and  in- 
creased outrages;  and  thieves,  pickpockets,  bur- 

277 


278  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

glars,  and  criminals  of  all  sorts  flocked  into  the 
city  from  other  places,  and  plied  their  foul  voca- 
tions, while  the  dangerous  elements  of  all  classes 
and  both  sexes  exerted  the  most  untiring  efforts 
to  promote  the  cause  of  disorder,  riot,  and  rapine, 
Unfortunately,  the  militia  had  gone  to  Pennsyl- 
vania to  aid  the  troops  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
and  the  police  were  powerless  to  cope  with  a  mob 
which  now  numbered  thousands  of  the  worst 
enemies  of  society,  and  the  riot  went  madly  on  for 
the  space  of  four  days  until  the  troops  could  be 
restored  to  the  city.  The  draft  was  forgotten  and 
the  mob  was  fatally  bent  on  mischief  of  any  sort, 
crime  of  every  name,  outrage  of  every  degree. 
The  weakest  and  the  most  powerful  alike  were 
targets  for  the  violence  of  the  mad  mob.  Lead- 
ing citizens  were  assaulted,  and  their  houses  pil- 
laged. The  mob  had  an  especial  antipathy  to 
negroes,  and  although  the  blacks  were  unoffend- 
ing, yet  any  one  caught  on  the  streets  was  in- 
stantly strung  up  to  the  first  lamp-post.  There 
was  a  negro  orphan  asylum  on  Fifth  Avenue 
which  afforded  a  home  for  about  750  colored  or- 
phans ;  this  was  set  afire  by  the  brutal  mob,  the 
poor  orphans  were  driven  off  and  beaten,  and  the 
building  and  contents  were  destroyed,  after  being 
pillaged. 

The  only  consistency  in  the  acts  of  this  mad 
mob  was  to  steal  all  they  could,  kill  every  negro 
they  could  see,  and  attack  every  policeman  they 
could  discover ;  they  aimed  at  no  other  specific  re- 
sult, but  simply  did  all  the  mischief  they  dared ; 
they  did  indeed  intend  to  destroy  the  buildings  in 
which  the  loyal  newspapers,  especially  the  Tribune, 
were  printed,  but  the  riot  was  quelled  just  before 
it  attained  those  results.  Governor  Seymour 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  279 

made  a  speech  to  the  rioters  from  the  steps  of  the 
City  Hall ;  and  on  Tuesday  issued  a  proclamation, 
neither  of  which  produced  any  effect.  Both  the 
Governor  and  the  police  did  the  best  they  could, 
but  they  could  not  control  so  fearful,  desperate, 
and  bloody-minded  a  mob;  naught  but  the  force 
of  regiments  could  suppress  them.  The  riot  was 
not  quelled  till  the  serried  ranks  of  infantry,  with 
lines  of  glistening  steel,  gave  notice  to  the  rioters 
that  henceforth  they  could  not  longer  murder, 
pillage,  and  burn  with  impunity ;  but  that  the  con- 
test henceforth  would  be  with  organized  force. 
This  issue  the  rioters  were  eager  to  decline  and 
did,  in  fact,  decline. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  weakened  both 
by  the  withdrawal  of  troops  and  the  impairment 
of  the  army's  morale  on  account  of  this  riot,  and 
the  Rebel  army  was  strengthened  correspond- 
ingly. Lee  was  thereby  emboldened  to  weaken 
his  army  in  the  East  by  sending  Longstreet  to  the 
support  of  Bragg,  who  was  confronted  by  Rose- 
crans  in  Middle  Tennessee. 

Meanwhile  the  draft  had  not  been  enforced  in 
New  York  City  and  on  August  3  Governor  Sey- 
mour appealed  to  the  President  to  suspend  the 
draft  until  the  courts  could  adjudge  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  law,  which  was  in  doubt,  and  for 
other  reasons.  To  this  letter  the  President  made 
the  following  reply : 

I  do  not  object  to  abide  a  decision  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court,  or  of  the  Judges  thereof,  on  the 
constitutionality  of  the  draft  law.  In  fact,  I  should  be 
willing  to  facilitate  the  obtaining  of  it.  But  I  cannot 
consent  to  lose  the  time  while  it  is  being  obtained.  We 
are  contending  with  an  enemy  who,  as  I  understand, 
drives  every  able-bodied  man  he  can  reach  into  his 


28o  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

ranks,  very  much  as  a  butcher  drives  bullocks  into  a 
slaughter-pen.  No  time  is  wasted,  no  argument  is  used. 
This  produces  an  army  which  will  soon  turn  upon  our 
now  victorious  soldiers  already  in  the  field,  if  they  shall 
not  be  sustained  by  recruits  as  they  should  be.  It  pro- 
duces an  army  with  a  rapidity  not  to  be  matched  on 
our  side,  if  we  first  waste  time  to  reexperiment  with  the 
volunteer  system,  already  deemed  by  Congress,  and 
palpably,  in  fact,  so  far  exhausted  as  to  be  inadequate ; 
and  then  more  time  to  obtain  a  Court  decision  as  to 
whether  a  law  is  constitutional  which  requires  a  part 
of  those  not  now  in  the  service  to  go  to  the  aid  of 
those  who  are  already  in  it ;  and  still  more  time  to 
determine  with  absolute  certainty  that  we  get  those  who 
are  to  go  in  the  precisely  legal  proportion  to  those  who 
are  not  to  go.  My  purpose  is  to  be  in  my  action  just 
and  constitutional,  and  yet  practical,  in  performing  the 
important  duty  with  which  I  am  charged,  of  maintain- 
ing the  unity  and  the  free  principles  of  our  common 
country. 

The  draft  was  resumed  on  August  19,  and  as 
the  thugs  found  they  would  be  confronted  by  men 
with  guns  and  the  animus  to  shoot,  instead  of  by 
helpless  negroes  and  children,  they  concluded  that 
discretion  was  the  better  part  of  valor,  and  did 
nothing  unseemly ;  and  the  draft  was  concluded 
in  an  orderly  fashion.  I  recollect  in  November, 
1864,  paying  some  of  the  very  men  drafted  at 
this  time :  they  were  members  of  the  68th  New 
York  Infantry,  and  were  guarding  blockhouses 
between  Bridgeport  (Ala.)  and  Chattanooga. 
They  looked  sullen  and  discontented,  but  had  no 
scruples  about  drawing  their  pay. 

A  less  tragic,  yet  far  more  important,  develop- 
ment of  Northern  resistance  to  military  authority 
occurred  in  Ohio  during  the  summer  and  fall  of 
1863.  General  Burnside  in  his  new  depart- 
ment had  little  chance  to  repeat  his  military  blun- 
ders, but  his  well-meaning  stupidity  soon  caused 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  281 

him  to  involve  the  Administration  in  a  political 
complication  which  it  required  all  the  finesse  of 
the  President  to  bring  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
Clement  L.  Vallandigham,  an  extreme  States- 
rights  Democrat,  who  as  a  member  of  the  preced- 
ing Congress  had  in  a  speech  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  eloquently  denounced  the  war, 
declaring  the  purpose  of  the  Administration  to  be 
to  "  change  our  present  democratical  form  of  gov- 
ernment into  an  imperial  despotism,"  repeated 
these  sentiments  in  Democratic  meetings  through- 
out Ohio,  and,  in  particular,  assailed  General 
Burnside  for  an  edict  he  had  issued  known  as 
"  General  Order  No.  38,"  forbidding  acts  com- 
mitted for  the  benefit  of  the  enemy,  and  stating 
that  persons  committing  such  offenses  would  be 
tried  as  spies  or  traitors,  or  sent  over  into  the 
lines  of  their  friends.  On  May  4  General  Burn- 
side  arrested  Mr.  Vallandigham  at  his  home  in 
Dayton,  and  brought  him  to  headquarters  at  Cin- 
cinnati for  trial  by  court-martial.  His  counsel, 
Senator  Pugh,  applied  for  a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  which  the  judge  refused,  on  the  ground 
that  the  action  of  General  Burnside  was  in  the 
interest  of  public  safety.  Mr.  Vallandigham  was 
tried  on  the  6th,  found  guilty,  and  sentenced  to 
imprisonment  in  a  Federal  fortress.  General 
Burnside  designated  Fort  Warren  in  Boston  Har- 
bor as  the  place  of  incarceration.  The  President, 
however,  modified  this  sentence  into  the  alternative 
presented  by  Order  No.  38,  and  sent  the  prisoner 
over  into  the  Confederate  lines.  From  the  South 
he  ran  through  the  blockade,  finally  arriving  in 
Canada. 

The  opponents  of  the  war,  being  sadly  in  need 
of  a  concrete  example  of  the  tyranny  against 


B82  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

•which  they  were  inveighing,  seized  upon  the  case 
-as  fulfilling  every  desired  specification.  In  Val- 
landigham himself,  an  eloquent  fanatic,  they  pos- 
sessed an  ideal  hero  and  martyr  of  the  cause. 
Public  meetings  were  held  all  over  the  country  to 
•denounce  the  Administration  for  its  despotic  act. 
General  Burnside,  fearing  that  he  had  been  un- 
wise in  bringing  this  storm  of  criticism  upon  the 
•Government,  offered  his  resignation.  In  reply 
the  President  telegraphed  him  on  May  29  as 
follows : 

When  I  shall  wish  to  supersede  you  I  will  let  you 
Tcnow.  All  the  cabinet  regretted  the  necessity  of  arrest- 
ing, for  instance,  Vallandigham,  some  perhaps  doubt- 
ing there  was  a  real  necessity  for  it ;  but,  being  done, 
.all  were  for  seeing  you  through  with  it. 

The  brunt  of  seeing  Burnside  through,  how- 
ever, fell  on  the  President,  and  ably  did  he  fulfil 
the  difficult  task.  Opposed  to  him  were  some  of 
the  shrewdest  constitutional  lawyers  in  the  coun- 
try. At  their  instigation  meetings  in  denuncia- 
tion of  Vallandigham 's  arrest  were  held  in  vari- 
ous parts  of  the  country.  The  President  chose 
to  reply  to  the  resolutions  passed  by  a  meeting  at 
Albany,  N.  Y.,  on  May  19.  To  this  Governor 
Seymour  had  sent  an  address,  in  which  he  said: 
"  If  this  proceeding  is  approved  by  the  Govern- 
ment, and  sanctioned  by  the  people,  it  is  not 
•merely  a  step  toward  revolution — it  is  revolution  ; 
it  will  not  only  lead  to  military  despotism — it  es- 
tablishes military  despotism."  The  resolutions 
closed  with  a  denunciation  of  "  the  blow  struck  at 
a  citizen  of  Ohio  "  as  "  aimed  at  every  citizen 
of  the  North,"  and  "  against  the  spirit  of  our 
laws  and  Constitution."  They  earnestly  called  on 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  283 

the  President  "to  reverse  the  action  of  the  mili- 
tary tribunal  which  has  passed  a  cruel  and  un- 
usual punishment  upon  the  party  arrested,  pro- 
hibited in  terms  by  the  Constitution,"  and  to  re- 
store him  to  liberty. 

The  President  took  his  time  in  preparing  a  re- 
ply, with  the  result  that  the  letter,  when  it  was 
finished  on  June  12,  proved  to  be  one  of  his  not- 
able papers,  comparable  for  its  cogent  argument 
to  his  Cooper  Union  address. 

He  began  by  analyzing  the  resolutions  of  the 
meeting  and  showing  that  their  movers  and  him- 
self had  a  common  purpose,  the  maintenance  of 
the  nation,  differing  only  in  the  choice  of  meas- 
ures for  effecting  that  object.  "  The  meeting,  by 
their  resolutions,  assert  and  argue  that  certain 
military  arrests  .  .  .  for  which  I  am  ultimately 
responsible,  are  unconstitutional.  I  think  they 
are  not."  He  then  argued  that  these  arrests  were 
not  made  for  "  treason,"  as  charged,  but  on 
"  totally  different  grounds,"  i.  e.,  for  purely  mili- 
tary reasons.  He  narrated  the  manner  in  which 
the  enemy  with  which  the  country  was  in  open 
war  had,  under  cover  of  "  liberty  of  speech," 
"  liberty  of  the  press,"  and  "  habeas  corpus,"  kept 
a  corps  of  spies  in  the  North,  which  had  aided 
the  secessionist  cause  in  a  thousand  ways.  "  Yet," 
said  the  President,  "  thoroughly  imbued  with  a 
reverence  for  the  guaranteed  rights  of  individuals, 
I  was  slow  to  adopt  the  strong  measures  which 
by  degrees  I  had  been  forced  to  regard  as  being 
within  the  exceptions  of  the  Constitution,  and  as 
indispensable  to  the  public  safety."  But  the  evil 
had  to  be  dealt  with,  and  by  more  effective  means 
than  afforded  by  the  civil  courts,  on  whose  juries 
sympathizers  with  the  accused  were  apt  to  sit, 


284  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

"  more  ready  to  hang  the  panel  than  to  hang  the 
traitor."  And  again,  said  Lincoln,  there  are 
crimes  against  the  country  which  may  be  so  con- 
ducted as  to  evade  the  cognizance  of  a  civil  court, 
such  as  dissuading  a  man  from  volunteering  or 
inducing  a  soldier  to  desert.  These  are  cases 
clearly  coming  under  that  clause  of  the  Constitu- 
tion which  permits  suspension  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  "  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or 
invasion,  public  safety  may  require  it." 

The  President  then  proceeded  to  draw  a  dis- 
tinction between  civil  and  military  law.  He  said : 

The  former  is  directed  at  the  small  percentage  of 
ordinary  and  continuous  perpetration  of  crime,  while 
the  latter  is  directed  at  sudden  and  extensive  uprisings 
against  the  Government,  which,  at  most,  will  succeed 
or  fail  in  no  great  length  of  time.  In  the  latter  case 
arrests  are  made  not  so  much  for  what  has  been  done, 
as  for  what  probably  would  be  done.  The  latter  is 
more  for  the  preventive  and  less  for  the  vindictive  than 
the  former.  In  such  cases  the  purposes  of  men  are 
much  more  easily  understood  than  in  cases  of  ordinary 
crime.  The  man  who  stands  by  and  says  nothing  when 
the  peril  of  his  Government  is  discussed  cannot  be  mis- 
understood. If  not  hindered,  he  is  sure  to  help  the 
enemy;  much  more  if  he  talks  ambiguously — talks  for 
his  country  with  "  buts,"  and  "  ifs,"  and  "  ands." 

The  President  showed  how  greatly  the  country 
had  suffered  through  deferring  arrests  for  trea- 
son, by  citing  the  cases  of  Breckinridge,  Lee, 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  and  other  commanders  in  the 
Confederate  service  who  had  all  been  within  the 
power  of  the  Government  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  and  who  were  well  known  to  be  traitors 
at  the  time.  Said  the  President : 

In  view  of  these  and  similar  cases,  I  think  the  time 
not  unlikely  to  come  when  I  shall  be  blamed  for  having 
made  too  few  arrests  rather  than  too  many. 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  285 

Mr.  Lincoln  then  examined  the  contention  of 
the  committee  that  even  during  a  war  military  ar- 
rests were  unconstitutional  outside  of  the  region 
of  hostilities.  To  this  the  President  replied : 

Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  Constitution  itself  makes 
no  such  distinction,  I  am  unable  to  believe  that  there 
is  any  such  constitutional  distinction.  I  concede  that 
the  class  of  arrests  complained  of  can  be  constitutional 
only  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public 
safety  may  require  them ;  and  I  insist  that  in  such  cases 
they  are  constitutional  wherever  the  public  safety  does 
require  them,  as  well  in  places  to  which  they  may 
prevent  the  rebellion  extending,  as  in  those  where  it 
may  be  already  prevailing;  as  well  where  they  may 
restrain  mischievous  interference  with  the  raising  and 
supplying  of  armies  to  suppress  the  rebellion,  as  where 
the  rebellion  may  actually  be ;  as  well  where  they  may 
restrain  the  enticing  men  out  of  the  army,  as  where 
they  would  prevent  mutiny  in  the  army.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Vallandigham's  arrest  was  made  because  he  was 
laboring,  with  some  effect,  to  prevent  the  raising  of 
troops,  to  encourage  desertions  from  the  army,  and  to 
leave  the  rebellion  without  an  adequate  military  force 
to  suppress  it.  He  was  not  arrested  because  he  was 
damaging  the  political  prospects  of  the  Administration 
or  the  personal  interests  of  the  commanding  general, 
but  because  he  was  damaging  the  army,  upon  the  exist- 
ence and  vigor  of  which  the  life  of  the  nation  depends. 
He  was  warring  upon  the  military,  and  this  gave  the 
military  constitutional  jurisdiction  to  lay  hands  upon 
him.  If  Mr.  Vallandigham  was  not  damaging  t.he  mili- 
tary power  of  the  country,  then  his  arrest  was  made  on 
mistake  of  fact,  which  I  would  be  glad  to  correct  on 
reasonably  satisfactory  evidence. 

With  an  argument  appealing  even  more  to  the 
hearts  than  the  heads  of  his  critics,  Mr.  Lincoln 
continued : 

I  understand  the  meeting  whose  resolutions  I  am 
considering  to  be  in  favor  of  suppressing  the  rebellion 
by  military  force — by  armies.  Long  experience  has 


aS6  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

shown  that  armies  cannot  be  maintained  unless  desertion 
shall  be  punished  by  the  severe  penalty  of  death.  The 
case  requires,  and  the  law  and  the  Constitution  sanction, 
this  punishment.  Must  I  shoot  a  simple-minded  soldier 
boy  who  deserts,  while  I  must  not  touch  a  hair  of  a 
wily  agitator  who  induces  him  to  desert?  ...  I  think 
that,  in  sach  a  case,  to  silence  the  agitator  and  save 
the  boy  is  not  only  constitutional,  but  a  great  mercy. 

In  fine,  said  the  President: 

I  can  no  more  be  persuaded  that  the  Government  can 
constitutionally  take  no  strong  measures  in  time  of 
rebellion,  because  it  can  be  shown  that  the  same  could 
not  be  lawfully  taken  in  time  of  peace,  than  I  can  be 
persuaded  that  a  particular  drug  is  not  good  medicine 
for  a  sick  man  because  it  can  be  shown  to  not  be  good 
food  for  a  well  one.  Nor  am  I  able  to  appreciate  the 
danger  apprehended  by  the  meeting,  that  the  American 
people  will  by  means  of  military  arrests  during  the 
rebellion  lose  the  right  of  public  discussion,  the  liberty 
of  speech  and  the  press,  the  law  of  evidence,  trial  by 
jury,  and  habeas  corpus  throughout  the  indefinite  peace- 
ful future  which  I  trust  lies  before  them,  any  more  than 
I  am  able  to  believe  that  a  man  could  contract  so  strong 
an  appetite  for  emetics  during  temporary  illness  as  to 
persist  in  feeding  upon  them  during  the  remainder  of 
his  healthful  life. 

The  President  gently  rebuked  the  memorial- 
ists for  introducing"  partisan  politics  into  the  af- 
fair by  designating  themselves  as  "  Democrats  " 
rather  than  "  American  citizens."  Nevertheless 
he  accepted  the  challenge,  and  showed  that  An- 
drew Jackson,  the  idol  of  the  Democratic  party, 
had  made  a  military  arrest  of  the  author  of  a 
denunciatory  newspaper  article,  and  refused  the 
service  upon  himself  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus, 
being  fined  for  so  doing ;  thirty  years  later,  after 
a  full  discussion  of  the  constitutional  aspects  of 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  287- 

the  case,  a  Democratic  Congress  refunded  him 
principal  and  interest  of  the  fine. 

At  the  conclusion  of  his  letter  the  President 
stated  that  he  had  been  pained  when  he  learned: 
of  Mr.  Vallandigham's  arrest,  and  he  prom- 
ised to  release  him  with  pleasure  when  he  felt 
assured  that  the  public  safety  would  not  suffer 
by  it. 

On  June  n  the  Ohio  Democratic  Convention 
nominated  Vallandigham  for  Governor  of  the 
State  upon  a  platform  which  protested  against  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation,  military  arrests  in 
loyal  States,  and  in  particular,  the  banishment 
of  Vallandigham.  A  committee  presented  these 
resolutions  to  the  President,  and  on  June  29  he 
replied  to  them  in  the  tenor  of  his  letter  to  the 
Albany  meeting,  elaborating  the  constitutional 
argument,  and  closing  with  the  following  proposi- 
tion: 

Your  nominee  for  Governor  .  .  is  known  .  .  .  to 
declare  against  the  use  of '  an  army  to  suppress  the 
rebellion.  Your  own  attitude,  therefore,  encourages 
desertion,  resistance  to  the  draft,  and  the  like,  because 
it  teaches  those  who  incline  to  desert  and  to  escape  the 
draft  to  believe  it  is  your  purpose  to  protect  them,  and 
to  hope  that  you  will  become  strong  enough  to  do- 
so.  ... 

I  cannot  say  I  think  you  desire  this  effect  to  follow 
your  attitude ;  but  I  assure  you  that  both  friends  and 
enemies  of  the  Union  look  upon  it  in  this  light.  It 
is  a  substantial  hope,  and,  by  consequence,  a  real 
strength  to  the  enemy.  If  it  is  a*  false  hope,  and  one 
which  you  would  willingly  dispel,  I  will  make  the  way 
exceedingly  easy.  I  send  you  duplicates  of  this  letter, 
in  order  that  you,  or  a  majority,  may,  if  you  choose, 
indorse  your  names  upon  one  of  them,  and  return  it 
thus  indorsed  to  me,  with  the  understanding  that  those 
signing  are  thereby  committed  to  the  following  proposi- 
tions, and  to  nothing  else : — 


283  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

1.  That  there  is  now  rebellion  in  the  United  States, 
the  object  and  tendency  of  which  is  to  destroy  the  Na- 
tional Union ;  and  that,  in  your  opinion,  an  army  and 
navy    are    constitutional    means    for    suppressing    that 
rebellion. 

2.  That  no  one  of  you  will  do  anything  which,  in  his 
own  judgment,  will  tend  to  hinder  the  increase,  or  favor 
the  decrease,  or  lessen  the  efficiency  of  the  army  and 
navy,    while    engaged    in    the    effort   to    suppress    that 
rebellion ;  and, — 

3.  That  each  of  you   will,   in  his  sphere,   do  all  he 
can  to  have  the  officers,   soldiers,   and   seamen   of  the 
army  and  navy,  while  engaged  in  the  effort  to  suppress 
the  rebellion,  paid,   fed,  clad,  and  otherwise  well  pro- 
vided for  and  supported. 

And  with  the  further  understanding  that  upon  receiv- 
ing the  letter  and  names  thus  indorsed,  I  will  cause 
them  to  be  published,  which  publication  shall  be,  within 
itself,  a  revocation  of  the  order  in  relation  to  Mr. 
Vallandigham. 

The  committee,  put  upon  the  defensive  by  this 
clever  device  of  the  President,  took  the  only  atti- 
tude which  was  possible  short  of  capitulation,  and 
rejected  the  proposition  as  an  insult  to  their 
loyalty.  They  went  into  the  campaign  fore- 
doomed to  defeat.  The  Republican  party  deter- 
mined to  "  make  treason  odious  "  by  piling  up  an 
enormous  majority  of  votes  against  him.  They 
nominated  John  Brough,  a  "  War  Democrat,"  to 
make  the  issue  as  clear  as  possible.  By  a  State 
law  the  soldiers  in  the  field  were  permitted  to 
vote,  and  they,  as  well  as  the  citizens  at  home, 
cast  their  ballots  under  conditions  which  would 
be  far  from  satisfactory  to  a  ballot  reformer  of 
the  present  day.  Brough  won  the  election  with 
over  100,000  votes  to  spare.  Soon  after  his  de- 
feat, Vallandigham  returned  openly  to  Ohio,  evi- 
dently daring  the  Government  to  arrest  him  again. 
The  President,  however,  realizing  that  Vallan- 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  289 

digham's  power  to  injure  the  draft  was  broken, 
ignored  his  presence  in  the  country.  Undoubt- 
edly he  would  have  taken  a  similar  course  from 
the  beginning,  had  not  Burnside's  action  in  ar- 
resting Vallandigham  forced  him  to  carry  out  an 
autocratic  policy.  For  Lincoln  did  not  approve 
of  supplying  martyrs  to  the  opposition,  and,  there- 
fore, when  forced  to  do  so,  he  contrived  to  make 
them  as  unheroic,  and  even  ridiculous,  as  possible. 
Brilliant  orator  though  he  was,  Clement  L.  Vallan- 
digham's  connection  with  his  party  became  a  posi- 
tive detriment  to  it,  and  he  soon  retired  from 
politics  to  devote  himself  to  law,  in  the  practice 
of  which  he  met  his  death  in  a  strange  and  tragic 
fashion.  In  defending  a  man  accused  of  murder 
he  shot  himself,  as  he  was  illustrating  the  manner 
in  which  his  client  might  have  discharged  his 
pistol  by  accident  while  drawing  it  from  his 
pocket. 

The  political  campaign  of  1863  in  other  States 
as  well  as  in  Ohio  was  waged  along  the  lines  laid 
down  by  the  President,  with  the  result  of  sweep- 
ing gubernatorial  victories  for  the  Administration. 

The  President  not  only  sounded  the  keynote 
of  the  campaign,  and  formulated  the  Administra- 
tion's platform,  but  wrote,  as  it  were,  the  cam- 
paign text-book  of  his  party,  reviewing  the  acts 
of  the  Administration  and  supporting  its  policies 
so  completely  and  cogently  that  nothing  essential 
could  be  added.  All  this  he  did  in  an  address 
which  he  sent  to  a  mass-meeting  of  "  uncondi- 
tional Union  men,"  at  Springfield,  111.,  and  which 
was  there  read  on  September  3  amid  the  greatest 
enthusiasm. 

After  tendering  the  nation's  gratitude  to  those 
"  noble  men  whom  no  partisan  malice  or  partisan, 


290  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

hope  can  make  false  to  the  nation's  life,"  the 
President  plunged  at  once  into  a  justification  of 
his  course. 

There  are  those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  me.  To 
such  I  would  say :  You  desire  peace,  and  you  blame 
me  that  we  do  not  have  it.  But  how  can  we  attain  it? 
There  are  but  three  conceivable  ways :  First,  to  suppress 
the  rebellion  by  force  of  arms.  This  I  am  trying 
to  do.  Are  you  for  it?  If  you  are,  so  far  we  are 
agreed.  If  you  are  not  for  it,  a  second  way  is  to 
give  up  the  Union.  I  am  against  this.  Are  you  for 
it?  If  you  are,  you  should  say  so  plainly.  If  you 
are  not  for  force,  nor  yet  for  dissolution,  there  only 
remains  some  imaginable  compromise.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve any  compromise  embracing  the  maintenance  of 
the  Union  is  now  possible.  All  I  learn  leads  to  a 
directly  opposite  belief.  The  strength  of  the  rebellion 
is  its  military,  its  army.  That  army  dominates  all  the 
country  and  all  the  people  within  its  range.  Any  offer 
of  terms  made  by  any  man  or  men  within  that  range, 
in  opposition  to  that  army,  is  simply  nothing  for  the 
present,  because  such  man  or  men  have  no  power  what- 
ever to  enforce  their  side  of  a  compromise,  if  one  were 
made  with  them. 

To  illustrate.  Suppose  refugees  from  the  South  and 
peace  men  of  the  North  get  together  in  convention  and 
frame  and  proclaim  a  compromise  embracing  a  restora- 
tion of  the  Union.  In  what  way  can  that  compromise 
be  used  to  keep  Lee's  army  out  of  Pennsylvania? 
Meade's  army  can  keep  Lee's  army  out  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, and,  I  think,  can  ultimately  drive  it  out  of  ex- 
istence. But  no  paper  compromise  to  which  the  con- 
trollers of  Lee's  army  are  not  agreed  can  at  all  affect 
that  army.  In  an  effort  at  such  compromise  we  should 
waste  time  which  the  enemy  would  improve  to  our 
disadvantage ;  and  that  would  be  all.  A  compromise, 
to  be  effective,  must  be  made  either  with  those  who 
control  the  rebel  army,  or  with  the  people  first  lib- 
erated from  the  domination  of  that  army  by  the  suc- 
cess of  our  own  army.  Now,  allow  me  to  assure  you 
that  no  word  or  intimation  from  that  rebel  army,  or 
from  any  of  the  men  controlling  it,  in  relation  to  any 
peace  compromise,  has  ever  come  to  my  knowledge  or 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  291 

belief.  All  charges  and  insinuations  to  the  contrary 
are  deceptive  and  groundless.  And  I  promise  you  that 
if  any  such  proposition  shall  hereafter  come,  it  shall 
not  be  rejected  and  kept  a  secret  from  you.  I  freely 
acknowledge  myself  the  servant  of  the  people,  accord- 
ing to  the  bond  of  service — the  United  States  Constitu- 
tion— and  that,  as  such,  I  am  responsible  to  them. 

But  to  be  plain.  You  are  dissatisfied  with  me  about 
the  negro.  Quite  likely  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion 
between  you  and  myself  upon  that  subject.  I  certainly 
wish  that  all  men  could  be  free,  while  I  suppose  you 
do  not.  Yet,  I  have  neither  adopted  nor  proposed 
any  measure  which  is  not  consistent  with  even  your 
view,  provided  you  are  for  the  Union.  I  suggested 
compensated  emancipation,  to  which  you  replied  you 
wished  not  to  be  taxed  to  buy  negroes.  But  I  had 
not  asked  you  to  be  taxed  to  buy  negroes,  except  in 
such  way  as  to  save  you  from  greater  taxation  to  save 
the  Union  exclusively  by  other  means. 

You  dislike  the  emancipation  proclamation,  and  per- 
haps would  have  it  retracted.  You  say  it  is  unconsti- 
tutional. I  think  differently.  I  think  the  Constitution 
invests  its  commander-in-chief  with  the  law  of  war  in 
time  of  war.  The  most  that  can  be  said — if  so  much — 
is  that  slaves  are  property.  Is  there — has  there  ever 
been — any  question  that  by  the  law  of  war,  property, 
both  of  enemies  and  friends,  may  be  taken  when 
needed  ?  And  is  it  not  needed  whenever  taking  it  helps 
us,  or  hurts  the  enemy?  Armies,  the  world  over,  de- 
stroy enemies'  property  when  they  cannot  use  it ;  and 
even  destroy  their  own  to  keep  it  from  the  enemy. 
Civilized  belligerents  do  all  in  their  power  to  help  them- 
selves or  hurt  the  enemy,  except  a  few  things  regarded 
as  barbarous  or  cruel.  Among  the  exceptions  are  the 
massacre  of  vanquished  foes  and  non-combatants,  male 
and  female. 

But  the  Proclamation,  as  law,  either  is  valid  or  is 
not  valid.  If  it  is  not  valid  it  needs  no  retraction. 
If  it  is  valid  it  cannot  be  retracted,  any  more  than 
the  dead  can  be  brought  to  life.  Some  of  you  profess 
to  think  its  retraction  would  operate  favorably  for 
the  Union.  Why  better  after  the  retraction  than  before 
the  issue?  There  was  more  than  a  year  and  a  half 
of  trial  to  suppress  the  Rebellion  before  the  Proclama- 
tion was  issued,  the  last  one  hundred  days  of  which 


292  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

passed  under  an  explicit  notice  that  it  was  coming, 
unless  averted  by  those  in  revolt  returning  to  their 
allegiance.  The  war  has  certainly  progressed  as  favor- 
ably for  us  since  the  issue  of  the  Proclamation  as 
before. 

I  know  as  fully  as  one  can  know  the  opinions  of 
others  that  some  of  the  commanders  of  our  armies 
in  the  field,  who  have  given  us  our  most  important 
victories,  believe  the  Emancipation  policy  and  the  use 
of  colored  troops  constitute  the  heaviest  blows  yet  dealt 
to  the  Rebellion,  and  that  at  least  one  of  those  im- 
portant successes  could  not  have  been  achieved  when 
it  was  but  for  the  aid  of  black  soldiers. 

Among  the  commanders  who  hold  these  views  are 
some  who  have  never  had  any  affinity  with  what  is 
called  "  Abolitionism,"  or  with  "  Republican  party  poli- 
tics," but  who  hold  them  purely  as  military  opinions. 
I  submit  their  opinions  as  entitled  to  some  weight 
against  the  objections  often  urged  that  emancipation 
and  arming  the  blacks  are  unvvise  as  military  measures, 
and  were  not  adopted  as  such  in  good  faith. 

You  say  that  you  will  not  fight  to  free  negroes. 
Some  of  them  seem  willing  to  fight  for  you ;  but  no 
matter.  Fight  you,  then,  exclusively,  to  save  the  Union. 
I  issued  the  Proclamation  on  purpose  to  aid  you  in 
saving  the  Union.  Whenever  you  shall  have  conquered 
all  resistance  to  the  Union,  if  I  shall  urge  you  to  con- 
tinue fighting,  it  will  be  an  apt  time  then  for  you 
to  declare  you  will  not  fight  to  free  negroes.  I  thought 
that  in  your  struggle  for  the  Union,  to  whatever  extent 
the  negroes  should  cease  helping  the  enemy,  to  that 
extent  it  weakened  the  enemy  in  his  resistance  to  you. 
Do  you  think  differently?  I  thought  that  whatever 
negroes  can  be  got  to  do  as  soldiers,  leaves  just  so 
much  less  for  white  soldiers  to  do  in  saving  the  Union. 
Does  it  appear  otherwise  to  you?  But  negroes,  like 
other  people,  act  upon  motives.  Why  should  they  do 
anything  for  us  if  we  will  do  nothing  for  them?  If  they 
stake  their  lives  for  us  they  must  be  prompted  by  the 
strongest  motive,  even  the  promise  of  freedom.  And 
the  promise,  being  made,  must  be  kept. 

The  letter  closed  with  a  glowing  exordium, 
such  as  those  which,  in  the  days  of  the  fight  for 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  293 

free  territory,  had  roused  his  auditors  to  a  frenzy 
of  enthusiasm.  In  classic  phrase  it  pictured  the 
soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  Union  marching  on  to 
certain  victory.  It  paid  tribute  to  the  courage  of 
the  negro  troops,  and  with  Cromwellian  ire  con- 
trasted their  patriotism  with  the  hypocritical  pre- 
tensions of  the  "  malignants  "  of  the  peace  party. 
Yet  its  oratorical  fervor  was  restrained  from 
soaring  into  bombast  by  a  ballast  of  common- 
sense,  and  its  tense  feeling  was  relieved  by  a 
touch  of  grotesque  humor,  to  which,  as  President 
even  more  than  as  citizen,  Lincoln  was  wont  to 
give  loose  in  his  most  serious  moments.  Virtually 
his  "  last  stump-speech,"  it  was  unquestionably 
his  most  characteristic  and  best  one. 


The  signs  look  better.  The  Father  of  Waters  again 
goes  unvexed  to  the  sea.  Thanks  to  the  great  North- 
west for  it;  nor  yet  wholly  to  them.  Three  hundred 
miles  up  they  met  New  England,  Empire,  Keystone,  and 
Jersey,  hewing  their  way  right  and  left.  The  sunny 
South,  too,  in  more  colors  than  one,  also  lent  a  help- 
ing hand.  On  the  spot,  their  part  of  the  history  was 
jotted  down  in  black  and  white.  The  job  was  a  great 
national  one,  and  let  none  be  slighted  who  bore  an 
honorable  part  in  it.  And  while  those  who  have  cleared 
the  great  river  may  well  be  proud,  even  that  is  not  all. 
It  is  hard  to  say  that  anything  has  been  more  bravely 
and  well  done  than  at  Antietam,  Murfreesboro,  Gettys- 
burg, and  on  many  fields  of  less  note.  Nor  must  Uncle 
Sam's  web-feet  be  forgotten.  At  all  the  watery  mar- 
gins they  have  been  present.  Not  only  on  the  deep 
sea,  the  broad  bay,  and  the  rapid  river,  but  also  up 
the  narrow,  muddy  bayou,  and  wherever  the  ground 
was  a  little  damp,  they  have  been  and  made  their 
tracks.  Thanks  to  all :  for  the  great  republic — for  the 
principle  it  lives  by  and  keeps  alive — for  man's  vast 
future — thanks  to  all. 

Peace  does  not  appear  so  distant  as  it  did.  I  hope 
it  will  come  soon,  and  come  to  stay,  and  so  come  as 
to  be  worth  the  keeping  in  all  future  time.  It  will  then 


294  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

have  been  proved  that  among  free  men  there  can  be  no 
successful  appeal  from  the  ballot  to  the  bullet,  and  that 
they  who  take  such  appeal  are  sure  to  lose  their  case 
and  pay  the  cost.  And  then  there  will  be  some  black 
men  who  can  remember  that  with  silent  tongue,  and 
clenched  teeth,  and  steady  eye,  and  well-poised  bayonet, 
they  have  helped  mankind  on  to  this  great  consumma- 
tion, while  I  fear  there  will  be  some  white  ones  unable 
to  forget  that  with  malignant  heart  and  deceitful  speech 
they  strove  to  hinder  it. 

Still,  let  us  not  be  over-sanguine  of  a  speedy  final 
triumph.  Let  us  be  quite  sober.  Let  us  diligently 
apply  the  means,  never  doubting  that  a  just  God,  in  his 
own  good  time,  will  give  us  the  rightful  result. 

That  reference  in  the  address  to  offers  of 
compromise  made  by  representatives  of  the  Con- 
federacy was  evoked  by  various  propositions 
made  for  self-advertisement  by  irresponsible  par- 
ties such  as  Fernando  Wood,  a  Democratic 
politician  of  New  York,  who  boldly  confessed  his 
sympathy  with  the  South  and  virtually  offered 
himself  as  a  mediator.  To  him  Lincoln  had  re- 
plied (on  December  12,  1862) : 

Understanding  your  phrase,  "  The  Southern  States 
would  send  representatives  to  the  next  Congress,"  to 
be  substantially  the  same  as  that  "  the  people  of  the 
Southern  States  would  cease  resistance,  and  would  re- 
inaugurate,  submit  to,  and  maintain  the  national  author- 
ity within  the  limits  of  such  States,  under  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,"  I  say  that  in  such  case  the 
war  would  cease  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  if,  within  a  reasonable  time,  "  a  full  and  general 
amnesty  "  were  necessary  to  such  end,  it  would  not  be 
withheld.  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  proper  now  for 
me  to  communicate  this  formally  or  informally  to  the* 
people  of  the  Southern  States.  My  belief  is  that 
they  already  know  it ;  and  when  they  choose,  if  ever, 
they  can  communicate  with  me  unequivocally.  Nor 
do  I  think  it  proper  now  to  suspend  military  operations 
to  try  any  experiment  of  negotiation. 


NORTHERN  RESISTANCE  TO  AUTHORITY  295 

It  is  true,  however,  that  a  no  less  responsible 
party  than  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  Vice-Presi- 
dent of  the  Confederacy,  had  presented  to  the 
Navy  Department  on  July  4,  1863,  a  request  that 
he  be  permitted  to  come  to  Washington  bearing 
"  a  communication  in  writing  from  Jefferson 
Davis,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  Confederate  States,  to  Abraham 
Lincoln,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States,"  but  there  was 
no  statement  of  the  nature  of  the  communication. 
As  the  request  studiously  avoided  recognition  of 
the  President  in  other  than  the  military  capacity 
of  that  office,  Mr.  Lincoln  very  wisely  and 
properly  ordered  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to 
reply : 

The  request  of  A.  H.  Stephens  is  inadmissible.  The 
customary  agents  and  channels  are  adequate  for  all 
needful  communication  and  conference  between  the 
United  States  forces  and  the  insurgents. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   SECOND   ELECTION    AND    INAUGURATION — RE- 
CONSTRUCTION 

IT  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  ex- 
pected that  Mr.  Lincoln's  policy  would  be  in- 
dorsed by  all  members  of  his  own  party.  His 
efforts  were  conscientiously  directed  toward  the 
preservation  of  the  Union,  and  not  to  the  enforce- 
ment of  any  partisan  or  sectional  policy ;  the  radi- 
cals were  dissatisfied  with  his  conservative  policy 
in  reference  to  slavery  and  to  his  retention  of  Mc- 
Clellan ;  likewise  to  his  fraternity  with  the  Blairs, 
and  his  pandering  to  the  border  slave  States ;  and 
there  were  many  personal  grievances  inherent  in 
the  distribution  of  so  much  official  patronage. 
The  net  result  was,  the  organization  of  a  faction 
within  his  own  party  to  secure  the  retirement  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  at  the  end  of  his  first  term,  and  a 
change  of  dynasty.  The  great  leaders  in  this 
movement  were  Salmon  P.  Chase  and  Benjamin 
F.  Wade  of  Ohio,  H.  Winter  Davis  of  Maryland, 
and  Samuel  C.  Pomeroy  of  Kansas.  Chase  had 
been  generally  regarded  as  the  candidate  whom 
they  should  rally  the  opposition  to,  but  not  meet- 
ing with  the  support  he  deemed  necessary  for  any 
show  of  success,  he  retired  from  the  contest  early. 
About  May  i  a  call  for  a  convention  was  issued ; 
and  still  another  call  by  some  Germans  of  St. 
296 


THE  SECOND  ELECTION  297 

Louis ;  and  yet  another  by  some  radical  Abolition- 
ists, all  centering  in  this  same  movement. 

Chase,  however,  soon  realized  the  hopelessness 
of  his  Presidential  aspiration,  and  retired  from  the 
contest.  The  malcontents  then  picked  upon  Fre- 
mont as  their  candidate,  and  called  a  convention 
to  nominate  him  at  Cleveland  on  May  31. 

On  that  day  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  per- 
sons assembled  at  the  Weddell  House  in  Cleve- 
land, professing  to  hail  from  fifteen  different 
States  and  the  District  of  Columbia.  As  no  con- 
ventions had  been  held,  however,  the  gathering 
could  assume  no  higher  significance  than  that  of 
a  mass-meeting  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  recusant, 
disgruntled  politicians,  who  did  not  approve  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  administration,  and  would  have 
liked  to  put  someone  else  in  his  place.  As  a  rule, 
they  were  distinguished  men  and  disappointed 
politicians,  many  of  them  "  cranks,"  whose  ruling 
idea  was,  that  the  rebellion  should  be  crushed 
forthwith,  and  the  property  of  the  Rebels  confis- 
cated. But  none  of  the  great  leaders  were  there : 
Chase,  Wade,  Davis,  and  Pomeroy,  who  had 
started  the  movement,  were  conspicuous  by  their 
absence.  The  one  hundred  and  fifty  were  gen- 
erally strangers  to  public  life,  and  to  each  other, 
and  the  only  external  manifestation  presented  was 
of  a  lot  of  small  political  philosophers,  wandering 
aimlessly  through  the  hotel  exchange,  trying  to 
find  out  what  they  had  come  there  for.  As  they 
had  come  there  on  their  own  hook,  and  had  no 
credentials,  and  represented  nobody  but  them- 
selves, so  also,  to  make  matters  harmonious,  no 
hall  had  been  provided,  nor  had  any  other  ar- 
rangement been  made  for  the  purposed  meeting. 
The  ridiculousness  of  the  whole  affair  was  palp- 


398  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

able,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  majority  of  the 
crowd  would  have  slunk  away  and  got  quietly  out 
of  town,  had  it  not  been  that  it  would  have  added 
to  the  grotesqueness  of  the  situation.  Finally, 
someone  started  a  fifty-cent  subscription  and  en- 
gaged a  hall,  borrowed  a  pen  and  bottle  of  ink, 
cabbaged  a  dozen  sheets  of  hotel  notepaper,  and 
gathered  the  "  delegates  "  together  in  the  front 
part  of  the  hall.  They  opened  proceedings  by 
electing  the  greatest  man  there,  John  Cochrane  of 
New  York,  to  be  chairman.  In  the  afternoon 
resolutions  were  adopted.  Then  the  luckless  and 
troublesome  Fremont  was  nominated  for  Presi- 
dent by  acclamation,  and  the  chairman  as  Vice- 
President,  after  which  the  "  convention "  ad- 
journed. The  platform  was  a  string  of  gener- 
alities, some  of  which  no  one  could  object  to. 
The  "  party  "  acquiesced  in  the  suppression  of 
the  rebellion ;  favored  the  right  of  habeas  corpus, 
right  of  asylum,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  an  amend- 
ment of  the  Constitution  to  debar  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  slavery,  one  term  of  the  Presidency,  elec- 
tion of  President  by  direct  vote  of  the  people,  con- 
fiscation of  the  land  of  Rebels,  and  its  distribution 
among  soldiers  and  actual  settlers. 

Fremont,  visionary  as  usual,  seems  to  have 
thought  he  was  going  to  be  elected.  He  accepted 
the  nomination  in  a  splenetic  letter,  abusing  the 
Administration  for  infidelity  to  the  principles 
upon  which  it  came  into  being,  and  for  "  its  dis- 
regard of  constitutionaal  rights,  its  violation  of 
personal  liberty  and  the  liberty  of  the  press,  and, 
as  a  crowning  shame,  its  abandonment  of  the  right 
of  asylum,  dear  to  all  free  nations  abroad."  What 
was  meant  by  the  last  sentence  is  a  deep  mystery. 
He  concurred  in  the  platform  except  the  plank 


THE  SECOND  ELECTION  299 

about  confiscation ;  agreed  tentatively  to  with- 
draw from  the  canvass  if  Lincoln  would  ;  and  ris- 
ing to  the  mock  solemnity  of  the  occasion,  loftily 
exclaimed :  "  If  Mr.  Lincoln  be  renominated,  as 
I  believe  it  would  be  fatal  to  the  country  to  in- 
dorse a  policy  and  renew  a  power  which  has  cost 
us  the  lives  of  thousands  of  men  and  needlessly 
put  the  country  on  the  road  to  bankruptcy,  there 
will  remain  no  alternative  but  to  organize  against 
him  every  element  of  conscientious  opposition, 
with  the  view  to  prevent  the  misfortune  of  his 
election."  And  so  certain  was  he  of  election, 
that,  with  no  well-defined  basis  of  support,  he 
resigned  his  position  in  the  army. 

It  is  astonishing  how  the  Presidential  maggot, 
working  in  a  man's  brain,  addles  his  good  sense. 
That  Fremont  should  refer  to  national  bank- 
ruptcy showed  imbecility  of  the  supreme  type, 
inasmuch  as  his  course  in  Missouri,  had  it  been 
adopted  by  the  Government  generally,  would 
have  made  the  country  bankrupt  in  ninety  days. 

On  the  same  day  that  Fremont  wrote  his  letter 
of  acceptance,  a  meeting  was  held  in  New  York, 
ostensibly  to  thank  General  Grant  for  his  success 
in  his  campaign  toward  Richmond,  but  really  to 
launch  him  as  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency. 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  invited  to  attend,  and  in  reply 
he  wrote  a  letter  which  completely  nullified  the 
Presidential  part  of  it.  His  letter  read  thus : 


It  is  impossible  for  me  to  attend.  I  approve,  never- 
theless, of  whatever  may  tend  to  strengthen  and  sustain 
General  Grant  and  the  noble  armies  now  under  his 
direction.  My  previous  high  estimate  of  General  Grant 
has  been  maintained  and  heightened  by  what  has  oc- 
curred in  the  remarkable  campaign  he  is  now  con- 
ducting, while  the  magnitude  and  difficulty  of  the  task 


3°° 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


before  him  does  not  prove  less  than  I  expected.  He 
and  his  brave  soldiers  are  now  in  the  midst  of  their 
great  trial,  and  I  trust  that  at  your  meeting  you  will 
so  shape  your  good  words  that  they  may  turn  to  men 
and  guns,  moving  to  his  and  their  support. 

At  the  corvvention  which  met  in  Baltimore  on 
the  8th  day  of  June  Mr.  Lincoln  received  every 
vote  for  President,  except  the  Missouri  vote, 
which,  under  instructions,  was  cast  for  General 
Grant,  in  honor  of  his  having  once  lived  there. 

The  President  accepted  the  nomination  in  a 
brief  speech,  and  thereafter  in  an  equally  brief 
letter.  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tennessee  was  nomi- 
nated as  Vice-President. 

The  Democratic  Convention  met  at  Chicago  on 
August  29.  Governor  Seymour  of  New  York 
presided,  and  Mr.  Vallandigham  of  Ohio  drafted 
the  only  plank  of  the  platform  which  received  any 
attention  during  the  campaign.  This  was  a  dec- 
laration that  the  war  was  a  failure,  and  that  a 
convention  of  the  States,  or  some  other  peaceable 
means,  be  arranged  to  restore  peace  "  on  the 
basis  of  the  Federal  Union  of  the  States." 

General  McClellan  of  New  Jersey  was  nomi- 
nated for  President,  and  George  H.  Pendleton 
of  Ohio,  an  extreme  peace  man,  for  Vice-Presi- 
dent. 

On  the  day  after  the  convention  adjourned 
came  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  and  Lin- 
coln's victory,  which  he  himself  had  previously 
doubted,  was  assured. 

Fremont  realized  the  disloyal  attitude  in  which 
he  appeared  before  the  country,  and  withdrew  his 
candidacy  in  favor  of  Lincoln.  General  McClel- 
lan tried  to  stem  the  set  of  the  tide  toward  Lincoln 
by  repudiating  the  "  peace  "  plank  of  his  plat- 


THE  SECOND  ELECTION  301 

form.  The  President  greatly  increased  his  popu- 
larity by  a  number  of  cheering  speeches  he  made 
to  troops  returning  from  the  front  through  Wash- 
ington, and  in  response  to  serenades  of  citizens 
of  Maryland  (on  the  occasion  of  the  State's  adop- 
tion of  a  new  constitution  without  slavery)  and  of 
Pennsylvania. 

His  tender  solicitude  for  the  wounded  sol- 
diers, as  shown  by  his  speaking  at  sanitary  fairs 
in  neighboring  cities,  as  well  as  consoling  letters 
to  the  bereaved  relatives  of  those  killed  in  battle 
and  the  pardons  he  gave  to  soldiers  condemned  to 
die  for  such  offenses  as  sleeping  at  their  posts, 
endeared  him  more  and  more  to  the  people,  until 
the  term  "  Father  Abraham  "  became  fastened 
upon  him  in  loving  regard,  untinged  with  its 
original  comic  suggestion.  F.  B.  Carpenter,  the 
artist,  whose  reminiscences  of  Lincoln  in  his  book 
"  Six  Months  in  the  White  House  "  cover  this 
period,  has  so  completely  presented  this  side  of 
the  President's  character,  that  it  would  be  super- 
fluous to  give  such  anecdotes  here.  One  letter 
of  condolence  is  so  beautiful  in  language,  as  well 
as  tender  in  sympathy,  that  lovers  of  Lincoln 
rightly  look  for  it  in  every  book  about  him  that  is 
published,  and  hence  it  is  reproduced  here.  It 
was  to  Mrs.  Bixby  of  Boston,  who  had  lost  five 
sons  in  the  war,  and  whose  sixth  was  lying 
severely  wounded  in  the  hospital. 


DEAR  MADAM  : — I  have  been  shown  in  the  files  of  the 
War  Department  a  statement  of  the  Adjutant-General 
of  Massachusetts,  that  you  are  the  mother  of  five  sons 
who  have  died  gloriously  on  the  field  of  battle.  I  feel 
how  weak  and  fruitless  must  be  any  words  of  mine 
which  should  attempt  to  beguile  you  from  the  grief 
of  a  loss  so  overwhelming.  But  I  cannot  refrain  from 


302 


LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 


tendering  to  you  the  consolation  that  may  be  found  in 
the  thanks  of  the  Republic  they  died  to  save.  I  pray 
that  our  Heavenly  Father  may  assuage  the  anguish 
of  your  bereavement,  and  leave  you  only  the  cherished 
memory  of  the  loved  and  lost,  and  the  solemn  pride 
that  must  be  yours  to  have  laid  so  costly  a  sacrifice 
upon  the  altar  of  freedom. 

Yours,  very  sincerely  and  respectfully, 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 


Space  is  wanting  here  to  present  examples  of 
the  many  proclamations  of  days  of  fasting  and 
prayer,  as  well  as  of  thanksgiving,  all  of  which 
are  permeated  with  a  devout  sense  of  the  im- 
manence of  the  Divine  Will,  guiding  the  destinies 
of  the  nation  through  such  humble  means  as  him- 
self. It  was  a  feeling  general  at  the  time  not 
only  with  church  people,  but  many  who,  like  him- 
self, were  not  communicants  in  any  particular 
religious  denomination.  The  motto  upon  some 
of  our  coins,  "  In  God  We  Trust "  was  placed 
upon  them  at  this  time,  and  therefore  has  an  his- 
toric as  well  as  a  religious  significance  which 
should  cause  it  to  be  retained  to  the  end  of  the 
nation's  history,  whatever  views  may  be  adopted 
by  the  Executive  in  particular,  or  the  Govern- 
ment in  general,  about  the  separation  of  church 
and  state. 

The  good  people  of  the  country,  breaking  over 
party  lines,  cast  an  overwhelming  vote  for  Lin- 
coln and  Johnson,  and  this  ticket  received  the 
«lectoral  votes  of  every  Northern  State  but  New 
Jersey,  and  also  of  the  former  slave  States: 
Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Tennessee,  and  West  Vir- 
ginia. 

The  President  delivered  the  last  Annual  Mes- 
sage to  Congress  of  his  first  term  (and,  as  it 


THE  SECOND  INAUGURATION          305 

proved,  the  last  one  of  his  life)  on  December  6, 
1864. 

After  reporting  on  the  favorable  condition  of 
the  various  departments,  the  Foreign,  the  Treas- 
ury, the  Navy,  etc.,  he  commented  upon  the  re- 
sults of  the  late  election  as  proving  the  almost 
unanimous  sentiment  of  the  nation  to  be  in  favor 
of  prosecuting  the  war  for  the  Union.  He 
therefore  promised  that  there  should  be  no  steps 
backward,  saying  in  conclusion : 


In  presenting  the  abandonment  of  armed  resistance 
to  the  national  authority  on  the  part  of  the  insurgents 
as  the  only  indispensable  condition  to  ending  the  war 
on  the  part  of  the  Government,  I  retract  nothing  here- 
tofore said  as  to  slavery.  I  repeat  the  declaration  made 
a  year  ago,  that  while  I  remain  in  my  present  position 
I  shall  not  attempt  to  retract  or  modify  the  Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation.  Nor  shall  I  return  to  slavery  any 
person  who  is  free  by  the  terms  of  that  proclamation 
or  by  any  of  the  acts  of  Congress. 

If  the  people  should,  by  whatever  mode  or  means, 
make  it  an  executive  duty  to  reenslave  such  persons, 
another,  and  not  I,  must  be  their  instrument  to  per- 
form it. 

In  stating  a  single  condition  of  peace,  I  mean  simply 
to  say,  that  the  war  will  cease  on  the  part  of  the  Gov- 
ernment whenever  it  shall  have  ceased  on  the  part  of 
those  who  began  it. 

On  January  31  Congress  passed  the  Thirteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  prohibiting  slav- 
ery throughout  the  entire  country,  and  before  his 
death  the  President  had  the  gratification  of  learn- 
ing that  his  own  State  of  Illinois  was  the  first  to 
ratify  it. 

A  numerous  assemblage  was  convened  in  front 
of  the  Capitol  on  March  4,  1865,  to  witness  the 
second  inauguration  of  the  great  President.  The 


304  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

morning  was  very  stormy,  however,  and  the  com- 
mittee of  arrangements  began  to  take  measures 
to  have  the  ceremonies  performed  in  the  Senate 
Chambers,  which  would  have  proved  a  great  dis- 
appointment to  the  congregated  masses.  A 
providential  interference  however  took  place, 
which  brought  a  complete  change  in  the  space  of 
sixty  seconds;  at  11.40  the  rain  ceased,  the  clouds 
parted,  revealing  the  brilliancy  of  a  deep  azure 
sky;  and  at  the  moment  when  Chief- Justice 
Chase  arose  to  administer  the  oath,  the  glorious 
sunlight  fell  through  a  rift  in  the  clouds  upon  the 
head  of  the  newly  consecrated  President,  and  a 
brilliant  silver  cloud  floated  near  the  earth  just 
above  the  President,  as  if  the  benison  of  Heaven 
rested  upon  him.  His  Inaugural  Address  is  an 
English  classic,  and  for  both  its  style  and  sub- 
stance will  live  as  long  as  English  literature. 

After  reviewing  the  situation  at  the  time  of  his 
First  Inaugural  Address,  when  the  country  was 
divided  into  two  hostile  parties  over  the  question 
of  slavery,  the  President  said : 

Neither  party  expected  for  the  war  the  magnitude 
or  the  duration  which  it  has  already  attained.  Neither 
anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  conflict  might  cease 
[with  the  conflict],  or  even  before  the  conflict  itself 
should  cease.  Each  looked  for  an  easier  triumph,  and 
a  result. less  fundamental  and  astounding. 

Both  read  the  same  Bible  and  pray  to  the  same 
God,  and  each  invokes  His  aid  against  the  other.  It 
may  seem  strange  that  any  men  should  dare  to  ask 
a  just  God's  assistance  in  wringing  their  bread  from 
the  sweat  of  other  men's  faces,  but  let  us  judge  not, 
that  we  be  not  judged.  The  prayers  of  both  could  not 
be  answered.  That  of  neither  has  been  answered  fully. 
The  Almighty  has  His  own  purposes.  "  Woe  unto  the 
world  because  of  offenses,  for  it  must  needs  be  that 
offenses  come,  but  woe  to  that  man  by  whom  the 


THE  SECOND  INAUGURATION          305 

offense  cometh."  If  we  shall  suppose  that  American 
slavery  is  one  of  those  offenses  which,  in  the  providence 
of  God,  must  needs  come,  but  which  haying  continued 
through  His  appointed  time,  He  now  wills  to  remove, 
and  that  He  gives  to  both  North  and  South  this  terrible 
war  as  the  woe  due  to  those  by  whom  the  offense  came, 
shall  we  discern  therein  any  departure  from  those  Di- 
vine attributes  which  the  believers  in  a  living  God  al- 
ways ascribe  to  him?  Fondly  do  we  hope,  fervently  do 
we  pray,  that  this  mighty  scourge  of  war  may  speedily 
pass  away.  Yet  if  God  wills  that  it  continue  until  all 
the  wealth  piled  by  the  bondsman's  two  hundred  and 
fifty  years  of  unrequited  toil  shall  be  sunk,  and  until 
every  drop  of  blood  drawn  with  the  lash  shall  be  paid 
by  another  drawn  with  the  sword,  as  was  said  three 
thousand  years  ago,  so  still  it  must  be  said,  "  The  judg- 
ments of  the  Lord  are  true  and  righteous  altogether." 

With  malice  towards  none,  with  charity  for  all,  with 
firmness  in  the  right  as  God  gives  us  to  see  the  right, 
let  us  finish  the  work  we  are  in :  to  bind  up  the  nation's 
wounds,  to  care  for  him  who  shall  have  borne  the  bat- 
tle, and  for  his  widow  and  his  orphan — to  do  all  which 
may  achieve  and  cherish  a  just  and  a  lasting  peace 
among  ourselves  and  with  all  nations. 


Following  this  speech,  so  full  of  revelation  to 
the  people  of  the  greatness  of  the  heart  and  mind 
of  the  man  they  had  chosen  for  their  President, 
came  the  address  of  the  Vice-President,  which 
shocked  those  present  exceedingly  by  its  proof 
that  they  had  elected  a  demagogue  to  the  second 
highest  place  in  their  gift,  and  as  a  possible  suc- 
cessor to  the  great  Lincoln.  To  speak  plainly, 
Andrew  Johnson  was  drunk.  While  his  friends 
claimed  that  he  was  ordinarily  an  abstainer, 
and  therefore  was  peculiarly  susceptible  to  the 
effect  of  the  liquor  he  had  taken  to  fortify  him- 
self for  the  memorable  occasion,  he  is  not  to  be 
excused  for  the  sentiments  he  expressed  when  in 
this  deplorable  condition.  In  vino  veritas  is  a 


306  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

wise  saying,  and  the  words  of  Johnson  drunk  were 
afterward  proved  to  be  in  accord  with  the  nature 
of  the  man  by  the  acts  of  Johnson  sober.  He 
showed  himself  in  every  way  to  be  the  most  vul- 
gar type  of  demagogue. 

Andrew  Johnson  was  literally  and  from  choice 
one  of  the  common  people,  preferring  the  society 
of  the  uncultured  classes  to  that  of  the  elite  of 
the  nation.  When  he  was  about  to  be  inaugu- 
rated as  Governor  of  Tennessee  upon  his  first 
election  to  the  office,  elaborate  preparations  for  the 
ceremony  were  made  by  the  people  of  Nashville. 
A  procession  was  formed  of  the  militia,  civic  so- 
cieties, and  other  organizations  in  uniform  and 
regalia,  and  an  elegant  barouche,  drawn  by  four 
horses  gayly  caparisoned  with  flags  and  pompons 
was  driven  to  the  St.  Cloud  Hotel,  where  the  out- 
going Governor  waited  on  the  newly-elected  Gov- 
ernor to  escort  him  to  the  Capitol.  But,  to  the 
consternation  of  everybody,  as  Johnson  stepped 
out  of  the  hotel,  he  rejected  the  proffered  escort, 
saying :  "  I  guess  I'll  go  up  with  the  people  " ; 
and,  letting  the  procession  go  without  him, 
plodded  along  on  foot,  surrounded  by  hoi  polloi, 
feeling  consciously  proud  as  if  he  had  performed 
an  heroic  feat. 

While  he  was  a  Senator  at  Washington  he 
lodged  at  the  St.  Charles,  a  fourth-rate  hotel, 
where  he  received  few  callers.  On  account  of 
his  humble  origin  and  his  pronounced  Union 
sentiments,  Southern  Senators  ignored  him  so- 
cially, and  his  quality  did  not  assure  associates 
from  the  Northern  States ;  so  when  the  Southern 
States  began  to  secede,  he  was  the  most  nearly 
isolated  of  all  the  Senators. 

In  February,   1861,  Joseph  Lane,  a   Senator 


THE  SECOND  INAUGURATION          307 

from  Oregon  (and  who  had  been  associated  with 
Breckinridge  on  the  Presidential  ticket)  read  in 
the  Senate  an  elaborate  speech  in  favor  of  seces- 
sion, to  which  Johnson  made  a  most  scathing  re- 
ply in  which  he  abused  Lane  unmercifully,  not 
only  politically  but  personally.  This  speech  made 
Johnson  immensely  popular  at  the  North,  and 
especially  with  the  Administration,  and  after  the 
secession  governor  (Harris)  fled  from  Tennes- 
see, the  President  made  Johnson  a  Brigadier- 
General  of  Volunteers  and  assigned  him  to  duty 
as  Military  Governor  of  Tennessee,  which  office 
he  held  until  he  was  elected  Vice-President. 

At  the  time  of  his  Vice-Presidential  inaugura- 
tion Johnson  was  stopping  at  the  Kirkwood,  one 
of  the  inferior  hotels  of  Washington.  In  his  in- 
augural address  he  made  an  even  more  dema- 
gogic display  of  his  sentiments  than  he  had  done 
at  Nashville.  The  Associated  Press  dispatch 
thus  narrated  the  occurrence : 

"  The  Vice-President  (Johnson)  followed,  re- 
ferring to  his  elevation  from  the  ranks  as  an  illus- 
tration of  American  privilege,  and  proceeded  at 
length  upon  the  subject  of  the  subordination  of 
Presidents  and  Secretaries  to  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple. When  the  oath  of  office  was  administered," 
continues  the  account,  "  the  Vice-President  took 
the  Bible  in  his  hand,  and,  elevating  it  before  the 
audience,  exclaimed :  '  I  kiss  this  book  before  my 
nation  of  the  United  States.' '  The  dispatch 
concluded  with  the  statement  that :  "  The  address 
of  Vice-President  Johnson  is  very  severely  cen- 
sured on  all  hands.  His  friends  allege  he  must 
have  been  laboring  under  a  very  severe  indisposi- 
tion." 

Here  is  the  speech  verbatim  as  taken  from  the 


3o8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

"  Year  Book  " :  "  I'm  a-goin'  for  to  tell  you — 
here  to-day;  yes,  I'm  a-goin'  for  to  tell  you  all, 
that  I  am  a  plebeian!  I  glory  in  it;  I  am  a 
plebeian!  The  people — yes,  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  made  me  what  I  am ;  and  I 
am  a-goin'  for  to  tell  you  here  to-day — yes,  to- 
day, in  this  place — that  the  people  are  everything. 
We  owe  all  to  them.  If  it  be  not  too  presumptu- 
ous, I  will  tell  the  foreign  ministers  a-sittin'  there, 
that  I  am  one  of  the  people.  I  will  say  to  Sena- 
tors and  others  before  me — I  will  say  to  the  Su- 
preme Court,  which  sits  before  me — that  you  all 
get  your  power  and  place  from  the  people.  And, 
Mr.  Chase,"  he  said,  suddenly  addressing  the 
Chief  Justice  by  name,  "  your  position  depends 
upon  the  people."  Turning  to  the  other  side  of 
the  house  where  sat  Mr.  Seward  and  the  other 
Cabinet  officers,  he  severally  addressed  them  as  he 
had  addressed  Mr.  Chase :  "  And  I  will  say  to 
you,  Mr.  Secretary  Seward,  and  to  you  Mr.  Sec- 
retary Stanton,  and  to  you,  Mr.  Secretary " 

here  he  hesitated  for  a  name,  and  bent  down  and 
asked  Mr.  Hamlin  if  he  knew  who  was  Secretary 
of  the  Navy.  Having  been  informed,  he  con- 
tinued in  the  same  loud  tone — "  And  you,  Mr. 
Secretery  Welles,  you,  all  of  you,  derive  your 
power  from  the  people." 

It  is  impossible  to  attempt  to  describe  the  feel- 
ings of  this  august  assemblage.  I  well  recollect 
that  Sumner  refused  to  talk  about  it  at  all,  say- 
ing that  it  was  too  terrible  an  event,  and  should 
be  relegated  to  oblivion  as  soon  as  possible.  Lin- 
coln, charitable  and  magnanimous  as  ever,  said : 
"  Don't  you  fear  for  Andy ;  he's  all  right." 

The  editor  of  the  New  York  Independent,  how- 
ever, came  out  with  this  statement :  "  Truth  com- 


THE  SECOND  INAUGURATION          309 

pels  me  to  write  that  he  [Johnson]  indulged  in  a 
vile  harangue,  in  presence  of  the  assembled  thou- 
sands, including  the  representatives  of  all  the 
foreign  governments ;  and  the  source  of  his  in- 
spiration was,  not  parriotism,  but — whisky."  The 
same  paper  in  a  scathing  editorial  demanded  his 
resignation ;  but,  as  we  have  said,  the  sentiment  of 
the  nation  was  in  favor  of  covering  the  sad  event 
with  the  mantle  of  oblivion. 

At  the  Inauguration  Ball  that  evening  John- 
son made  himself  very  conspicuous,  paying 
marked  attention  to  Mrs.  Lincoln  (as  the  report 
says),  although  he  had  not  fully  recovered  from 
his  "  indisposition." 

Mrs.  Lincoln,  as  reported  in  Herndon's  "  Life 
of  Lincoln,"  makes  the  following  statement :  "  He 
[Lincoln]  greatly  disliked  Andrew  Johnson. 
Once  the  latter,  when  we  were  in  company,  fol- 
lowed us  around  not  a  little.  It  displeased  Mr. 
Lincoln  so  much  he  abruptly  turned  and  asked, 
loud  enough  to  be  heard  by  others,  '  Why  is  this 
man  forever  following  me  ?  '  At  another  time, 
when  we  were  down  to  City  Point,  Johnson,  still 
following  us,  was  drunk.  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  despera- 
tion, exclaimed :  '  For  God's  sake  don't  ask  John- 
son to  dine  with  us ! '  Sumner,  who  was  along, 
joined  in  the  request." 

At  the  death  of  Hannibal  Hamlin  on  July  4, 
1891,  a  sharp  controversy  arose  between  Colonel 
A.  K.  McClure,  the  veteran  editor  of  the  Philadel- 
phia Times,  and  John  G.  Nicolay,  Mr.  Lincoln's 
private  secretary,  as  to  whom  Mr.  Lincoln  de- 
sired to  be  associated  with  him  on  the  ticket  in  the 
Presidential  contest  of  1864. 

This  controversy  commenced  by  the  assertion  of 
Colonel  McClure  in  his  paper  of  July  6,  1891,  that 


3io  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

Mr.  Lincoln  "  gravely  urged  "  upon  him  to  eome 
as  a  delegate  at  large  to  the  convention  to  support 
Johnson  for  Vice-President,  and  that  he  sup- 
ported Johnson  in  accordance  with  such  request, 
against  Hamlin,  his  personal  choice.  The  next 
day  Mr.  Nicolay  stated  in  the  public  press  that  the 
"  statement "  that  Lincoln  opposed  the  nomina- 
tion of  Mr.  Hamlin  was  "  entirely  erroneous  " ; 
that  Lincoln  had  confidentially  expressed  to  Nico- 
lay his  personal  preference  for  Hamlin.  This 
was  an  indiscreet  way  of  contradicting  a  man  of 
McClure's  standing  and  well-known  relation  to 
Lincoln,  in  his  lifetime.  The  editor  promptly  re- 
plied with  a  very  caustic  article  in  which  he  af- 
firmed his  previous  statement  with  emphasis  and 
circumstances,  and  corroborated  his  view  as  to 
Lincoln's  sentiments  by  the  testimony  of  Charles 
A.  Dana,  who  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
under  Lincoln,  and  who  shared  the  President's 
confidence  to  a  considerable  extent. 

To  this  Nicolay  replied,  and,  in  maintaining  his 
position,  unnecessarily  made  an  issue  of  veracity 
between  himself  and  McClure,  which  was  not  only 
an  unwise  but  an  unjust  thing  to  do.  Colonel 
McClure  might  have  erred  in  his  inferences, 
but  a  man  of  his  intellectual  and  moral  character 
could  not  mistake  as  to  his  facts,  and  he  stated  as 
a  fact,  apprehensible  to  his  senses,  that  Lincoln 
urged  him  to  drop  Hamlin  and  support  Johnson. 

Meanwhile  Judge  Pettit  of  Pennsylvania 
stated  that,  on  the  morning  of  the  sitting  of  the 
convention,  Mr.  Lincoln  told  him  that  his  prefer- 
ence was  for  Johnson ;  and  Colonel  Lamon  said 
that  he  heard  Lincoln  urge  Swett  to  support 
Johnson,  and  that  Lincoln  even  wrote  a  letter  in- 
ferentially  in  favor  of  Johnson  (which,  however, 


THE  SECOND  IN  A  UGURA  TION          3 1 1 

was  not  used).  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr. 
Welles,  also  intimated  that  Lincoln  did  not  want 
Hamlin,  but  says  that  he  was  "  careful  to  avoid 
the  expression  of  any  opinion."  However,  the 
Secretary  intimated  that  the  President's  choice 
was  Johnson.  And  one  of  Nicolay's  strong 
points  is  that  Lincoln  himself  sent  him  word  at 
Baltimore  that  he  would  not  express  any  pref- 
erence. 

Now,  a  further  fact  tending  to  corroborate 
McClure  is  that  Mr.  Lincoln  sent  General  Cam- 
eron to  General  Butler,  asking  the  latter  to  be- 
come a  candidate.  This  Lincoln  would  not  have 
done  had  he  been,  as  Nicolay  claims,  in  favor  of 
Hamlin,  for  if  he  wanted  Butler  as  against  Ham- 
lin, it  is  plain  that  he  did  not  want  Hamlin,  i.  e., 
it  is  not  at  all  probable  that  Hamlin  was  his 
second  choice.  Governor  Stone  of  Iowa  stated 
that  Lincoln  wanted  Dickinson,  Dix,  Johnson,  or 
some  other  War  Democrat,  thus  attesting  that 
the  President  did  not  want  Hamlin.  Thurlow 
Weed  says,  ex  cathedra,  that  Lincoln  did  not 
want  Johnson,  but  wanted  Dickinson,  thus  also 
attesting,  from  his  standpoint,  that  Lincoln  did 
not  want  Hamlin.  Swett  was  working  for  Holt 
at  Baltimore,  which  indicates  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
did  not  want  Hamlin,  for  Swett  was  nearer  to 
Lincoln  in  the  way  of  knowing  his  preference 
in  that  respect  than  anybody  in  the  nation. 

In  favor  of  the  position  that  Lincoln  did  want 
Hamlin,  I  know  of  but  three  authorities,  viz.,  Mr. 
Nicolay,  Burton  C.  Cook,  and  Mr.  Hamlin  him- 
self, all  of  whom,  however,  are  very  strong  au- 
thorities. Mr.  Nicolay  said  that  Mr  Lincoln 
confidentially  expressed  to  him  his  preference 
for  Hamlin.  I  think  this  cannot  be  literally  true : 


312  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

there  is  nothing  in  either  written  or  unwritten 
history  to  show  that  the  President  ever  said  any- 
thing of  confidence  or  consequence  to  Mr.  Nico- 
lay.  Their  relative  positions  warranted  confi- 
dences, but  somehow  these  seem  never  to  have 
passed  from  the  principal  to  his  subordinate. 

Mr.  Cook  was  an  astute  and  secretive  man,  a 
veteran  and  cautious  politician.  He  went  to  Lin- 
coln to  ascertain  whom  the  latter  wanted  as  Vice- 
President,  so  that  the  powerful  Illinois  delegation 
could  execute  his  desire,  and  he  said  "  That  he 
had  a  preference  I  positively  know.  After  my 
interview  with  him,  I  was  as  positive  that  Hanni- 
bal Hamlin  was  his  favorite  as  I  am  that  I  am 
alive  to-day." 

Shortly  before  his  death  Hamlin  said :  "  Lin- 
coln evidently  changed  his  position  [from  desir- 
ing him]  ;  that  is  all  I  can  say.  If  we  shall  ever 
meet  again,  I  may  say  something  more  to  you. 
I  will  write  no  more."  This  means  that  at  one 
time  Lincoln  either  was,  or  pretended  to  be,  for 
Hamlin. 

That  Mr.  Lincoln  preferred  some  War  Demo- 
crat to  Hamlin  at  a  certain  time  is  apparent  from 
his  sending  Cameron  to  Butler ;  from  Thurlow 
Weed's  statement;  from  Governor  Stone's  state- 
ment ;  from  Colonel  McClure's  statement ;  from 
Judge  Pettit's  statement;  from  General  Butler's 
statement;  from  Swett's  actions  at  Baltimore; 
from  Lamon's  statement;  and  from  Mr.  Dana's 
statement.  That  Lincoln  preferred  Hamlin  is 
attested  (so  far  as  I  know)  only  by  Cook  and 
Nicolay.  Hamlin  does  not  testify  that  Lincoln 
was  for  him  then ;  his  judgment  seems  to  be  that 
Lincoln  had  changed.  And  the  same  might  be 
said  of  Nicolay.  Lincoln  might  have  been  for 


THE  SECOND  INAUGURATION          313 

Hamlin  when  he  informed  Nicolay,  and  changed 
afterward.  But  Cook's  testimony  complicated 
matters.  He  was  the  chairman  of  the  Illinois 
delegation  at  the  convention,  and  had  many  votes 
to  cast  as  Lincoln  might  desire.  The  argument 
is  that  Lincoln  wanted  Johnson,  and  yet  he  de- 
liberately throws  away  the  sure  and,  peradven- 
ture,  controlling  vote  of  his  own  State,  and  in 
fact  caused  it  to  be  cast  affirmatively  against  his 
earnest  desire.  Cook  cannot  be  mistaken.  He 
is  as  sagacious  a  politician  as  McClure;  he  di- 
vined what  Lincoln  meant  to  make  him  believe. 
Lincoln  knew  that  Cook  was  going  to  Baltimore 
to  work  for  Hamlin  because,  inter  alia,  Lincoln 
wanted  it  so. 

The  two  strong  opposing  features  in  the  con- 
tention are  the  statements  of  McClure  and  Cook ; 
to  one  of  whom  he  represented  that  he  wanted 
Johnson  and  to  the  other  Hamlin,  doing  so  at 
the  same  time  and  for  the  same  object.  The 
mystery  is  deepened  by  the  reflection  that  Lincoln 
sent  for  McClure  in  order  to  solicit  the  vote  of 
Pennsylvania  for  Johnson,  while  upon  the  volun- 
tary offer  of  Illinois  he  placed  that  State  in  the 
Hamlin  column,  a  complete  neutralization  of  ef- 
fort. His  reply  to  Nicolay,  "  Swett's  all  right," 
to  which  McClure  attaches  much  importance,  is, 
I  think,  inconsequential.  The  question  was  gro- 
tesque under  the  circumstances.  The  further 
reply :  "Wish  not  to  interfere,"  etc.,  which  Nico- 
lay lays  much  stress  upon,  I  think  amounts  to 
nothing.  In  the  position  in  which  he  stood,  he 
must  say  that,  no  matter  how  ardent  were  his 
personal  feelings. 

In  looking  over  the  whole  field,  I  think  that 
at  first  Lincoln  expected  to  be  defeated  anyway, 


3i4  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

and  took  no  anxious  thought  about  his  running 
mate,  expecting  the  ticket  to  be  the  old  one  by 
force  of  political  inertia.  I  think  that  Hamlin 
and  Nicolay  saw  Lincoln  while  in  this  mood ; 
afterward  he  thought  it  well  to  make  the  best 
struggle  possible,  and,  while  deeming  a  coalition 
with  the  acting  War  Democrats  necessary,  he 
did  not  settle  down  on  Johnson  at  first,  which 
may  account  for  Weed's  and  Stone's  opinion ; 
and  that  the  reason  of  Swett's  action  and  Cook's 
opinion  is  that  Lincoln  feared  that,  if  they  came 
out  for  Johnson,  his  hand  would  appear,  for, 
next  to  nominating  Johnson,  it  was  desirable  that 
Lincoln  should  not  be  known  in  the  matter. 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  I  think  Lincoln 
wanted  Johnson,  and  that,  for  policy's  sake,  he 
suffered  Swett  to  dissemble  his  sentiments  at 
Baltimore,  while  he  dissembled  his  real  senti- 
ments to  Cook;  though  I  don't  think  he  com- 
mitted any  positive  act  of  deceit  with  Cook,  but 
allowed  him  to  deceive  himself.  As  to  Hamlin, 
I  think  that  Lincoln's  only  indirection  toward 
him,  if  any,  was  in  changing  his  mind  according 
to  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  but  without  ad- 
vising him  of  it.  But  all  that  Lincoln  did,  posi- 
tively or  negatively,  was  for  the  sake  of  the 
sacred  cause  of  the  Union. 

Worn  out  by  the  importunities  of  office-seekers, 
the  President  on  March  25  sought  refuge  in  a 
visit  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  City  Point.  Here  he  held  a  consulta- 
tion with  General  Grant  and  General  Sherman, 
the  latter  coming  up  from  Goldsboro,  N.  C,  to 
the  meeting.  On  the  2d  of  April  Richmond 
was  occupied  by  the  Federal  troops,  and  on  the 
3d  the  President  visited  the  captured  capital  of 


RECONSTRUCTION  315 

the  Confederacy.  He  went  unannounced,  and 
without  a  military  guard,  even  walking  from 
the  wharf  to  General  Weitzel's  headquarters, 
which  were  in  the  house  occupied  only  two  days 
before  by  the  Confederate  President.  The 
colored  people,  however,  recognized  their  deliv- 
erer, and  crowded  about  him  with  exclamations 
of  religious  fervor.  A  spectator  of  the  scene  de- 
scribed it  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly: 

The  walk  was  long,  and  the  President  halted  a  mo- 
ment to  rest.  "  May  de  good  Lord  bless  you,  President 
Linkum ! "  said  an  old  negro,  removing  his  hat  and 
bowing,  with  tears  of  joy  rolling  down  his  cheeks.  The 
President  removed  his  own  hat,  and  bowed  in  silence; 
but  it  was  a  bow  which  upset  the  forms,  laws,  customs, 
and  ceremonies  of  centuries.  It  was  a  death-shock  to 
chivalry  and  a  mortal  wound  to  caste.  Recognize  a 
nigger !  Faugh !  A  woman  in  an  adjoining  house  be- 
held it,  and  turned  from  the  scene  in  unspeakable 
disgust. 

The  President  returned  to  Washington  on 
Sunday,  April  9,  recalled  by  a  carriage  accident 
in  which  Secretary  Seward  had  broken  his  right 
arm  and  his  jaw.  Shortly  after  his  arrival  the 
news  came  of  Lee's  surrender,  and  the  citizens  of 
Washington,  wild  with  delight,  waited  on  him  on 
Monday  afternoon  with  congratulations.  He  dis- 
missed them,  promising  a  speech  on  the  next 
evening. 

This,  his  last  public  address,  he  devoted  almost 
entirely  to  the  reinauguration  of  the  national  au- 
thority— reconstruction,  which  now  faced  the 
Government.  He  said  of  the  problem: 

It  is  fraught  with  great  difficulty.  Unlike  a  case  of 
war  between  independent  nations,  there  is  no  author- 
ized organ  for  us  to  treat  with — no  one  man  has 


316  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

authority  to  give  up  the  rebellion  for  any  other  man. 
We  simply  must  begin  with  and  mold  from  disor- 
ganized and  discordant  elements.  Nor  is  it  a  small 
additional  embarrassment  that  we,  the  loyal  people, 
differ  among  ourselves  as  to  the  mode,  manner,  and 
measure  of  reconstruction.  As  a  general  rule,  I  abstain 
from  reading  the  reports  of  attacks  upon  myself,  wish- 
ing not  to  be  provoked  by  that  to  which  I  cannot 
properly  offer  an  answer.  In  spite  of  this  precaution, 
however,  it  comes  to  my  knowledge  that  I  am  much 
censured  for  some  supposed  agency  in  setting  up  and 
seeking  to  sustain  the  new  State  government  of 
Louisiana. 

In  this  I  have  done  just  so  much  as,  and  no  more 
than,  the  public  knows.  In  the  annual  message  of 
December,  1863,  and  in  the  accompanying  proclama- 
tion, I  presented  a  plan  of  reconstruction,  as  the  phrase 
goes,  which  I  promised,  if  adopted  by  any  State,  should 
be  acceptable  to  and  sustained  by  the  executive  gov- 
ernment of  thev  nation.  I  distinctly  stated  that  this 
was  not  the  only  plan  which  might  possibly  be  ac- 
ceptable, and  I  also  distinctly  protested  that  the  execu- 
tive claimed  no  right  to  say  when  or  whether  members 
should  be  admitted  to  seats  in  Congress  from  such 
States.  This  plan  was  in  advance  submitted  to  the 
then  Cabinet,  and  distinctly  approved  by  every  mem- 
ber of  it.  ...  The  message  went  to  Congress,  and  I  re- 
ceived many  commendations  of  the  plan,  written  and 
verbal,  and  not  a  single  objection  to  it  from  any  pro- 
fessed emancipationist  came  to  my  knowledge  until  after 
the  news  reached  Washington  that  the  people  of  Lou- 
isiana had  begun  to  move  in  accordance  with  it. 

I  have  been  shown  a  letter  on  this  subject,  supposed 
to  be  an  able  one,  in  which  the  writer  expresses  regret 
that  my  mind  has  not  seemed  to  be  definitely  fixed  upon 
the  question  whether  the  seceded  States,  so  called,  are 
in  the  Union  or  out  of  it.  It  would  perhaps  add  as- 
tonishment to  his  regret  were  he  to  learn  that  since  I 
have  found  professed  Union  men  endeavoring  to  answer 
that  question,  I  have  purposely  forborne  any  public 
expression  upon  it.  As  appears  to  me,  that  question 
has  not  been  nor  yet  is  a  practically  material  one,  and 
that  any  discussion  of  it,  while  it  thus  remains  prac- 
tically immaterial,  could  have  no  effect  other  than  the 
mischievous  one  of  dividing  our  friends.  As  yet,  what- 


RECONSTRUCTION  317 

ever  it  may  become,  that  question  is  bad  as  the  basis 
of  a  controversy,  and  good  for  nothing  at  all — a  merely 
pernicious  abstraction.  We  all  agree  that  the  seceded 
States,  so  called,  are  out  of  their  proper  practical  rela- 
tion with  the  Union,  and  that  the  sole  obiect  of  the 
Government,  civil  and  military,  in  regard  to  these 
States,  is  to  again  get  them  into  their  proper  practical 
relation.  I  believe  that  it  is  not  only  possible,  but  in 
fact  easier,  to  do  this  without  deciding  or  even  consid- 
ering whether  those  States  have  ever  been  out  of  the 
Union  than  with  it.  Finding  themselves  safely  at 
home,  it  would  be  utterly  immaterial  whether  they  had 
been  abroad.  Let  us  all  join  in  doing  the  acts  neces- 
sary to  restore  the  proper  practical  relations  between 
these  States  and  the  Union,  and  each  forever  after  inno- 
cently indulge  his  own  opinion  whether,  in  doing  the 
acts,  he  brought  the  States  from  without  into  the 
Union,  or  only  gave  them  proper  assistance,  they  never 
having  been  out  of  it.  The  amount  of  constituency, 
so  to  speak,  on  which  the  Louisiana  government  rests, 
would  be  more  satisfactory  to  all  if  it  contained  fifty 
thousand,  or  thirty  thousand,  or  even  twenty  thousand, 
instead  of  twelve  thousand,  as  it  does.  It  is  also  unsat- 
isfactory to  some  that  the  elective  franchise  is  not 
given  to  the  colored  man.  I  would  myself  prefer  that 
it  were  now  conferred  on  the  very  intelligent,  and  on 
those  who  serve  our  cause  as  soldiers.  Still,  the  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  the  Louisiana  government,  as  it 
stands,  is  quite  all  that  is  desirable.  The  question  is, 
Will  it  be  wiser  to  take  it  as  it  is  and  help  to  improve 
it,  or  to  reject  and  disperse?  Can  Louisiana  be  brought 
into  proper  practical  relation  with  the  Union  sooner 
by  sustaining  or  by  discarding  her  new  State  govern- 
ment? Some  twelve  thousand  voters  in  the  heretofore 
Slave  State  of  Louisiana  have  sworn  allegiance  to  the 
Union,  assumed  to  be  the  rightful  political  power  of 
the  State,  held  elections,  organized  a  State  government, 
adopted  a  Free  State  Constitution,  giving  the  benefit  of 
public  schools  equally  to  black  and  white,  and  empow- 
ering the  Legislature  to  confer  the  elective  franchise 
upon  the  colored  man.  This  Legislature  has  already 
voted  to  ratify  the  Constitutional  Amendment  recently 
passed  by  Congress,  abolishing  slavery  throughout  the 
nation.  These  twelve  thousand  persons  are  thus  fully 
committed  to  the  Union  and  to  perpetuate  freedom  in 


3i8  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  State — committed  to  the  very  things,  and  nearly  all 
things,  the  nation  wants — and  they  ask  the  nation's 
recognition  and  its  assistance  to  make  good  this  com- 
mittal. Now,  if  we  reject  and  spurn  them,  we  do  our 
utmost  to  disorganize  and  disperse  them.  We,  in  fact, 
say  to  the  white  man :  You  are  worthless  or  worse ; 
we  will  neither  help  you  nor  be  helped  by  you.  To 
the  blacks  we  say :  This  cup  of  liberty  which  these, 
your  old  masters,  held  to  your  lips,  we  will  dash  from 
you,  and  leave  you  to  the  chances  of  gathering  the 
spilled  and  scattered  contents  in  some  vague  and  unde- 
fined when,  where,  and  how.  If  this  course,  discourag- 
ing and  paralyzing  both  white  and  black,  has  any  tend- 
ency to  brinig  Louisiana  into  proper  practical  relations 
with  the  Union,  I  have  so  far  been  unable  to  perceive 
it.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  recognize  and  sustain  the 
new  government  of  Louisiana,  the  converse  of  all  this 
is  made  true.  We  encourage  the  hearts  and  nerve  the 
arms  of  twelve  thousand  to  adhere  to  their  work,  and 
argue  for  it,  and  proselyte  for  it,  and  fight  for  it, 
and  feed  it,  and  grow  it,  and  ripen  it  to  a  complete 
success.  The  colored  man,  too,  in  seeing  all  united  for 
him,  is  inspired  with  vigilance,  and  energy,  and  daring 
to  the  same  end.  Grant  that  he  desires  the  elective 
franchise,  will  he  not  attain  it  sooner  by  saving  the 
already  advanced  steps  towards  it,  than  by  running 
backward  over  them?  Concede  that  the  new  govern- 
ment of  Louisiana  is  only  to  what  it  should  be  as  the 
egg  is  to  the  fowl,  we  shall  sooner  have  the  fowl  by 
hatching  the  egg  than  by  smashing  it.  ... 

What  has  been  said  of  Louisiana  will  apply  generally 
to  other  States.  And  yet  so  great  peculiarities  pertain 
to  each  State,  and  such  important,  and  sudden  changes 
occur  in  the  same  State,  and  withal  so  new  and  un- 
precedented is  the  whole  case,  that  no  exclusive  and 
inflexible  plan  can  safely  be  prescribed  as  to  details  and 
collaterals.  Such  exclusive  and  inflexible  plan  would 
surely  become  a  new  entanglement.  Important  princi- 
ples may  and  must  be  inflexible.  In  the  present  situa- 
tion, as  the  phrase  goes,  it  may  be  my  duty  to  make 
some  new  announcement  to  the  people  of  the  South. 
I  am  considering,  and  shall  not  fail  to  act  when  satis- 
fied that  action  will  be  proper. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  END 

THE  animus  of  murder  existed  against  Mr. 
Lincoln  from  the  period  of  his  election.  In 
January,  1861,  he  showed  me  several  vulgar  let- 
ters, all  having  Southern  postmarks,  containing 
threats  against  his  life;  also  some  apparently 
friendly  warnings  on  the  same  subjects,  from  the 
same  sources.  There  were  some  newspaper  arti- 
cles in  the  Southern  press,  having  the  same 
animus  and  intent. 

The  President  not  only  took  no  precautions 
against  assassination  himself,  but  allowed  none  to 
be  taken  by  others  in  his  behalf.  The  Secretary 
of  War  did  indeed,  for  a  time,  send  an  escort 
with  him  to  and  from  the  Soldiers'  Home  on  the 
outskirts  of  Washington  where  he  spent  the  hot 
summer  nights,  but  it  was  ultimately  abandoned, 
being  thoroughly  distasteful  to  the  President. 

Upon  one  occasion,  when  remonstrated  with  on 
the  subject  of  his  indifference  to  danger,  he  drew 
from  a  pigeon-hole  a  large  package  of  letters, 
and  said :  "  Every  one  of  these  letters  contains  a 
threat  of  assassination.  Were  I  to  give  it 
thought  it  might  make  me  nervous,  but  I  have 
concluded  that  there  are  opportunities  to  kill  me, 
every  day  of  my  life,  if  there  are  persons  dis- 
posed to  do  it.  It  is  not  possible  to  avoid  ex- 

319 


.320  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

posure  to  such  a  fate,  and  I  shall  not  trouble  my- 
self about  it." 

And  so  daily  he  heroically  pursued  the  even 
tenor  of  his  way,  and  the  prescribed  path  of 
duty,  with  the  sword  of  Damocles  suspended 
above  his  head.  He  continued  to  walk  alone,  un- 
guarded at  all  hours  of  the  day  or  night,  between 
the  White  House  and  War  Office  and  elsewhere. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  war  the  threats  of 
assassination  became  especially  bold  and  bitter. 
Of  these,  the  following  advertisement  appearing 
in  a  Selma  (Ala.)  newspaper  is  a  fair  example: 

A  million  dollars  wanted  to  have  peace  by  ist  of 
March.  If  the  citizens  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
will  furnish  me  with  the  cash  or  good  securities  for 
the  sum  of  $1,000,000,  I  will  cause  the  lives  of  Lincoln, 
Seward,  and  Andrew  Johnson  to  be  taken  by  the  ist 
of  March  next.  This  will  give  us  peace  and  satisfy 
the  world  that  tyrants  cannot  live  in  a  land  of  liberty. 
If  this  is  not  accomplished,  nothing  will  be  claimed 
beyond  the  sum  of  $50^000  in  advance,  which  is  sup- 
posed to  be  necessary  to  reach  and  slaughter  the  three 
villains.  I  will  give  myself  $1,000  toward  the  patriotic 
purpose.  Everyone  wishing  to  contribute  will  address 
H.  Catawba,  Ala.,  December  i,  1864. 

This  advertisement,  it  transpired,  had  been 
inserted  by  Colonel  George  Washington  Gayle,  a 
leading  lawyer  of  the  city. 

Whether  the  damnable  deed  was  the  sequence 
and  denouement  of  this  advertisement  has  never 
been  ascertained ;  but  the  sequel  attested  that  the 
lives  aimed  at  by  the  Booth  conspiracy  were  the 
same  as  those  mentioned  in  this  odious  and  de- 
testable advertisement. 

During  that  same  winter  the  Rebel  agents  in 
Canada  were  endeavoring  to  secure  someone  to 
remove  (as  it  was  euphemistically  termed)  the 


THE  END  321 

President,  Vice-President,  Secretary  of  State, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Secretary  of  War, 
and  General  Grant.  When  interrogated  by  an 
assassin  who  contemplated  undertaking  the 
bloody  enterprise,  if  they  wanted  Secretary 
Welles  also  killed,  the  reply  was,  "  No !  he 
isn't  worth  killing."  These  agents  tried  to  im- 
press the  prospective  murderer  with  the  idea, 
that  "  killing  tyrants  was .  no  murder,"  and 
they  reasoned  out  the  conclusion  with  self- 
gratulation,  that  the  murder  of  these  officers 
would  produce  anarchy,  as  there  was  no  de- 
signated officer  to  succeed  any  of  them.  There 
is  much  reason  to  suppose  that  this,  and  not 
the  Selma  scheme,  was  the  initial  movement 
which  culminated  in  the  diabolical  denouement  of 
April  14,  1865,  but  the  chief  agent  was  killed 
prematurely  ;  the  Rebel  messenger  who  communi- 
cated between  the  conclave  in  Canada  and  the 
assassins  escaped  to  Europe ;  the  Rebel  agents  in 
Canada  disappeared ;  those  who  knew  much  were 
awed  to  silence,  and  conclusive  proof,  such  as 
was  needful  for  such  a  crime,  could  not  be  had ; 
but  this  complicity  in  this  dastardly  crime  has 
many  reasons  to  fortify  it,  among  which  was  the 
approval  of  the  crime  by  Jefferson  Davis  and 
other  leaders  of  the  "  lost  cause." 

The  conspiracy  being  formed,  it  required  only 
an  emotional  incentive  to  fire  the  chief  agent  to 
the  deed. 

This  occurred  in  the  last  address  of  Lincoln. 
On  the  outskirts  of  the  crowd  assembled  to  hear 
him  was  one  J.  Wilkes  Booth,  an  actor,  who  had 
come  to  Washington  the  previous  Saturday,  and 
was  stopping  at  the  National  Hotel.  With  him 
was  a  young  man  named  David  E.  Herold.  The 


322  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

two  seemed  nervous  and  uneasy ;  and  were  no- 
ticeably so,  when  the  tall  form  of  the  President 
appeared  and  commenced  his  speech.  Finally, 
Lincoln  made  use  of  this  expression :  ..."  It 
is  also  unsatisfactory  to  some  that  the  election 
franchise  is  not  given  to  the  colored  man.  / 
would  myself  prefer  that  it  were  now  conferred 
on  the  very  intelligent,  and  on  those  who  serve 
our  cause  as  soldiers."  It  was  at  that  juncture, 
Herold  relates,  that  Booth  nudged  him,  and  said 
in  a  tone  of  bitter  resentment :  "  That  means 
nigger  equality;  now,  by  God!  I'll  put  him 
through." 

Booth  was  a  young  man  of  twenty-six,  un- 
stable and  erratic  in  character,  and  full  of  vanity, 
felicitating  himself  on  his  personal  beauty.  He 
had  quit  the  stage  some  time  before  on  account 
of  a  throat  affection  (I  have  seen  a  playbill  an- 
nouncing his  appearance  at  the  Boston  Museum 
in  1862),  and  was  doing  a  little  speculating  in 
petroleum  stocks  as  a  business.  He  occupied 
much  of  his  time  of  late  in  playing  "  stud  poker  " 
and  drinking  whisky.  Although  his  people  were 
all  thoroughly  devoted  to  the  cause  of  the  Union, 
he  had  fanatically  championed  the  Southern 
cause.  In  November,  1864,  he  left  a  sealed  en- 
velope with  the  actor  John  S.  Clarke,  his  brother- 
in-law,  which  he  withdrew  after  a  time,  and 
deposited  again.  Neither  Clarke  nor  his  wife, 
Booth's  sister,  had  any  idea  of  the  contents  of  the 
package,  but  when  ultimately  opened  it  was 
found  to  contain  some  U.  S.  bonds  and  oil  stocks, 
also  a  letter  written  by  Booth,  full  of  vapid,  inane, 
and  obscure  rigmarole.  The  signature  was  evi- 
dently made  at  a  different  time  from  the  body  of 
the  letter,  and  Mr.  Clarke  is  of  opinion  that 


THE  END  323 

Booth  added  his  signature  at  the  time  when  he 
withdrew  the  package. 

General  Grant  reached  Washington  on  the 
1 3th,  and  held  a  long  consultation  with  the  Presi- 
dent and  Secretary  of  War.  Next  day  was  Good 
Friday  and  also  Cabinet  day,  and  the  President 
laid  down,  in  general  terms,  his  contemplated 
poliqy  toward  the  Rebels,  which  was  a  general 
amnesty  and  obliteration  of  the  past.  He  held  a 
long  conversation  with  his  son,  Robert,  who,  as 
an  aide  on  Grant's  staff,  had  been  at  Lee's  sur- 
render, and  had  returned  to  the  White  House. 
He  had  a  lengthened  interview  with  Speaker  Col- 
fax,  who  was  about  to  depart  on  a  tour  to  the 
mining  regions  of  California.  He  also  saw  sev- 
eral callers  on  business  matters,  the  last  one  being 
Hon.  George  Ashmun,  who  had  sat  in  Congress 
with  him,  and  had  also  presided  over  the  "  wig- 
wam "  convention.  As  there  was  not  time  to 
complete  Mr.  Ashmun's  business,  the  President 
agreed  to  meet  him  and  Judge  C.  P.  Daly  early 
next  morning;  and,  in  order  to  facilitate  his  en- 
trance, wrote  on  a  card :  "  Allow  Mr.  Ashmun 
and  friend  to  come  in  at  9  A.M.  to-morrow.  A. 
Lincoln."  This  is  the  last  word  he  ever  wrote. 

The  enterprising  proprietor  of  Ford's  Theater, 
in  virtue  of  a  partial  promise  he  had  extracted 
from  Mrs.  Lincoln,  inserted  in  all  the  daily 
papers  of  that  day,  as  a  news  item,  the  following : 
"  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  President  and  Mrs. 
Lincoln  and  ladies,  will  occupy  the  State  box  at 
Ford's  Theater  to-night,  to  witness  Miss  Laura 
Keene's  company  in  Tom  Taylor's  *  American 
Cousin.'  " 

General  Grant,  however,  preferred  to  visit  his 
family  at  Burlington,  N.  J.,  and  started  thither 


324  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

on  the  late  afternoon  train.  The  President  really 
did  not  wish  to  go  to  the  theater,  but,  in  view  of 
the  newspaper  announcement,  deemed  it  his  duty 
to  do  so;  and  Speaker  Colfax,  though  invited, 
failing  to  go,  the  President  and  Mrs.  Lincoln 
secured  the  company  of  Major  H.  R.  Rathbone 
and  Miss  Clara  W.  Harris,  the  stepson  and 
daughter  respectively  of  Senator  Harris  of  New 
York.  They  reached  the  theater  at  about  nine 
o'clock,  while  the  play  was  in  progress,  and  were 
ushered  into  the  State  box,  according  to  pro- 
gramme. 

Booth  was  still  at  Washington  on  the  I4th,  and, 
seeing  the  announcement  of  the  engagement  at 
Ford's  Theater,  visited  the  theater  at  about 
eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  knowing  the  pro- 
prietor and  employees  well.  He  found  the  two 
private  boxes  on  the  left  hand  of  the  stage  being 
made  into  one  by  removal  of  the  partition,  and 
decorated  with  the  American  flag.  Little  did  he 
then  think  that  that  sacred  flag  was  to  be  the 
nemesis  of  his  fate!  Upon  some  pretext,  not 
clearly  appearing,  he  induced  Spangler,  the  stage 
carpenter,  to  fit  a  brace  to  the  door  which  led 
from  the  auditorium  to  the  box,  so  that,  when  it 
was  in  place,  the  box  could  not  be  reached  from 
the  auditorium.  He  then  took  in  the  whole  situa- 
tion fully,  and,  in  order  not  to  be  baffled  by  the 
closing  of  the  door  which  led  from  the  box  itself 
to  the  sub-hall,  he  had  the  screws  carefully  re- 
moved from  the  snaplock  which  secured  them. 
There  was  a  deliberate  method  in  his  madness,  if 
indeed,  as  has  been  claimed,  he  was  mad.  Hav- 
ing thus  fitted  up  his  workshop  to  suit  his  infernal 
object,  he  next  repaired  to  a  livery  stable  and 
engaged  a  fleet  horse  for  a  horseback  ride,  to  be 


THE  END  325 

used  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon.  Next 
in  the  order  of  his  industries,  with  what  object  is 
not  clear,  he  stopped  in  at  the  Kirkwood  House 
and  called  for  the  Vice-President.  The  latter 
was  engaged  and  declined  the  visit.  The  assassin 
then  wrote  on  a  card  and  left  it :  "I  don't  want 
to  disturb  you;  are  you  at  home?  J.  Wilkes 
Booth."  It  should  be  stated  that  Vice-President 
Johnson  had  remained  at  Washington  since  the 
inauguration  attending  to  department  business 
for  his  constituents,  but  was  intending  to  return 
home  on  the  succeeding  day,  also  that  he  had  no 
connection  with  Booth,  and  that  it  was  part  of 
the  conspiracy  to  assassinate  the  Vice-President. 

At  four  o'clock  P.M.  Booth,  in  a  visible  state 
of  nervous  unrest,  called  for  and  rode  off  on  his 
hired  horse,  and  after  a  brief  formal  ride,  hid 
him  away  in  a  stable  in  rear  of  Ford's  Theater, 
which  he  had  previously  engaged  for  that 
purpose. 

In  course  of  the  evening  Booth  brought  the 
horse  to  the  rear  of  the  theater,  and  Spangler 
assumed  its  charge,  employing  a  boy  to  hold  it. 
Booth  and  one  or  two  of  his  confederates  next 
appeared  in  front  of  the  theater,  and  as  the  hour 
or  half  hour  and  sometimes  quarter  of  the  hour 
would  occur,  they  would  dramatically  exclaim 
"  nine  o'clock,"  etc. 

At  nine  o'clock  one  of  the  conspirators  ap- 
proached the  President's  servant,  who  kept  guard 
at  the  outer  door  leading  toward  the  private  box, 
having  a  large  official  envelope  for  General 
Grant,  and,  asking  for  the  General,  retired.  He 
had  been  sent  to  spy  out  the  land,  in  all  prob- 
ability. 

Three-quarters  of  an  hour  thereafter  one  of 


326  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  conspirators,  standing  near  the  audience  door, 
said  solemnly :  "  Nine  o'clock  and  forty-five  min- 
utes " ;  another  repeated  the  expression,  and  still 
others  till  it  reached  the  sidewalk.  Ten  minutes 
afterwards  the  party  vociferated,  "  Nine  o'clock 
and  fifty-five  minutes  " ;  which  was  taken  up  and 
passed  along  as  the  former  had  been.  At  ten 
o'clock  the  hour  was  again  called,  echoed,  and 
repeated;  also  at  10.10,  at  which  time  J.  Wilkes 
Booth  appeared,  and  the  conspirator  sentinels  dis- 
appeared suddenly. 

At  10.15  the  houj  of  fate  had  struck  and  Booth 
entered  the  dress  circle,  and  with  apparent  non- 
chalance sauntered  around  the  outer  lobby  of  the 
dress  circle,  reaching  the  President's  servant, 
who  was  watching  the  play  several  feet  away 
from  the  door.  He  showed  the  servant  a  card, 
saying  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  sent  for  him,  which 
quieted  the  servant,  who  continued  watching  the 
stage.  Booth  also  stood,  for  two  minutes,  look- 
ing with  apparent  interest  at  the  performance. 
He  then  quietly  entered  into  the  vestibule,  softly 
closing  the  door  behind  him,  and  with  the  accom- 
modating brace  fitted  by  Spangler,  secured  it 
from  any  entrance  or  interference  from  the  main 
auditorium.  The  two  doors  to  the  boxes  them- 
selves were  shut,  and  the  assassin  deliberately 
bored  a  gimlet  hole  through  one  of  them,  and 
with  his  knife  reamed  out  the  hole  so  that  he 
might  get  a  range  of  vision  over  the  entire  box ; 
thus  he  became  master  of  the  situation.  Then, 
drawing  a  small  silver-mounted  Derringer  pistol 
and  carrying  it  in  his  right  hand,  and  taking  a 
long  dagger  in  the  left,  he  swiftly  opened  the 
door,  and  when  within  four  feet,  fired  directly  at 
the  back  of  the  President's  head.  The  aim  and 


THE  END  327 

fell  purpose  were  alike  unerring;  the  doomed 
President's  head  fell  a  little  forward,  his  eyes 
closed,  but  otherwise  his  attitude  was  unchanged. 
He  never  was  conscious  of  what  had  occurred, 
but  passed,  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye,  into  the 
fathomless  realms  of  insensibility  and  eternity. 
At  this  time  Mr.  Lincoln  sat  in  an  armchair 
nearest  the  audience,  with  his  wife  immediately 
on  his  right,  her  hand  resting  on  his  knee.  The 
President  was  leaning  a  little  on  his  right  arm, 
his  left  lightly  holding  back  the  curtain  so  as  to 
afford  a  wider  range  of  view.  Major  Rathbone 
and  Miss  Harris  sat  a  little  to  the  right,  and  the 
whole  party  were,  at  the  particular  moment,  in- 
tently engrossed  with  the  play.  The  sole  speaker 
on  the  stage  at  the  time  was  Harry  Hawk,  who 
played  the  part  of  Asa  Trenchard ;  and  he  had 
just  got  off  the  gag  suited  to  the  occasion: 
"  Well,  neow  I'll  tell  yeow  one  o'  Mr.  Linkin's 
stories,"  when  the  fatal  shot  rang  out.  Those 
were  the  last  sounds  that  Mr.  Lincoln  heard  this 
side  of  eternity.  Major  Rathbone,  with  admir- 
able presence  of  mine,  sprang  for  the  murderer, 
who,  dropping  his  pistol,  struck  a  vicious  blow 
with  the  dagger  which  wounded  the  Major  in  the 
arm  and  disconcerted  him  for  the  moment,  dur- 
ing which  the  miscreant  jumped  over  the  railing 
on  to  the  stage,  where  he  shouted,  "  Sic  semper 
tyrannis! " 

In  his  leap,  however,  his  spur  caught  in  the 
folds  of  the  American  flag,  which  caused  him 
to  fall  in  such  a  manner  as  to  fracture  the  small 
bone  of  his  leg,  below  the  knee.  He  arose  at 
once,  however — haste  was  needful — and  again 
shouting  in  a  theatrical  style.  "  The  South  is 
avenged !  "  he  started,  with  the  dagger  glistening, 


328  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

toward  the  rear  of  the  stage,  in  a  rapid  gait. 
Hawk  was  alone  upon  the  stage,  and  supposing 
that  the  seeming  madman  was  after  him,  darted 
behind  the  flies,  where  he  escaped  up  a  flight  of 
stage  stairs.  Booth  made  his  way  unimpeded  to 
the  rear  of  the  theater,  and,  hastily  mounting  the 
horse,  galloped  off  in  the  darkness,  crossed  the 
Anacosta  bridge  and  was  temporarily  sheltered 
by  the  Maryland  Rebels,  and  ultimately  shot  like 
a  mad  dog  by  one  Boston  Corbett,  a  sergeant  in 
the  regular  army. 

Of  all  persons  present  in  that  vast  audience 
there  were  two  who  had  perfect  presence  of 
mind:  one  was  Joseph  B.  Stewart,  a  lawyer  of 
herculean  build,  who  was  sitting  in  the  parquette 
and  who  clambered  on  the  stage  as  rapidly 
as  he  could,  and  pursued  the  fleeing  assassin. 
Booth,  however,  had  too  much  the  start  of  him, 
and  when  Stewart  reached  the  rear  of  the  theater, 
he  had  mounted  his  horse  and  was  galloping  off. 
The  other  person  with  presence  of  mind  was  Miss 
Keene,  who  was  behind  the  flies  waiting  for  her 
cue,  when,  attracted  by  the  firing,  she  rushed  to- 
ward the  stage  just  in  time  to  see  Booth  before 
he  disappeared.  Coming  immediately  to  the 
front  she  exclaimed,  "  It's  Wilkes  Booth,"  and 
in  a  commanding  voice  ordered  the  audience  to 
be  quiet.  Then  at  once  she  ran  to  her  dressing- 
room  and  procured  some  water,  spirits,  etc., 
returning  with  which  she  went  hastily  to  the 
President's  box.  Meantime  pandemonium  reigned 
supreme.  Women  went  into  hysterics,  fainted, 
cried,  wrung  their  hands,  tore  their  hair,  and 
screamed.  Men  swore,  raved,  shook  their 
clenched  fists,  stamped,  and  shouted.  Major 
Rathbone's  arm  bled  profusely;  Mrs.  Lincoln 


THE  END  329 

screamed,  shrieked,  cried,  and  became  hysterical; 
the  news  flew;  the  doorkeepers  left  their  posts, 
and  the  public  surged  in.  A  boy  ran  down  Penn- 
sylvania Avenue,  which  was  thronged  with  peo- 
ple, exclaiming,  "  Man  shot  at  the  theater,"  and 
the  people  rushed  thither.  It  is  astonishing  with 
what  rapidity  bad  news  can  travel,  and  also  that 
its  speed  is  increased  in  direct  ratio  to  the  inten- 
sity of  its  sadness ;  and  so  it  would  seem  as  if  all 
Washington  knew  of  the  awful  tragedy  within  a 
few  moments  after  its  occurrence.  Two  sur- 
geons appeared  on  the  scene  while  the  excitement 
raged,  and  gained  access  to  the  victim;  one  of 
them  felt  the  President's  fluttering  pulse  and 
gazed  at  his  closed  eyes  and  impassive  face;  the 
other  parted  the  hair  and  glanced  at  the  wound. 
Their  eyes  met  in  glances  which  effectually  con- 
curred that  no  basis  existed  for  hope.  They 
quietly  exchanged  a  few  words  together,  and  in 
reply  to  Mrs.  Lincoln's  agonizing  entreaties,  sim- 
ply shed  involuntary  tears,  and  made  no  answer, 
which  the  unerring  instinct  of  a  woman  inter- 
preted aright.  Meanwhile,  some  one,  hurriedly 
crossing  the  street,  and  ringing  the  bell  of  Mr. 
Peterson's  house,  nastily  explained  the  needs  of 
the  moment,  and  requested  the  instant  use  of  a 
lower  room,  which  was  readily  accorded.  Im- 
mediately thereafter  four  brawny  men  appeared 
in  the  fatal  box,  gently  lifted  the  armchair  con- 
taining the  unconscious  form  of  the  martyr,  and, 
the  way  being  forcibly  cleared  by  the  police  and 
others,  tenderly  bore  it  across  the  street,  and 
carried  it  to  a  little  bedroom  at  the  end  of  the 
halH  The  door  was  guarded,  and  none  admitted 
but  the  friends.  Most  of  the  Cabinet  officers  had 
reached  there  as  soon  as  the  inanimate  form  of 


330  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

the  President.  The  Surgeon-General  of  the 
Army  had  also  come,  and  he  was  making  a  thor- 
ough examination  of  the  wound.  At  length, 
looking  into  the  anxious  faces  who  sought  his,  he 
said  to  Stanton,  who  had  caught  him  by  the  arm 
impulsively,  as  if  to  pull  the  secret  from  him,  "  I 
fear,  Mr.  Stanton,  that  there  is  no  hope,"  and  pro- 
ceeded calmly  to  wipe  his  probe.  The  Secretary 
of  War  exclaimed  in  tones  of  heartrending 
anguish,  "  No !  no !  General !  oh,  no !  "  and  burst 
into  a  series  of  convulsive  sobs,  which  shook  his 
burly  frame.  Senator  Sumner  sat  on  the  bed, 
holding  one  of  the  dying  man's  hands  and  crying 
bitterly.  No  such  august  assembly  had  ever 
gathered  before  about  a  deathbed.  The  strong 
men  of  the  nation  were  there,  men  used  to  battle 
and  conflict,  leaders  in  moral  and  physical  war- 
fare, but  it  was  a  necessity,  as  well  as  a  virtue,  to 
weep,  and  the  walls  of  that  obscure  little  apart- 
ment were  resonant  with  the  pent-up  grief  of 
strong  men,  hardened  by  sorrow  and  unused  to 
tears. 

In  an  adjacent  room  the  most  tender  offices  of 
love  and  sympathy  were  beneficently  and  affec- 
tionately bestowed  upon  the  stricken  one,  already 
doomed  to  drain  the  chalice  of  bereavement  and 
widowhood  to  the  bitter  dregs;  and  when  the 
solemn  vigils  of  that  morally  black  and  tempestu- 
ous night — the  nox  tristis  of  this  century — had 
passed,  and  morning  broke,  peace  came  to  the 
most  illustrious  and  deeply  deplored  political 
martyr  of  all  time. 

A  hush  fell  upon  the  august  assemblage  of 
mourners;  it  was  as  if  grief  had  petrified  them. 
The  solemn  silence  was  broken  by  the  voice  of 
Secretary  Stanton,  usually  harsh  and  imperious, 


THE  END  331 

but  now  pitiful  and  humble  by  emotion,  tear- 
fully soliloquizing :  "  There  lies  the  greatest 
leader  of  men  the  world  ever  saw." 

At  nine  o'clock  an  undertaker's  wagon  appeared 
at  the  door  of  the  Peterson  mansion ;  the  body  of 
the  great  martyr  was  placed  in  it,  and  guarded 
and  escorted  by  a  company  of  regular  soldiers,  it 
was  conveyed  to  the  White  House — prepared  for 
burial,  embalmed,  and  placed  in  a  mahogany 
casket,  which,  in  turn,  was  placed  in  a  grand 
catafalque,  four  feet  high,  in  the  center  of  the 
Green  Room,  which  had  been  appropriately 
draped  for  the  sad  occasion,  and  where  a  guard 
of  honor  had  been  posted.  Soon  the  rich  coffin 
containing  the  sacred  remains  was  piled  high 
with  rare  exotics  and  domestic  flowers,  tokens  of 
patriotic  love,  from  the  lowly  clerk  and  exalted 
statesman  alike. 

Within  five  minutes  of  the  time  when  the 
President  was  shot  a  conspirator  with  Booth, 
Lewis  Payne  Powell,  generally  known  as  Payne,, 
called  at  Mr.  Seward's  residence,  pushed  aside 
the  servant  who  answered  the  bell,  ran  upstairs 
to  the  bedroom  where  the  disabled  Secretary  was 
lying,  and,  admission  being  refused  him  by  Mr. 
Seward's  son  Frederick,  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State,  beat  him  on  the  head  with  a  pistol,  frac- 
turing his  skull.  Hearing  the  noise,  Miss  Fannie 
Seward,  who  was  attending  her  father  within, 
then  opened  the  door,  through  which  Payne 
darted ;  he  fell  upon  Mr.  Seward  in  bed  with  a 
bowie-knife  and  stabbed  him  three  times  about 
the  -throat  before  he  was  seized  by  an  invalid 
soldier  named  Robinson,  who  was  attending  as 
nurse.  Payne  turned  upon  Robinson,  and  gave 
him  a  number  of  severe  wounds.  While  the  as- 


332  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

sassin  was  thus  engaged,  Mr.  Seward  contrived 
to  roll  off  the  bed  on  its  farther  side ;  seeing  that 
his  victim  was  out  of  reach,  and  hearing  Miss 
Seward  at  the  window  crying  "  Murder!  "  Payne 
broke  away  from  Robinson  and  rushed  down- 
stairs. On  his  way  he  met  another  son  of  the 
Secretary,  Major  Augustus  Seward,  whom  he 
struck  with  his  dagger,  and  another  attendant 
upon  the  sick  man,  Mr.  Hanswell,  whom  he 
stabbed ;  gaining  the  street,  he  mounted  his  horse 
and  rode  away. 

He  was  apprehended  later,  and,  with  Herold, 
Booth's  accomplice,  Mrs.  Surratt,  a  tavern- 
keeper  who  had  harbored  Booth,  and  another 
conspirator,  Atzerodt,  was  condemned  to  death 
and  hanged  on  July  7.  Other  conspirators  were 
condemned  to  various  terms  of  imprisonment. 

Meetings  were  held  everywhere  to  give  ex- 
pression to  the  unusual  grief ;  even  the  Rebels,  in 
many  instances,  clothed  their  hearts  in  semi- 
mourning,  seeing  through  the  mists  of  partisan 
prejudice  the  kindly  spirit,  ardent  patriotism, 
and  beneficent  charity  of  this  Father  of  his 
people. 

On  the  succeeding  Sabbath  every  church  in 
the  Northern  part  of  the  nation  held  memorial 
services,  and  the  voice  of  eulogy  filled  the  land, 
even  extending  to  parts  of  the  South.  At  Char- 
lotte, N.  C,  where  Jefferson  Davis  was  stopping 
in  his  flight  southward,  the  preacher  at  a  serv- 
ice attended  by  Mr.  Davis  severely  condemned 
the  act,  looking  sharply  at  the  Confederate 
President,  "  as  if,"  reported  Mr.  Davis,  "  he 
thought  I  had  something  to  do  with  it." 

Undoubtedly  Mr.  Davis  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  crime,  but  there  is  sworn  testimony  that  he 


THE  END 


333 


expressed  his  sympathy  with  it.  According  to 
the  evidence  of  Lewis  F.  Bates,  subsequently 
superintendent  of  the  Southern  Express  Com- 
pany for  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  at  whose 
house  in  Charlotte,  N.  C,  Davis  was  stopping, 
the  Confederate  President  on  receiving  a  tele- 
gram from  General  Breckinridge  announcing 
Lincoln's  assassination,  coldly  remarked :  "  If  it 
were  to  be  done,  it  were  better  it  were  well 
done  " ;  and  two  days  later,  when  Breckinridge 
was  present,  in  reply  to  the  general's  expression 
of  regret  for  the  murder,  Mr.  Davis  said :  "  Well, 
General,  I  don't  know ;  if  it  were  to  be  done  at 
all,  it  were  better  that  it  were  well  done,  and  if 
the  same  had  been  done  to  Andy  Johnson,  the 
beast,  and  to  Secretary  Stanton,  the  job  would 
then  be  complete." 

On  Monday,  the  I7th  of  April,  a  Congressional 
meeting  was  held,  and  Senator  Sumner  moved 
for  a  Committee  of  Arrangements  for  the  fu- 
neral, which  was  appointed,  with  himself  at  the 
head.  The  following  were  designated  as  pall- 
bearers, viz. :  Foster,  Morgan,  Johnson,  Yates, 
Wade,  and  Conness,  Senators;  and  Dawes,  Cof- 
froth,  Smith,  Colfax,  Worthington,  and  Wash- 
burne  from  the  House  of  Representatives;  also 
one  member  from  each  State  and  Territory  was 
selected  to  form  a  Committee  of  Escort.  It  was 
one  of  the  most  august  bodies  of  men  that  ever 
assembled  anywhere.  Except  the  Duke  of  Well- 
ington, no  man  in  all  history  ever  had  so  eminent 
a  body  of  pall-bearers.  On  the  ensuing  day  the 
White  House  was  opened  to  all  who  desired  to 
view  the  remains  which  lay  in  state  in  the  East 
Room,  adorned  with  huge  flower  emblems ;  and 
fully  twenty-five  thousand  persons  availed  them- 


334  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

selves  of  the  privilege,  and  several  thousand  more 
were  denied  it  for  want  of  time. 

The  succeeding  day  (Wednesday)  the  funeral 
took  place  in  the  East  Room.  It  was  a  most  im- 
pressive and  solemn  service.  The  President  of 
the  United  States,  the  entire  Cabinet,  the  Su- 
preme Court  Justices,  the  Lieutenant-General  of 
the  Army  and  a  brilliant  suite,  the  Senior  Ad- 
miral of  the  Navy  and  many  other  naval  officers, 
the  Diplomatic  Corps,  and  a  large  array  of  Sena- 
tors and  Congressmen,  besides  many  influential 
citizens,  made  up  an  audience  of  worth  and  bril- 
liancy rarely  convened.  Mrs.  Lincoln  herself 
was  thoroughly  prostrated  with  grief,  and  unable 
to  leave  her  bed,  and  Robert  T.  Lincoln  and  little 
""  Tad,"  the  latter  inconsolable  with  grief,  were 
the  chief  personal  mourners.  Several  of  Mrs. 
Lincoln's  relatives  were  present,  but  none  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's. 

The  solemn  service  began  by  Rev.  Dr.  Hall,  an 
Episcopal  clergyman,  reading  in  an  impressive 
manner  the  Episcopal  Scripture  Service  for  the 
burial  of  the  dead.  The  venerable  Bishop  Simp- 
son of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  then 
offered  a  fervent  prayer,  after  which  Dr.  Gurley, 
pastor  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  which  Mrs. 
Lincoln  attended,  preached  the  funeral  discourse 
from  the  text  in  Mark  xi.,  22 :  "  Have  faith  in 
God !  "  The  services  were  then  concluded  by 
prayer  by  Rev.  Dr.  Gray,  Chaplain  of  the  Senate, 
a  Baptist  clergyman. 

The  remains  were  immediately  transferred  to 
a  stately  funeral  car  which  had  been  improvised 
for  the  occasion,  and,  attended  by  a  brilliant  and 
imposing  military  cortege  with  arms  reversed,  the 
solemn  procession  moved  towards  the  Capitol. 


THE  END  335 

The  weather  was  perfect,  and  the  arrangements 
were  carried  out  with  faultless  precision.  The 
wagon  way  of  the  wide  avenue  was  kept  entirely 
clear  by  policemen,  but  the  sidewalks,  windows, 
and  roofs  along  the  route  were  a  perfect  mass  of 
humanity,  solemn,  awe-struck,  reverential;  and 
as  the  plaintive  dirges  from  the  bands  of  music 
with  muffled  drums  floated  out  on  the  air,  and  the 
precise  tread  of  the  veterans  animated  the  sub- 
lime scene,  tears  welled  up  from  the  hearts  of 
thousands,  attesting  the  strength  of  the  affection 
which  the  benign  ruler  had  inspired  in  the  breasts 
of  the  people. 

The  procession  reached  the  Capitol,  and  the 
remains  were  borne  into  the  rotunda,  where  Rev. 
Dr.  Gurley  read  the  usual  service  for  the  burial 
of  the  dead,  while  the  President  and  Cabinet, 
relatives,  and  some  members  of  Congress  at- 
tended. The  casket  was  placed  on  the  cata- 
falque and  a  short  prayer  followed :  and  the  serv- 
ices were  at  an  end. 

It  was  earnestly  desired  that  the  body  should 
be  buried  in  the  vault  beneath  the  rotunda  of  the 
Capitol  which  had  been  prepared  for  the  body  of 
Washington,  but  not  used;  and  this  plan,  so 
obviously  proper,  would  probably  have  been  car- 
ried out,  but  for  the  interference  of  Senator 
Yates,  Congressman  Washburne,  and  Governor 
Oglesby,  who,  animated  by  considerations  of 
State  pride,  carried  the  day  in  favor  of  interment 
at  the  late  home  of  the  martyr.  Accordingly,  at  six 
o'clock  A.M.,  on  the  2ist  inst.,  the  casket,  after 
having  been  visited  by  many  thousands  of  people 
on  the  day  before,  was  closed ;  and  an  hour  later 
was  transferred,  in  the  presence  of  the  President, 
his  Cabinet,  the  General  of  the  Army  and  his 


336  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

staff,  and  a  distinguished  assemblage  of  eminent 
personages,  to  a  special  car  which  had  been  fitted 
up  for  the  purpose.  Attended  by  the  guard  of 
honor,  the  two  sons  and  other  relatives,  and  the 
Congressional  Committee  of  Escort,  it  started  on 
its  way  to  the  receptacle  of  final  repose. 

The  first  intention,  and  indeed,  desire  of  the 
family,  was  to  transfer  the  casket  to  Springfield 
with  as  little  pomp  as  possible,  but  in  deference  to 
the  earnest  desire  of  the  people,  this  simple  plan 
yielded  to  the  adoption  of  substantially  the  same 
route  which  had  been  taken  by  the  untried 
Lincoln  of  four  years  previously,  en  route  to  a 
martyr's  death  and  immortality.  At  eight  o'clock 
A.M.  on  the  2ist  the  solemn  procession,  consist- 
ing of  seven  coaches  and  a  locomotive,  all 
solemnly  draped  in  black,  slowly  moved  out  from 
the  depot,  amidst  an  immense  concourse  of  peo- 
ple, all  reverently  uncovered. 

A  methodical  programme  had  been  made  out 
in  the  War  Department,  adopted  by  the  various 
railway  companies  and  committees  en  route, 
which  was  rigidly  adhered  to,  and  carried  into 
effect  without  a  flaw,  from  inception  to  close. 
A  low  rate  of  speed  was  ordered,  and  a  pilot 
engine  preceded  the  train.  At  ten  o'clock,  the 
train  reached  Baltimore,  the  city  through  which, 
but  four  years  and  two  months  before,  President 
Lincoln  had  had  to  flee  in  the  night  to  avoid  assas- 
sination. But  how  changed  !  All  that  earnest  af- 
fection could  do  to  show  respect  and  reverence 
to  the  ashes  of  the  illustrious  dead  was  done ; 
a  very  large  and  imposing  military  escort  was  at 
the  depot,  and  a  stately  funeral  car,  tastefully 
draped,  was  in  attendance,  to  which  the  remains 
were  transferred.  A  procession  escorted  the 


THE  END  337 

body  to  the  Exchange,  where  it  was  placed  on  a 
raised  dais,  decorated  with  funereal  flowers.  A 
constant  stream  of  citizens  passed  in  double  file 
for  four  hours  to  gaze  on  the  face  of  the  dead, 
and  then  not  more  than  a  tenth  of  the  people 
assembled  were  able  to  take  part  in  such  homage. 
The  funeral  train  then  proceeded  to  Harris- 
burg,  the  Governor  of  the  State  accompanying  it. 
At  all  way  stations  crowds  assembled  to  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  train,  and  at  York,  where  the 
train  halted  for  a  few  moments,  six  girls,  dressed 
in  mourning,  obtained  permission  to  enter  the 
funeral  car  and  deposit  a  beautiful  wreath  of 
white  flowers  upon  the  casket.  Bells  tolled,  can- 
non reverberated,  and  dirges  were  played  by 
bands  at  each  village.  The  grief  was  universal 
and  equal  everywhere.  At  Harrisburg  the  re- 
mains were  conveyed  to  the  Capitol,  and  placed 
upon  a  catafalque,  bedecked  with  flowers.  The 
casket  was  opened,  and  the  citizens  were  per- 
mitted to  review  the  remains  till  midnight. 
Philadelphia  was  the  next  stopping  point.  An 
immense  procession  escorted  the  casket  from 
Broad  Street  station  to  Independence  Hall,  where 
the  remains  of  America's  greatest  martyr  were 
placed  in  the  chamber  where,  ninety  years  before, 
Liberty  was  proclaimed  to  the  world.  The 
casket  was  opened,  and  from  ten  o'clock  till  mid- 
night opportunity  was  given  to  the  vast  crowd 
to  view  the  remains;  and  hundreds  remained 
crowded  about  the  hall  door  so  as  to  have  an 
early  opportunity  of  inspection  the  ensuing  morn- 
ting.  The  next  day  was  Sunday,  but  the  doors 
were  opened  at  six  o'clock,  and  remained  so  till 
one  o'clock  on  Monday  morning ;  and  all  through 
these  nineteen  hours  a  double  row  of  people  filed 


338  'LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

past  the  casket  which  contained  all  that  was  mor- 
tal of  him  who,  four  years  before,  in  that  same 
place,  had  said,  "  If  this  country  cannot  be  saved 
without  giving  up  that  principle  [of  constitu- 
tional liberty],  I  would  rather  be  assassinated 
upon  this  spot  than  surrender  it."  Early  Mon- 
day morning  the  train,  bearing  its  most  precious 
burden,  moved  majestically  off  for  New  York,  at- 
tended with  the  sound  of  funeral  dirges,  boom- 
ing cannon,  and  suppressed  farewells  from  thou- 
sands of  uncovered  patriots.  Throughout  the  entire 
journey  through  New  Jersey  crowds  appeared  at 
every  station,  every  crossroads,  at  every  farm- 
stead. It  seemed  as  if  all  the  inhabitants  of  that 
State  of  Revolutionary  memories  had  assembled 
along  the  line  of  travel,  to  see  at  least  the  train 
which  bore  the  remains  of  him  they  loved.  Guns 
were  fired,  mourning  emblems  displayed,  bands 
played,  crowds  stood  silent,  and  respectfully  and 
reverently  uncovered.  Reaching  Jersey  City, 
where  the  depot  was  draped  in  mourning,  the 
train  was  greeted  by  a  chorus  of  seventy  singers 
chanting  dirges.  Ten  stalwart  soldiers  then  bore 
the  casket  to  the  hearse  which  had  been  specially 
provided,  and  which  was  drawn  by  six  gray 
horses  heavily  draped  in  black.  It  was  received 
across  the  river  by  a  great  procession,  which,  mar- 
shaled by  General  Dix,  escorted  the  remains  to 
the  City  Hall,  where  a  trained  chorus  of  eight 
hundred  of  the  best  vocalists  in  the  city  chanted 
the  "  Chorus  of  the  Spirits  " ;  and  this  sad  but 
beautiful  melody  together  with  the  sound  of  tolling 
bells,  booming  cannon,  and  waving  flags  draped 
with  funereal  emblems,  made  thetscene  appear  like 
one  of  weird  and  fated  enchantment.  Arrived  at 
the  City  Hall,  the  casket  was  placed  under  the 


THE  END  339 

dome  which  was  arranged  to  allow  of  a  subdued 
light;  and,  for  twenty-four  consecutive  hours,  a 
stream  of  people  passed  rapidly  through,  while 
crowds  without,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach  in 
all  directions,  looked  enviously  on,  knowing  that 
their  opportunity  would  never  come.  The  first 
line  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  long,  and  ex- 
tended the  whole  length  of  Chatham  Street,  Chat- 
ham Square,  and  into  the  Bowery.  It  was  esti- 
mated that  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  per- 
sons viewed  the  remains,  while  double  that  num- 
ber were  present  who  failed  to  do  so.  And  yet 
this  was  at  the  very  spot  where,  less  than  two 
years  before,  an  equal  crowd  had  gathered  to 
resist  the  draft  ordered  by  him  who  lay  within 
the  coffin. 

At  twenty  minutes  before  twelve  o'clock  on  the 
25th  the  casket  was  transferred  to  the  funeral 
car,  and  escorted  to  the  Hudson  River  Railway 
depot  by  the  finest  military  cavalcade  ever  wit- 
nessed in  New  York.  It  consisted  of  at  least  fif- 
teen thousand  men  in  most  brilliant  uniforms, 
and  accompanied  by  the  finest  bands  in  the  nation. 
The  civic  procession  was  equally  noteworthy,  for 
the  Federal  and  State  dignitaries  and  representa- 
tives of  foreign  governments,  in  full  costume, 
were  there  by  hundreds,  and  all  the  streets  lead- 
ing to  the  depot  were  thronged  with  people.  As 
the  New  York  Herald  said :  "Such  an  occasion, 
such  a  crowd,  and  such  a  day  New  York  may 
never  see  again." 

The  trained  stopped  at  Albany,  Buffalo,  Cleve- 
land, Columbus,  and  Indianapolis,  where  similar 
scenes  occurred  to  those  which  have  been  de- 
scribed. As  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey, 
people  gathered  all  along  the  route  to  pay  honor 


340  LINCOLN  THE  PRESIDENT 

to  the  passing  corpse  of  their  beloved  "  Father 
Abraham."  The  New  York  Tribune  well  said: 
"  A  funeral  in  each  house  .  .  .  would  hardly 
have  added  solemnity  to  the  day." 

Chicago  was  reached  on  the  first  day  of  May. 
The  whole  city  was  clad  in  mourning;  the  body 
of  the  President  was  placed  in  the  rotunda  of  the 
Court  House,  over  the  north  door  of  which  was 
the  motto :  "  The  altar  of  freedom  lias  borne  no 
nobler  sacrifice,"  and  over  the  south  door  of 
which  was  the  motto,  "Illinois  clasps  to  her 
bosom  her  slain,  but  glorified,  son." 

The  last  stage  of  the  long,  sad  journey  was 
now  reached  on  the  morning  of  May  3.  The  en- 
tire city  of  Springfield  was  clad  in  mourning, 
and  the  body  of  him  whose  living  presence  had 
been  so  familiar  in  these  streets  was  borne 
through  them  to  the  Representatives'  Hall  in  the 
State  House,  being  the  same  hall  where,  eleven 
years  before,  he  had  uttered  his  terrible  philippic 
against  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
At  ten  o'clock  A.M.  of  May  4  the  casket  was  borne 
to  the  hearse,  and  a  long  and  mournful  procession 
wended  its  way  to  Oak  Ridge  Cemetery.  The 
journey  of  eighteen  hundred  miles  was  ended,  and 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  henceforth  to  be  a  tender 
and  sacred  memory.  Rev.  Dr.  Hall  made  a  fer- 
vent prayer ;  the  choir  sang  a  hymn ;  a  Scripture 
lesson  and  the  dead  President's  last  inaugural  were 
read ;  and  Bishop  Matthew  Simpson  of  the  Meth- 
odist Episcopal  Church  made  an  eloquent  address. 
Rev.  Mr.  Gurley  of  Washington  closed  the  service 
with  prayer;  the  vault  door  opened;  and,  as  the 
choir  sang  softly,  "  Unveil  thy  Bosom,  Faithful 
Tomb,"  the  casket  was  placed  in  the  vault,  and 
the  body  of  the  great  martyr  was,  like  his  soul, 
at  rest. 


DC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A    000228516     1 


